Defying the Civil Rights Lobby: The American Multiracial Movement

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Background

Throughout the 1990s a handful of advocates argued to stunning if partial success that it was both inaccurate and an affront to force multiracial Americans into monoracial categories. They called for the addition of a multiracial designator on the U.S. Census to bolster the self-esteem of multiracial children; furthermore, they maintained that the recognition of racial mixture could help defuse American racial polarization. Fearing the potential dilution of minority numbers and political power, ironically, civil rights groups emerged as the staunchest opponents of the multiracial category effort. Nevertheless, from 1992 to 1998, six states passed legislation to add a multiracial category on state forms. Further, in 1997 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) announced an unprecedented “mark one or more” (MOOM) decision, which did not add a multiracial category to the census, but nevertheless, allowed Americans to identify officially with as many racial groups as they saw fit. Although in some ways its immediate impact might seem negligible, I argue in Race Counts: American Multiracialism & Post-Civil Rights Politics (The University of Michigan Press, Forthcoming) that MOOM will eventually reach deeply into the nation’s civil rights agenda. Ultimately this recent restructuring of the American racial classification system, in tandem with coexisting trends, could push the nation to rethink the logic of civil rights enforcement.

The multiracial movement started with a handful of adult-based groups that formed on the West Coast in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Currently there are approximately thirty active adult-based multiracial organizations across the United States.
and about the same number of student organizations on college campuses. Most of the adult-based groups are oriented toward social support more than political advocacy, but in 1988, a number of these local organizations joined forces to create the Association for Multi-Ethnic Americans (AMEA). At that point, the primary political goal of this new umbrella group was to push the Census Bureau to add a multiracial category on the 1990 census. Soon after the establishment of AMEA, two other national umbrella organizations formed: Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) and A Place for Us. Beyond agenda setting, this small, disorganized social movement exerted little to no influence over the aforementioned outcomes. At the height of movement activity it involved no more than 1000 individuals in a loose network of groups (Figure 5.1) scattered across the country and only twenty or so core, committed activists at the helm.

**Explaining the Federal Level Policy Change**

The new race data are unlike any before. How did it happen? While instituted by a Democratic administration, I argue that Democrats and Republicans saw different things in the same trend, and furthermore, that there is something in the multiracial idea that most of us want to hear. In this regard, the growing literature (Skerry 2000, Spencer 1999, Perlmann and Waters 2002, Nobles 2000) tends to hurry past or altogether overlook an important point: both federal and state outcomes were basically (intended to be) symbolic.

*The 1993 Hearings*

At the OMB’s request, citing ongoing criticism of the census and rapid change in the racial and ethnic makeup of the country, Thomas Sawyer (D-Ohio), chair of the
Subcommittee on Census, Statistics, and Postal Personnel of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, conducted hearings on the “Federal Measurements of Race and Ethnicity” in 1993. As discussed in chapter 2, controversy has engulfed every census since 1970. These difficulties spurred what would turn out to be a comprehensive four-year review, beginning with the hearings chaired by Sawyer. The multiracial category initiative eventually became the dominant focus of the review. In the end, the official prism through which race had been viewed in this country for two decades gave way to a new system. Before 1997, identification with more than one race was not allowed; after 1997, the OMB gave everyone the option to identify with as many races as they wish (MOOM). Further, the OMB approved the addition of a new Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander classification, while retaining the preexisting four major races and the Hispanic (ethnic) category.

According to Sally Katzen, administrator of the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the time had come in 1993 to “have a comprehensive review of all the categories.”1 Laying emphasis upon the “very profound and sincere human concerns that have been voiced in letters by citizens across the country,” she had “received pictures of children with questions. How shall I record this child’s ethnicity? How shall I record this child’s race? The kids are cute. The questions are real and very pressing.”2 Conveying a sense of control over the process, Katzen said the review would be a “fairly speedy process for something this complex”3 and that the racial data necessary for the many programmatic needs of the federal government, including civil rights enforcement, would be left intact. The tone was of a reasonable balance struck: the situation deserved examination, but ultimately, this investigation would not fundamentally disrupt the
preexisting system. Other members of the subcommittee included Tom Petri (R-Wisconsin) and Albert Wynn (D-Maryland).

The prospect of multiracial recognition without adverse civil rights consequences was attractive in Clinton’s OMB. Opening the hearings in 1993, Rep. Sawyer, like Katzen, set the expectation that a balance could be struck between ongoing racial and ethnic data needs and growing racial diversity/fluidity. He pointed to the need to preserve racial and ethnic “data for…important [civil rights] applications,” but acknowledged that we have developed categories that “in the view of many, have become misleading over time.” Notably, although a federal multiracial category proposal was on the table from the beginning, it does not appear as if the OMB ever really intended to go that route. Katzen indicated as much in 1993 when answering in the affirmative to Rep. Petri’s inquiry as to whether a change would likely result in a “compromise in how the figures are massaged rather than how the public is forced to categorize.” This brings me back to where I started: Democrats drove the process and ultimately offered (what they thought of as only) symbolic recognition. There is no statutory purpose served by federal level multiple-race data. And those identifying as multiracial on state forms (chapter 4) are re-collapsed into the standard racial and ethnic categories mandated by the OMB whenever necessary for purposes of federal reporting.

Harry Scarr, then Acting Director of the Census Bureau, testified that growing racial diversity fueled by high levels of immigration made extensive testing and research a necessity for the 2000 count. In fact, more testing was the ruling consensus of the 1993 hearings. The involved civil rights forces – including MALDEF, NCLR, the National Urban League (NUL) and the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and
Pacific Islanders, notably not the NAACP - found themselves on this side of the “extensive testing” argument for a variety of reasons, none the least because for years, all had been insisting that the bureau and the OMB improve the count. Interestingly, this was not the first time that a multiracial option was considered by the OMB. The agency considered but rejected a 1988 proposal to add an ‘Other’ racial category, ultimately falling back again on the need for more testing. That category would have been “principally for individuals of mixed race backgrounds and those who want the option of specifically stating a unique identification.”8 While supported by “many multi-racial/multi-ethnic groups and some educational institutions”9 (AMEA was established in that same year), Katzen testified in 1993 that OMB “walked into a little firestorm” in 1988 when considering this modification to the 1977 directive. The proposal was dropped due to opposition from Federal agencies including the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the EEOC. According to Katzen:

Those who opposed the change asserted that the present system provided adequate data, an issue we could discuss; that any changes would disrupt historical continuity, a very important consideration; and that the proposed changes could be expensive and potentially divisive, again something which probably could be thought through and handled in a mature fashion.10

Here we see the reverse of the sampling/undercount dynamic: civil rights forces are telling us the system is workable as-is; the OMB tells us it is not.

The logic of more testing to correct known flaws and to address new trends was impossible to avoid. Although Billy Tidwell of the National Urban League feared a multiracial designation might “effectively turn the clock back” for blacks, he conceded that “significant adjustments in the measurement of race and ethnicity may be in order.”11
Similarly, Sonia Pérez of NCLR underlined the need for accurate racial and ethnic data regarding the Hispanic population. However, she also described that population as multiracial “by nature,”\textsuperscript{12} referring the subcommittee to Census Bureau analyst Manuel de la Puente’s work indicating that “as a whole Hispanics view race as a continuum.”\textsuperscript{13} Mixed messages (sorry) also came from Stephen Carbo then Staff Attorney for MALDEF, who said

> the continued collection of race and ethnicity data in the census is fundamental...[and] any changes to the collection of data on race and ethnicity must be strictly scrutinized to ensure that the integrity of our civil rights laws are not compromised.\textsuperscript{14}

However, asked by Sawyer whether increasing the number of choices would help, Carbo replied, “I’m hard pressed to find a situation where understanding diversity better, understanding complexity better, is a hindrance.”\textsuperscript{15} Rachel Joseph of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) stated that her organization had no major objections to the quality of the 1990 census count of Indian and Alaska Native people (between 1970 and 1980 the American Indian population grew by an improbable 73 percent;\textsuperscript{16} between 1980 and 1990, by X percent).\textsuperscript{17} Joseph said that Indian tribes and organizations would be “very reluctant to change the race question without extensive testing and clear evidence that any proposed change would lead to improvements in the quality of the Indian data.”\textsuperscript{18} Except for the testing part, American Indians lost this argument (see Figure 6.1).

Civil rights testimony was more pointed on at least one count. Arthur Fletcher, Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights said he could “see a whole host of light-skinned Black Americans running for the door the minute they have another
choice.” Beyond the fact that it is misleading to think of multiracial identification primarily in black-white terms (I discuss this later), this is an astounding comment from Fletcher, who would seemingly prefer racial assignment divorced from consent and personal identification. He also joined the call for more testing. Thus, the civil rights position came close to that of the OMB, if more warily: the existing arrangement may need examination but ultimately it should be left fundamentally unchanged.

AMEA and Project RACE representatives held different ideological and political views from the beginning, though they shared the position of Carlos Fernandez (then AMEA president), who told the subcommittee that “No child should be forced to favor one parent over the other by any government agency.” Further, both organizations concurred that this growing community of multiracial people and families could help to alleviate racial strife. Finally, they agreed that the lack of a federal multiracial category represented a health risk in terms of misdiagnoses. However, they parted ways on a critical point: Susan Graham objected to “any format that does not include the term ‘multiracial,’” taking this position in light of the self-esteem of multiracial people.

I’m not a scholar, attorney, or lawmaker. I’m just a mother, a mother who cares about children and whether I like it or not, I realize that self-esteem is directly tied to accurate racial identity. Ironically [due to different classification schemes] my child has been [regarded as] white on the U.S. census, black at school, and multiracial at home, all at the same time.”

AMEA’s proposal differed from that of Project RACE. The latter insisted on a stand-alone, separate multiracial classification without further breakdown. The former proposed the addition of a multiracial category “followed by a listing of the racial and/or ethnic groups appearing on the main list.” AMEA would later vacillate on this point, but at this juncture both AMEA and Project RACE concurred that every
“multiethnic/interracial” person has the “same right as any other person to assert an identity that embraces the fullness and integrity of their actual ancestry,” as Carlos Fernandez, AMEA president, testified before the subcommittee. One problem here is that a multiracial person, according to multiracial advocates, is someone with two monoracial parents. Put differently, in calling for a tally whereby multiracial individuals could identify “accurately,” the multiracial logic falls back on a biological rationale for identification. And how, in the case of the Project RACE proposal, would the arbitrary lumping of responses into a catch-all multiracial category be more accurate? Another problem is that while both groups pointed to the societal benefits of multiracial recognition - again, Fernandez: “our very identity is a challenge to this deeply ingrained prejudice of a divided world” – the vision was abstract and no details were supplied.

Members of Congress testifying in 1993 were not particularly interested to debate the pros and cons of a potential multiracial category. Representative Sawyer opened the second session on 29 July, once more underscoring the necessities and uses of racial data, but again reiterating his original caveat: these “categories of convenience…convey an illusion of specificity that fails to capture the dynamic patterns of our population.” Senator Daniel Akaka (D-HI) followed with a case in point. Stating that his proposal was supported “by the entire Hawaii congressional delegation, Hawaii’s Governor John Waihee, Native Hawaiian organizations, and the National Count for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders,” Akaka requested a separate classification for Native Hawaiians. “We have literally fallen through the cracks,” he testified, “between definition as Native Americans in many Federal laws and classification as Asian or Pacific Islanders in Federal forms.” Ultimately, Akaka won this argument and a new Native
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander (NHOPI) category was created in 2000 (pop. 398,835). Two items were on Norman Mineta’s (D-CA) agenda. First, he wanted to put a stop to the Census Bureau’s plans to collapse the separate ethnic categories (in other words, to eliminate the check-off format) for Asian-Pacific Americans used previously. Second, Mineta wanted respect. “Until the Bureau recognizes [us] as a constituency to be served rather than a problem to be dealt with, this estrangement will persist.” He succeeded in his first goal; it is less clear if his second stipulation was met. Barney Frank (D-MA) “wouldn’t be here…if we knew exactly what percentage” of the people in New Bedford and southeastern Massachusetts are of Cape Verdean ancestry. “People have a problem out there. Are they African-American? Are they Black? Are they Cape Verdean?” Absorbed in other issues, Congressional Democrats paid little attention to the multiracial category proposal in 1993.

However, the lone Republican on the subcommittee, hailing from an overwhelmingly white district in Wisconsin, was thinking about the possibilities. On 30 June, Rep. Petri asked civil rights testifiers if they were

Worried that if [a multiracial category is instituted] and you have to have – when you get into court, if they establish discrimination by comparing with the pool in the community and if it drops from ten percent to eight percent because there’s a new multiracial category this might somehow make it harder to win a case or something? Stephen Carbo of MALDEF responded that he was “not sure” but he “[understood] the question.” Later, Petri opined, “when you create a new category it may complicate litigation and protection in the civil rights area.” Stunningly, within a year of the 1993 hearings, Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives for the first time in forty years. As a result, House committees were reorganized and the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight assumed the responsibilities of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. During the 104th Congress, furthermore, Petri introduced H.R. 3920 as an amendment to the Paperwork Reduction Act. It would have required that respondents have an opportunity to “specify, respectively, ‘multiracial’ [in the case of a list of racial classifications] or ‘multiethnic’ [in the case of a list of ethnic classifications] in the collection of information.” During the 105th Congress he reintroduced this failed measure as H.R. 830 calling it the “Tiger Woods Bill”. Incidentally, Tiger Woods never associated with the multiracial cause, despite fervent efforts to bring him on board.

The Research Agenda and Subsequent Developments

The OMB delivered on its promise to investigate comprehensively the matter of racial categorization. In March 1994, it established the Interagency Committee for the Review of Racial and Ethnic Standards, the most important of the numerous committees and workshops established toward this end. This committee, comprised of representatives from more than thirty federal agencies, would eventually submit final recommendations to the OMB. One of its first acts was to create a Research Working Group, co-chaired by the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), to outline an appropriate agenda for researching and testing key concerns. The five central issues identified by the Research Working Group included:

1. *Reporting of multiple races*: What are the possible effects of including a multiple-race response option or a multiracial category in data collections that ask individuals to identify their race and ethnicity?
2. *Combining questions on race and Hispanic origin*: Should a combined race/Hispanic origin question be used instead of separate questions on race and Hispanic origin?

3. *Concepts of race, ethnicity, and ancestry*: Should the concepts of race, ethnicity, and ancestry be combined and include, for example, a follow-up, open-ended question with no fixed categories? How well does the public understand these three concepts?

4. *Terminology*: Should any of the current terminology for the racial and ethnic categories be replaced or modified?

5. *New classifications*: Should new racial or ethnic categories be developed for specific population groups and be added to the minimum basic set of categories?³⁷

The agenda itself represented a victory for multiracial activists, as almost all of the major issues identified for exploration related directly to their concerns. Soon after, the Research Working Group announced its upcoming plans for the continuing review. The highlights would include public hearings in 1994 to solicit commentary on a number of potential changes to OMB 15. Then, in May 1995, the BLS would sponsor a Supplement on Race and Ethnicity to the Current Population Survey (CPS). The Census Bureau would test alternative approaches to collecting data on race and Hispanic origin in the March 1996 National Content Survey (NCS), and finally, in June 1996, the bureau would conduct a Race and Ethnic Targeted Test (RAETT) to assess the effects of possible changes on smaller populations.³⁸ All of this was good news for multiracial advocates, but by late 1993, as reported in *AMEA Networking News*, multiracial advocates were “quite aware of the political, bureaucratic and traditional cultural forces we are up against.”³⁹
After the Research Working Group laid out its research agenda, civil rights groups began to look upon the multiracialists much more seriously. In response to the OMB’s stated plans, in 1994, a number of civil rights organizations circulated a “Coalition Statement,” signed by the Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the NAACP, the National Urban League, and the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. The Coalition argued:

The risk of instituting a change in existing public policy...could have profound adverse consequences for the general welfare. Rather than being progressive [the multiracial proposal] portends serious regressive effects...we are concerned that the addition of a multiracial category may have unanticipated adverse consequences, resulting in Blacks being placed even lower in the existing American hierarchy... [The multiracial initiative has] potential disorganizing and negative effects on Black Americans...and would, [in] reduct[ing] the official count of Black Americans, distort public understanding of their condition...Directive 15 is appropriately viewed as part of the judicial, legislative, and administrative machinery that has been constructed over time to combat and eradicate racial discrimination. It is important to remind ourselves that this anti-discrimination capability was achieved at great cost. The sacrifices of the Civil Rights Movement...were not in vain...We are opposed to any action by OMB which will result in the disaggregation of the current Black population.40

Here, the (black) civil rights stance is unequivocal. The multiracial proposal is not progressive (although it might seem so) and would be of more harm than help. AMEA and Project RACE responded:

This statement is alarmist in tone, and implies that a multiracial category, in and of itself, has the ‘power’ to upset the racial/ethnic status quo...Civil rights gains sought by any minority group in the history of the United States have never been without risk, and have been well worth changes in existing policies. The multiracial community is no less discriminated against and no less deserving of its rights than any other racial or ethnic community. The interracial community sees the rigidity of these existing categories as a means of shutting out its people from receiving the same benefits, protections, and considerations under the law as the representatives of the ‘coalition’ wish to retain...[Your] stance merely perpetuates the myth that races and ethnic groups cannot mix. It encourages a continued atmosphere of antagonism, elitism, and suspicion which allowed anti-miscegenation laws to stay on record in sixteen states
up until 1967...Let there be no doubt, this issue is as much an economic numbers game to the groups resisting the addition of a new category as it is a discussion of lofty socio-political ideals. How are the civil rights of the interracial community being properly served if you continue to ignore these families and their offspring? 

In the hearings and in virtually all other available outlets, multiracial activists routinely touted the transformative possibilities of their efforts, but here that claim is muted to absent. In response to the coalition statement, AMEA and Project RACE chose to stress the interest group aspirations of the purported multiracial community. Put differently, multiracial advocates wanted it both ways: they wanted a piece of the pie (as a separate ethnoracial group) but they also sought to undermine the notion of distinct ethnoracial categories.

A few months after this exchange, the principal of a high school in Wedowee, Alabama told students that he would cancel the school prom if interracial couples attended. AMEA contacted the Bowens family with condolences and the offer to assist in whatever way possible. Meanwhile, the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a lawsuit in Federal Court on behalf of Bowens, charging her civil rights had been violated under both the U.S. Constitution and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Bowens incident again drew national press attention to the multiracial movement. Once more, Carlos Fernandez, now AMEA’s outgoing president, thought he had found the perfect court case. It was “specifically her multiracial status that earned her the abuse of principal Hulond Humphries,” Fernandez observed. However, against the wishes of both AMEA and the Southern Poverty Law Center, Bowens chose eventually to settle out of court.
In August 1995, the OMB issued a *Federal Register* notice to provide an interim report on the review process. Having received oral testimony from 94 witnesses in the public hearings and the opinions of nearly 800 letter writers, the *Federal Register* indicated that many of these comments proposed allowing individuals self-identifying with more than one race to ‘check all that apply’ from the list of preexisting options.\(^{43}\) In response to the interim report, AMEA and Project RACE sent a joint letter to Katherine Wallman, Chief of Statistical Policy for the OMB: ‘‘mark all that apply’ or ‘check as many as applicable’ would still render a multiracial person invisible, and merely serve to collapse numbers back into the five existing categories.’’\(^{44}\) Keep in mind that at this point AMEA and Project RACE stood for a multiracial category designator and nothing less. Although multiracial advocates regarded the ‘mark all that apply’ suggestion a potential setback, within a few months they found themselves incorporated into the process. In November 1995, following up on the recommendation of Ron Brown, the late Secretary of Commerce, Martha Riche - who filled the long-vacant position of Census Bureau director in October 1994 - interviewed Ramona Douglass and based on that meeting granted AMEA a formal role on the Census 2000 Advisory Committee.

Not all multiracial activists agreed that movement strategy should hinge on legal maneuverings and staid meetings in Washington. Some wanted to take it to the streets. That same year (1994) Charles Michael Byrd, a limousine driver-cum-multiracial activist based in Queens, New York, launched *Interracial Voice*. It would quickly become the major means of circulating information within the activist multiracial community. As Byrd’s website - billing itself as “The Voice of the Global Mixed-Race/Interracial Movement” - grew in popularity, Byrd himself grew more inclined to assert his own
opinions. Single-handedly, he organized the first multiracial solidarity march, held on the Mall in Washington D.C. on 20 July 1996. Byrd did not lead or even actively participate in a multiracial organization. Nevertheless, using the website as his platform, he began planning for the event against the wishes of AMEA and other involved actors. While his main stated objective was to petition the government to institute a multiracial category for the 2000 census, Byrd had other objectives, including:

- Repudiating the rising tide of separatist ideology that is engulfing the traditional civil rights organizations and their leaders
- Signaling the beginning of the end of ‘race’ as the social construct that divides humanity
- Unmasking hypodescent…a.k.a. the infamous ‘one drop rule,’ for what it is: one of the most vicious aspects of American racism

Multiracial Solidarity!
Multiracial Power!  

Eventually, in many cases begrudgingly, Byrd managed to collect seventeen endorsements for the march from multiracial organizations across the country and arranged for fourteen speakers to deliver speeches at the event. Ruth and Steve White, Susan Graham, and particularly lacking in enthusiasm, Ramona Douglass, were in attendance. Before the march, Douglass complained, “I believe the pen is mightier than the picket line...my demonstration days are numbered...the board room is where lasting decisions can be made - not in the streets. This isn’t Selma in the sixties.” Again, AMEA preferred to operate as an institutionalized, ethnic lobbying group. This author attended the demonstration, at which many of the sentiments advanced by multiracial activists that I had read on paper began to materialize in front of me. A man walked quietly around the perimeter of the small crowd, his two young children in tow, carrying a sign that read: I AM THE FATHER OF MY CHILDREN. (Often, the parents of
multiracial children are presumed to be unrelated to them or to each other.) A young interracial couple informed me that they intended to hold hands all day, something they rarely felt comfortable doing under most circumstances. A black woman sitting on the grass with her white husband held a placard that read: I AM NOT THE MAID. Byrd wanted their numbers taken seriously, but with a generous estimate of approximately 300 people in attendance (including curious, lingering passerby), his ambition remained painfully unrealized. Until this point, multiracial activists had been referring to growing numbers and millions of potential supporters without ever having placed the onus on themselves to actually make these masses of people materialize.

Making matters even worse, the media covered the march extensively. This author counted three major networks there to cover what Clarence Page referred to in the Chicago Tribune as a “hundred person picnic.” By this point, the multiracial issue regularly made headlines in newspapers and on television programs across the country. Since 1992, a number of states had passed legislation to add a multiracial category on state forms and similar legislation was pending in others (chapter 4). In the two years prior to the hearings, the multiracial issue was covered in US News and World Report, made the front page of the New York Times, appeared on the cover of TIME magazine, showed up on CNN and NPR, and was reported upon in all four major Black publications: Emerge, Ebony, Jet and Essence magazines.

The CPS test results provided a first look at the potential impact of a multiracial category. Extensive media coverage was being devoted to a (growing but still) very small population so inclined to identify as such. Given the opportunity, approximately 1.5 percent of respondents identified as multiracial in the 1995 CPS, a monthly national
sample survey of approximately 60,000 households. In the 1996 National Content Survey (NCS) mailed out to 94,500 households, four of the thirteen panels tested for the effects of adding a multiracial or biracial category and reached a similar conclusion. In the NCS, about “one percent of persons reported as multiracial in the versions of the race question that included a multiracial or biracial response category.” Both tests showed that a multiracial category would impact the Asian and Native American/Alaskan Native counts more than that of blacks but the impact of a multiracial category was not statistically significant for any minority group in either test.

The 1997 Hearings

In the fall of 1996, just after the first solidarity march, multiracial advocates learned that they would have one last opportunity to assert their views before Congress in a second set of hearings slated for 1997. Afterwards, the Interagency Committee would devise and submit its final recommendations to the OMB. Recognizing that the OMB would most likely act in accordance with the Interagency Committee’s recommendations, the first few months of 1997 marked a critical juncture for multiracial advocates. However, their efforts were fraught frustration. In February 1997, with the first of the three hearing dates just two months away, Ramona Douglass was unhappy with what she saw as her marginalized role on the Census Advisory Committee. AMEA had been relegated to a subcommittee, the Committee on Special Populations, which met separately from the larger group. On 1 February, she wrote to Charles Byrd for help, noting that the “challenges posed by the Committee on Special Populations and their continuing efforts to shut out a multiracial perspective being heard by the committee or
the full 2000 Census Advisory Committee [are formidable]... The NAACP and the Urban League have been instrumental in this attempted shut out.” However, multiracial organizations’ call for a “flood of e-mail, faxes, and letters to carry us into the congressional hearings on this subject with strong community support” went unheeded.

Another frustration was that, in spite of a concerted effort to get their testimony scheduled into the first round of hearings (23 April) multiracial groups were not allowed to make their case until the second scheduled date (22 May). Sensing that their efforts had been railroaded, Douglass expressed her disappointment in a torrent of speeches and press releases. At the University of Michigan she complained:

When Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his ‘I Have A Dream’ speech, and spoke of a day when men and women would be judged ‘not by the color of their skins but by the content of their character,’ I don’t believe that any part of that dream or speech mentioned the protection of government entitlements, beefing up racial ‘numbers’ or increasing federal funding...Dr. King was about the business of preserving Human Rights, be they Black, White, Brown, Red, Yellow, or somewhere in between...What we in the interracial/multiethnic community are saying today is that it is no longer acceptable that political expediency or the self-serving agendas of special interest groups [thwart our efforts].

Also discouraging was the fact that only two nationally recognized groups had stepped forward to pick and choose what to endorse of the multiracial platform: the Libertarian Party and the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL). The JACL supported a multiple-check off scheme, not a stand alone multiracial category. The Libertarian Party, in contrast, wanted to eliminate racial classifications from all government forms. “If millions of Americans withheld their racial data from the government,” national chair Steve Dasbash, wrote in a July 1997 press release, “the politicians’ framework for American Apartheid would crash to the ground.”
Petri and Gingrich

Just before the hearings began, a number of conservative Republicans surfaced to lend support to the multiracial category effort. The most sweeping of these gestures came from Thomas Petri (R-WI), who, without consulting any of the multiracial leaders across the country, introduced H.R. 830 in February 1997. If passed, it would have required the OMB to add a ‘multiracial’ or ‘multiethnic’ designation on the 2000 census had it not come to such a conclusion on its own volition. In an interview with multiracial activist Charles Byrd of Interracial Voice, Petri, conceding that his own constituency “happens to be one of the more homogeneous in the country,” avoided questions as to why he had not even consulted multiracial category advocates about the bill. When Byrd asked him to comment on the civil rights issues at stake, Petri replied, “I understand that those organizations’ [civil rights groups] goal is to deal with the problem, and the bigger the problem is, the happier they are I guess - from the point of view of having something to organize around and raise money for and protest.” Petri’s voting record on civil rights-related legislation demonstrates no prior interest in or concern for disadvantaged minorities (Table 3.2).

Susan Graham happened to live in Newt Gingrich’s district and met with him two months before the hearings began. Although the two had never met before, Gingrich knew of Graham due to her successful effort to get a multiracial category added to Georgia state forms three years prior. Recounting her meeting with the Speaker of the House, Graham reported that she had “waited two years [for the opportunity to meet him]. I was told I had TEN MINUTES to talk with him. I quickly outlined the problem...I handed Newt a bound report with the history of the movement and statistics. He quickly
flipped through the report, put it aside and said ‘This is the right thing to do for the children.’ After this brisk deliberation, Gingrich threw his full support behind the multiracial category initiative. In the eight week period after his meeting with Graham and before the hearings, the Speaker of the House issued a number of statements in support of the multiracial category effort. He sent a personal letter to Franklin Raines, head of the OMB, on the multiracialists’ behalf: “I would like to add my voice by saying that I strongly believe that including a multiracial option on federal forms and in the 2000 census would significantly help to ensure a more accurate reflection of the racial makeup of the United States.” Further, Gingrich submitted written testimony to be considered in conjunction with the 1997 hearings.

We should…stop forcing Americans into inaccurate categories aimed at building divisive subgroups and allow them the option of selecting the category ‘multiracial’, which I believe will be an important step toward transcending racial division and reflecting the melting pot which is America.

Finally, Gingrich announced ten “practical steps for building a better America,” among which included “adding a multiracial category to the census” and “doing away with affirmative action.”

The 1997 hearings differed from those held in 1993 in three ways. First, in the interim, Republicans gained control of the House of Representatives for the first time in four decades. Thus, the 1997 hearings took place under the auspices of a different committee - Government Reform – and with a new chairman, Stephen Horn (R-CA). Second, the multiracial category issue had become the driving force of the
comprehensive review promised and delivered by the OMB. On the defensive, the roster of civil rights witnesses moved further up the food chain and the NAACP became involved, as did a number of black legislators (none had testified in 1993). Third, if the OMB decided not to implement the category, H.R. 830 represented one last potential route to a multiracial designator on census 2000.

Rep. Horn commenced hearings on ‘Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census’ before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology on 23 April 1997. Reps. Thomas Sawyer (chair of the 1993 hearings) and Thomas Petri (ranking member on the 1993 subcommittee), having had much occasion to ponder their views on the matter, testified on different sides of the issue. Sawyer’s thoughts, “the product of serious reflection on what I have learned over the past several years of studying this issue,” left him with a balance now tilted distinctly with a view toward “the primary purposes for which we collect the data…a multiracial category…places the consistency of all of the data at risk.”63 In contrast, Petri testified that the exclusion of an “entire category of people on a government form such as the census” was an effective denial “of their unique place in society.”64 Given his voting record, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Petri had ulterior motives (Table 3.1). What made multiracials a “category” or a “group” or a “community”65 Petri did not say, although as witnesses made clear in 1993, this is an important and unsettled question.

Because H.R. 830 never came to a vote there is no comprehensive record of legislative preference on the matter. However, almost all of the Congressional Democrats who expressed their views on the multiracial issue were opposed to a multiracial category
on the census; all of the Republicans who did so were in favor of it. The pattern along partisan lines is striking, as is its exception.

Table 3.1 Partisan Patterns of Congressional Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislator</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Pro-Civil Rights Voting**</th>
<th>Opposed to a Multiracial Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cochran (MS)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>15% of the time</td>
<td>Boxer (CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conyers (MI)</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>100%***</td>
<td>Davis (IL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gingrich (GA)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Feinstein (CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gramm (TX)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>Maloney (NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn (CA)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Meek (FL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mack (FL)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Sawyer (OH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petri (WI)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Velasquez (NY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thompson (TN)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Waters (CA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watts (OK)</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>Waxman (CA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26% AVERAGE 95% AVERAGE

*Legislators are identified as pro or con based on congressional testimonies (where applicable) and their comments on the multiracial issue as reported in the media (Lexis/Nexis).
** Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Voting Record Scorecard for the 104th and 105th Congresses.
***Ratings for Conyers, Sawyer, Meek, and Waters are from the LCCR Scorecard for the 107th Congress.

Table 3.1 reflects Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (LCCR) report card ratings for the members of Congress who testified in the hearings or, to my knowledge, otherwise expressed their views of the multiracial category proposal publicly while it was under consideration. It is difficult to envision this collection of Republican legislators supporting a racial identity movement without ulterior motives. In fact, to my knowledge, not one Republican in support of the multiracial category possibility said one thing as to
how we might implement it yet avoid jeopardizing the enforcement of civil rights. Carrie Meek (D-FL) reminded the committee of the importance of this work.

I understand how Tiger Woods and the rest of them feel. But no matter how they feel from a personal standpoint, we're thinking about the census and reporting accuracy. . . . The multiracial category would cloud the count of [the] discrete minorities who are assigned to a lower track in public schools, . . . kept out of certain occupations, and whose progress toward seniority or promotion has been skewed. . . . Lastly, Mr. Chairman, multiracial categories will reduce the level of political representation for minorities.67

The big surprise is John Conyers, a founder of the Congressional Black Caucus. Knowing that what he had to say was “not going to be welcomed by all of my Congressional Black Caucus colleagues,” Conyers testified that we “undermine these rights for which so many battles have been fought” if we allow people to pick only one racial category. He would include a multiracial category and “within the same question allow people to check all of the racial categories with which they identify.” 68 Conyers, in other words, preferred that the OMB reallocate multiple race responses back into the standard categories. As discussed in chapter 4, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun (D – IL) was also sympathetic to the multiracial cause; in particular, she advocated the elimination of racial categories on school forms.69 Is multiracial recognition in the minority interest or not?

Tabulation

Although the NAACP did not testify in the 1993 hearings, Harold McDougall did so twice in 1997 on the organization’s behalf. In his first appearance before the subcommittee (22 May) McDougall said there was no documented history of discrimination against multiracial and argued that their recognition on the census – an
inappropriate place for such a statement – would make it more difficult to track discrimination. The NAACP would “consider the issue in a more formal way” after its annual conference that July. But by the time McDougall had a second chance before the subcommittee, the interagency committee had already submitted its final recommendations to the OMB a few weeks earlier (9 July 1997). Most significantly, the committee unanimously rejected the addition of a stand-alone multiracial category, recommending instead that respondents be allowed to mark one or more races.

McDougall, back before the subcommittee on 25 July, said the NAACP had discussed the matter with AMEA and other multiracial organizations and concluded that the ‘select one or more’ option best suits all our purposes.

The NAACP, along with other civil rights groups, accepted MOOM because it had no choice. Further, the test results strongly suggested that the black count would be least impacted by the addition of a multiracial category. (And note that Hispanics, as an ethnic group, already had the functional options of MOOM.) The RAETT findings, released in May 1997, mostly corroborated the results of the earlier CPS and NCS tests. Taken together, “the results from the CPS Supplement, the NCS and the RAETT suggest that providing multiracial reporting options would not affect the percentages reporting as white or as black, but may well affect reporting in populations with higher intermarriage rates, most notably American Indians and Alaska Natives, and Asians and Pacific Islanders.” Representatives from these groups protested, calling for further testing of the mark all that apply options (Jacinta Ma of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium) or even explicitly opposing any change whatsoever (JoAnn Chase of the
National Congress of American Indians) but the interagency committee passed over these recommendations and soon after, the OMB followed suit.

Unveiling the new policy on 29 October 1997, Franklin Raines, Director of the OMB said, “We are not closing the door on the expression of multiracial heritage. We are allowing people to express their multiracial heritage in whatever way they view themselves.”74 Not all multiracial movement advocates saw it this way and MOOM gave rise to a rift within the core group of multiracial activists, eventually splintering prior alliances. Ultimately, AMEA accepted the MOOM decision as a way to both report multiple heritages and to maintain civil rights enforcement efforts. Susan Graham of Project RACE felt that AMEA had sold out and she vowed to continue the fight for a stand-alone multiracial category. Others, including Ruth and Steve White and Charles Byrd of *Interracial Voice*, came to believe that getting rid of racial categorization altogether was a necessary first step toward eradicating racism. I discuss the split in chapter 5.

Irrespective of multiracial advocates’ internal divisions, MOOM soon became the center of a new political battle as attention shifted to the way in which the bureau would tabulate multiple responses. Although the thirty federal agencies represented on the Interagency Committee recommended unanimously against the addition of a multiracial category, the committee articulated no specific suggestions as to how its proposed (and adopted) alternative could be carried out logistically; hence the creation of the Tabulation Working Group. The Tabulation Working Group was made up of a subset of Interagency Committee members; their job was to specify the mechanics of processing multiple race responses and to generate guidelines for federal agencies to aggregate and report multiple
race data. The tabulation issue launched an all-new round of deliberations and arguments about how to tackle this technically challenging and politically charged task. The situation also led to criticism of the OMB for announcing the new policy while the details remained unsettled.

Indicative of the difficulties involved, the Tabulation Working Group managed to produce the guidelines only a few weeks before the 2000 census was conducted. The delay stemmed largely from the fact that current civil rights laws require statistics that plainly distinguish between those who are members of minority groups and those who are not. This meant that, for the purposes of civil rights monitoring, the Tabulation Working Group had the unenviable job of devising a standard by which to reallocate multiple race responses to a single race. I discuss this issue from the perspective of multiracial advocates in chapter 5, but to be clear, what we are talking about here is racial reassignment. Multiple race responses would have to be “put back” in a single box (Goldstein and Morning 2003) in order to produce numbers for the purposes of civil rights enforcement as well as to devise methods that would allow data users to compare 2000 data with that of earlier censuses. This is known as the “bridging” problem. To address these concerns, the Tabulation Working Group considered an extensive array of statistical possibilities. Each would have impacted the civil rights count of racial groups differently and the seriously considered options were as follows:

- **Deterministic Whole Assignment - Largest Group Other Than White**: This method of tabulation would have involved reassigning those who checked more than one box to the largest of the non-white groups s/he marked. So, a respondent reporting her/his race as black, white, and Asian, would, for tabulation purposes be
counted as a black person. (*This would have artificially inflated the size of large minority groups.*)

- **Deterministic Whole Assignment - Smallest Group:** When two or more minority populations would be identified, the respondent would be assigned to the group with the smallest population. (*This would have artificially inflated the size of small minority groups.*)

- **Deterministic Whole Assignment - Largest Group:** This method would have assigned people selecting two or more racial groups to the group with the largest population with respect to monoracial responses. For example, Black-American Indian respondents would be counted as blacks. Black-White respondents would be counted as whites. (*This would have artificially inflated the size of the white population.*)

- **Deterministic Whole Assignment - Plurality:** In this method, when respondents reported more than one race, they would have been queried about the one race they most strongly identify with, and the proportion choosing each of the two possibilities would have been calculated accordingly. Take, for example, persons who identify as white and American Indian. All such persons who chose American Indian as their “main” race would have been assigned to the American Indian population. (*This would have served to draw attention to -yet not address- the initial complaint of multiracial groups regarding a forced choice/privileging one parent over the other.*)

- **Deterministic Fractional Assignment - Equal Fractions:** This method would have assigned fractions of persons to groups according to the numbers of multiracial responses given by respondents. For instance, an individual black and white response
would result in 0.5 persons added to each group. *(While this method had the virtue of not re-collapsing mixed-race responses to a monoracial group, the approach bears resemblance to the kinds of allocations associated with blood quantum classifications. Moreover, it seemed untenable in that this method would yield population counts that are not whole numbers. What is the meaning of a number such as 2.5 black people? This approach runs counter to the way that race is broadly understood in American society.)*

- **Deterministic Fractional Assignment - Unequal Fractions:** This is a variant on the plurality method discussed above. In this scenario, responses would be tabulated through an *a priori* partitioning scheme. For instance, if two-thirds of the White-Asian population responded that Asian was their “main” race - the race they most closely identified with - then one-third of a White-Asian multiracial respondent would be counted toward the aggregate total of the white population, and two-thirds toward the total for the Asian population. *(This method would have been extremely cumbersome, especially for non-technical users, but its virtue was that it rested on an empirical distribution of “main” responses for determining fractional assignments.)*

In general, two different sorts of problems emerged when the Tabulation Working Group tested these various methods using the CPS, NCS, and RAETT data. **Problem #1:** For large groups such as the white population, results were more or less consistent across methodologies. For small groups with significant numbers of interracial unions, namely American Indians and Asians, the choice of tabulation methods had a significant impact on population projections. **Problem #2:** The methodologies best controlling for group
size were the ones involving fractional methods. Although these methods had the best statistical “goodness of fit” values, their implementation was politically impractical. Otherwise interpreted, first you were an ‘other’ and now you’re a fraction?

The main concerns of civil rights groups were (1) to keep civil rights enforcement intact and (2) to tabulate to the minority group when an individual identified as such and also as white. OMB Bulletin No. 00-02, issued 9 March 2000, reflects these priorities. The most important aspects of the new guidelines are as follows. First, in order to distinguish those persons who selected a single race, say Asian, from those who selected Asian and another race, groups were reported in ranges from minimum to maximum sizes. Thus, we now have alternate - yet all official - counts of racial groups. Furthermore, allowing people to mark more than one race resulted in 63 possible combinations of the five official single race categories and “Some other race.” Because each racial category is again divided by a census question asking respondents if they are Hispanic, the universe of race/ethnic mixtures swells to a grand total of 126. Second, the tabulation guidelines for MOOM state that people who marked white and some other racial group should be tabulated as a part of the identified minority group for the purposes of civil rights enforcement. Invariably, this means that some people classified as white in 1990 were counted as minorities a decade later. While this procedural decision addressed the civil rights community’s immediate concerns about dwindling numbers, it is hard to justify on any other grounds. Finally, the tabulation guidelines go against the principle of self-identification in that people are reallocated into categories they did not choose for themselves, leading to the observation that the new allocation
scheme shares awkward conceptual space with the old one-drop rule. These problems run the risk of making race-based policies even more controversial than they already are.

**Summary**

“We do not want to end up at the end of the decade still thinking,” Sally Katzen said in 1993, yet the OMB has left us with much to ponder. Although not typically viewed in a symbolic/substantive rubric, a question worth pondering is in fact whether MOOM will remain symbolic (Perlmann and Waters 2002). Put differently, although it was sold as a minor reform, it is difficult to see how this move strengthens the case for race-based laws and public policies. In response to a question asked at a speech in 1995, President Clinton stated that the proposal to add a multiracial box on the census “makes sense,” though he said he had not heard it before. Within a few years, Newt Gingrich was the most prominent backer of the idea. It is clear that conservatives saw in multiracialism a way to undermine civil rights enforcement yet seem progressive in the process of doing so. It is arguable, in fact, that the right has seized the political momentum in setting the terms upon which we understand what multiracial means (consider California’s Proposition 54, the “Racial Privacy Initiative”). The OMB and the Census Bureau want to believe that technical procedures can be divorced from politics (Skerry 2000), and want the rest of us to believe that as well. Nobles 1999, Perlmann and Waters 2002, Spencer 1999 and others show us the impossibility of this.

However, these authors stop short of a much needed discussion about civil rights strategy. Civil rights advocates were caught unprepared and on the defensive. Former Census Bureau director Martha Riche explained to me how this worked for black civil
rights representatives: “the African-Americans were the least comfortable but the…process created a logic that they would have had a hard time escaping by the time they saw where things were heading.” It is important to keep in mind that multiracial identity claims were not and are not without power. Under the circumstances, to dismiss these concerns as frivolous or as conspiratorial does not lead us in a helpful direction. Multiracial recognition is here and a number of trends suggest that the issue will grow, not diminish, in significance and acceptance. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I suggest that the multiracial movement was not a right-wing conspiracy. Rather, it was appropriated by more powerful people with that agenda. Therefore, the easy conclusion about multiracial motives is not, in my estimation, the correct one; it is a mistake to equate the political goals of most multiracial activists with those of Newt Gingrich and company. My account leaves open the otherwise foreclosed possibility of co-opting multiracial politics from the left.
Notes


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Riche’s point on OMB autonomy.


13. Ibid., p. 172.


15. Ibid., 179.


21. Ibid., Testimony by Susan Graham, 108.

22. Carlos Fernandez. 30 June 1993. p. 128. “Whenever the question calls for ‘racial’ classification, the category ‘multiracial’ should be included. Whenever a question calls for ‘ethnic’ classification, the category ‘multiethnic’ should be included. Whenever racial and ethnic information is sought in a combined format, the category ‘multiracial/multiethnic’ should be included.” Carlos Fernandez. 30 June 1993. p. 128.


31 Barney Frank, 29 July 1993, p. 211.


34 Tom Petri. 30 June 1993, p. 194.


36 (cite AMEA records)


38 In addition to these tests, the National Center for Educational Statistics and the Office of Civil Rights in the Department of Education jointly conducted a survey of 1,000 public schools on how schools collect racial data (NCES, 1996).


45 Byrd’s rationale for taking to the streets was that although the umbrella groups had achieved significant success, “not much effort...has been expended to disseminate news of the movement to mixed-race individuals on a grassroots level, and if the multiracial initiative fails, it will be because the government simply did not take our arguments or our numbers seriously.” “Why The Multiracial Community Must March on July 20!” <http://www.intvoice.com>. No Date Listed.


47 Interracial Individuals listserv (now defunct). From Ramona Douglass, AMEAPRES@aol.com <http://soyokaze.biosci.ohio-state.edu/~jei/ii> (posted 25 July 1995).

48 (cite plans to create a PAC)


53 Memo from Ramona Douglass to Nancy Brown and Faye Mandell (MASC leaders). (March 1997).
Unpublished.
54 Ramona Douglass, Keynote address, *Beyond the 2000 Census: Community as Team*. University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor. (5 April 1997).
55 As a way to “acknowledge the rights of multiracial people to identify truthfully and accurately, without
hurting minority groups that need accurate reporting of race and ethnic data for civil rights purposes.”
56 Libertarian Party press release, 10 July 1997.
1997.
58 Ibid., 23 April 1997.
60 Letter from Newt Gingrich to Franklin Raines. 1 July 1997.
61 *Cite – 1997 congressional hearings.*
1997, sec. A, p. 3. Also see Steven A. Holmes, “Gingrich Outlines Plan on Race Relations” *NYT* 19 June
1997. Section B; Page 12; Column 4.
63 Tom Sawyer, *1997 Congressional Hearings – full cite.*
64 Tom Petri. *1997 Congressional Hearings - full cite.*
65 Tom Petri. *1997 Congressional Hearings - full cite.*
66 “Civil rights issues” include policy areas such as welfare reform, immigration restrictions, minimum
wage increases and educational funding.
67 CARRIE MEEK- 23 April 1997
69 Letter from Carol Moseley-Braun to Michelle Erickson. 3 March 1993. *Moseley-Braun also (??)*
sponsored a bill that would have made it illegal for federally funded adoption agencies to deny or
delay placing a child solely on the basis of race.
70 Harold McDougall. 22 May 1997.
71 (However, as discussed in chapter 6, it appears that unanimity was achieved only with the
dismissal of Roderick Harrison, now a researcher at the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies.)
73 In contrast to the CPS and NCS tests, RAETT was designed with small populations in mind. Department of
74 Faye Fiore, “Multiple Race Choices to be Allowed on 2000 Census,” *Los Angeles Times*, 30 October,
75 Tabulation Working Group of the Interagency Committee for the Review of Standards for Data on Race
and Ethnicity “Provisional Guidance on the Implementation of the 1997 Standards for Federal Data on
Race and Ethnicity,” Appendix C. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 15
December 2000.
76 For example, Matthew Snipp calculated that the “smallest group method” would have led to a 71 percent
increase in the American-Indian population in 1990, as opposed to using the old monoracial format. Snipp,
“Clues to the Future of Other Groups from the American-Indian Experience,” Presented at the Bard
77 See for instance, D’Vera Cohn, “A Racial Tug of War over Census: New Option Fosters Group
78 Should a person marking two or more minority races become involved in a civil rights enforcement case,
the individual would be allocated to the race that s/he is believes the discrimination was based on.
Alternately, should the enforcement action require assessing disparate impact or a discriminatory pattern,
the rule is to “analyze the patterns based on alternative allocations to each of the minority groups.”
Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, “To the Heads
of Executive Departments and Establishments -- Subject: Guidance on Aggregation and Allocation of Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights Monitoring and Enforcement," Bulletin No. 00-02 (March 9, 2000).


80 News Service, “Gingrich Hails 9 Bills, 94 Days,” St. Louis Post Dispatch, 8 April 1995, page 1A.

81 Martha Riche. Personal Correspondence. 10 November 2003.

82 It is worth noting that the current arrangement rests on an assumption (disproved by census projections) that the multiple race population will remain small. What will happen as the multiple race population grows?

83 For instance, a 2003 survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reported that 77 percent of all Americans agreed with the statement, "I think it is all right for blacks and whites to date each other." Full cite.