In July of 2008, the *New York Times* ran an article about the evolution of the Algerian militant group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), into a branch of al-Qaeda called “al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb.”¹ The Armed Islamic Group emerged after the Algerian government cancelled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992 to prevent a victory by the Islamic Salvation Front, a party led by a broad coalition of Islamic activists who had banded together to take advantage of the temporary thaw in Algerian politics. The GIA was not interested in parliamentary politics: its goal was to overthrow the Algerian government by violence and establish an Islamic government in its place.

According to the article, in 1994 the group was approached by Osama bin Laden who sought to establish a base in Algeria. The group refused bin Laden’s request. In an interview obtained by the *New York Times*, one of the group’s leaders stated that he told bin Laden, “We don’t have anything to do with anything outside….We are interested in just Algeria.” Ten years later, in the fall of 2004, a spin-off and successor to the GIA, the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Struggle” (*al-jamaʿa al-salafiyya lil-daʿwa wal-qital*—or GSPC) reversed the GIA’s decision and contacted Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi, the (now deceased) leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. What caused the group to reverse its predecessor’s decision?

According to one account, immediately following 9/11 the Bush administration changed its designation of the GSPC from a “regional insurgency” to a terrorist group. It also began targeting the group as part of the Global War on Terror. In March of 2004,
a covert American operation led to the capture of one of the group’s leaders. In the wake of the incident, the group contacted al-Zarqawi and began operations against Westerners and Western interests in Algeria and beyond. Said the GSPC’s leader, “If the U.S. administration sees that its war against the Muslims is legitimate, then what makes us believe that our war on its territories is not legitimate?”

There are two aspects of this story that are important for the argument presented in this chapter. First, there is the difference between the two statements: “We don’t have anything to do with anything outside….We are interested in just Algeria,” and “If the U.S. administration sees that its war against the Muslims is legitimate, then what makes us believe that our war on its territories is not legitimate?” The significance of the two comments will become apparent below.

The second aspect of this story that is important for us concerns the problem of labeling and the transformative power of labels. Timothy Garton Ash addressed the latter issue directly when he wrote in the pages of the Guardian,

>Finding the right words is part of stopping [terrorists]. It means we’ve correctly identified our real enemies. It also means we don't unnecessarily create new enemies by making all Muslims feel that they're being treated as terrorists.\(^3\)

Ash was not the only observer disturbed by the careless application of labels. In April 2008 the United States Department of Homeland Security issued a “guidance memorandum” entitled, “Terminology to Define Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims.”\(^4\) “Words matter,” the memorandum begins. "We must carefully avoid giving bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders the legitimacy they crave, but do not possess, by characterizing them as religious figures, or in terms that may make them
seem to be noble in the eyes of some.” The memo goes on to critique various words used to identify those behind 9/11.

So what words are “out” and what words are “in” for identifying America’s enemies in the Global War on Terror (a phrase which itself was rhetorically downgraded at the outset of the Obama administration to “overseas contingency operations”)? “Out” is anything having to do with religion: all variations on jihad (jihadi, jihadist, mujahid, mujahidin), salafi, Islamist, Islamic terrorist, holy warrior, and the execrable neologism, “Islamo-fascist.” “In” is “violent extremist” (to differentiate al-Qaedaists and their ilk, one might suppose, from pacifist extremists) and “terrorist.” The Department of Homeland Security memorandum thus takes us from the world of religion to the world of terrorology.

We should appreciate the Department of Homeland Security’s attempt to bring order and sense to the problem of nomenclature. Naming is, of course, inextricably linked to the process of classification and understanding. And we should also applaud the department’s quick tutorial in things Islamic in their attempt to try to get things right. In terms of moving away from religious markers for identifying the enemy in what was formerly called the Global War on Terror, there is much to commend the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts. Let us take a look at two examples:

First, the ever-popular term jihadi: The Department of Homeland Security memo rightly points out that since jihad is a central tenet of Islam, applying the term jihadi to bin Laden and his ilk blurs the distinction between al-Qaedaist ideology and the beliefs of most Muslims. This is distinction that should not be blurred. In fact, al-Qaedaists read into jihad meanings alien to most mainstream Islamic scholars, if not most Muslims, in two ways: First, al-Qaeda equates jihad with armed struggle. Since the end of the first Islamic century, when the caliphate consolidated its position (and, the argument goes,
wished to assert its Weberian monopoly over lawful violence), most mainstream jurists—and, indeed, most Muslims—have not. Second, al-Qaeda also views armed struggle against Islam’s enemies as a personal obligation to be undertaken by all Muslims. Their reasoning is that waging a defensive jihad is incumbent on all when the Islamic community is under attack—as it has been, they claim, since the beginning of the Reconquista. For them, jihad-as-armed-struggle is a sixth (neglected) pillar of the faith, and those who do not undertake it cannot be considered true Muslims. Most mainstream jurists, on the other hand, have viewed armed struggle under present circumstances as a responsibility to be delegated to proper authorities, such as governments and their armed forces. And most jurists associate any litmus test for being a true Muslim with the heterodox Kharajite sect of the first Islamic century. According to most jurists, the Kharajites’ gravest sin was that they sowed the seeds of fitna (discord) in the community by doing what bin Laden and others do: pronouncing Muslims they disagreed with to be non-Muslims, and thus rendering them suitable for killing.

Furthermore, as the Department of Homeland Security memo points out, identifying bin Laden with jihad bolsters his religious credentials—something he has, in the past, been very concerned about. And bin Laden has reason to be concerned: In spite of the fact that he was educated in business and not religious sciences, bin Laden has taken upon himself the right to issue fatawa (religious pronouncements)—a task usually reserved for those with special training. It is not for naught, then, that various leaders of al-Qaeda themselves designate their group as part of a greater “jihad movement” or as “jihadi-salafis.”

This brings us to a second term that has begun to dominate the literature about al-Qaeda and its spin-offs: “salafi.” Salafis are distinguished by two characteristics:
First, salafis reject all sources for religious knowledge except two: the Qur’an and hadith (collections of the sayings and acts of the Prophet and his companions), along with, usually, that which can be directly extrapolated from the Qur’an and hadith.

Second, salafis look back to the original Medinan community established by Muhammad (the community of the salaf al-salih—the pious ancestors—from which the term salafi is derived) as the ideal community, worthy of emulation.

Al-Qaedaists certainly are salafis, as anyone remotely acquainted with their pronouncements can attest. But they are not the only salafis. In fact, we can identify at least two types of salafis who would use salafism for the purpose of tajdid (renewal of Islamic society). Each uses the foundational texts in a different way: One group uses them as an instructional manual, the other as a jumping-off point. In terms of the first group, there are salafis like the wahabiya of Saudi Arabia and the Taliban who believe the sources provide them with a strict roadmap to be followed without deviation. Hence, their single-mindedness when it comes to dress codes, gender relations, prescribed punishments, and the like. They derive their position on all of these issues from applying a close reading of the two sources and a particular hermeneutical strategy that enables them to fill in lacunae. Counterposed to these salafis are the so-called “modernist salafis.” The concern of the modernists—indeed, their raison d’être—is to align Islam with the modern world. As a result, they self-consciously subsume the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith within a post-Enlightenment episteme. Drawing from that episteme, the modernists argue that one can find women’s rights, human rights, democracy, etc. in the Qur’an and hadith. When Muhammad died, for example, the elders of the community met to “elect” the first caliph. Is this not parliamentarianism, the modernists ask? The same elders committed the caliph to fulfill
certain conditions and swore loyalty as long as he did so. How is that different from constitutionalism?

Using the term salafi to designate bin Laden et al. lumps “good” modernist salafis in with “bad” “fundamentalist” salafis. (The use of the terms “fundamentalism” and “fundamentalist,” by the way—terms which have no Arabic equivalent and were originally coined to describe a specific current in the American Protestant tradition—seem to enjoy diminishing popularity when applied to Islam.11) And, if there ever is to be that “Islamic Reformation” that (mostly) Western commentators have so patronizingly been demanding, it will have to come from the “modernists,” so that would be a mistake.12

Overall, then, using religious terminology for either bureaucratic or propagandistic reasons is neither accurate nor smart. On the other hand, neither is the solution proposed by the Department of Homeland Security—simply designating our enemies as “terrorists” or “violent extremists.” The problem with using these terms is that they are too vague to be of any analytical utility. The pages of the numerous terrorology journals which have proliferated in the wake of 9/11 are inhabited by an eclectic cast of characters: Osama bin Laden, Ted Kosinski, Basque separatists, the ancient Zealots, Timothy McVeigh, PKK guerillas, Indian Thuggees, bomb-throwing anarchists, radical environmentalists, the Isma’ili Assassins of the twelfth century, fringe animal rights and abortion rights advocates, Saddam Hussein, at least three prime ministers of Israel, the aforementioned Algerian insurgents, the Red Brigades, the government of Syria (but no longer Libya), etc. At the time the Department of Homeland Security issued its memorandum, the Department of State of the United States listed forty-two groups that met one or more of six criteria as terrorist organizations—a number that was only limited, one supposes, by a lack of
imagination. These groups have articulated widely differing ideologies and use violence for widely different purposes. So in the end, one must ask: What does al-Qaeda have in common with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia? They kill people. But so do shark attacks.

Terrorism is a relational term: One rarely finds anyone identifying themselves as a terrorist. There is, of course, the occasional exception: the Stern Gang, active in mandatory Palestine, did so, and the website “Minbar al-tawhid wal-jihad” quotes ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam, the Palestinian-born “Afghan Arab” and mentor of Osama bin Laden, as stating,

We are terrorists (irhabiyyun), and terrorism is a sacred duty. Let the West and East know that we are terrorists (irhabiyyun) and we are terrifying (murʿib). {And prepare against them what force you can and horses tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of God and your enemy and others besides them [8:60]}. Terrorism (irhab) is a sacred duty in God’s religion.

Nevertheless, it is telling that the article by ʿAzzam that follows is not only entitled, “Jihad…Not Terrorism,” but goes on to detail why the former term is an appropriate description of ʿAzzam’s activities, not the latter. With that in mind, it’s no wonder bin Laden was able to appear outraged in his videotaped statement of September 2007 that a country that had committed genocide against its indigenous peoples and had dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was calling him the terrorist.¹⁴

So, then, if religious terms are out and terrology neologisms are, at best, imprecise and, at worst, an abomination, what then are we left with? In terms of typologizing movements which use Islam as their primary marker, I think we might be well advised to go to two experts—Ayman al-Zawahiri and ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Hakim
(a.k.a. Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri) two of the most important theoreticians in the ranks of al-Qaeda—and see how they look at movements that, for the sake of expediency, we might place under the rubric “political Islam.” Once the typologization is in place, the labeling comes easily.

Like others associated with al-Qaeda and its ilk, al-Zawahiri consistently identifies the Zionist-Crusader alliance as the main enemy of Islam and the Islamic community. But in his writings and speeches, al-Zawahiri also castigates two types of fifth columnists within the Islamic world: those who have abandoned their previous commitment to jihad, and those who are guilty of the sin of particularism.

First, those who have abandoned their previous commitment to jihad: In his *Fursan tahta raya al-nabi* (Knights under the Prophet’s Banner)\(^{16}\)—a tract which is a strange amalgam of history, polemic, personal testament, and *tour d’horizon* of the “jihadi Islamic movement”—al-Zawahiri identifies two groups that are guilty of this sin. The first is the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the premier Islamist political association in the Arab world. Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood has had a checkered history with both the Egyptian government and with political violence. In 1987, the brotherhood renounced violence and pledged allegiance to the Egyptian government (the government rewarded the brotherhood by reaffirming its refusal to allow the group to participate in the electoral process as a formal political party). The second group al-Zawahiri castigates for abandoning jihad are those jailed members of the Islamic Group (*al-gama‘a al-Islamiya*) who renounced their jihad in 1997 and agreed to a ceasefire with the Egyptian government. Before its repression (and the merger of some recalcitrant elements of the organization with al-Qaeda) the Islamic Group had been responsible for attacks against tourists, among other targets, during the 1990s in an effort to disrupt the Egyptian economy and thus bring down the Egyptian
government. In his book, al-Zawahiri treats both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Group “defectors” with scorn, writing, “Has it become the job of the jihadi groups…to repeatedly importune corrupt secular governments to grant us permission to establish an Islamic state?”

The second group al-Zawahiri castigates consists of those who might be accused of the sin of particularism; i.e., those whose geographic and philosophical horizons fall short of encompassing the entirety of the Islamic umma. For example, one might expect al-Qaeda and Hamas to be natural allies: Both employ a discourse in which jihad takes pride of place (the “Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas]—Palestine” mentions jihad no less than eleven times, and article fifteen of the charter explicitly states that jihad is an individual duty incumbent on every Palestinian), so if we were to go back to the banished terminology, both might be called jihadi. Both claim to derive their ideology from the principles of the Medinan community, so again going back to the banished terminology, both might be called salafi. Both want to have all of Palestine governed according to the dictates of Islamic law, so going a third time to the banished terminology, both might be called Islamist. And both have committed acts of violence against civilians, so both might be called terrorist. Nevertheless, al-Zawahiri has condemned Hamas (and, unsurprisingly, its Lebanese Shi‘i analogue, Hizbullah) for a number of reasons: He has condemned Hamas for reaching agreement with secularists (i.e., by joining Fatah in a unity government—and thus committing itself to “respecting” previous agreements with Israel—Hamas “fell into the quagmire of surrender” and “committed aggression against the rights of the Islamic umma”). He has condemned Hamas for “entering polytheistic councils” (Hamas participated in the Palestinian parliament). And he has condemned Hamas for basing its right to rule on vox populi rather than divine commandment (it ran in and won in parliamentary elections). Most
important, al-Zawahiri has condemned Hamas for privileging the bond of nationality over the sacred bond of religion and for transforming a front in the struggle to liberate all Islamic lands from Spain to Bosnia to Kashmir to the Philippines into just another movement for national liberation. “Muslim youths in Afghanistan plunged into battle to liberate Muslim land,” al-Zawahiri wrote.

They used Islamic slogans alone—a matter of utmost significance because many battles for liberation that have taken place in our Islamic world have mixed together nationalist slogans with patriotic and Islamic slogans, and sometimes even leftist and communist slogans. This has produced among young Muslims a rupture between their Islamic jihadi beliefs, which must be based solely on devotion to the religion of God, and the practical implementation of those beliefs.

The Palestinian case is a good example of this, because there they have mixed slogans and beliefs, with the understanding that it is perfectly fine to ally with the devil if it leads to the liberation of Palestine. They allied with the devil—and they lost Palestine.²⁰

For al-Zawahiri, the liberation of Palestine provides a way station on the road to liberating the entire Islamic umma. For Hamas, the liberation of Palestine is the goal. (In response to al-Qaeda’s attacks, Hamas has called al-Qaeda “destructive and isolationist” and has attempted to expunge al-Qaeda from Gaza by violently suppressing al-Qaeda affiliates, such as Jaysh al-Islam, Fatah al-Islam, Jaysh al-Umma, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, and Jund Ansar Allah. Hizbullah has responded to al-Zawahiri and the al-Qaeda tendency as well. The “spiritual guide” of Hizbullah, Muhammad Fadlallah, called 9/11 “a gift to the American administration.”²¹ He was right, of course).
As we shall see below, these musings of Ayman al-Zawahiri on the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hizbullah, and the like, on the one hand, and his determination to tease out and flaunt the differences between those groups and al-Qaeda, on the other, provide us with an implicit schematic rendering of political Islam. The rendering provided by Abu Musʿab al-Suri in his rambling, sixteen-hundred page internet tome, Daʿwa al-muqawama al-Islamiya al-ʿalamiya (*Call to a Global Islam* *Islamic Resistance*), is, on the other hand, explicit. Tracing the emergence of “modern” Islamic movements from the abolition of the caliphate in 1924 and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood four years later, al-Suri argues that it was not until the 1965-90 period that the main categories of contemporary Islamic movements truly crystallized. For al-Suri, these categories consist of non-political movements (which concentrate on missionary activity and separate that activity from the realm of politics), political movements (such as those like the Muslim Brotherhood that have, in various places and times, participated in the political process), jihadi movements, and separationist/takfiri movements (the most famous of which was the Egyptian takfir wal-higra, active in the 1970s). Al-Suri subdivides the category of jihadi movements into those, like al-Qaeda, that are part of what he designates as *bricolage* drawing from the “Muslim Brotherhood/Sayyid Qutb/ibn Taymiyya/salafi/Wahhabi” tradition, and those, like Hamas, that were born of foreign occupation or aggression. Since, according to al-Suri, the non-political and political movements pulled towards each other during the 1990-2000 period, and since, according to al-Suri, takfiris have been at best dupes and at worst *agents provocateurs*, we are, in effect, left with a rendering that closely approximates that of Ayman al-Zawahiri.23

Following the typology suggested by Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musʿab al-Suri instead of the typology suggested by the Department of Homeland Security, then,
we find al-Qaeda arrayed against two types of organizations within the Islamic community: One might be called ameliorist, the other Islamo-nationalist. Let’s look at these in turn:

Ameliorists might be considered the social democrats or Fabians of political Islam. They come in two varieties. First, there are those who advocate incremental change and function as a lobby and sometimes a political party. Included in this category are Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, which has participated in parliament; and factions within the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, which, as was mentioned earlier, cannot itself act as a political party. The second type of ameliorist includes those who have abandoned high politics and instead concentrate on transforming—Islamizing—society. They frequently undertake missionary work for that end. Their view is that Islamic rule cannot be imposed from the top down on a society that is unprepared and undeserving of it.

The second category identified as fifth columnist by al-Zawahiri (but described less provocatively by al-Suri) might be described as Islamo-nationalist. This category includes those who seek to control the instruments of state, engage in wars of national liberation, or both. These organizations then seek to use the disciplinary regime of modern states to Islamize their societies from the top down. As opposed to the ameliorists, some of whom merely seek to participate in affairs of state playing by the rules of the game, Islamo-nationalists seek to redefine the nature of the state. There are a number of examples we might look to: Hamas, Hizbullah, and factions within the Taliban (in spite of the organization’s close association with al-Qaeda). Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, went so far as to tell a British newspaper—albeit with more than a touch of calculation—“[we are] neither politicians nor a political party but simply nationalists working for the welfare of Egypt and the
restoration of usurped Egyptian rights.” Whatever his motivation in making this statement, it is significant that it was to the category of nationalism al-Banna turned in order to explain his organization to a foreign audience.

Islamo-nationalists may not, at first glance, appear to comprise a coherent category. They have, for example, used a number of tactics to assume power. In Iran, they participated in (and here the emphasis should be on the words participated in) revolution; in Palestine, they have participated in elections; in Somalia and Afghanistan, they have participated in armed struggle. Islamo-nationalist groups also come in a variety of forms: Some, such as the Taliban of Afghanistan are vanguardist, mobilizing a small number of activists to take power. Others, such as Hizbullah and Hamas, have built mass-based political operations. Both Hizbullah and Hamas are totally interwoven in society through a network of charities, social service organizations, militias, etc. Whatever their differences, however, all Islamo-nationalist organizations (like the ameliorist organizations identified above) do have something in common: They have chosen to work within the established nation-state system. Hamas seeks the liberation of Palestine; Hizbullah claims to fight for Lebanese sovereignty; the Taliban (or factions thereof) even sought to represent Afghanistan in the United Nations. Now compare the Taliban’s quest with the attitude of al-Qaeda toward the UN. According to al-Zawahiri and others, the Crusader powers created the UN which, in turn, created Israel which is the linchpin in the Zionist-Crusader alliance. For al-Zawahiri and his associates, the UN is little more than “an organization of unbelief….an instrument for applying the decisions of the Zionist/Crusaders, among which are decisions to wage war against us and to divide and occupy our lands.”
The fact that both ameliorists and Islamo-nationalists work within the nation-state system drives Ayman al-Zawahiri and his associates to distraction. According to the online magazine sawt al-jihad (Voice of Jihad),

The (Arab) nation states...are a Western model that the West created to allow it to build up its general colonialist plan for the Islamic East. These countries have no religious foundation, and have neither a right to exist nor a popular base. They were forced upon the Muslim peoples, and their survival is linked to the Western forces that created them. Therefore, the general aim of the jihad and the Mujahideen is to strike at the foundations and infrastructure of the Western colonialist program or at the so-called world order—or, to put it bluntly, to defeat the Crusaders in the battle that has been going on for over a century. Their defeat means, simply, the elimination of all forms of nation-states, such that all that remains is the natural existence familiar to Islam—the regional entity under the great Islamic state.26

At first, it might seem a bit counterintuitive to believe that groups whose primary marker is Islam should work within the nation-state system. But it is necessary to remember two things. First, other nationalisms also use transnational religious identities to differentiate themselves. One need only think of the Irish, Hindu nationalists, or Israelis. Second, one must remember that Islam does not exist apart from social practice and the beliefs social practice confirms. After all, Muslims whose social existence is defined by the modern state and state system have two choices with regard to Islam: On the one hand, they can subsume Islam within categories of belief coherent with their lived world. That lived world includes notions of distinct national identities, cultural
authenticity, public vs. private spheres, and the like. On the other hand, they can banish Islam from the “public sphere” entirely by rendering it phenomenologically “other.”

The roots of the contemporary Islam/state *pas de deux* can be traced back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Starting at that time, the inhabitants of the Middle East were affected by the same transformative processes that were simultaneously affecting the inhabitants of Europe and much of the rest of the world. Included among those processes was the imposition of the modern disciplinary state, which first arrived in the Middle East as a result of emulation of the Western model of statecraft by Middle Eastern rulers and potentates, and as a result of direct imposition—that is, colonialism. Although the ability of Middle Eastern states to impose the new regimen varied from place to place and took decades to evolve to the level of the sort of state present today, over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries these states were increasingly able to extend their disciplinary and representational reach and engage their populations in common practices. This extension and engagement, in turn, activated and reinforced modes of conceptualizing society and government very similar to those that developed in Europe.

This being the case, one would naturally assume that the social and political movements that have emerged in the region during the last century—including those movements that use Islam as their primary marker—would be analogous to European social and political movements. On the flipside, one would assume that the social science categories developed to typologize European social and political movements would be applicable to the Middle East—or else not valid for Europe either. Hence our use of the labels “ameliorist” and “Islamo-nationalist” to refer to movements singled out for criticism by al-Zawahiri and al-Suri, and hence al-Zawahiri’s and al-Suri’s criticism of these movements in the first place. But if it is the case that al-Zawahiri’s and al-
Suri’s criticism of the ameliorists and Islamo-nationalists goes back to the willingness of the ameliorists and Islamo-nationalists to work within the parameters of the nation-state system, and if it is the case that socio-political movements that have emerged in the Middle East would naturally correspond to socio-political movements that emerged in Europe in response to similar conditions (our predisposition to mystify things Islamic notwithstanding), how then should we classify al-Qaeda and its ilk?

As in the case of the various organizations and parties that might be included within the categories of ameliorism and Islamo-nationalism, al-Qaeda-type groups should neither be understood in terms of an autonomous category of religion nor be defined by the level of political violence they are prepared to commit. Nor, if the social sciences have any validity at all, should it be necessary to invent some *sui generis* category, based, perhaps, on some irreducible Islamic civilization or tradition, for them. Instead, as I have written elsewhere, the category most appropriate for al-Qaeda and its various spin-offs and imitators is Islamo-anarchist.

Before we can deal with the appropriateness of this typology, it is necessary to deal with what I mean by the word “anarchist.” Social scientists have defined anarchism in a number of ways. Some look at anarchism as a subcategory subsumed within the category of eschatology or political violence. Some look at anarchism as a form of psycho-pathology. Most commonly, social scientists with a historical bent identify anarchism with a specific intellectual tradition—the deformed twin of Marxism, if you will, or a stepchild of the Enlightenment. This, of course, was the anarchism that was preeminent during the movement’s European and eurogenic heyday which lasted from 1880-1920. And if we were to restrict anarchism to one geographic area and one time period, and if we were to eliminate from the fold self-proclaimed anarchists who derived their brand of anarchism from Christian antinomianism or Liberalism or from
some different tradition, their case is plausible. There is, however, a different way of looking at anarchism: Anarchism does not represent an intellectual tradition, per se; rather, anarchism, like nationalism, is a distinct category of political phenomenon. 29

As in the case of nationalist movements, all anarchist movements are isomorphic regardless of the distinctiveness of the particular doctrines that distinguish one from another. Anarchist movements throughout the modern period and the world over employ a shared form of discourse that, for the sake of this discussion, has four characteristics. Not coincidentally, the same goes for al-Qaeda:

First, in its discourse, anarchism claims to be defensive. As I said earlier, the struggle the “Zionist-Crusader alliance” is waging against the Islamic umma—and the legality of and obligation to self-defense—plays a preeminent role in al-Qaeda’s polemics. Here’s how bin Laden has put it:

Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple: Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. You attacked us in Palestine…. You attacked us in Somalia; you supported the Russian atrocities against us in Chechnya, the Indian oppression against us in Kashmir, and the Jewish aggression against us in Lebanon. Under your supervision, consent and orders, the governments of our countries, which act as your agents, attack us on a daily basis. These governments prevent our people from establishing the Shari’a, using violence and lies to do so. 30

The second characteristic of the discourse of anarchism—and the discourse of al-Qaeda—is that it is anti-systemic. In other words, it not only targets the system and its agents that are, for anarchists, the source of oppression, that targeting provides the central axis around which the discourse revolves. The system against which anarchists rail varies from time to time and place to place. It might be the nation-state or capitalist
system, or, most recently, the globalized world order. The agents of the system also vary, and have included the bourgeoisie, individual politicians, or, most recently, the IMF and the World Bank. By its anti-systemic nature anarchism differs from nationalism—nationalists want to join the system, not destroy it.

For al-Qaeda, the state-system was imposed on the Middle East by the Zionist-Crusader alliance to keep it weak and subjugated. Again, to quote Voice of Jihad:

The (Arab) nation states…are a Western model that the West created to allow it to build up its general colonialist plan for the Islamic East. These countries have no religious foundation, and have neither a right to exist nor a popular base. They were forced upon the Muslim peoples, and their survival is linked to the Western forces that created them. Therefore, the general aim of the jihad and the mujahidin is to strike at the foundations and infrastructure of the Western colonialist program or at the so-called world order—or, to put it bluntly, to defeat the Crusaders in the battle that has been going on for over a century. Their defeat means, simply, the elimination of all forms of nation-states, such that all that remains is the natural existence familiar to Islam—the regional entity under the great Islamic state.31

The third characteristic that the discourse of anarchism and that of al-Qaeda hold in common is that because anarchism is anti-systemic, anarchists are put in the position of counterposing an alternative to the system they oppose. In other words, anarchists put themselves in a position of proposing some form of counter-community. They sometimes do this explicitly, sometimes implicitly: Bakunin had his romanticized Gemeinschaft. Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri have their caliphate.
A lot—probably altogether too much—has been made of the call to reestablish a caliphate. This is probably because it reeks of exoticism and medievalism—thus we can caricature and stigmatize those who attacked us. But for al-Qaedists the term caliphate has, so far, escaped rigorous definition. Various al-Qaedists have used the term “caliphate” in various ways: Sometimes al-Qaedists have used it as a metaphor, as when al-Zawahiri defined it as “Islamic rule that will respect the rights and honors of its citizens, fight corruption and spread justice and equality,’ a place ‘in whose shade will retire every Muslim—nay, every wronged one and seeker of justice on the face of this earth.” Sometimes for al-Qaedists the caliphate takes the form of a post-millenarian hallucination, as when bin Laden said, “The entire Islamic community has set in motion the establishment of a rightly-guided caliphate which our prophet foretold in an authentic hadith; to wit: the rightly-guided caliphate will return, God willing.” The one thing we can say for sure after reading or listening to texts written by self-proclaimed al-Qaedists is that al-Qaedists do not envision the establishment of an Islamic superstate with the disciplinary attributes and hierarchies of a modern nation-state. Rather, in the al-Qaeda imagination it seems that the caliphate might be defined as a territorial expanse freed from the constraints of the nation-state system and ordered and administered according to the precepts of Islamic law.

If one compares the al-Qaedist view of the caliphate with that of the Party of Liberation (hizb al-tahrir), one can see the danger of placing too much significance in the call for its reestablishment. The Party of Liberation was founded in Palestine in the 1950s, and shares a political and social vision not unlike other parties founded during the heyday of Third Worldist ideologies—as might be gleaned from its chosen name. Like al-Qaeda, the Party of Liberation advocates the restoration of the caliphate. Unlike al-Qaeda, however, the party’s vision of the caliphate is that of a modern, corporatist
state, albeit a very large one. It has even laid out the blueprint for a functionally
divided, hierarchical apparatus for caliphal governance. And, unlike al-Qaeda, the
party claims not to believe in defensive jihad or, under present circumstances, the use of
violence. Advocating a caliphate, in other words, is similar to labeling something as
terrorism: it tells us nothing useful about a group’s ideology.

The final characteristic of anarchism that is displayed by al-Qaeda is that the
discourse of anarchism draws from the cultural milieu in which it is embedded. This
might appear self-evident, but it is not. Anarchist discourse differs from, for example,
scientific socialism, inasmuch as the latter provides its adherents with an invariable
vocabulary and mode of argumentation and logic. Think of how little the discourse of
the Bolsheviks differs from the discourse of Cuban revolutionaries. Now think of how
much the discourse of William Godwin differs from that of Sacco and Vanzetti, not to
mention Ayman al-Zawahiri. Nineteenth century European anarchist movements drew
from the language of Christian communitarianism or utopian or scientific socialism, for
example. The cultural tool box from which al-Qaedaists draw includes a variety of
Islamic tropes and the argumentation and logic of salafism.

This last point about the necessity to situate particular anarchist discourses
within their cultural milieu is particularly important if one wants to understand
anarchism as a political phenomenon rather than an intellectual tradition. It has been
argued, for example, that al-Qaeda cannot be anarchist because its spokesmen have
advocated the reestablishment of a caliphate “strictly ruled by religious law.”
Anarchists, on the other hand, “looked toward liberation from the bonds of all
hierarchical authority, religious structures, and both secular and religious law.” The
problem with this argument is that it assumes that all anarchist movements, throughout
the world and throughout time, must subscribe to the Enlightenment conception of
freedom that sees human freedom in terms of individual freedoms. Sayyid Qutb—the Muslim Brotherhood intellectual and author from whom al-Qaedaists and their ilk have frequently drawn—would, for one, beg to differ. In his works, Qutb sets up a different linkage, one that associates human subjugation with the oppression of human laws and uncontrollable desires for material goods and physical pleasure, on the one hand, and human freedom with submission to God’s will rather than to the rule of man and human compulsions, on the other. As Ayman al-Zawahiri puts it, “True freedom means submission to the law of God, looking down from high upon desires, excesses, and passions.”\(^3^6\) It is not that either Qutb or his disciple lacked familiarity with the Enlightenment ideal; it was just that they chose to reject it.

Now it should be noted that the discussion above privileges a small, albeit notorious, group of al-Qaedaists: Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Osama bin Laden, and their immediate cohort. If, as Olivier Roy has written, the term “al-Qaeda” no longer refers to a distinct entity but has become “a brand name ready for franchise,”\(^3^7\) one must be cautious with generalizations based on such a narrow sample. After all, the actions and pronouncements of Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi earned the Jordanian-born thug a strong reprimand from al-Zawahiri.\(^3^8\) Taking it one step further, it is worth emphasizing that the three categories of political Islam discussed in this chapter—ameliorist, Islamo-nationalist, Islamo-anarchist—should be seen as ideal types. As we saw with the Algerian example with which the chapter began, it is possible for groups to evolve from one to another type over time. And as we know from the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, it is possible for boundaries within organizations to be fuzzy or for organizations to house multiple perspectives. Hence, the ongoing argument within the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt about the relative importance of \textit{da‘wa} (missionary work) vs. \textit{siyasa} (political work). And the Muslim Brotherhood has not been the only
Islamist group torn in multiple directions: The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood tried to resolve the da’wa/siyasa dilemma—and avoid government repression—by setting up a separate party, the Islamic Action Front in 1992. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood concentrates on da’wa; the Islamic Action Front on siyasa.

But even if the three categories are ideal types, it should appear evident by now that both the language of religious studies and the language of terrorology are inadequate for identifying and thus understanding the phenomena we are witnessing in the Islamic world. Besides the problems underscored by the Department of Homeland Security, there are two problems with the language of theology. First, it mystifies our object of study: It treats religion as a distinct phenomenon that is impervious to analysis and that must be accepted on its own terms. Second, it reinforces the idea of Islamic exceptionalism. This might be acceptable to a Samuel Huntington or a Bernard Lewis, but for most scholars of Islam and/or the Middle East, this battle is long over. The language of terrorology also presents us with two problems. First, it mistakes an attribute—political violence—for essence. Second, it can only be wielded as a blunt instrument.

That is the bad news. But there is good news as well: First, the announcement in March 2009 that the British government was interested in reestablishing contact with the “political wing” of Hizbullah, and the suggestion floated by the Obama administration around the same time that it might be interested in talking with more “reasonable” (i.e., “statist”) elements within the Taliban, along with the Obama administration’s reformulation of the “Global War on Terrorism” as “overseas contingency operations,” have indicated a shift among policy-makers that takes us from a paradigm in which terrorism is viewed as a fundamental unit of analysis to a paradigm in which terrorism is viewed merely as a tactic. The second piece of good news is that
we already have existing social science categories that are up to the task of typologizing political Islam.


2 For the centrality of the Global War on Terrorism on strategic thinking within the GSPC, see the statements of Abu ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Bara, head of the GSPC’s “advisory council,” at http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=smz02rpa, particularly http://www.tawhed.ws/r1/?i=4290&x=smz02rpa (last accessed 17 July 2009).

3 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2215010,00.html (last accessed 22 May 2009).

4 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs_crl_terminology_08-1-08_accessible.pdf (last accessed 22 May 2009).


7 The terms “takfir” and “takfiri” have such negative resonance among mainstream Muslims that they have often been invoked by those opposing the ideology of the al-Qaedists. For example, the anti-al-Qaeda website, “Islam against Extremism.com”—whose purpose is “uncovering deviant ideologies, extremism, terrorism, and their proponents”—has condemned ʿUmar bin Mahmud Abu ʿUmar (a.k.a. Abu Qatada), who
is affiliated with al-Qaeda and has seen action in both Afghanistan and Algeria, as a “misguided, bloodthirsty takfiri”: “Abu Qatada said in his interview with the Hayat newspaper (19th May, 1999): ‘We do not desire to fight America unless it attacks us, and begins the fight first. This is different to the fight against the apostate regimes in our lands, those against whom jihad is an individual obligation upon every single Muslim.’ This is the ideology of takfir, the excommunication of governments, and then by extension whole societies that was given a fresh revival in the works of Sayyid Qutb, the root of all contemporary takfiri and jihadi groups. This then leads to the justification of the killing of innocent men, women and children…This trait is not unique to Abu Qatada, rather it is a trait of all contemporary neo-Kharijites—may Allah disfigure them.” [1](http://www.islamagainstextremism.com/articles/bqael-abu-qatada---a-misguided-bloodthirsty-takfiri.cfm) (last accessed 21 May 2009). In his defense, Abu Qatada cites sources that demonstrate “the act of declaring non-believers non-Muslims is a religious requirement par excellence.” See Abu Qatada, “Limatha al-jihad?” (“Why Jihad?”) [2](http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=yrvjtyr8) (last accessed 28 July 2009). On the other hand, the “kharajite” and “takfiri” labels seem to rattle other al-Qaeda, who have been provoked to respond. While it seems al-Qaeda simply dismiss the former label out of hand, their response to the latter varies. Sometimes, they claim that they do not have to declare their Muslim rivals and enemies to be unbelievers (yukaffirun) because the actions of those rivals and enemies clearly place them outside the Islamic community (yakfirun). At other times they defend the notion of takfir as lawful as long as prescribed rules and procedures—such as not declaring whole categories of people apostates—are followed. See, for example, Abu Muhammad ʿAsim al-Maqdisi, “al-Risala al-thalathiniya fi al-tahthir min al-ghalu fi al-takfir” (“The Thirteenth Letter Warning of Over-enthusiasm in Takfir”), [3](http://www.tawhed.ws/t) (last accessed 21

8 Magnus Ranstorp, for example, argues convincingly that bin Laden’s fatwa of 22 February 1998 was, among other things, an effort to legitimize the right of an upstart to issue a fatwa in the first place. Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin-Laden’s Fatwa,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21 (1998) pp. 321-30.

9 According to Thomas Hegghammer, “[When] Muslim states speak of militant Islamists they consider illegitimate, they do not use the term Jihadist, but rather explicitly delegitimising terms such as ‘terrorists’ [irhabiyyun], Kharajites [khawarij], ‘deviants’ [munharifun], or members of ‘the misled sect’ [al-fī’a al-dhalla].” (The term *munharifun* might better be translated in the Soviet style as “deviationists.”)

The term *wahabiya* (Wahhabi) refers to a puritanical Islamic movement. It is based on the teachings of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab, an eighteenth-century Muslim scholar from Arabia.


I have always been amused by the audacity of those who stand outside the Islamic tradition and call for an “Islamic Reformation.” According to Islamic tradition, Islam is already a reformation: After all, God gave the same message to the Jews and Christians, but they managed to corrupt it. Furthermore, if one looks at the position of Martin Luther on such matters as scripturalism, iconoclasm, the cult of authenticity, and the use of incendiary rhetoric, the closest strain in Islam to those who carried out the Protestant Reformation in Europe would include Osama bin Laden, among others.

For the most current listings, see http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last accessed 17 July 2009).


While “political Islam” is, perhaps, the most common generic term applied to the phenomenon discussed in this article, it is problematic because it assumes the meaning
of both “the political” and “Islam” to be self-evident. The term used by Abd al-Hakim (al-Suri) in his *Da'wa*, cited above, is *sahwa* (awakening), a term ironically employed to designate the American-backed, anti-Al-Qaeda insurgents in Iraq.


17 Ibid., 178.

18 “*Mithaq harakat al-muqawama al-Islamiya—Filastin (Hamas)*,” n.p., 1 Muharam 1409 A.H.


20 al-Zawahiri, *Fursan*, 58. See also Abu Muhammad Maqdisi, “*Nahnu wa-Hamas lisna ʿala minhaj wahid wa-huma min yualinu thalika*” (“We and Hamas do not share a program and they admit it”), http://www.tawhed.ws/r/?i=gfdtreyt (last accessed 28 June 2009).

différentes pour la capitation des cœurs et des esprits de l’Umma,” *Cultures and Conflicts* 66 (été 2007), 157-77.

22 The correct chronological order would be ibn Taymiyya-Wahhabi-Muslim Brotherhood-Sayyid Qutb. All the items on this list belong to the category “salafi.” Taqi al-Din ibn Taymiyya was a fourteenth-century Muslim scholar who preached jihad against the Mongols; Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood have been described above; Sayyid Qutb was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt who was hanged by Gamal ʿAbd al-Nasser in 1966. Both the members of groups like al-Qaeda and the groups themselves are sometimes referred to as “Qutbi” by their detractors (see footnote 7).

23 ʿAbd al-Hakim (al-Suri), *Daʿwa*, 660-854. Although in this work he does not single out Hamas for disparagement, al-Suri makes his attitude apparent: He puts “localism”—i.e., fighting within the “Sykes-Picot boundaries” (boundaries drawn up by Britain and France during World War I that divided up Ottoman territory into zones of direct and indirect control)—on his list of the most important problems faced by “jihadi” groups. “These (types of) jihads,” he writes on page 854, “have been tried and found wanting for forty years.”


27 For further discussion of transnationalism and national identity and religion and the modern episteme, see, inter alia, Amartya Sen, *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (NY: W.W. Norton, 2006); Aziz al-Azmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (London:


