The Myth of Voter Suppression and the Enforcement Record of the Obama Administration

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Attorney General Eric Holder,¹ created a false hue and cry about a supposed loss of voting rights in recent years. They claim that state legislatures’, and particularly Republicans’, including President Donald Trump, support for reforms intended to improve the election process’s integrity, such as voter identification requirements and the maintenance procedures of statewide voter registration lists, amounts to widespread, systemic “voter suppression” of minority voters.²

In fact, there is no “voter suppression” epidemic, as demonstrated by, among other things, the enforcement record of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “Civil Rights Division”). The Civil Rights Division is responsible for enforcing all federal voting rights laws that prohibit discrimination,


². The progressive Left seems to label almost any election rule or regulation they dislike as “voter suppression.” See generally Danielle Root & Liz Kennedy, Increasing Voter Participation in America, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 11, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2018/07/11/453319/increasing-voter-participation-america/ (“Furthermore, states must have in place affirmative voter registration and voting policies in order to ensure that eligible voters who want to vote are able to and are not blocked by unnecessary and overly burdensome obstacles such as arbitrary voter registration deadlines and inflexible voting hours.”) (emphasis added). That includes voter ID laws; not counting ballots cast outside of an assigned precinct; any steps taken by states to maintain the accuracy of voter registration rolls by removing ineligible voters; and even the requirement that has been in place for decades in the overwhelming majority of states that requires an individual to register prior to election day. See id. According to the founder of iVote, a partisan “advocacy group that campaigns to elect Democratic secretaries of state,” “[v]oter registration itself is a voter-suppression tool.” Ellen Kurz, Registration Is a Voter-Suppression Tool. Let’s Finally End It, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/registration-is-a-voter-suppression-tool-lets-finally-end-it/2018/10/11/e1356198-cca1-11e8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html?utm_term=.92b2beaaf1af.
intimidation, and other efforts intended to prevent individuals from voting, as well as federal requirements imposed on the states for offering voter registration opportunities and maintaining those records’ accuracy.  

These new state regulations and laws addressing the security of our elections, such as requiring voter identification or participation in programs that compare state voter registration lists, cannot be validly termed as “voter suppression” because they comply with existing federal voting laws, particularly given the evidence that such reforms have not hurt turnout or prevented eligible individuals from being able to vote. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has seen a steady decrease in the number of enforcement cases due to decreasing violations of federal law.  

“Voter suppression” isn’t even a legitimate, defined legal term under the statutes that protect voters, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) and the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (“NVRA”). “Voter suppression” is a faux term artificially created to unfairly condemn any election reform with which critics disagree, including perfectly legal reforms. The term is a linguistic trick designed to lump reasonable, legal, and common-sense actions by states meant to safeguard the integrity of the election process with illegal activities like poll taxes and literacy tests, thereby tainting legal actions taken by states to protect voters and elections.

The critics of these reform efforts allege that maintaining accurate voter registrations rolls to ensure that only eligible individuals cast ballots, prosecuting actual cases of election fraud, and implementing basic security reforms such as voter identification requirements that the American people overwhelmingly support is somehow “voter suppression.” Nothing could be further from the truth.

4. See discussion infra Parts III & IV.
5. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. See supra note 1.
This Essay will explain, in Part II, the need for election reform that addresses the vulnerabilities in our voter registration and election system and increases the security and integrity of the election process. Part III will demonstrate that these reforms do not constitute “voter suppression” and that there have been no widespread, systemic efforts to implement discriminatory legislation, including since the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision that lifted the Section 5 preclearance requirements from certain jurisdictions. Part IV will show that the DOJ’s recent enforcement record of applicable federal voting rights laws demonstrates that there is no ongoing voter suppression campaign. Part V will explain why a new Section 5 is not needed to protect voting rights across the country. Part VI concludes.

II. THE NEED FOR REFORM TO PREVENT ELECTION FRAUD

The United States has a long history of election fraud, and preventing it remains a legitimate state interest, contrary to those who claim that it doesn’t exist. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed when it upheld Indiana’s voter ID law, states have “a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures that have been criticized as antiquated and inefficient.”8 Unfortunately, with regard to election fraud, it remains true, as the Supreme Court stated:

[T]hat flagrant examples of such fraud . . . have been documented throughout this Nation’s history by respected historians and journalists, that occasional examples have surfaced in recent years, and that Indiana’s own experience with fraudulent voting . . . demonstrate that not only is the risk of voter fraud real but that it could affect the outcome of a close election.9

Most states utilize an “honor” system for the voter registration and voting process that does a poor job of guarding against election fraud. The Heritage Foundation maintains the only database in the country of recent cases of election fraud, and as of May 2019, the database contained 1,199 proven instances of voter fraud, including over 8. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008).
9. Id. at 195–96 (footnotes omitted).
a thousand criminal convictions and other cases in which a court-ordered new elections because of fraud.\textsuperscript{10} This database is not a comprehensive list of all the fraud that has occurred in American elections, but it is a sampling of the many different types of fraud that have occurred and serves as a sobering reminder of the need for election safeguards.\textsuperscript{11}

This catalog of cases does not include other evidence of election fraud. For example, the Government Accountability Institute (“GAI”) discovered that thousands of individuals had illegally cast votes in multiple states in the 2016 election.\textsuperscript{12} GAI obtained voter rolls and voter histories from twenty-one states, representing 17\% of all possible state-to-state combinations.\textsuperscript{13} GAI performed a data comparison of registered voters using a rigorous matching methodology that relied on names, birthdates, and full social security numbers.\textsuperscript{14} As GAI said in its report, “[t]he probability of correctly matching two records with the same name, birthdate, and social security number is close to 100 percent. Using these match points will result in virtually zero false positives from the actual matching process.”\textsuperscript{15}

GAI found almost 8,500 individuals who had voted illegally in more than one state.\textsuperscript{16} That included 2,200 duplicate voters in Florida, where George W. Bush’s 2000 election margin of victory was only 537 votes, and the 2018 election had several extremely tight races including for governor and U.S. senator.\textsuperscript{17} Despite this clear evidence of fraud

\textsuperscript{10} Election Fraud Cases from Across the Country, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud (last visited May 13, 2019).

\textsuperscript{11} Id.; see, e.g., JOHN FUND & HANS VON SPAKOVSKY, WHO’S COUNTING?: HOW FRAUDSTERS AND BUREAUCRATS PUT YOUR VOTE AT RISK 33–44 (2012); LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 274–301 (1996).


\textsuperscript{13} Id. at 2.

\textsuperscript{14} Id. at 3.

\textsuperscript{15} Id.

\textsuperscript{16} Id. at 2–3.

\textsuperscript{17} PowerPoint, Ken Block, Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, Data Mining for Potential Voter Fraud: Findings and Recommendations, Slide 8 (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/docs/pacei-ken-block-
by thousands of voters, there is no indication that a single election official in any of the states examined by GAI made any effort to obtain the names of any of these duplicate voters to initiate investigations and possible prosecutions. GAI estimated that extending its conservative matching formula to all 50 states “would indicate an expected minimum of 45,000 high-confidence duplicate voting matches.”

The Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”), a non-profit public interest law firm dedicated to improving election integrity, has also obtained official registration records from several states including Virginia, Michigan, and New Jersey. These records showed that thousands of noncitizens were removed from voter rolls after the noncitizens contacted officials and asked to be removed, but not before many of them had cast ballots in multiple elections. What is most concerning about this is the fact that these noncitizens registered and cast illegal votes without detection by any election officials, which demonstrates the vulnerability of the current “honor” system most states have in the election process. The fact that these noncitizens were removed only after they voluntarily notified election officials of the problem begs the question: how many other undetected noncitizens are illegally registered and voting across the nation?

Just as with GAI’s findings, there is no indication that election officials forwarded the names of any of the noncitizens reported by

18. AMERICA THE VULNERABLE, supra note 12, at 3.
PILF to law enforcement officials for investigation and possible prosecution.

Our voter registration and election system desperately needs reforms intended to address these types of vulnerabilities, and these reforms are not, as some claim, “voter suppression.”

III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT SECTION 5, SHELBY COUNTY, AND VOTER SUPPRESSION

The supposed voter suppression epidemic is often blamed on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, in which the Court struck down the coverage formula of Section 5 of the VRA. The claim is that once certain states were no longer covered under Section 5, their state legislatures rushed to pass laws intended to suppress minority voters and keep them from registering and casting their ballots. Critics say these discriminatory laws would have been stopped by the DOJ under preclearance requirements of Section 5. That is also a false claim.

Passed in 1965, Section 5 was originally an emergency five-year provision that required covered jurisdictions to get approval of any changes in their voting laws from the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or a three-judge panel in federal court in Washington, D.C., a process known as preclearance. It was renewed for an additional five years in 1970; for an additional seven years in 1975; for an additional twenty-five years in 1982; and finally an additional twenty-five years in 2006. At the time of the Shelby County decision in 2013, Section 5 covered nine states and parts of six others.

23. See, e.g., Gupta, supra note 21, at 1–2.
24. Id.
25. 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012); Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 538.
Critics point to the *Shelby County* decision as the genesis of the voter suppression movement despite the fact that voter ID requirements were implemented in places like Georgia, Indiana, and Arizona years before the Court decided *Shelby County*. In fact, both Georgia and Arizona were covered under Section 5, and their ID laws were not only precleared and approved by the U.S. Department of Justice under Section 5 but also survived court challenges under Section 2 of the VRA.

The Court ruled that the coverage formula contained in Section 4, which determined which states and jurisdictions were subject to Section 5, was unconstitutional because it had not been updated to reflect modern conditions when it was renewed by Congress in 2006: “[H]istory did not end in 1965 . . . [Y]et the coverage formula that Congress reauthorized in 2006 . . . ke[pt] the focus on decades-old data relevant to decades-old problems, rather than current data reflecting current needs.”

Congress specifically designed the coverage formula of Section 4 to capture those states that were engaging in blatant discrimination by taking into account black voters’ low registration and turnout caused by discriminatory practices. Thus, coverage under Section 4 was based on a jurisdiction maintaining a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and registration or turnout of all voters of less than 50% in the 1964 election. Registration or turnout of less than 50% in the 1968 and 1972 elections was added in successive renewals of the law, the latest in 1975. That was the last time the coverage formula was revised, and the Section 4 formula did not utilize more current information when Section 5 was renewed in 2006.

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29. See, e.g., Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 554 F.3d at 1357; Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d at 1052; Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 27.

30. *Shelby County*, 570 U.S. at 552–53.


32. A test or device referred to a practice such as a literary test that was used by local election officials to deny or abridge the right to an individual. See id. § 10303(c).

33. *Id.* § 10303(b).

34. *Id.*
As the Court pointed out, the original conditions that justified the preclearance requirements no longer existed; in fact, the turnout of minority voters in the covered jurisdictions was higher than in the rest of the nation, and black turnout exceeded white turnout in “five of the six States originally covered by Section 5, with a gap in the sixth State of less than one half of one percent.”

Section 5 was needed in 1965. But as the Court recognized, time has not stood still, and “[n]early 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.” Systematic, widespread discrimination against black voters has long since disappeared. As the Court recognized in the Northwest Austin case in 2009: “Voter turnout and registration rates now approach parity. Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”

The Census Bureau’s May 2013 report on the 2012 election showed that blacks voted at a higher rate than whites nationally (66.2% vs. 64.1%). That same report shows that black voting rates exceeded that of whites in Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, all of which were covered in whole by Section 5, and in North Carolina and Florida, portions of which were covered by Section 5. Louisiana and Texas, which were also covered by Section 5, showed no statistically significant disparity between black and white turnout.

Overall, the black voting rate is consistently higher than the white voting rate in the formerly covered jurisdictions than in most of the nation.

Looking at long-term trends, in the 2014 congressional elections, black turnout was slightly above the black turnout rate in 1978 (40.6% vs. 39.5%) while white turnout in the same period had declined.

35. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 535.
36. Id. at 547.
39. Id. at 9 fig.5.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 8.
by about five percentage points (50.6% vs. 45.8%). By comparison, there has been a steep downward trend in the overall turnout rate in congressional elections from 48.9% in 1978 to only 41.9% in 2014. This turnout data does not support the claim that the turnout of black voters is somehow being “suppressed.” In fact, minority turnout has bucked the overall long-term downward trend in general turnout.

No one can reasonably claim that there is still widespread, official discrimination in any of the previously covered states, or that there are any marked differences between states such as Georgia, which was covered, and states such as Massachusetts, which was not covered. As the Supreme Court approvingly noted and as Judge Stephen F. Williams pointed out in his dissent in the Shelby County decision in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, jurisdictions covered under Section 4 before Shelby County had “higher black registration and turnout” than uncovered jurisdictions. Covered jurisdictions also “ha[d] far more black officeholders as a proportion of the black population than do uncovered ones.” In a study that looked at lawsuits filed under Section 2 of the VRA, Judge Williams found that the “five worst uncovered jurisdictions . . . have worse records than eight of the covered jurisdictions.”

Arizona and Alaska, which were covered under Section 5, had no successful Section 2 lawsuit ever filed against them in the 24 years

43. Id. at 4 fig.2.
45. Georgia and Massachusetts had almost identical turnout of their voting eligible populations in the 2018 congressional election: 55% in Georgia and 54.6% in Massachusetts. Id.
47. 679 F.3d at 892.
48. Id. at 897.
reviewed by that same study cited by Judge Williams.\textsuperscript{49} The increased number of current black officeholders throughout the covered jurisdictions provides additional assurance that official, systemic discriminatory actions are highly unlikely to recur.

Without evidence of widespread voting disparities among the states, continuing the coverage formula unchanged in 2006 was irrational. As the Supreme Court said in \textit{Shelby County}, Congress “did not use the record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions.”\textsuperscript{50} Instead, it reenacted Section 4 “based on 40-year-old facts having no logical relation to the present day.”\textsuperscript{51} It would be no different than if Congress in 1965 had based the coverage formula not on what had happened in the prior year’s election in 1964, but had instead opted to base coverage on registration and turnout from the Hoover era in 1928 or the Roosevelt election in 1932.

The \textit{Shelby County} decision did not affect the viability of other portions of the VRA, including its most powerful tool. Section 2 of the VRA is a nationwide, permanent prohibition on the “denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees” that protect language minorities.\textsuperscript{52}

\section*{IV. THE RECENT ENFORCEMENT RECORD OF THE DOJ}

If there really had been a flood of laws passed by state legislatures to suppress the votes of minority voters, particularly after \textit{Shelby County}, there is no question that there would have been an increase in the enforcement activities of the DOJ under the various federal voting rights laws it is tasked with enforcing. Yet not only did that not occur, enforcement actually decreased during the Obama administration when compared to the prior Bush administration.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{49} \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{50} \textit{Shelby County}, 570 U.S. at 554.
\item \textsuperscript{51} \textit{Id}.
\end{itemize}
A. The Recent Enforcement Record of the DOJ Under Section 2

Tom Perez (2009–13) and Vanita Gupta (2014–17), two political appointees who headed the Civil Rights Division during the Obama administration, have made similar claims that so-called voter suppression is an ongoing issue.\(^{53}\) Gupta claims that voting rights “in America are under assault” and that the “Shelby County decision emboldened states to pass voter suppression laws, such as those requiring photo identification.”\(^{54}\) Perez claims he investigated “voter suppression” and spent “much of [his] time” as head of the Civil Rights Division “suing states that tried to block eligible voters from the ballot box.”\(^{55}\)

Given the very clear statements of members of the Obama administration, including the two heads of the Civil Rights Division who were responsible for enforcing the VRA, there is little doubt that if a state were to have engaged in voter suppression—abridging the right to vote in a discriminatory manner—the Obama administration would have filed suit to stop it. In fact, Attorney General Eric Holder announced on July 16, 2013, only one month after the Shelby County decision, that he was directing the Civil Rights Division “to shift resources to the enforcement of Voting Rights Act provisions that were not affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling—including Section 2.”\(^{56}\)

Yet a review of the litigation record of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division after Shelby County shows no sharp increase in enforcement actions that would correlate with a widespread (or even isolated) “voter suppression” effort.\(^{57}\) In fact, the Obama administration’s enforcement record, contrary to the claims of Perez and Gupta, shows an overall substantial downward trend in the number of enforcement actions filed in comparison to the Bush administration under the


\(^{54}\) Gupta, supra note 21.

\(^{55}\) Perez, supra note 53.

\(^{56}\) Holder, supra note 1.

various provisions of the VRA from 2001 to 2016, including after 2013, the year *Shelby County* was decided.\(^{58}\)

The Voting Section’s litigation list shows that the Bush administration filed sixteen cases to enforce Section 2 of the VRA in the administration’s eight years.\(^{59}\) Four of those cases were in three jurisdictions covered by Section 5: South Carolina, Georgia, and Mississippi.\(^{60}\)

The Obama administration filed only four cases to enforce Section 2 in that administration’s eight years, three of which were filed after the *Shelby County* decision.\(^{61}\) Those three cases were in jurisdictions covered by Section 5: two in Texas (covered in whole) and one in North Carolina (where only part of the state was covered).\(^{62}\)

There was no upsurge in Section 2 cases after the 2013 *Shelby County* decision; in fact, the Obama administration filed far fewer Section 2 enforcement actions than the prior administration. The number of Section 2 cases filed in Section 5 jurisdictions by the Bush administration prior to *Shelby County* and the number of Section 2 cases filed in former Section 5 jurisdictions by the Obama administration after *Shelby County* was exactly the same—three.

So again, there was no sudden rise in enforcement actions filed to stop voting discrimination (or so-called voter suppression) in jurisdictions formerly covered by Section 5. Thus, despite its rhetoric, the Obama administration was not able to discern any widespread voter suppression efforts or else it would have filed many more Section 2 enforcement actions. Instead, it filed only one-third the number of cases of the prior Republican administration.

An examination of those Section 2 cases filed against Texas and North Carolina by the Obama administration also raises serious doubts about the “voter suppression” claim.

One of those Texas cases was a typical redistricting case, similar to many other redistricting cases that the Civil Rights Division filed.

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58. *Id.* The official DOJ list of cases and settlement agreements under the VRA and the NVRA is available on the webpage of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division. *Id.* The settlement agreements listed are in enforcement matters that were settled without suit being filed. *Id.* That webpage provides the numbers of enforcement cases cited in this article.

59. *Id.*

60. *Id.; Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra* note 27.

61. *Voting Section Litigation, supra* note 57.

62. *Id.; Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra* note 27.
over the long history of the VRA against both Democratic and Republican state legislatures.\(^{63}\) Such cases often come down to a dispute over relatively small differences in the percentages of minority voters in particular districts and the effects those differences may or may not have on the ability of voters to elect their candidates of choice.\(^{64}\) Those “effects” are often based on speculation by competing experts on whether candidates preferred by minority voters have the ability to get elected.\(^{65}\) The “voter suppression” claim can’t be made against the Texas case given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of intentional discrimination.\(^{66}\)

The other Texas enforcement action was against the state’s voter ID law,\(^{67}\) while the case filed against North Carolina by the DOJ attacked not only the state’s voter ID law but also its changes in early voting, termination of same-day registration, and its reinstatement of a requirement for voting in a voter’s assigned precinct.\(^{68}\)

In *North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory*, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit overruled a district court finding that none of these reforms were discriminatory in either purpose or

\(^{63}\) For the long, complicated history of the most recent redistricting dispute in Texas, see *Abbott v. Perez*, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018). The Supreme Court held that there was no evidence of bad faith or intentional discrimination when Texas adopted an interim redistricting plan; rejected claims that one congressional and two state house districts violated the VRA; and held that one state house district that had been turned into a Latino opportunity district by moving in Latino voters at the request of counsel for a plaintiff was an impermissible racial gerrymander. *Id.* at 2327, 2313–14, 2335. Texas was trying to make it easier to elect a Hispanic candidate, not harder.

\(^{64}\) In redistricting cases, Section 2 requires that protected groups have the same ability as other voters “to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012 & Supp. 2018) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).

\(^{65}\) This is because Section 2 provides that the “extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered” when determining if a legislative district violates Section 2. *Id.*

\(^{66}\) *See Perez*, 138 S. Ct. at 2327.

\(^{67}\) *Veasey v. Abbott*, 888 F.3d 792, 795 (5th Cir. 2018). As discussed in detail later in this Section, the amended Texas voter ID law is in place today after being upheld by the Fifth Circuit.

effect. Instead, it held that all these reforms, including the state’s voter ID law, were discriminatory and violated the VRA.

The Fourth Circuit panel’s decision regarding the North Carolina law, however, is an outlier that is not in accord with the findings and holdings of other courts. The Fourth Circuit panel accused the district court judge of having “missed the forest in carefully surveying the many trees” in finding that the North Carolina election reform law was not discriminatory. However, it is the Fourth Circuit panel that seems to have missed both the trees and the forest because the district court judge presented a detailed analysis of the factual evidence and the expert’s opinion that demonstrated that the various reforms were not enacted with any discriminatory intent and would not have a discriminatory effect on voters.

As just one example, the panel assigned great weight (and assigned nefarious motives) to the fact that the state legislature requested racial data relevant to its proposed changes in election laws. But the panel was seemingly ignorant of the DOJ’s practices under the VRA. A portion of North Carolina had long been covered under the preclearance procedures of Section 5 until the Shelby County decision. The state legislature was well aware of that, because of that coverage, the DOJ

69. Id. at 214. On the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts noted that there was a dispute over the petition filed with the Court. North Carolina v. N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1399–1400 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). It had been filed by the state, its governor (a Republican), and the state board of elections prior to the 2016 election. Id. The newly elected Democratic attorney general moved to dismiss the petition on behalf of the state and the new Democratic governor. Id. The North Carolina legislature objected, claiming the attorney general had no authority under state law to dismiss the petition on behalf of the state. Id. According to Roberts:

Given the blizzard of filings over who is and who is not authorized to seek review in this Court under North Carolina law, it is important to recall our frequent admonition that “[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case.”

Id. at 1400.

70. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 215.

71. Id. at 214.


73. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 216–17.

74. Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 27.
always demanded such racial data from jurisdictions filing preclearance submissions.\textsuperscript{75} While Section 5 was no longer in effect when this law was being considered by the state legislature, North Carolina was simply following the same procedures it had been following for 40 years as required under Section 5 practices.

Except for the voter ID requirement, all the other changes made by the North Carolina legislature at issue in the 2016 decision were actually in effect in the 2014 primary and general elections.\textsuperscript{76} As the district court pointed out, “the greatest increase in turnout in the 2014 midterm primary was observed among African American voters, despite the implementation of [the election reform bill];” similarly, “[n]ot only did African American turnout increase more than other groups in 2014 . . . but that general election saw the smallest white-African American turnout disparity in any midterm” since 2002.\textsuperscript{77} Thus, contrary to the panel’s speculation, there was actual evidence that these reforms did not have a discriminatory effect in depressing minority turnout.

The Fourth Circuit panel also threw out the voter ID portion of the election reform law.\textsuperscript{78} But a different panel of the same Fourth Circuit upheld Virginia’s voter ID requirement in 2016, finding that it was not discriminatory under the VRA.\textsuperscript{79} Virginia’s law requires a photo ID to vote but has an exemption that allows individuals to vote who don’t have an ID just as the North Carolina law did, which the Fourth Circuit said was discriminatory despite that exemption.\textsuperscript{80}

The Fourth Circuit’s decision in \textit{NAACP v. McCrory} that not allowing voters to cast a ballot outside of their assigned precinct is discriminatory and amounts to voter suppression is not consistent with the law and decisions from other jurisdictions. As the Sixth Circuit said in \textit{Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell}, requiring individuals

\textsuperscript{75} The author is the former Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights and Coordinated Enforcement of Section 5 of the VRA when he was at the DOJ from 2001 to 2005.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP}, 182 F. Supp. 3d at 332–37, 348–49.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id.} at 349–50.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{McCrory}, 831 F.3d at 219.


\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Lee}, 843 F.3d at 594; \textit{McCrory}, 831 F.3d at 219. Under the Virginia law, “if a voter does not possess an acceptable form of photo identification, Virginia’s Board of Elections must provide one to the voter free of charge and without any requirement that the voter present documentation.” \textit{Lee}, 843 F.3d at 594.
to vote in an assigned precinct is an “aspect common to elections in almost every state” and did not violate federal law. There are rational and reasonable grounds for such a requirement:

The advantages of the precinct system are significant and numerous: it caps the number of voters attempting to vote in the same place on election day; it allows each precinct ballot to list all of the votes a citizen may cast for all pertinent federal, state, and local elections, referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows each precinct ballot to list only those votes a citizen may cast, making ballots less confusing; it makes it easier for election officials to monitor votes and prevent election fraud; and it generally puts polling places in closer proximity to voter residences.

A panel of the Ninth Circuit recently held that “Arizona’s longstanding requirement that in-person voters cast their ballots in their assigned precinct” is not a violation of Section 2 of the VRA or the First, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Such a requirement imposes “only a minimal burden on voters” and serves “Arizona’s important regulatory interests.”

There cannot be a violation of the law when there is no discrimination present that prevents individuals from voting in their assigned precincts even though it may be more “convenient” to vote outside of an assigned precinct.

The Sixth Circuit also disagreed with the Fourth Circuit panel’s distorted view of early voting and same day registration and issued a warning to courts about getting “entangled, as overseers and micromanagers, in the minutiae of state election processes.” The Fourth Circuit held that North Carolina’s elimination of same day registration (which the majority of states do not allow) and its reduction in the

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81. 387 F.3d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
82. Id. at 569.
84. Id. at 697.
86. As of January 2019, only 17 states and the District of Columbia allow same day (or election day) registration. Same Day Voter Registration, NAT’L CONF. ST.
number of early voting days from seventeen to ten (although the number of hours the polls stayed open remained the same) was also discriminatory. But the claim that making changes in early voting or not offering same day registration is somehow discriminatory is not only not true, it amounts to a court micromanaging the state’s election process.

As the Sixth Circuit pointed out in *Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted*, the “Constitution does not require any opportunities for early voting.” The plaintiffs in that case claimed that the Ohio legislature’s decision to reduce the number of early voting days from thirty-five to twenty-nine days before Election Day was discriminatory under Section 2 of the VRA and unconstitutional. According to the Sixth Circuit, which ruled against the plaintiffs, this was “an astonishing proposition”:

> Nearly a third of the states offer no early voting. Adopting plaintiffs’ theory of disenfranchisement would create a “one-way ratchet” that would discourage states from ever increasing early voting opportunities, lest they be prohibited by federal courts from later modifying their election procedures in response to changing circumstances. Further, while the challenged regulation may slightly diminish the convenience of registration and voting, it applies even-handedly to all voters, and, despite the change, Ohio continues to provide generous, reasonable, and accessible voting options to all Ohioans.

Those who argue that not allowing same day registration or early voting amounts to voter suppression and a violation of federal law because such opportunities might benefit some voters are making the wrong inquiry. As the Sixth Circuit laid out:

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88. *Ohio Democratic Party*, 834 F.3d at 623.
89. *Id.*
90. *Id.*
The issue is not whether some voter somewhere would benefit from . . . early voting or from the opportunity to register and vote at the same time. Rather, the issue is whether the challenged law results in a cognizable injury under the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. We conclude that it does not.\footnote{Id.}

If all voters in a state, regardless of their racial or ethnic background, have the same opportunity to register and exercise their right to vote, it is not voter suppression of minority voters if they are not given a certain number of days of early voting or are not allowed to register and vote on Election Day. As the Sixth Circuit in \textit{Ohio Democratic Party} stated, it is as if the critics want to “disregard the Constitution’s clear mandate that the states (and not the courts) establish election protocols, instead reading the document to require all states to maximize voting convenience.”\footnote{Id. at 629.} Under that legal theory:

\begin{quote}
[L]ittle stretch of imagination is needed to fast-forward and envision a regime of judicially-mandated voting by text message or Tweet (assuming of course, that cell phones and Twitter handles are not disparately possessed by identifiable segments of the voting population).\footnote{Id.}
\end{quote}

Similarly, in 2012, a federal judge rejected a challenge to the State of Florida’s reduction of early voting from twelve to eight days, concluding it was not a violation of the VRA or the Constitution.\footnote{See Brown v. Detzner, 895 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1255–56 (M.D. Fla. 2012).} The fact that more minority voters might prefer early voting did “not demonstrate that the changes will deny minorities equal access to the polls.”\footnote{Id. at 1246.} The court pointed out that many states do not have early voting at all, yet under the theory being pushed by the plaintiffs, the “next logical step” would be a claim:

\begin{quote}
[T]hat if a state with a higher percentage of registered African-American voters than Florida did not implement
an early voting program a Section 2 violation would occur because African-American voters in that state would have less of an opportunity to vote than voters in Florida. It would also follow that a Section 2 violation could occur in Florida if a state with a lower percentage of African-American voters employed an early voting system . . . that lasts three weeks instead of the two week system currently used in Florida. This simply cannot be the standard for establishing a Section 2 violation.96

Contrary to the Fourth Circuit panel’s view about early voting, although some voters may find it more convenient, turnout data show that early voting seems to actually decrease turnout. For example, a 2013 study released by professors from the University of Wisconsin that compared turnout in early voting states to those without early voting showed that “early voting lowers the likelihood of turnout by three to four percentage points.”97

Even the experts retained by the challengers in *NAACP v. McCrory* admitted that early voting does not increase turnout. The district court pointed out that one of the experts opined, in a peer reviewed publication, that the “research thus far has already disproved one commonly made assertion, that early voting increases turnout. It does not.”98 In fact, the longer the window of early voting, the greater the effect on lowering turnout.99 The reasons that early voting hurts turnout have not been conclusively determined. But a reasonable inference is that allowing voters to vote over an extended period of time diffuses the effectiveness of mobilization activities by candidates and political parties.

In addition to the North Carolina voter ID law that was challenged by the DOJ, a Section 2 lawsuit was also filed by the Obama

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96. *Id.* at 1254 (quoting Jacksonville Coal. for Voter Prot. v. Hood, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1335–36 (M.D. Fla. 2004)).
administration against Texas in *Veasey v. Abbott*.\(^{100}\) Despite the frequently asserted claim that all ID laws are intended to suppress votes, they have been upheld as nondiscriminatory, an intangible burden on voters, and constitutional in court decisions in numerous states including Georgia, Indiana, Tennessee, South Carolina, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Alabama, among others.\(^{101}\)

The end result of *Veasey* is that, with minor modifications, the voter ID law is in place in Texas.\(^{102}\) This litigation resulted in a series of decisions by the Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit. In an *en banc* decision, the Fifth Circuit found the ID requirement had a disparate impact on minority voters but reversed the district court’s finding that the ID requirement was enacted with a discriminatory purpose and remanded the case for further consideration.\(^{103}\) The Fifth Circuit said that the district court’s finding was “infirm” and that the court had “relied too heavily on the evidence of State-sponsored discrimination dating back hundreds of years” instead of more contemporary examples.\(^{104}\) Furthermore, said the Fifth Circuit, “[n]o one questions the legitimacy” of the concerns of the state legislature in passing this law that “centered on protection of the sanctity of voting, avoiding voter fraud, and promoting public confidence in the voting process.”\(^{105}\)

It should be noted that actual voter turnout contradicted the claims that the Texas voter ID law would have a disparate impact on minority voters in Texas, reflecting that the *en banc* court’s conclusion

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100. *See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2018).*


102. *See Veasey, 888 F.3d 792.* The original Texas statute required a Texas driver’s license, non-driver’s license ID, or “Election Identification Certificate” issued by the Texas Department of Public Safety, a Texas concealed carry permit, a U.S. passport, or military ID. *Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 225 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 612 (2017).*

103. *See Veasey, 830 F.3d at 272.*

104. Id. at 230–31.

105. Id. at 231.
on the effect of the law was wrong.\textsuperscript{106} Before the ID law was preliminarily enjoined, it was in effect for the 2013 state elections in Texas in which there were state constitutional amendments on the ballot, as well as candidates and other ballots issues in individual counties.\textsuperscript{107} Turnout went up with the ID law in place when compared to the 2011 state election, including in counties that are heavily minority counties.\textsuperscript{108}

On remand from the Fifth Circuit, the district court issued a permanent injunction against the ID law.\textsuperscript{109} This was later reversed as an abuse of discretion by a panel of the Fifth Circuit, which held that an amendment to the original law that had been approved by the state legislature ameliorated the problems claimed by the plaintiffs.\textsuperscript{110} That amendment allowed any voter without one of the free photo IDs issued by the state to vote after completing a “Declaration of Reasonable Impediment” form and presenting a specified form of non-photo ID.\textsuperscript{111}

Election officials could not question the reasonableness of the voter’s explanation in the declaration of why the voter was not able to obtain the free photo ID.\textsuperscript{112} The form of non-photo ID that had to be presented with the declaration included a valid voter-registration or birth certificate, a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government documents with the voter’s name and address.\textsuperscript{113}

Contrast the Obama administration’s position in the \textit{Veasey} case with its position in \textit{NAACP v. McCrory}. When \textit{Veasey} was on remand, the DOJ filed a joint pleading with Texas prior to the 2016 election in which the DOJ agreed that an appropriate interim remedy would be a “reasonable impediment” exemption—the very same exemption that


\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Id.} at 1.

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Id.} at 2.


\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Veasey v. Abbott}, 888 F.3d 792, 795–96 (5th Cir. 2018).

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.} at 796.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Id.}
the Texas legislature then adopted in 2017, which the Fifth Circuit sub-
sequently held ameliorated the plaintiffs’ claims. This submission 
was made by Vanita Gupta, who was the principal deputy (and thus 
acting) attorney general for the Civil Rights Division.

Significantly, the DOJ’s position in Veasey was inconsistent 
with the position it took in McCrory. The North Carolina voter ID law 
challenged by the DOJ (that was eventually thrown out by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals panel) in McCrory had been similarly 
amended by the state legislature to add a reasonable impediment ex-
emption. The North Carolina law allowed an individual to vote after 
completing a declaration of reasonable impediment form, without 
the second requirement of showing an identification document such as a 
valid voter-registration or birth certificate, a current utility bill, bank 
statement, government check, paycheck, or other government docu-
ments with the voter’s name and address. Thus, the North Carolina 
law was less “burdensome” than the Texas law that the Civil Rights 
Division had previously approved.

Yet, contrary to the position it took in Veasey, the DOJ claimed, 
and a panel of the Fourth Circuit agreed, that even with the reasonable 
impediment exemption, the North Carolina ID law was discrimina-
tory. The Fourth Circuit’s view was not only out of step with the 
Fifth Circuit in Veasey, it was also not in accord with a three-judge 
panel decision in the District of Columbia.

In 2012, when Section 5 of the VRA was still in effect, South 
Carolina filed a lawsuit in the District of Columbia seeking preclear-
ce of its new voter ID law, which had a reasonable impediment ex-
emption. Individuals would still be able to vote without a photo ID

114. Id.; Joint Submission of Agreed Terms at 2, Tex. State Conf. of NAACP 
Terms].

115. Joint Submission of Agreed Terms at 4, supra note 114.

116. See N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 

345 (M.D.N.C. 2016).

118. McCrory, 831 F.3d at 243.

119. See id. at 240.

by signing “an affidavit at the polling place” that listed “the reason that they have not obtained a photo ID” provided by the state for voting without a fee.121

In an opinion written by then-District of Columbia Circuit Court Judge (now Associate Justice) Brett Kavanagh, the panel held that South Carolina’s voter ID law did not violate the VRA.122 The court stated that the South Carolina law “does not have a discriminatory retrogressive effect” and “was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose.”123 That law has been in place since 2013 without any reported problems.

The idea that it is a violation of the VRA if there is some slight disparity between racial groups in the percentage of black and whites who already have a photo ID is simply not credible nor reasonable. When the Seventh Circuit upheld Wisconsin’s voter ID law against claims that the law was discriminatory because, it was alleged, there was a slight disparity between the percentage of whites and blacks who already possess photo IDs, the court articulated a common sense argument that disrupts the voter-ID-is-voter-suppression mantra:

Plaintiffs describe registered voters who lack photo ID as “disenfranchised.” If the reason they lack photo ID is that the state has made it impossible, or even hard, for them to get photo ID, then “disfranchised” might be an apt description. But if photo ID is available to people willing to . . . stand in line at the office that issues drivers’ licenses, then all we know from the fact that a particular person lacks a photo ID is that he was unwilling to invest the necessary time.124

The numbers often put forward by those who claim that large numbers of Americans don’t have photo ID are, as the Seventh Circuit correctly noted, “fanciful” in a:

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Under Section 5, no voting change could be approved if it would have a retrogressive effect, i.e., putting voters in a worse position than before the change. See id.
124. Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 2014).
[W]orld in which photo ID is essential to board an airplane, enter Canada or any other foreign nation, drive a car (even people who do not own cars need licenses to drive friends’ or relatives’ cars), buy a beer, purchase pseudoephedrine for a stuffy nose or pick up a prescription at a pharmacy, open a bank account or cash a check at a currency exchange, buy a gun, or enter a courthouse to serve as a juror or watch the argument of this appeal.\textsuperscript{125}

Thus, the DOJ’s recent record of enforcement of Section 2 of the VRA provides little evidence to support the claim that there are widespread, unlawful, voter suppression actions being taken against minority voters by states and local jurisdictions. The Texas voter ID litigation in \textit{Veasey} resulted in only minor changes to its election procedures, and the court’s decision in the North Carolina case, \textit{NAACP v. McCrory}, is inconsistent with both the law and what actually happened in North Carolina when the law was in effect.

\textbf{B. The Recent Enforcement Record of the DOJ Under Section 11(b)}

Another provision of the VRA that could be used to go after actual voter suppression is Section 11(b), which provides that “[n]o

C. The Recent Enforcement Record of the DOJ Under Section 208

Section 208 of the VRA requires local governments to allow “[a]ny voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write [to] be given assistance by a person of the voter’s choice . . . .” 129 Although this may sound like an

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127. Id. § 10307(a).
128. See Cases Raising Claims Under Section 11(B) of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-section-11b-voting-rights-act#philadelphia (last updated Aug. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Cases Raising Claims Under Section 11(B) of the Voting Rights Act]. The mishandling by the Obama administration of the New Black Panther Party lawsuit filed by the Bush Administration just before it left office was very controversial. The complaint alleged that members of the New Black Panther Party, dressed in black, paramilitary-style uniforms and carrying nightsticks, threatened and intimidated individuals at a polling place in Philadelphia. The case in large part was dismissed with a watered-down injunction even though the DOJ could have obtained a default judgment when the defendants failed to answer the lawsuit. FUND & VON SPAKOVSKY, supra note 11, at 139–47. U.S. v. Brown was the first case ever filed by the DOJ against local black officials for discriminating against white voters. The district court judge concluded that the VRA protects all voters and that the defendants engaged in racially-motivated manipulation of the electoral process to dilute the votes of white voters. See United States v. Brown, 494 F. Supp. 2d 440, 486–87 (S.D. Miss. 2007), aff’d, 561 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2009).
innocuous provision, the DOJ has used it in the past to go after jurisdictions that were refusing to allow voters to be assisted or who were allowing improper assistance—assistance that was intimidating or involved threats to voters to make them vote for particular candidates.\footnote{130}

Yet the Obama administration filed only one enforcement action utilizing this provision in its entire eight years in office, and that case was filed in 2009,\footnote{131} four years before Shelby County. In comparison, the Bush administration filed ten cases to enforce Section 208.\footnote{132} Only two of those cases were filed in a jurisdiction covered by Section 5, both in Texas.\footnote{133}

Again, the record of the last ten years of enforcement of Section 208 shows no widespread voter suppression effort that prevents voters from getting the assistance they need to vote.

\section*{D. The Recent Enforcement Record of the DOJ Under the National Voter Registration Act}

Often claims of “voter suppression” relate to registration list maintenance procedures that remove voters who have died, moved away, or otherwise become ineligible to vote. The NVRA\footnote{134} sets out strict standards that specify the rules governing such maintenance procedures (which the law requires to be utilized on a regular basis)\footnote{135} and the conditions under which registrants can be removed from the voter rolls. Compliance with the NVRA cannot reasonably be termed “voter suppression.”

\footnotesize

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{130. See, e.g., Consent Decree, Judgment, and Order, United States v. Fort Bend Cty., No. 4:09-cv-1058 (S.D. Tex. April 13th, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/ftbend_cd.pdf.}
\item \footnote{131. Voting Section Litigation, supra note 57.}
\item \footnote{132. Id.}
\item \footnote{133. Id.; Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, supra note 27.}
\item \footnote{134. 52 U.S.C. § 20501 (2012). There are also requirements governing statewide voter registration lists as well as voter registration in general in the Help America Vote Act of 2002. See id. § 20901; see also id. § 21083 (entitled “Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements and requirements for voters who register by mail”).}
\item \footnote{135. States must “conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible voters . . . .” Id. § 20507(a)(4).}
\end{itemize}
Violations of the NVRA by, for example, removing eligible voters from statewide voter registration lists, could, on the other hand, be considered voter suppression. Yet the enforcement records of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division show a sharp downturn in the number of enforcement actions filed under the NVRA over the past decade, including since Shelby County. While the Bush administration filed ten lawsuits to enforce the NVRA and entered into two settlement agreements, for a total of 12 enforcement actions, the Obama administration filed only four cases to enforce the NVRA and entered into two settlement agreements, for a total of six enforcement matters in the eight years it was in office, less than one per year.

That hardly constitutes evidence of widespread “voter suppression” given the number of election jurisdictions across the United States, which includes thousands of counties and individual townships in addition to the fifty states and the District of Columbia. In total, there are over 10,000 election administration jurisdictions in the United States. And that record certainly does not support the claim of the former head of the Civil Rights Division, Tom Perez, that he spent most of his time “suing states that tried to block eligible voters from the ballot box.”

Two of the NVRA lawsuits filed by the Obama administration, against Rhode Island and Louisiana, claimed that the states were not offering “voter registration opportunities in [state] public assistance offices and offices that provide state-funded programs primarily serving persons with disabilities.” One enforcement action against Florida


137. See id.; see also Voting Section Litigation, supra note 57. The Obama administration initiated an action against New York by letter dated January 6, 2017, but the case was ultimately settled by the Trump administration. See Memorandum of Understanding, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (June 20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/memorandum-understanding.


139. Perez, supra note 53.

140. Cases Raising Claims Under the National Voter Registration Act, supra note 136.
asserted it was conducting a list-maintenance program within 90 days of a federal election, which is prohibited under the NVRA. A fourth lawsuit against the City of New York, which is not exactly known as a Republican stronghold, was over the city’s list maintenance procedures. The DOJ claimed New York’s flawed procedures included not removing voters from the registration list who had died or moved away, as well as removing some voters for a failure to vote without using the notice procedures mandated in the NVRA. Although these cases all involved technical violations of the NVRA, none of them showed intentional, partisan conduct aimed at suppressing minority voters.

Both of the settlement agreements entered into between the Obama administration and the states of Connecticut and Alabama concerned the development of an electronic voter registration system for driver’s license applicants to replace the states’ paper-based systems. While that may certainly be a more efficient method of ensuring voter registration at DMV offices, the NVRA has no requirement for an electronic-based system. While the Obama administration persuaded these states to agree to implement new procedures not required under federal law, these settlement agreements cannot even remotely be classified as correcting any type of voter suppression, systemic or otherwise.

A relatively recent Supreme Court decision, Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, lays to rest the claim that complying with the NVRA’s requirement of removing voters who have moved, died, or otherwise become ineligible to vote to improve the accuracy of statewide voter registration rolls constitutes “voter suppression.” As that decision pointed out, registration lists in this country are very unreliable and inaccurate: “24 million voter registrations in the United

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141. See id.
142. Id.
144. See Voting Section Litigation, supra note 57.
145. See 52 U.S.C. § 20504 (2012), which requires states to provide applicants for a driver’s license with a voter registration form. There is no mention of an electronic form being required versus a paper form.
States—about one in eight—are either invalid or significantly inaccurate. And about 2.75 million people are said to be registered to vote in more than one State."\(^\text{147}\)

_Husted_ dealt with Ohio’s list maintenance procedures.\(^\text{148}\) Ohio uses the precise method outlined in the NVRA to maintain the accuracy of its voter rolls, procedures that the plaintiffs claimed violated both the NVRA and the Help America Vote Act ("HAVA") of 2002.\(^\text{149}\) As the Supreme Court summarized:

Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years as a rough way of identifying voters who may have moved, and it then sends a preaddressed, postage prepaid card to these individuals asking them to verify that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return this card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls.\(^\text{150}\)

According to the Court, Congress anticipated that some voters would not return the prepaid card to confirm they have not moved, and the NVRA treats that failure as non-dispositive evidence that they no longer reside at their registered address.\(^\text{151}\) The NVRA then allows states to remove that voter from the registration list if the voter fails to vote in two federal elections after the date the notice was sent out.\(^\text{152}\)

The plaintiffs’ challenge, claiming that states cannot remove registrants for a failure to vote under any circumstances, “not only second-guesses the congressional judgment embodied in [the NVRA’s] removal process, but it also second-guesses the judgment of the Ohio Legislature as expressed in the State’s [removal process].”\(^\text{153}\) States that comply with the NVRA therefore cannot be engaged in “voter suppression.”

Finally, it should be noted that the Obama administration filed one enforcement action under HAVA, which supplements the NVRA,

\(^\text{147}\) _Id._ at 1838 (citation omitted).
\(^\text{148}\) See _id._
\(^\text{149}\) _Id._ at 1838–41.
\(^\text{150}\) _Id._ at 1838.
\(^\text{151}\) _Id._ at 1839.
\(^\text{152}\) _Id._ at 1839–40.
\(^\text{153}\) _Id._ at 1846.
and entered into one settlement agreement. The DOJ settlement agreement was in regard to Palm Beach County, Florida’s failure to use voting machines that were fully compliant with Section 301 of HAVA, which requires at least one voting machine in each precinct that can used by blind or disabled voters.

The HAVA enforcement action was filed against Fort Bend County, Texas, for not providing provisional ballots as required under Section 302 of HAVA, and the case settled through a consent decree. HAVA’s provisional ballot provision allows any individual to vote after asserting that she is eligible and registered, even if her name does not appear on the list of registered voters in her precinct or if an election official challenges her eligibility. The voter casts a provisional ballot that is forwarded to election officials at the end of Election Day. Those officials determine if the individual was entitled to vote. If so, the vote must be counted, and the voter must be notified of the election officials’ decision, and if it is not counted the reasons for the decision.

Thus, if an eligible voter is removed from the registration list due to an administrative error or some kind of intentional misconduct by election officials, that voter will still be able to vote through the provisional balloting process. That is why claims of so-called voter

154. See Voting Section Litigation, supra note 57.
158. Id. § 21082(a)(3).
159. Id. § 21082(a)(4).
160. Id. § 21082(a)(4)–(5).
suppression over the supposedly unfair efforts to remove ineligible individuals from voter registration rolls should ultimately fail—because HAVA’s provisional balloting requirement acts as a failsafe to ensure that every individual who complies with his or her state’s registration requirement will be able to vote. And in its entire eight years in office, the Obama administration found only one instance from anywhere across the nation in which a political jurisdiction was violating the provisional balloting requirement.\(^{161}\)

The overall enforcement record of the DOJ under the VRA, the NVRA, and HAVA does not support the claim that there is widespread, unlawful “voter suppression” of minority voters going on across the country, either before or after the *Shelby County* decision. In fact, there has been a sharp downturn in the number of enforcement actions filed by the DOJ to enforce federal voting rights laws, particularly during the Obama administration.

Those who still claim there is a “voter suppression” epidemic cannot blame a lack of resources or personnel at the Civil Rights Division to pursue such claims either because the DOJ retained the lawyers and staff who worked full-time on Section 5 matters after the 2013 *Shelby County* decision.\(^{162}\) As directed by Eric Holder, that staff was reassigned to enforce the other provisions of the VRA and the NVRA (and HAVA).\(^{163}\) And appropriations from Congress for the Civil Rights Division have steadily increased from $136 million in FY 2013, the year *Shelby County* was decided, to $147.2 million in FY 2018.\(^{164}\)

Given that no one questions the Obama administration’s willingness to enforce provisions of the VRA, the NVRA, and HAVA, the

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163. See id.

downturn in enforcement actions most likely reflects a reduction in discriminatory actions by states and localities that would otherwise be sufficient to justify the DOJ filing a lawsuit.

V. A NEW SECTION 5?

Proponents of the “voter suppression” myth have called upon Congress to reinstate Section 5 of the VRA. The enforcement record, however, demonstrates that there is no need for Congress to reinstate Section 5. While Section 5 might have been a necessary measure at the time it was enacted, it constituted an unprecedented and extraordinary intrusion into state sovereignty, requiring covered states to get the federal government’s approval for voting changes made by state and local officials. No other federal law presumes that states cannot govern themselves and that they must obtain the federal government’s approval before they implement any changes to their own laws. As the Supreme Court said, Section 5 “employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary problem.”

Today, six years after Shelby County, as the DOJ’s enforcement record shows, there is still no evidence of widespread, systemic, official discrimination by any of the formerly covered jurisdictions (or any other state) that would justify re-imposing the onerous Section 5 pre-clearance requirement. In the relatively few jurisdictions where a Section 2 violation has been found, there is no evidence that those political bodies have evaded the court-imposed remedies to implement further discriminatory practices.

That is a key point because the fundamental reason that Section 5 was implemented in 1965 as an adjunct to Section 2 was to stop efforts by local jurisdictions to evade court-ordered remedies. As the Supreme Court said in 1966 in Katzenbach v. South Carolina, in which it upheld the constitutionality of Section 5, the pre-clearance requirement was tailored to stop such “obstructionist tactics.” But in 2013, the Supreme Court in Shelby County reiterated its earlier observation.

in *Northwest Austin* that nearly half a century later, “[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare.”168

Moreover, it would be fundamentally unfair to impose preclearance requirements on states or other political jurisdictions because of discriminatory actions—if they occur—that are committed by political subdivisions over which they have no control.

To meet the requirements of the Constitution and justify federal supervision of state and local government, a new coverage formula for Section 5 would have to identify those jurisdictions for which Section 2 would not be effective because of systemic racial discrimination and evasion of federal court decrees. That will not be possible because there is no evidence of such behavior in voting either in the states formerly covered under Section 5 or anywhere else.169

The absence of Section 5 does not mean jurisdictions can never be subject to federal oversight and a preclearance requirement. Critics of *Shelby County* seem to ignore another provision of the VRA, Section 3, which can be used to supervise any jurisdiction that has a proven pattern of discriminatory conduct.170 While the Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula of Section 4 that triggered Section 5 preclearance requirements, Section 3 was not at issue in *Shelby County*. Although Section 3 has rarely been used, if a jurisdiction has engaged in repeated discrimination and a court finds it is necessary to prevent future problems, Section 3 provides that the court can essentially place the jurisdiction into the equivalent of Section 5 coverage.171

If that happens, then “no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless” the court or the Attorney General has precleared the change and found that it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.”172

The point here is that while the Supreme Court in *Shelby County* found that the general conditions in covered states today do not justify their continued exception from general constitutional principles and

169. See supra Part IV.
171. Id.
172. Id.
structures, a court can still appoint federal examiners and place a particular jurisdiction into the equivalent of federal receivership—Section 5 preclearance—if it finds sufficient evidence of current, repeated discrimination and a recalcitrant defendant.

Section 5 was also unprecedented in the way it violated fundamental American principles of due process: it shifted the burden of proof of wrongdoing from the government to the covered jurisdiction. Unlike all other federal statutes that require the government to prove a violation of federal law, covered jurisdictions were put in the position of having to prove a negative—that a voting change was not intentionally discriminatory and did not have a discriminatory effect. While such a reversal of basic due process principles may have been constitutional at the time it was enacted, given the extraordinary circumstances present in 1965, it cannot be justified today.

Section 3 does not present this constitutional due process problem because it does not shift the burden of proof for preclearance to covered jurisdictions until the government or a private plaintiff has proven that the jurisdiction has engaged in discrimination. Thus, it remains a valuable, case-specific tool for those jurisdictions that a court finds should have a preclearance requirement.

And this powerful tool to combat attempts to suppress the votes of eligible, legitimate voters by recalcitrant jurisdictions has been successfully employed in two relatively recent cases in Alabama and Texas. The fact that there have only been two cases since Shelby County in which a political jurisdiction was ordered to be covered un-

173. Id. § 10304(a). Section 5 required a jurisdiction to prove that its voting change would not have “the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote.” Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. § 10302(c).
176. See Patino v. Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017); Allen v. City of Evergreen, No. 13-0107-CG-M, 2014 WL 12607819 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2014). These are the only two cases in which a federal court has found evidence sufficient to warrant imposition of the preclearance regime of Section 3 since Shelby County. This is another indication of how rare the circumstances are that would warrant preclearance. In the Texas voter ID case, Section 3 was not imposed on the state because the Fifth Circuit held that the district court not only had “no legal or factual basis to invalidate” the Texas ID law, but that “its contemplation of Section 3(c) relief accordingly fails as well.” Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 2018).
der Section 3, though, also shows that there is no evidence of widespread, voting discrimination or voter suppression anywhere in the country. It seems obvious that this claim is a myth created for partisan political purposes to scare voters.

VI. CONCLUSION

Americans today have an easier time registering and voting than at any time in our nation’s history. The DOJ’s enforcement record under the VRA, the NVRA, and the HAVA demonstrates that there is no widespread, systemic voter suppression effort by state legislatures to discriminate against minority voters and deny them (or any other citizens) the ability to vote.

In fact, the substantial reduction in enforcement actions during the eight years of the Obama administration demonstrates that the opposite is true—we have less discriminatory conduct today than ever before. The data on turnout in recent elections also provides no evidence that state laws and regulations governing registering to vote, casting ballots, or maintaining voter rolls are suppressing the ability of any American to cast ballots and participate in the electoral process.

This record also shows that there is no reason to reinstate the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the VRA to, in essence, place certain states in the equivalent of federal receivership when it comes to their laws and regulations governing voting. In fact, Congress would have a difficult time coming up with any kind of coverage formula that would withstand constitutional scrutiny and justify imposing such an extraordinary requirement on state and local governments.

To ensure fair elections that accurately reflect the will of the voters, states must have the ability to maintain the accuracy of voter registration rolls. In fact, federal law requires that they do so. Furthermore, states have an obligation to address the vulnerabilities in the honor system in place by implementing reforms that help improve the integrity of the democratic process, from the casting of votes to the counting of ballots.

Manufacturing false claims of voter suppression when states try to improve the security and integrity of the election process or when

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they make routine changes such as moving a polling place is a disservice to our democratic system. Not only does it damage public confidence, but also it clogs the judicial system with meritless claims in an attempt to persuade judges to, as the Sixth Circuit said, “become entangled, as overseers and micromanagers, in the minutiae of state election processes.”\textsuperscript{178} That is a serious error that federal judges should avoid.

It is also not a violation of the Constitution and it is not a discriminatory violation of the VRA to require voters to: vote on Election Day, as opposed to weeks before that day; register prior to the election;\textsuperscript{179} vote in the precinct where they reside; show some proof of identity; or verify that they still reside in a jurisdiction when election officials receive evidence that they may have moved out of state and thus have become ineligible to vote. This is not voter suppression.

A common refrain when it comes to voting rights and election administration is that we want to ensure that every eligible American citizen can vote and that fraud or administrative errors do not dilute his vote. That requires states to take reasonable, common sense actions that impose minimal burdens on voters and do not constitute “voter suppression.” Any claims to the contrary are wrong.

\textsuperscript{178} Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 622–23 (6th Cir. 2016), application for stay denied, 137 S. Ct. 28 (2016).

\textsuperscript{179} Although, states cannot require registration more than 30 days before Election Day. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972). James F. Blumstein, the plaintiff, is the University Professor of Constitutional Law at the Vanderbilt University School of Law. Id. at 331.