

College of Arts and Sciences Professional Development Assignment Report
Recipient: Dursun Peksen (Department of Political Science)
Term: Spring 2015

I completed five article-length manuscripts during my professional development assignment (PDA). Three of those manuscripts are on the effectiveness and consequences of economic sanctions and the other two explore the impact of pro-market policies on labor rights and women's economic status. I also attended three workshops and one conference during my PDA assignment.

Manuscripts Completed:

Article # 1: The manuscript (co-authored with Lisa Hultman) explores how threats and imposition of international sanctions affect the intensity of civil conflict violence. We formulate and test two competing views on the possible effect of economic and military-specific sanctions on conflict dynamics by combining data on fatalities in battle-related violence in all internal armed conflicts in Africa from 1989 to 2005 with data on economic sanctions and arms embargoes. The results indicate that threats of economic sanction and arms embargo are likely to increase the intensity of conflict violence. Similarly, imposed economic sanctions are likely to contribute to the escalation of conflict violence. Imposed arms embargoes, on the other hand, are likely to reduce conflict violence. *Status: Accepted for publication at *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.*

Article # 2: The second manuscript (co-authored with Timothy Peterson) assesses the extent to which potential—rather than realized—alternate markets affect strategic behavior between sanctioning (sender) and target states prior to sanction use. We argue that the sender is more likely to threaten or impose sanctions against a potential target with higher trade dependence on the sender, but only under the condition that the target's ability to redirect lost trade to third parties is low. As the target's ability to redirect lost trade increases, the sender is less likely to use sanctions because it expects that the target could mitigate the intended costs of the coercion more easily. We capture potential alternate markets using a measure of the total economic capabilities held by the target's allies, finding support for our expectations in statistical tests using data on U.S. sanctions spanning 1950 to 2005. *Status: Accepted for publication at *Political Research Quarterly**

Article # 3: The third manuscript argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure as they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Single party regimes, on the other hand, are more likely to acquiesce to foreign pressure because such regimes tend to lack strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models lend support for the theoretical claims that sanctions against personalist regimes are likely to attain their intended goals and those against military or single party regimes are unlikely to induce concessions. The findings also indicate that sanctions directed at democracies might be more effective than those against military and single party regimes. There is, however, no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against democratic governments and personalist regimes. *Status: Under review at *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.*

Article # 4: The fourth manuscript (co-authored with Robert Blanton) explores the extent to which pro-market policies affect labor rights. We combined data on five distinct policy areas associated with economic liberalization with data on labor rights for the period 1981–2012. The results indicate that pro-market policies – except the ones involving rule of law and secure property rights – undermine labor rights. Thus while there are some positive economic and political outcomes associated with market-supporting policies, we show that economic liberalization comes at the cost of respect for labor rights. *Status: Accepted for publication at European Journal of Political Research.*

Article # 5: The fifth manuscript that I worked during my PDA assignment advances the hypothesis that market-liberalizing policies in five key areas –government size and spending, legal system and protection of property, access to sound money, freedom from excessive regulation, and economic openness– help women gain a more active role in the total labor force but do not ameliorate gendered economic discrimination. On the contrary, this article asserts that market-friendly economic reforms might contribute to the rise of women’s economic rights violations. Results from a panel of over 120 countries for the period 1981-2011 indicate that promarket economic policies are associated with an increased share of female employment in the labor force but less respect for women’s economic rights. Overall, the data analysis points to an overlooked, but important, contrast of more female employment yet less respect for women’s economic rights in freer economies. The results also present a dilemma for policymaking. Whereas pro-market policies and reforms might drive economic growth and create more employment opportunities for women, such policies and reforms might be implemented at the expense of women’s economic rights, which are crucial for the empowerment of women. *Status: Under review at Journal of International Relations and Development.*

Workshops and Conferences Attended:

I contributed to three workshops. One of the workshops was organized by an NGO called International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN). The workshop took place in Washington, D.C. in April 2015. I gave a presentation on the possible effects of economic sanctions on women’s socio-economic and political status the sanctioned countries. The second workshop was organized by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and held in Oslo, Norway in April 2015. At the workshop, we presented a manuscript (co-authored with Sam Bell and Amanda Murdie) that forecasts women’s protest activities. The third workshop was organized by Eurasian Peace Science Society, which was held at Sabanci University’s Istanbul Policy Center in Istanbul, Turkey in June 2015. At the workshop, I presented my co-authored piece with Lisa Hultman on the possible effect that economic sanctions have civil conflict dynamics. I also attended the annual conference of the International Studies Association in New Orleans, LA in February 2015. I presented the following two papers at the conference: (1) “Labor Rights and Financial Crises: Does Tight Money Loosen Labor Rights?” (Co-authored with Robert Blanton and Shannon Blanton) and (2) “International Financial Institutions and Women’s Status: The Effect of World Bank and IMF Programs on Women” (Co-authored with Nicole Detraz).

Summary of the Activities during my PDA Assignment:

Manuscripts accepted for publication: 3

Manuscripts currently under review: 2

Workshops attended: 3

Conference attended: 2 papers presented at the annual ISA conference