

## Course Descriptions—Graduate Level Courses Spring 2010

### STUDIES IN ANCIENT (historical)

PHIL 4/6211 - Arenson  
Spring 2010, TR 1:00-2:25

#### ANCIENT ETHICS: HEDONISM AND ANTI-HEDONISM

Readings from ancient thinkers on the nature and moral worth of pleasure. We take as our starting point the disputes in the Old Academy between Eudoxus and Speusippus, and continue on with Plato's major assessments of hedonism and anti-hedonism (as found particularly in the *Republic*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, and *Philebus*). Next we turn to Aristotle, the Cyrenaics, and Epicurus, with supplementary readings from Cicero's *De Finibus*, some of Plutarch's ethical works against Epicureanism, lesser-known authors who had something to say for or against hedonism, and secondary source material.

### RECENT ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY (analytic, theoretical)

PHIL 4/6422 - Tienson  
SPRING 2010, MW 12:40-2:05

Email: [jtienson@memphis.edu](mailto:jtienson@memphis.edu)  
Office: CL 323; Office phone: 678-3353

#### Course Description

A selective, critical historical survey of the analytic tradition in philosophy from the turn of the twentieth century to about 1980.

It is useful to think of philosophy in the analytic tradition as having entered a new phase around 1980: a particular set of problems in the philosophy of mind came to the fore, replacing philosophy of language at center stage. Philosophers who made this transition and those who have entered the field of analytic metaphysics and epistemology (broadly construed) since then take a certain body of literature, ideas, and arguments as common ground. This "common currency" derives from writings of Kripke, Putnam, Burge, Quine, and Wittgenstein, among others—as well as from works earlier in the century to which these authors were responding (such as Frege, Russell, and the logical positivists).

One aim of this course will be to acquaint students with this body of common currency. Since analytic philosophy was language-focused philosophy throughout much of its career, many of the issues discussed in the course will be issues in the philosophy of language.

## Texts

Baillie, James (ed.) *Contemporary Analytic Philosophy*, Prentice-Hall, Second Edition, 2003.

Material on UMdrive

## Requirements

Come to class prepared to discuss material.

Takehome midterm; takehome final

Appropriate term project.

## READING AND RESEARCH (analytic, theoretical)

PHIL 4/7994, ( $\cong$ PHIL 4/6432: Advanced Logic) -- Tienson

Spring, 2010. Days and Times TBA

## Propositional Modal Logics

Intermediate Logic covers the first order predicate calculus. This involves (1) translating English arguments into the languages of logic (and vice versa), and (2) using various formal methods for determining validity of arguments in the languages of logic—truth table, truth trees, and a natural deduction system. There are several ways in which the languages and methods of logic can be developed beyond what is studied in Intermediate Logic.

One further step in constructing formal logical systems is *modal logic*: the logic of possibility and necessity. Modal logic is different from the classical logic studied in Intermediate Logic because there are many different systems of modal logic. These systems differ concerning iterated modal operators: if  $P$  is necessary, is it necessary that  $P$  is necessary? If  $P$  is possible, is it necessary that  $P$  is possible? That is, using ‘ $\diamond$ ’ for ‘It is possible that’ and ‘ $\square$ ’ for ‘It is necessary that’, are S4 and/or S5 to be considered logical truths?

$$\text{S4} \quad \square P \supset \square \square P \qquad \text{S5.} \quad \diamond P \supset \square \diamond P$$

Different systems of modal logic result from giving different answers to these and other similar questions. There are in principle infinitely many different modal propositional systems. About six such systems are widely recognized and known by name by philosophers.

Several of these known systems, and many variations of them, have been interpreted as providing illuminating formalizations of philosophically important notions in addition to various kinds of necessity and possibility, notions such as knowledge, belief, and obligation.

Systems of modal logic were originally formulated as axiomatic systems; today named systems are identified by their “characteristic” axioms, such as S4 and S5 above.

In a famous recent event in the history of logic (circa 1960), Saul Kripke showed that many familiar systems of modal logic can be characterized semantically in terms of the Leibnizian notion of alternative possible worlds: P is necessarily true if and only if P is true in all alternative possible worlds. Systems differ in what they recognize as *alternative* possible worlds.

Furthermore, the familiar systems of modal logic can be formulated as (Fitch-style) natural deduction systems.

Thus, there are many different systems of modal logic of potential philosophical interest, each of which has an axiomatic characterization, a natural deduction characterization, and a characterization in terms of possible worlds. In the case of each modal system it can be *proven* that the three different characterizations determine as valid the same set of arguments and determine as logically true the same set of formulas. Recently, quite efficient, and rather elegant, methods have been developed for proving such things.

In this course we will (1) work within the different methods—axiomatic, natural deduction, and possible worlds—for demonstrating validity and logical truth in the various systems of modal logic, and (2) prove the equivalence of the various axiomatic and natural deduction systems relative to their possible world counterparts.

Texts:

Konyndyk, Kenneth, *Introductory Modal Logic*, Notre Dame, 1988

Hughes, G.E., and M.J. Cresswell, *A New Introduction to Modal logic*, Routledge, 1996.

**RECENT CONTINENTAL SEMINAR (continental, practical or theoretical)**

**PHIL 4/6441-- DeArmitt**

**Spring 2010, Tuesday, 2:30-5:30**

**“THE FEMININE”**

Dr. Pleshette DeArmitt  
Office: Clement 109  
Office Hrs: TBA  
& by appointment  
Office Phone: 678-1505

University of Memphis  
Spring Semester 2010  
T 2:30-5:30  
Clement 213  
pdearmtt@memphis.edu

**COURSE DESCRIPTION**

Twentieth Century Continental thought, especially after 1968, is well-known for thematizing notions of alterity or otherness. In the same vein, one finds various conceptions of the “feminine” and/or “woman” strategically employed in a number of theoretical movements: including psychoanalysis, phenomenology, deconstruction, and feminism. In this course, we will trace the idea of the “feminine” and its transformations in the writings of a number of recent Continental thinkers and will examine how this notion is put to work and to what theoretical, social, and political ends it is used.

### **REQUIRED READING**

[Selections from the books listed below will be made available on umdrive.]

Agacinski, Sylviane. *The Parity of the Sexes*.

Beauvoir, Simone de. *The Second Sex*.

Cixous, Hélène. *The Newly Born Woman*.

Derrida, Jacques. “Choreographies” and “Voice II”

Freud, Sigmund. “Female Sexuality” and “Femininity”

Kofman, Sarah. *The Enigma of Woman*

Kristeva, Julia. “Is There a Feminine Genius?”

Irigary, Luce. *An Ethics of Sexual Difference*

Lacan, Jacques. *Feminine Sexuality*

Levinas, Emmanuel. *Totality and Infinity*

Liotard, Jean-François. “One of the Things at Stake in Women’s Struggles”

### **COURSE REQUIREMENTS**

Students are expected to attend every class session, since the work we will do in class will be indispensable for all required written work. Further, it will be assumed that students will have read the assigned material more than once before each class session, as class lectures will work very closely with the texts. During the course of the semester, each student will present at least one “protocol,” i.e., a two-page, single-spaced summary of the key ideas and issues addressed the previous week. A seminar paper (13-15 pages), which should address the role of the feminine in 20<sup>th</sup> Century French Continental thought, will be due at the end of the term.

### **PROSEMINAR**

**PHIL 7/8001 -- DeArmitt**

**Spring 2010, Time TBA**

**Contact Pleshette for the spring syllabus**

### **TEACHING SKILLS**

**PHIL 7/8002 -- Tollefsen**

**Spring 2010, On Some Fridays (1-3)**

The course is for second year students who will be teaching their own courses next year. It is like the Proseminar in that there will not be a significant amount of work required. However, second year students **must** register for the course and **must** attend regularly in order to be able to be placed in the classroom in the fall of 2010. The class will meet from 1-3 on Fridays (and probably not every Friday). A schedule will be sent to second year students with course topics over the winter break; here are some topics which will be covered (not necessarily in this order).

1. Syllabi construction and text selection
2. Aims of introductory courses (1101 and 1102)
3. Demographics of Memphis Students, Student Code of conduct, student disability issues, and Office of judicial affairs.
4. Technology and the classroom
5. Ecourseware and MyMemphis grading, University grading policies
6. Classroom discussion techniques
7. Development of writing assignments and tests, grading issues
8. Lecture construction
9. Teaching philosophy
10. Teaching portfolio and cv

Each student will prepare a syllabus and choose texts for the course they will teach in the fall of 2010. Each student will also prepare a 15-20 minute lecture which will be videotaped and evaluated by the class. Some students may have teaching experience already. I look forward to your being able to share that experience with members of the class.

### **SEMINAR IN CONTINENTAL (continental, theoretical)**

**PHIL 7/8030 – Nennon/Schnell**

**Spring 2010 – Wednesday, 5:30-8:30 pm**

### **Constructive Phenomenology**

Email: ([tnennon@memphis.edu](mailto:tnennon@memphis.edu), 678-2156)

**Office Hours: by appointment**

### **Appropriate Audience**

This course will be appropriate for students who already possess familiarity with the phenomenological tradition and its critical appropriation within continental philosophy during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Students enrolling for credit should already possess good familiarity with the work of at least two or three of the figures mentioned below. Other students are welcome to audit the course if they wish.

### **Course Requirements**

In addition to the normal expectations regarding attendance and outside reading as preparation for the class sessions, student enrolled for credit will be expected to complete a take-home mid-term exam that requires them to reflect on and synthesize the material presented during the first half of the semester, participate in an in-class group presentation on a selected text during the second half of the semester, and complete a term paper of approximately 12-15 pages. The term mid-term will count 30%, the presentation 20%, and the term paper 50% towards the final grade for the course.

### **Course Description and Texts**

This course will consist of two parts. In the first part during the first half of the semester, Professor Alexander Schnell will provide a series of lectures on Husserl, Heidegger, Fink, and Richir centered around the question of foundations in and for phenomenology. Two seminar sessions dedicated to each of those four major figures. These sessions will be based on written papers by Professor Schnell that will be available in advance and then discussed in class.

The second half of the semester will be dedicated to in-depth studies of some of the basic texts listed below that will have been discussed during the first half of the semester.

#### **Part I.**

This series of lectures will attempt to clarify what the term „transcendental“ means within phenomenology, especially within the work of its “founding fathers” (i.e., Husserl, Heidegger, and Fink), on the one hand; and one of the main representatives of contemporary French phenomenology (Marc Richir), on the other. Proceeding from the concept of the “transcendental” in Kant, we will try to show how these authors develop different forms of the transcendental that each contain *constructive* elements within them. These lectures can thereby also and above serve as an introduction to “constructive phenomenology.”

Special emphasis will be placed on two topics. First of all, in terms of method, we will ask how Husserl’s claim to “final grounding” (*Letztbegründung*) can be fulfilled and examine passages from *Erste Philosophie* and the *Cartesian Meditations*. Why does Heidegger’s foundation of an ontological phenomenology revolve around the motion of *possibility* (cf. here *Being and Time* and *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*)? What is Fink’s contribution to the methodological founding and securing of phenomenology? And how is transcendental philosophy possible after Merleau-Ponty (Richir: *Phénomènes, temps et êtres*)? Our discussions of all of these figures will also establish lines of reference to classical German philosophy (especially Kant, Fichte, and Schelling). The second issue concerns a specific subject. We will pay special attention to the problem of *time* because, in both a methodological as well as a historical perspective, it can serve as a fruitful focal point for the exchange between classical (idealist) and phenomenological positions.

## Part II.

The second half of the semester will be devoted to a close interpretive analysis of several of the key texts that have been that have been discussed in more general terms during the first half of the semester.

### Basic Literature

Kant: *Critique of Pure Reason* (Preface 1787),

Fichte: *Wissenschaftslehre 1804/II* (Lectures 1 through 4)

Schelling: *System of Transcendental Idealism* („Introduction“ and „System of theoretical Knowing“)

Husserl: VI. *Logical Investigation*

Husserl: *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (1905 lecture)

Husserl: *Husserliana XXXIII* (Bernauer Manuskripte)

Husserl: *Husserliana VI* (Erste Philosophie)

Husserl: *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology*

Heidegger: *Being and Time*

Heidegger: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

Heidegger: *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*

Fink: *Phänomenologische Werkstatt, Teilband 2: Die Bernauer Zeitmanuskripte, Cartesianische Meditationen und System der phänomenologischen Philosophie*, R.

Bruzina (Hg.), Freiburg/München, K. Alber, 2008.

M. Richir: *Phénomènes, temps et êtres*

M. Richir : *Fragments phénoménologiques sur le temps et l'espace*

M. Richir, *Fragments phénoménologiques sur le langage*

M. Richir : Artikel in den *Annales de Phénoménologie* (2007, 2008, 2009)

A. Schnell : *Husserl et les fondements de la phénoménologie constructive*, Millon, 2007

### SEMINAR IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY (analytic, theoretical)

Philosophy 7/8203 - Blatti

Spring 2010 - Thursday, 5:30-8:30 pm

#### RECENT WORK ON PERSONAL IDENTITY

*What is our most basic nature, metaphysically speaking? And what are the conditions under which we persist through time and change?* To answer these questions is to answer the challenge of personal identity, and it will be the various, recent, competing answers to these questions that will constitute the topic of this seminar.

Readings will be divided into three sections. While our principal focus will be on recent contributions to the debates over personal identity, we will begin by discussing the views and arguments of John Locke, Thomas Reid, and David Hume. We'll then turn to a survey of more recent contributions (many of them neo-Lockean or neo-Humean, in

fact) drawn from the following roster of late-20th-century figures: Bernard Williams, Sydney Shoemaker, Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, David Lewis, Galen Strawson, Thomas Nagel, David Wiggins, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Peter Unger, Mark Johnston (and probably others). We'll conclude by focusing specifically on the animalist view of personal identity (according to which each of us is fundamentally a human animal and the conditions of our persistence are biological in character). In this connection, we'll read extensively from two recent books—Eric Olson's *The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology* (1997) and Lynne Rudder Baker's *Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View* (2000)—and the debates they have engendered.

The topic of personal identity is classified sometimes as a problem in the philosophy of mind, other times as a problem in metaphysics. Anyone interested in developing an area of concentration (or more) in one of these two areas would be especially well-served by this seminar.

### **SEMINAR IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY (historical)**

**PHIL 7/8301 -- Robinson**

**Spring 2010, Thursday, 2:30-5:30**

#### **DESCARTES**

TEXTS: R. Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (Cambridge 1984), 3 Vols. (CSM); Vol. I: ISBN-13: 978-0521288071; Vol. II: ISBN-13: 978-0521288088; Vol. III: ISBN-13: 978-0521423502. [Vols. I and II required; Vol. III recommended.]

#### DESCRIPTION:

Descartes' thought is widely considered to have initiated the Modern Period in Western philosophy. We look at the end of Scholasticism and the rise of the New Science in the Renaissance, then examine Descartes' early Regulae and his attempt in the Discourse to establish a Method for philosophy to develop a foundation for the science of Copernicus and Galileo. We then examine Descartes' magnum opus, the Meditations, together with the appended Objections and Replies, critical comments by contemporary thinkers together with Descartes' answers to them. We close with a consideration of the effect of Descartes' work on the Rationalists, Empiricists, and Kant, and on the end of the Enlightenment.

REQUIREMENTS: Class presentations, two short-answer exams, and a term paper.

### **SEMINAR IN ETHICAL THEORY (analytic, practical)**

**PHIL 7/8551 -- Debes**

**Spring 2010, Monday 5:30-8:30**

## SENTIMENTALISM

This course will focus on the 18th century movement in moral theory known as Sentimentalism. We will conduct a close reading of some of the writings by the early primary figures in that movement - Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume - as well as a few of their major antagonists - Mandeville and Balguy. The goal will be to acquire a knowledge of this increasingly popular area of historical study, its historical significance, as well as develop a better understanding of ethical theory generally. For, as it happens, 18th century sentimentalism was not in the first place a normative ethics. It was principally a moral psychological and metaethical position. Thus, by studying this period in the history of ethics, one can expect to deepen his or her understanding of the foundations of some major problems and debates in contemporary ethics.

Required Reading to be announced in a few weeks.

## COLLOQUIUM: PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS (continental, theoretical)

PHIL 7/8051 - Mader

Spring 2010, T 5:30-8:30

## INTENSITY

**\*NOTE: MA STUDENTS REQUIRE A PERMIT TO ENROLL IN THIS CLASS (MA students interested in enrolling should contact Mary Beth before making any attempt to register)**

“To think intensities, rather (and sooner) than qualities and quantities; depths rather than lengths and breadths; movements of individuation rather than species and kinds . . . We have always refused to think intensity in the West. Most of the time, we have reduced it to the measurable and the play of equalities; Bergson, for his part, to the qualitative and the continuous. Deleuze liberates intensity now, by and in a thought that would be the most elevated, acute and intense. One should make no mistake about this. To think intensity—its free differences and its repetitions—is not a slight revolution in philosophy.” Michel Foucault, “Ariane s’est pendue”, (1969 review of Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*), in *Dits et Ecrits*, I, p. 798. Translation: Mary Beth Mader.

Intensities or intensive magnitudes, such as temperatures and speeds, are part of the physical descriptions of the world offered by the natural sciences. Scientific accounts of intensity have their roots in philosophical accounts, specifically in the ontologies developed in the philosophies of medieval European Christendom. In Western philosophy since then, there has developed a minor tradition of philosophical thought about intensity, generally in the context of ontologies of quality and quantity.

In *Difference and Repetition* and several other texts, Gilles Deleuze implicitly revives, enriches, and centralizes this lesser tradition of ontological thought on the nature of intensity in Western philosophy. However, Deleuze rejects what he takes to be neutralizing accounts of intensity found in its treatment in much of Western philosophy. On his view, philosophical accounts of intensity that understand it as quality, or as extended quantity, fail to capture the specific character of intensity and its necessarily ineliminable structuring difference.

Although prompted by the Deleuzian critique, this seminar does not take it for granted, but presents the philosophical high points in the history of the ontology of intensity for our scrutiny and evaluation. The aim of the course is to chronologically examine the ontology of intensity so as to begin to set out its history or, even, its genealogy. We will study the concept as it appears in: Scotus, Oresme, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Riemann, and Deleuze. It will also necessarily include discussion of the history of the ontology and philosophy of measure, as well as the relation of intensity to art and to the faculty of sensibility. Time, student interest and translations permitting, works from Cohen, Ruyer, Simondon and Gilles Châtelet may also be included in our study.

### **General Requirements**

Regular contribution to seminar discussions, a short midterm essay (5-7 pp.), a one-page seminar paper proposal, and a seminar paper (16 pp.).

### **Specific Requirements**

#### **I. Spoken Work (20%)**

Regular contribution to seminar discussions is required. The seminar format is lecture followed by discussion. With permission, a seminar presentation may count as part of the class participation component of the course.

#### **II. Written Work (80%)**

1. A short explication of a seminar text. (5-7pp.) (10%)
2. A one-page seminar paper proposal and a 16-page seminar paper (70%) on an approved topic. A draft of the paper may be submitted for comments prior to its submission for a grade. Individual consultation on the seminar paper is recommended.

For questions, please contact Prof. Mader at [mmader@memphis.edu](mailto:mmader@memphis.edu).

**RESEARCH IN PROGRESS**  
**PHIL 7/8071 -- Tollefsen**  
**Spring 2010, Schedule TBA**