The Rise and Fall of the 1969 Chicago Jobs Campaign: Street Gangs, Coalition Politics, and the Origins of Mass Incarceration

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I. INTRODUCTION

On the morning of August 12, 1969, a crowd of more than a hundred Black youth attempted to force their way onto the construction site of a multi-million dollar research facility on the University of Illinois Circle (“UIC”) campus. Finding the front gate locked, these protestors, mostly members of Chicago’s three largest and most notorious street gang organizations—the Black P. Stone Rangers (“Stones”), Black Disciples (“Disciples”), and Conservative Vice Lords (“Lords”)—threatened the foreman and attempted to scale the job site’s gate. As a waiting group of police officers stepped in, all hell broke loose. First words and then blows were exchanged with the ensuing scuffle leaving three officers knocked to the ground. Targeting those who seemed to be in charge of the crowd, the police

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2 See id. at 10.
3 Id.
arrested seven people, including three leaders of the Coalition for United Community Action ("CUCA"), the broad alliance of community organizations and civil rights groups that had organized that day’s demonstration. When police refused to release them from custody, a growing crowd of several hundred youth, with their brightly-colored berets signaling their gang affiliation, marched from the university’s Near West Side campus through the City’s downtown area, snaking its way to the Chicago Police Department ("CPD") headquarters on the near South Side. With an equal number of police blocking their entry, the mass of protesters demanded and received a meeting with the Deputy Police Superintendent and the Assistant State’s Attorney, pressing the case for the release of those just arrested. Unsuccessful, the activists walked out of their impromptu meeting vowing to continue their direct action efforts to address the estimated forty percent joblessness among Chicago’s Black youth.

Unlike that morning’s protest, prior demonstrations had shown that civil rights activists and local gang members could successfully use nonviolent tactics to halt work at construction sites in and around the largely Black neighborhoods on the City’s South and West Sides. During the preceding three weeks, a contingent of the Lords, Stones, and Disciples ("LSD," an acronym for the coalition between the three gangs) joined with the CUCA in pressing local construction firms and building trades unions to hire more Black people to ensure, as one flyer stated, that the equal opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as well as key executive orders were “both implemented

5. Id.
6. Id.
In particular, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act forbids discrimination in any aspect of employment because of a person’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” While the Act charged an administrative agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with receiving, investigating, and attempting to resolve discrimination complaints, the Act also made it easier for employees to press their complaints in federal court. The following year, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, which established requirements for non-discriminatory hiring on the part of federal government contractors and subcontractors; the Executive Order required them to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.” Although President John F. Kennedy had incorporated the language of affirmative action into Executive Order 10925, Executive Order 11246 went further in mandating that contractors working on federally funded projects implement affirmative action plans to increase the participation of women and racial minorities if workforce analysis demonstrated their under-representation. These measures seemed to firmly oppose employment discrimination, yet federal officials failed to institutionalize sufficient regulatory mechanisms. By targeting large-scale construction projects, most of them federally funded, the construction site protests sought to expose the unwillingness of contractors to adhere to the letter of the law as well as the weaknesses of the government’s failure to implement it.

11. See id.
The distinct organizational manner of the construction industry compounded these failures as overwhelmingly white craft unions played a powerful role in supplying the labor force from which general contractors and subcontractors hired their employees.\(^\text{16}\) By limiting access to both union membership through trade schools and employment opportunities through hiring halls, these unions had been able to maintain the relatively high wages of their members while also ensuring that construction remained an all-white industry.\(^\text{17}\) For decades, Chicago’s civil rights activists drew particular attention to the racially exclusionary Washburne Trade School (“Washburne”), as it operated the only American Federation of Labor union certified apprentice training program where upon completion, applicants could gain automatic union membership and access to a well-paid sector of employment opportunities.\(^\text{18}\) Conducted in 1961, one comprehensive investigation of Washburne found that of the school’s 2,682 apprentices, only twenty-six were Black.\(^\text{19}\) In sharp contrast to more racially integrated unions like the Congress of Industrial Organization affiliated United Packing House Workers of America, seven of the twelve trades had no Black apprentices at all.\(^\text{20}\) Additionally, “[f]ive unions—representing the electricians, machinery operators, plumbers, architectural ironworkers, and cement masons—still use[d] the hiring hall [referral] system” that allowed unions to assign which members would work for which contractors.\(^\text{21}\) Backed by key allies within Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley’s administration and powerful political machines, the building trades affiliated with the American Feder-

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16. See id. at 63–64, 90.
17. See id. 63–64.
19. Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
ation of Labor had, until 1969, been able to ride out earlier rounds of anti-discrimination protests that targeted this industry.  

While remaining nonviolent, the involvement of the City’s Black street gangs reflected the militancy of the Black Power era. In leaflets, press statements, and direct threats, the CUCA not only demanded drastic changes to apprenticeship, hiring, and seniority policies but also the immediate provision of 10,000 on-the-job trainee positions.  “Why are Blacks excluded from the trade unions?,” asked one pamphlet. “Why do Whites from the suburbs come in and build on our turf denying us jobs?” When the City’s largest construction firms and building trades unions balked at these demands, this broad coalition of neighborhood groups, civil rights organizations, and street gang organizations repeatedly used a mix of intimidation and protest to halt work on twenty construction sites on projects totaling nearly $80 million. In case after case, site supervisors and foremen saw their employees threatened by crowds of baton-wielding, beret-wearing youth and decided it best to close down until further notice. Indeed, no arrests occurred during this first round of demonstrations in part because foremen routinely refused to sign onto a police complaint out of fear for the safety of their employees. “[I]t was inconceivable that two street gangs, the Rangers and Disciples could stop construction in Chicago,” Thomas J. Murray, the President of the

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24. Flyer, It’s Our Thang, supra note 23.
25. Id.
Building Trades Council, allegedly remarked just a day before the UIC campus protest, “but they [were] doing it.”

In contrast, the UIC protest was one of the few outside of the City’s Black neighborhoods, and it would mark the start of a sharp backlash to the campaign. This backlash would shape not only the fate of the 1969 jobs campaign but also seed the origins of mass incarceration in Chicago. On August 14, for instance, several large contractors and construction firms sought and won a preliminary injunction not only to prevent coalition members from entering construction sites but also to limit sidewalk picketing to just six people at a time. For their part, Murray and other officials in the trades unions stalled negotiations, agreeing to meet but refusing to seriously consider the coalition’s demands. At the same time, coalition partners also came under greater surveillance and harassment from the CPD, particularly its recently established Gang Intelligence Unit (“GIU”), and the Cook County State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan. As the CUCA leaders mulled over whether to defy the injunction, those in the LSD pressed forward, continuing demonstrations at various construction sites, including those on the UIC campus. As this phase of the campaign intensified, first the U.S. Department of Labor, and then Mayor Daley, attempted to mediate the ongoing negotiations in a way that took advantage of growing tensions between civil rights activists and gang leaders, ultimately brokering an agreement known as the 1970 Chicago Plan.

31. See generally Frailey, supra note 21 (reporting trades unions officials claimed that they did not have—and could not receive—negotiating authority over certain issues, but these officials suggested individual negotiations with the specific unions).
32. See Donald Mosby, Coalition Will Sue Cops, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Aug. 26, 1969, at 3; Charge Police with Brutality, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 1969.
34. See id.
Publicly hailed as a success by federal officials and construction industry representatives, this plan called for the hiring of 3,000 minority candidates through a process overseen by committees representing all the parties involved. Over the next several years, the Chicago Plan would serve as the framework for similar local plans that the Department of Labor would help to broker across the country. Yet rather than living up to its promise, the plan—as well as others modeled on it and implemented in cities across the country—would quickly prove itself a hollow victory, mainly because of the lack of strong federal enforcement provisions to undo the unions’ exclusive control over the training and hiring of workers in the skilled trades.35

While the direct involvement of the CUCA had been an early campaign demand, “a joint Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-Chicago police crackdown on gangs undermined the CUCA position just as it reached the apex of its power,” compelling it to reach a hasty settlement.36 As such, this agreement failed not only to put a dent in the problem of racial discrimination in the building trades, but also it coincided with a citywide “War on Gangs” that specifically targeted the City’s three largest Black street gangs, ultimately leaving LSD leaders and large swaths of their membership behind bars.37 Yet rather than resolving the problem of gang activity, this crackdown would only displace it to Illinois’ downstate prisons, with the threat posed by these same gang organizations repeatedly serving, over the decades to come, as a justification for a sustained punitive policy shift oriented towards mass incarceration.

This Essay will draw on the rise and fall of the 1969 Jobs Campaign to demonstrate how the shifts that made mass incarceration possible had as much to do with the growth of divisions within the movement as it did the conservative backlash to civil rights organizing. Part II details the development of this movement through prior efforts to politicize street gangs during the course of Chicago’s civil rights movement. Part III demonstrates how, building on this earlier foundation, the Jobs Campaign emerged through a coalition of civil

35. See Gellman, supra note 18, at 129.
36. Id. at 127.
37. See USENI EUGENE PERKINS, EXPLOSION OF CHICAGO’S BLACK STREET GANGS 1900 TO THE PRESENT 37 (1987).
rights organizations and more community-oriented factions within Chicago’s largest Black street gangs, jointly using non-violent direct-action protests to demand an end to racial discrimination within the City’s building trades. Part IV examines how the targeting of both rank-and-file gang members as well as prominent leaders undermined this campaign just as it began to make headway in its negotiations with the trades unions and building contractors. Consequently, a rash of arrests and indictments weakened the coalition, leaving its civil rights activists to sign onto a watered-down affirmative action agreement with no federal enforcement provisions just as the local law enforcement crackdown on gang organizations led to the further arrest and incarceration of those involved with these protests. Part V briefly concludes by illustrating how the defeat of the 1969 Jobs Campaign laid the foundation for the turn towards mass incarceration.

In her best-selling book, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, legal scholar Michelle Alexander argues that one of the key developments that made this shift towards mass incarceration possible was the use of coded anti-black rhetoric by conservative politicians in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Alexander writes:

> In the 1968 election, race eclipsed class as the organizing principle of American politics, and by 1972, attitudes on racial issues rather than socioeconomic status were the primary determinant of voters’ political self-identification. . . . Just as race had been used at the turn of the century by Southern elites to rupture class solidarity at the bottom of the income ladder, race as a national issue had broken up the Democratic New Deal “bottom-up” coalition—a coalition dependent on substantial support from all voters, white and black, at or below the median income.

While this account proves true in many respects, its over-reliance on electoral politics as the primary arena of struggle overlooks crucial

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39. *Id.* at 47.
developments that took place off the campaign trail and outside of the voting booth. In key ways, the harassment, arrest, and incarceration of prominent figures within the campaign would help to drive a wedge between coalition partners, chiefly the CUCA activists and the LSD gang members, at precisely the moment when they required a higher level of unity. These divisions not only mark the decline of the struggle against racial discrimination in Chicago’s skilled building trades but also set in motion factors that, over the next several decades, would shape the emergence of mass incarceration in Illinois and across the nation.

II. THE POLITICS OF STREET GANGS AND COALITION BUILDING

The breakdown of the LSD-CUCA coalition partnership is particularly striking in light of the central role that civil rights activists had played in engaging and helping to politicize Chicago’s most prominent Black gang organizations. During the early 1960s, various local activist groups, like the more militant Association of Community Teams (“ACT”), had sought to engage Black street gangs in protests against housing and school discrimination. Yet it was the decision by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (“SCLC”) to launch its first full-scale northern civil rights campaign in early 1966 that marks the start of the most sustained effort to engage Chicago’s growing street gangs as an important political constituency. Not only did Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and others within the SCLC hope that this regional shift might broaden the question of civil rights to matters of poverty and discrimination left unaddressed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, but they also saw an opportunity to make good on local invitations to come and help revive the fledgling local movement led by the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (“CCCO”). Over the past several years, waves of protests had failed to make headway against one of the United States’ oldest and most powerful urban political machines,

40. See DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 250–52, 261.
41. Id. at 265–67.
headed by Mayor Richard J. Daley. With the involvement of the SCLC, the local organizers now sought to attack slum conditions as a reflection of the need for economic justice, including “fair employment, a minimum wage, training programs using government funds, and tax reductions for employers who expanded opportunities,” particularly in trades jobs.

Yet as the SCLC’s campaign quickly narrowed its focus on slum housing, it failed to gain traction amongst residents of Chicago’s gritty West Side. Indeed, only its efforts to organize and politicize street gang organizations seemed to make headway. In the neighborhood of East Garfield Park, where civil rights workers struggled to build tenants’ unions and mobilize residents to take to the streets, groups like the Clovers, Roman Saints, and Lords grew in size and organization in the midst of the neighborhood’s rapid racial transition. Rather than shunning the gangs, civil rights workers engaged them, as “some of the strongest grass-roots organizations in the ghetto,” hoping to win them over to nonviolence and secure their participation in the growing Chicago Freedom Movement, a formal alliance between the SCLC and the CCCO as the local coalition of civil rights organizations.

By engaging gang organizations as an important political constituency, these efforts would leave a profound impact on the City’s coalition politics. At the outset, however, they would garner only mixed results. Through the spring of 1966, for instance, SCLC staff members like Albert Sampson and James Orange met regularly with members of the Rangers and the East Side Disciples, both based in the South Side neighborhood of Woodlawn, leading them in separate workshops on the importance of the nonviolent movement and the futility of violent protest, even going so far as to show them a documentary on the 1965 Watts rebellion. These initial meetings held their attention, but an effort to bring both gangs together in a SCLC-

43. Id. at 37–38.
44. See Gellman, supra note 18, at 116.
45. See generally RALPH, supra note 42, at 93 (discussing community organization by various groups).
46. Id.
47. DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 267.
sponsored peace conference on May 13 ended in a melee at the Southside YMCA, drawing sharp public criticism.\textsuperscript{48} Similarly, when several West Side neighborhoods erupted in violence in early July, led in part by local gang members, the Daley administration was quick to link this violent eruption to the SCLC’s nonviolence workshops.\textsuperscript{49} But while the SCLC failed to convince the gangs to wholeheartedly adopt nonviolence or even fully renounce their internecine turf battles, these efforts did draw key factions of each organization into the Chicago Freedom Movement as it turned its attention to housing discrimination that summer.\textsuperscript{50} By late July, for example, as the organizers staged regular marches into all-white neighborhoods on the City’s Southwest and Northwest Sides, members of the Stones, the Lords, and other gangs regularly participated, even serving as march marshals as well as personal bodyguards for Dr. King.\textsuperscript{51}

This involvement would prove pivotal. On August 5, five hundred open-housing demonstrators had barely started their march to a real estate office in the Chicago Lawn neighborhood when they found themselves confronted by a hail of projectiles and racial epithets thrown by a crowd of white counter-demonstrators.\textsuperscript{52} As Dr. King and others made their way through Marquette Park, one rock hit Dr. King in the back of the head, nearly knocking him to the ground.\textsuperscript{53} As the march continued up California Avenue, white hecklers continued to taunt the demonstrators and repeatedly tried to block their march while pelting them with bricks and bottles from the sidewalk.\textsuperscript{54} By the time the marchers returned to Marquette Park, they found themselves facing a crowd of nearly four thousand people, and the ensuing confrontation left at least thirty demonstrators injured, prefigur-

\textsuperscript{48} See RALPH, supra note 42, at 94–95.
\textsuperscript{49} See id. at 111; Alfred Friendly, Jr., Chicago Officials Voice Concern Over Apparent Gang Alliance with Rights Leaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1966, at 23.
\textsuperscript{50} See RALPH, supra note 42, at 137.
\textsuperscript{51} See id.
\textsuperscript{53} Id.
\textsuperscript{54} Id.
ing the sort of racist backlash to civil rights protests that scholars like Alexander have seen as key to fueling the punitive turn to mass incarceration.\textsuperscript{55} Later that evening, Stones leader Jeff Fort called a meeting of the top leadership of all the City’s largest gangs and Dr. King to discuss what happened that day. “They threatened that the next time they participated in a march they were going to come with guns in tow,” recalled authors Natalie Y. Moore and Lance Williams.\textsuperscript{56} “The Stones told [Dr.] King they refused to be mistreated like he had been.”\textsuperscript{57} In response to this challenge, Dr. King patiently preached to those in attendance about the importance of countering hatred with nonviolence, the promise of the movement, and the crucial role that the gangs could play.\textsuperscript{58} As a result, even more gang members participated in the subsequent open-housing marches, providing a security contingent that made it possible for SCLC-CCCO organizers to split police forces by carrying out multiple marches a day through all-white neighborhoods on the City’s Northwest and Southwest sides.\textsuperscript{59} Undeterred by further counter demonstrations and a court injunction secured by the Daley administration, this partnership between civil rights activists and various gang factions continued until SCLC-CCCO leaders reached a negotiated open-housing settlement with City officials by late August.\textsuperscript{60}

Although the Chicago Freedom Movement would fail to regain much of its momentum after this settlement, its efforts would lay the foundation for the development of the Jobs Campaign three years later. The CUCA drew on the example of the SCLC-CCCO in building a broad coalition, and, also, C. T. Vivian, the CUCA’s lead spokesperson, was a veteran SCLC activist who earlier participated in the Chicago Freedom Movement as a staff member of the Urban Training Center for Christian Mission. Through the late 1960s, the Urban Training Center for Christian Mission continued to carry forward the banner of the Chicago Freedom Movement’s initial mission of eco-

\textsuperscript{55} Id.


\textsuperscript{57} Id.

\textsuperscript{58} Id. at 41–42.

\textsuperscript{59} See id. at 42–43; see also DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 270.

\textsuperscript{60} See RALPH, supra note 42, at 171.
omic justice. By the summer of 1969, the Urban Training Center for Christian Mission would house the offices of a broad network of organizations that was first called the Black Coalition and then later renamed the CUCA. Yet the call for a sustained campaign for increased job opportunities found its foundation as much amongst Chicago’s increasingly politicized gang organizations as it did in the CUCA’s network of civil activists.

Beginning in 1967, the year after Dr. King left Chicago, first the Stones and Disciples on the South Side and then the Lords on the West Side—now redefined as a community-oriented group—launched efforts to address the joblessness of their members. Although these efforts varied in terms of the scope of their partnerships with local organizations, their effort of reliance on private foundations as opposed to federal funding and their emphasis on vocational training or entrepreneurialism, all speak to a commitment to securing gang members a stable and secure livelihood. While the Stones and Disciples’ Youth Manpower Project was beset by negative press and canceled the following year, the success of the Lord’s Operation Bootstrap would be joined by other accomplishments, including running a vocational training program, two youth centers, and an employment agency. Despite the differences, each gang’s efforts consistently pointed to a demand for greater economic inclusion. In addition to addressing employment concerns, they were also caught up in the process of gang politicization. As such, the 1969 campaign reflects

61. However, this coalition would not be the first to take up the issue of discrimination within the building trades as the Chicago-based Negro American Labor Council had made this the centerpiece of its desegregation campaign in the early 1960s. Gellman, supra note 18, at 114–15, 117. Drawing on these efforts, ACT led a demonstration at the site of an Illinois Bell Telephone office to highlight the bar against Black workers in the glazier and ironworker unions. Id. at 115.

62. See DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 278.

63. Id. at 275, 278.

64. See generally NOBLE-AMEER ALI, THE BLUE-LIGHT BOOK OF THE “ORIGINAL” BROTHERS OF THE STRUGGLE 27–30 (2016). This is a book written and published by United in Peace Inc., a gang truce organization that traces its origins back to the LSD. In describing the historical circumstances that gave rise to the LSD from the perspective of those involved in these organizations, it is an invaluable resource for scholars of gang politicization. At the same time, its PDF format does not include the customary pagination. Consequently, the page numbers cited above in
a continuation of these earlier efforts to combat a growing sense of neglect and isolation and force the City to break with the status quo. As one former gang member reminisced, “our coalition used the name with those ordered letters LSD to argue that WE the Unified Youth intended to ‘take Chicago on a trip.’”  

As historian Andrew Diamond notes, gang politicization initiatives stretch back to the beginning of the 1960s with the Revolutionary Action Movement (“RAM”), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”), and the radical civil rights group ACT but were taken up with greater frequency towards the decade’s end. Diamond wrote:

By the spring of 1967, Black Power thinking and its most vocal promoters—groups like ACT, RAM, SNCC, the Black Panther Party, and the Afro-American Student Association, and the Deacons for Defense—had increasingly strong influence on local organizations on the South and West sides, gangs and community organizations alike. Following Diamond, it is important to take the militancy of the LSD coalition not as a full-fledged turn towards political struggle but as a more aspirational, contested work-in-progress. While proponents of the campaign might later remember the coalition as having “over 50,000 active and mobilized members of the [LSD] . . . a true force to be reckoned with,” these recollections gloss over divisions internal to each gang organization. It is worth noting that the LSD’s leaders—
the Lords’ Lawrence Patterson, the Stones’ Leonard Sengali, and the Disciples’ Frank Weathers—were not only older than their rank-and-file members, but each had strong links to both local community organizations, like the Kenwood Oakland Community Organization (“KOCO”) and the West Side Organization (“WSO”), and held sway over gang factions more oriented towards community concerns. As such, the LSD coalition represented an attempt not only to win living wage employment and broader social transformation but also to work through each gang’s internal divisions by pursuing a vision that placed Black Power over gang empowerment.

These prior efforts had faced opposition, and this would continue in 1969. A variety of forces, principally CPD’s GIU, attempted to sabotage the gangs’ vocational programs and undermine political turn in gang activities by exacerbating these tensions. While less covert than the department’s notorious surveillance unit, or “Red Squad,” the GIU’s tasks extended beyond simple crime prevention. Indeed, the GIU was active in the monitoring of alleged gang members as well as in tracking their interactions with civil rights activists and radical militants. Indeed, it is worth nothing that after launching a Youth Group Intelligence Unit in 1961, CPD significantly reorganized and expanded it into the GIU in 1967, coincidentally just as the Stones and Disciples were preparing to launch their Youth Manpower project. “Participants in the project were regularly stopped on the street, searched, verbally abused, and arrested on disorderly conduct charges,” writes sociologist James B. Jacobs.

69. See Ali, supra note 64, at 46; Moore & Williams, supra note 56, at 64; Perkins, supra note 37, at 37.
70. See Diamond, supra note 33, at 289.
71. See generally id. at 277 (“Readily apparent from a survey of the files is the presence of [GIU] infiltrators who not only observed proceedings and dug up dirt, but also planted the seeds of destruction in the already fragile alliances of gangs, community organizations, and Black Power groups. Of particular interest to GIU operatives were any signs of cooperation between the different super gangs, as well as the developing links between the gangs and a range of Black Power groups—ACT, RAM, SNCC, the Afro-American Student Association, the Deacons of Defense, and later the Black Panthers.”).
73. Id.
Manpower] training centers . . . were frequently intruded upon by the police without search warrants.”

Diamond (who was one of the first scholars to gain access to the GIU records) emphasizes this point, with these interactions constituting a substantial portion of the unit’s archived records:

> Readily apparent from a survey of the files is the presence of infiltrators who not only observed proceedings and dug up dirt, but also planted the seeds of destruction in the already fragile alliances of gangs, community organizations, and Black Power groups . . . . The intense attention paid to the shifting alliances between these groups suggests a deep concern in the mayor’s office about the possible threat posed by the organizing activities under way in [B]lack Chicago beginning in the spring of 1967.

Over the next several years, the Daley administration would continue to devote considerable resources to monitoring these sorts of political activities, overseeing a sharp “increase in GIU officers from 38 to 200 between 1967 and 1969.”

It remains unclear what precisely led to the formation of the LSD and its involvement in the Jobs Campaign. Following continued gang politicization efforts, the Stones and the Disciples were ready to announce a new truce between the South Side’s two largest gangs by May 1969, an effort publicly supported by C. T. Vivian as the head of the Black Coalition. Although well publicized, this was only one of several gang truces and mergers forged during late spring and early summer of that year that effectively established the Lords as the third coalition partner and would forge the LSD. At roughly the same

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74.  *Id.*
75.  DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 277.
76.  *Gellman, supra note 18, at 127.*
78.  *See generally* Sheryl Fitzgerald, *Vice Lords to Battle Slum Housing*, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, July 11, 1969. Unfortunately, the above article simply identifies a growing sense of solidarity amongst the key constituents of the LSD, specifically the Lords and the Stones. Much historical research still needs to be done to definitively
time, Vivian’s Black Coalition renamed itself the CUCA and centered the efforts of its various partner organizations on employment discrimination in the building trades. While it remains unclear whether one coalition building effort catalyzed the other, it is worth noting that the LSD was exclusively concerned with bringing together the three largest gang organizations, while the CUCA relied on these same gang organizations as coalition partners. Indeed, published accounts of the CUCA describe collaboration with these street gangs as key, as their members “statistically and psychologically represented the ‘hard-core unemployed’” in the City’s Black neighborhoods. Lastly, as these twin coalitions anticipated launching their campaign, their preparations coincided with the Daley administration’s convening of various City agencies to coordinate their efforts to address the problem of gang-related crime. While focused squarely on the LSD’s coalition members, the administration’s emerging “War on Gangs” would be caught by surprise by the coalition’s involvement in the launch of the 1969 Jobs Campaign that summer but would quickly get up to speed in monitoring, harassing, and neutralizing its most prominent participants.

III. THE RISE OF THE CHICAGO JOBS CAMPAIGN

On July 22, the CUCA announced the start of its Jobs Campaign by holding a demonstration in the heart of Chicago’s financial district. That morning, some two hundred teenagers and young adults affiliated with the LSD marched from Garfield Park on the
West Side to the downtown loop.\footnote{Id.} Carrying signs that read “I am somebody” and “Blacks demand same chance,” these gang members and their coalition partners picketed the construction site of a First National Bank annex at Clark and Madison, blocking its gates and briefly halting work.\footnote{See id.} These coalition partners included the KOCO, Operation Breadbasket, Lawndale Peoples Planning and Action Conference, Valley Community Organization, and the Welfare Rights Organization.\footnote{Id.} Later, seventeen gang members sat in at the offices of the Building Trades Union Council at 130 North Wells Street, occupying them for more than two hours before being arrested for trespassing.\footnote{Id.} Refusing to talk with union officials, coalition members instead shared their list of demands with the press.\footnote{Id.} These demands included providing 10,000 on-the-job trainee positions to Black youth, elevating Black union members with at least four years’ experience to foremen and supervisory positions, eliminating testing for the on-the-job trainee program, providing an automatic deduction system for trainee dues, and abolishing the union hall referral system.\footnote{Id.} Taken together, the LSD and the CUCA sought to rectify the various ways in which Black workers had consistently been barred from relatively high-paying positions within the skilled building trades. Coalition members also warned that unless these demands were met, they would halt all building construction in the Black community.\footnote{Id.} Rather than addressing the exclusion of the LSD members to the labor market, the CUCA cast its demands through the rhetoric of equal opportunity, distributive justice, and community control.\footnote{Id.}

With no prior warning about the demonstration and sit-in, union officials were taken aback. “We had no indication something like this was going to happen today,” remarked Murray, president of the Building Trades Council.\footnote{Id.} “There’s been no controversy and things
have been going along nicely and apparently this group isn’t aware of all our efforts.”

From 1965 to 1969, Murray’s Building Trades Union Council had participated in the Chicago Apprenticeship Minority Program. Initiated in partnership with the Chicago Urban League, the U.S. Department of Labor, the Illinois employment service, the Building Construction Employers Association, and the Chicago Board of Education, this program had provided a narrow pathway for only 550 minority apprentices. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, the program had contributed to a 46% increase in Black apprentices within the local construction industry. Murray touted the fact that Black Chicagoans now made up 14% of apprentices in the union training program and were securing a slightly larger percentage of the existing construction jobs. And with a large number of construction projects being finalized, it was clear that the number of job opportunities would continue to grow, creating opportunities for an even greater number of skilled workers of all racial backgrounds.

Following the first surprise demonstration, the CUCA’s C. T. Vivian vowed to sue the Building Trades Union Council for racial discrimination. Specifically, he alleged not simply the employer’s but also the union’s failure to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 11246. Vivian contended that racial discrimination was systematically intertwined with training and hiring within the skilled trades, from the beginning of the apprentice program all the way through the union hall referral system. While addressing the issue of discrimination, this threat of litigation would have little bearing on the demand to hire thousands of on-the-job trainees through the CUCA’s coalition partners. Instead, the CUCA

93. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Christmas, Seek Construction Jobs, supra note 83.
98. Black Construction Apprentices Up 46%, supra note 94.
100. Id.
101. See id.; see also Christmas, Seek Construction Jobs, supra note 83.
pressed forward with its campaign of direct action, seeking to make good on its threat to shut down all building construction in the Black community, and the LSD played an indispensable role in carrying out these confrontations.\footnote{102}{See DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 306.} According to Diamond, “[a]lthough CUCA consisted of some sixty organizations [C]itywide, the muscle LSD provided to the campaign enabled CUCA to effectively shut down eleven construction sites between July 28 and July 30.”\footnote{103}{Id.} On July 28, for instance, 200 members of the LSD shut down work on four South Side construction sites: the Woodlawn YMCA, Woodlawn Gardens, Madden Park Homes, and the new Martin Luther King Jr. High School.\footnote{104}{Christmas, Construction Sites Shut, supra note 8.} On July 29, coalition members shut down six construction sites, including four Chicago Housing Authority public housing projects.\footnote{105}{See generally More Projects Halted; Expect Parley on Bias, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 1, 1969 (providing an overview of recent construction projects stopped by CUCA protestors); Surveillance Report, Chi. Police Dep’t, Observation or Surveillance Report of Coalition for United Community Action Construction Site at 39th & Cottage (July 29, 1969) (on file with author) [hereinafter Surveillance Report, July 29, 1969] (discussing work stoppages at several Chicago Housing Authority construction sites).} Within a few short weeks, the CUCA had placed itself at the forefront of a growing wave of protests against construction industry discrimination gathering momentum across the country.\footnote{106}{Gellman, supra note 18, at 121; see L. F. Palmer, Jr., Building Protest May Go Nationwide, CHI. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 16, 1969.} Yet the scale of these protests would broaden even further. During the first two weeks of August 1969, LSD members continued to halt work at construction sites across the City, carrying out a sustained series of demonstrations that would push the contractors’ association and trades union to the negotiating table.\footnote{107}{James Strong, City Building Unit, Blacks Set Meeting: Gang Halts Work at S. Side Sites, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1969.} Although private building and rehabilitation projects (like the construction of the University of Chicago’s Joseph Regenstein library) would temporarily become the focus of these protests, most of the LSD’s attention focused on large-scale, federally funded construction projects, namely
public housing, public school, and medical center facilities, and public transportation, particularly “L” stations on the Dan Ryan expressway. By August 1 these protests had stopped work on an estimated $35 million worth of construction. Even after negotiation began with representatives of the building trades, demonstrations continued as the CUCA noted its frustration with the failure of union officials to weigh their demands in a serious manner. Building Trades Council President Murray calculated that by August 6, continued demonstrations had closed down twenty construction sites with a total value of $60 million. Through these actions, LSD members were effectively taking advantage of the expansion and consolidation of what historian Arnold Hirsch refers to as the making of the City’s second ghetto. With its roots in a key set of decisions made during the early 1950s, this process was effectively an expansion of the City’s older racially segregated Black Belt through the South and West Sides in a manner profoundly aided by state actions. “With the emergence of redevelopment, renewal, and public housing . . . government took an active hand not merely in reinforcing prevailing patterns of segregation but also in lending them a permanence never seen before. . . . [I]t virtually constituted a new form of de jure segregation.” During the summer of 1969, LSD members repeatedly targeted federally funded construction sites and projects that helped to consolidate the scope of the City’s stark racial segregation while also expanding Black Chicagoans’ access to public services like education, housing, transportation, and health care.

The expanding purview of the City’s Black neighborhoods is even evident in the CUCA’s leaflets. “How long will we let others

108. See Lewis & Palmer, supra note 8; Negroes and the Craft Unions, Chi. TRIB., Aug. 1, 1969.
110. See Frailey, supra note 21, at 8.
113. See id.
114. Id.
build our own communities?,” one flyer asks. Typed onto a standard 8 by 11-inch sheet of paper and drawing on the rhetoric of Black militancy, it states: “The Coalition for United Community Action is carrying on a fight to end racism in the trade unions, open up thousands of jobs to the Black community and increase the Black community’s power of self-determination.” Further, it lists a set of demands, beginning with the call for the immediate provision of 10,000 union on-the-job trainee positions, which would be a key sticking point of subsequent negotiations. Reflecting the call for community control rippling through Black Power protests, the flyer concluded: “Support the Coalition’s fight to win these demands. It’s Our Right to Jobs on Our Turf . . .” Just as the creation of the City’s second ghetto had fixed in space the lines of racial separation, this wording suggests that it might have also afforded Chicago’s Black residents a broader sense of their own territory, a concept that even resonated with the LSD coalition members concerned less with Black Power and more with gang empowerment. As if to accentuate this point, the phrase, “It’s Our Thang,” was written across the top and bottom of this flyer. Most likely penned by an LSD member, this addition points to the degree to which the partnership between the City’s largest gangs and its most active civil rights organizations was premised on the easy slippage between gang turf and community control.

During the first several weeks of these protests, foremen repeatedly called police to the site of these protests, but refused to sign criminal complaints, ostensibly leaving officers with little ground on which to pursue the arrest of hundreds of avowed gang members.

115. See Flyer, It’s Our Thang, supra note 23.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. For his part, Diamond suggests that as Black residents of the South and Southwest sides became increasingly ghettoized in the late 1950s and early 1960s, “the search for respect in rituals of gang violence became much more territorial than racial.” DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 252.
120. See Flyer, It’s Our Thang, supra note 23.
121. See James Strong, Trades Ask for Aid in Threat by Negroes, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1969 (“[N]o arrests could be made for criminal trespass unless the contractors were willing to sign complaints.”); Strong, Unions Plan Meeting with Protest-
In many of these instances, Black workers made up a sizeable portion of those on-site and in a few instances, stopped work in solidarity with the protests. According to media reports, the response of white workers varied from fear and confusion to outright hostility. As coalition members announced their intention to block some $38 million in federal funds to the Chicago model cities program because of a violation of its citizen participation commitments, a group of white construction workers began to press for a more robust state response. For example, on August 7, the Chicago Tribune reported that nearly two-dozen construction workers confronted U.S. Attorney Thomas Foran outside of the federal building downtown after protests had halted progress on three building sites on the West Side, including an addition to Mt. Sinai hospital. They complained that although the police were present, some 200 gang members “swarmed . . . the project, cheering and waving clenched fists” after which the foremen “ordered the project closed and later said he did it to protect the workers.”

Offering only that his office could investigate their complaint, Foran suggested the workers press their general contractors to seek an injunction against further protests, just as the Daley

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122. According to a surveillance report around this timeframe, police:

Observed a Don Samuels M/N who works as a bricklayer for Prikler Construction Co. 2326 Elmwood Ave. Berwyn, Ill. and who seemed to be a spokesman for the [Negro] workers. Samuels indicated his belief that the Trade Unions and contractors have long discriminated [sic] against the black man and that work has stopped and will remain at a standstill at the 39th. street site until the demands of the [CUCA] are met. Investigators also spoke to other workers about the work stoppage and although they refused to give their names, most were in accord with the action taken.


123. See Strong, Trades Ask for Aid in Threat by Negroes, supra note 121.


125. Strong, Trades Ask for Aid in Threat by Negroes, supra note 121.

126. Id.

127. Id.

128. See id.
administration had secured an injunction against the Chicago Freedom Movement’s open-housing marches.\textsuperscript{129} Although the CUCA would continue to threaten and carry out further work stoppages, a judge would grant the unions and contractors an injunction two days after the arrests at UIC.\textsuperscript{130} Joining these efforts was the escalating harassment of LSD members, with coalition leaders openly complaining that gang members were being “beaten, picked up and harassed by the police, and threatened because of their activity with the [CUCA] in marching against construction sites . . . .”\textsuperscript{131} By the end of 1969, these efforts to illegally harass and legally curtail the Jobs Campaign would come together in a manner that would narrow its demands and silence its most militant participants.

IV. THE FALL OF THE CHICAGO JOBS CAMPAIGN

On August 13, the day after the arrests at the UIC campus, those in the CUCA Jobs Campaign once again took to the streets, though with a slightly different target in mind. According to a GIU surveillance report, nearly one hundred people, most of them appearing to be members of the Stones, began gathering in the early morning hours outside of KOCO’s offices on the South Side.\textsuperscript{132} Just before 8 a.m., the waiting crowd boarded a school bus and traveled westbound to offices of the WSO, near Roosevelt and Halstead, where they unloaded.\textsuperscript{133} Over the next hour, several buses dropped off roughly equal numbers of Lords and Disciples.\textsuperscript{134} By 9 a.m., the crowd had grown to roughly 350 to 400 people and had begun march-

\textsuperscript{129} See supra notes 30, 60 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{130} See Judge Restrains Job Protests, supra note 30; Strong, 7 Protesters Arrested at Building Job, supra note 1; see also Blacks Assail Protest Ban, Chi. Today, Aug. 15, 1969 (“The leader of a black group named in a restraining order against protesters disrupting work at construction sites called the order ‘oppression.’”).


\textsuperscript{133} See id.

\textsuperscript{134} See id.
ing east on Roosevelt, back to the UIC campus construction site. Waiting for them was Chicago’s Assistant Corporation Counsel, a line of nearly 200 police officers and officials from the Gust K. Newberg construction company, the contractors on the project. The contractors’ superintendent agreed to meet with the CUCA representatives, only to tell them that he would not shut down the site and called upon police to arrest anyone who crossed its fence line. “You don’t have enough police to handle this,” the Stones’ Leonard Sengali reportedly exclaimed, “if you don’t close down[,] the mortar between the bricks will be blood.” After a brief standoff with police, demonstrators shifted their attention and continued east to the downtown Loop area, ultimately winding their way to the Civic Center plaza. There, at the intersection of Dearborn and Clark, they assembled in a loose military formation—just as the plaza was being prepared to host crowds attending the welcoming parade for the Apollo 11 astronauts. As gang members stood silently, disrupting the plaza’s celebration of the historic moon landing, the CUCA leaders made their way to City Hall calling upon Mayor Richard J. Daley to move forward in negotiations with the contractors and labor unions. After meeting briefly with Mayor Daley’s aides, the CUCA leaders held a short press conference and then joined those who remained in the plaza in retracing their route back to the West Side.

As this impromptu shift in strategic focus to the mayor’s office might suggest, the CUCA was becoming increasingly concerned with the inability of their direct action protest to force the hand of the contractors and the trades unions—even going so far as seeking its own injunction against CPD for the harassment of its gang partners. By

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135. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
September, the CUCA, the unions, and the contractors had met three times at the negotiation table, but these discussions continued to stall on several of the demands, particularly the provision of 10,000 on-the-job trainee positions.\textsuperscript{144} In addition to City Hall, this continued standoff would also garner the attention of federal officials as the Chicago representatives of multiple federal agencies responded by forming the Federal Ad Hoc Committee Concerning the Building Trades (“FAHC”) to examine how they might investigate the situation in Chicago and, if necessary, enforce the existing executive orders on non-discriminatory hiring.\textsuperscript{145} Indeed, an initial FAHC assessment confirmed blatant racial exclusion in all but three of Chicago’s trade unions, all while nine of the unionized industries had labor shortages of up to fifty percent.\textsuperscript{146} Nevertheless, no mayoral or federal intervention would be immediately forthcoming.

Over the next couple of months, the CUCA would attempt to maintain the momentum of their campaign and keep the issues their demonstrations had raised on the front page of City newspapers. However, the court injunction hindered the CUCA’s efforts, effectively limiting them to symbolic pickets. As negotiations stalled and contractors resumed work on a number of the two dozen construction sites that protests had shut down,\textsuperscript{147} the LSD broke with the CUCA; amid published reports of a split and calls for unity, the LSD took over the initiative itself.\textsuperscript{148} On September 8, over a month after the initial demonstration at the UIC campus, the LSD rallied its supporters alongside Jesse Jackson and other civil rights leaders at the same construction site where they had previously been arrested.\textsuperscript{149} In clear

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\textsuperscript{144} U.S. Aid Called Key to Black Jobs, \textit{CHI. TODAY}, Aug. 22, 1969, at 4. On this point, the campaign was not alone. In one instance, House Representative Roman Pucinski suggested that federal funds for career education could be put towards an expansion of the building trades apprentice program. \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{145} Gellman, \textit{supra} note 18, at 123–24.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.} at 124.
\textsuperscript{149} Faith C. Christmas, \textit{Jesse, 3 Leaders: We’ll Stay in Jail}, \textit{CHI. DAILY DEFENDER}, Sept. 9, 1969, at 3.
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violation of the injunction, the LSD members led a mass picket of more than 800 people, encircling the work site and the scores of police that ringed the block-long area. When the building supervisors refused to halt work, police arrested Jackson and several prominent LSD leaders—Patterson of the Lords, Sengali of the Stones, and Weathers of the Disciples—on charges of trespassing. And just as with the initial demonstration at the site, a scuffle and a spate of rock throwing broke out, leaving several officers injured.

This second round of arrests at the UIC campus galvanized a broader layer of public support for the campaign, while at the same time feeding the backlash against it. Just days after these arrests, some 250 women and children affiliated with the CUCA picketed and held a prayer vigil outside the UIC campus construction site, as the first of several women-led marches in support of the campaign. Within a week, “labor representatives, ministers, City aldermen, and state legislators” decried these recent arrests, voiced their support for the CUCA’s campaign, and called upon Daley to mediate the dispute. Similarly, a group of local businessmen pledged approximately $815,000 in “no strings attached” funds to the CUCA. And at UIC, continued agitation by the LSD would lead a broad cross section of the campus, from Local 1627 of the American Federation of Teachers to the Young Socialists Alliance to the University Christian Movement, to come out in support of the Jobs Campaign, not only joining demonstrations but also demanding that the university presi-

150. Id.
151. Id.
153. Faith C. Christmas, Mothers, Kids Join Job Fight, Chi. Daily Defender, Sept. 13, 1969, at 1; see also Faith C. Christmas, U.S. Enters Jobs Fight, Chi. Daily Defender, Sept. 11, 1969, at 3 (“While hundreds of black women are expected to mobilize for a major demonstration at a construction site today, Washington officials announced here yesterday that a probe into reported racial bias in the Chicago building trades could possibly lead to a cut-off of federal contracts . . . .”).
dent halt all construction and expand minority enrollment. According to Diamond, the LSD’s intervention was pivotal:

Such pressure forced the Daley administration to broker an agreement between CUCA and the unions, referred to as the Chicago Plan of 1970, which, while failing to adequately address the problem of racial discrimination in the building trades, nonetheless suggested the great potential of such coordinated actions between civil rights leaders like Jackson and Chicago’s super gangs.

Yet, for various reasons, this potential would not be realized. One reason was that prior to the signing of the Chicago Plan and the conclusion of the CUCA’s campaign, the LSD would not be left as the only party to forcefully intervene on the job issue. This intervention occurred on the morning of September 24 as a rowdy, and in some instances drunk, crowd of roughly 3,500 white construction workers massed outside the entrance to federal hearings on the labor market discrimination. Organized by FAHC officials, these hearings were supposed to address allegations of the building industry’s failure to comply with Executive Order 11246’s affirmative action requirements. Yet when the CUCA’s Vivian and his wife attempted to enter the building, those in the mob pushed and shoved them while a small contingent of police officers looked on. Bearing placards identifying various unions, as well as others that read, “We had to Learn to Earn,” and “No Coalition,” the mob sought to forcefully shutdown the hearing before marching through the Loop and holding

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156. Gellman, supra note 18, at 125.
157. DIAMOND, supra note 33, at 306.
159. Gellman, supra note 18, at 124.
its own rally in opposition to the ongoing negotiations in the Civic Center plaza.  

After several tense minutes, a police chief escorted Vivian and his wife to a nearby squad car where the couple were left to sit for four hours, while the chanting crowd continued to menace them. “We went to the hearing expecting an orderly objective atmosphere where both sides could be heard and instead we found that the unions had no intention of having a hearing,” C. T. Vivian later recounted. Indeed, the crowd continued to disrupt the hearings until a contingent of 150 officers finally arrived to clear it out. The only arrests made that day were of four young Black men who had attempted to enter the building, only to be attacked by the mob. In the midst of being pummeled, one of them had pulled out a revolver and fired a series of warning shots to secure their escape from the mob.

In his interview with a Chicago Daily Defender reporter, Vivian opined that the day’s events testified to the “unwillingness on the labor unions’ part to seriously consider a thought-out solution to deal with their racism.” He went on to say, “it is our hope that the federal government will refuse to be intimidated by such action and will continue the hearings as soon as possible.” Not only would the hearings be rescheduled for a subsequent day and proceed without further incident, but also the visible resistance of the building trades union compelled Mayor Daley to take a more active role in the ongoing negotiations.

Another reason why the potential of the civil rights-street gang coalition would not be realized is that by the end of 1969, the Daley administration’s crackdown on the LSD had significantly weakened its more community-oriented factions and, by extension, the Jobs Campaign. By the end of May 1969, City Hall joined with the Chief Judge of the Municipal Division of the Circuit Court and the Cook

162. Christmas, Whites Halt Job Hearing, supra note 158.
163. Christmas, White Mob at Hearings, supra note 160.
164. Id.
165. Christmas, Whites Halt Job Hearing, supra note 158.
166. Id.
County State’s Attorney to reorganize the County’s circuit courts to expedite the handling of violent crimes. By the start of the Jobs Campaign, the police crackdown had led to the indictment of 144 gang members. Through the course of the campaign, LSD members routinely spoke against police harassment, beatings, and arrests, fomenting tensions amongst those in the campaign. In an interview on August 8, the Stones’ spokesman Leonard Sengali intimated to police investigators that members of his organization were considering pulling away from the CUCA because of increased police harassment solely due to their involvement in the Jobs Campaign. During subsequent press conferences, the speakers not only detailed what they described as repeated instances of intimidation and arrest that followed coalition demonstrations but also alleged that Sengali himself had been marked for a “hit” according to a source from within the police department.

This rumor of threats to the LSD’s leadership would come to fruition as the CUCA entered an intense round of negotiations with the trades unions and contractors’ associations in the fall and winter of 1969. First, police arrested Bobby Gore, spokesman for the Lords, in November in connection with the shooting death of a West Side man three weeks prior. Then, amidst a marked escalation in law enforcement of targeting local militants, detectives arrested Sengali in early December, alleging that he had shot and killed a salesman more

169. Id.
172. See Interview Report, Chi. Police Dep’t, supra note 131.
than a month prior.\textsuperscript{175} And within a month, GIU officers arrested Stones leader Jeff Fort early on January 4, 1970, on charges of aggravated battery.\textsuperscript{176} The CUCA decried these arrests as evidence of a conspiracy “to break black unity and strip the Coalition of its leadership by using law enforcement machinery,” particularly after Sengali claimed that the U.S. Attorney threatened to pursue the harshest murder charges against Sengali if he did not accuse Vivian and others within the CUCA of being communists.\textsuperscript{177} Yet as negotiations with the trades unions drew to a close, the jailing of these central leaders as well as the continued crackdown of the rank-and-file of the LSD significantly weakened the campaign’s morale.\textsuperscript{178} When City Hall reportedly added the release of Sengali and a few other gang members as a secret reward for signing the Chicago Plan, the Stones urged their coalition partners to sign onto it, which eleven CUCA representatives did on January 12, 1970.\textsuperscript{179}

According to the 1970 Chicago Plan, one thousand Black workers would immediately be placed on the job, one thousand young Black men would receive an on-the-job trainee position, and another one thousand would be placed at Washburne.\textsuperscript{180} Drawing on $449,112 in funding from the U.S. Department of Labor, the 1970 plan relied on an Administrative Committee and an Operations Committee, representing all the parties involved, to implement the agree-

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\textsuperscript{175} Julius Blakeny, \textit{Arrest Sengali in Killing}, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Dec. 6, 1969, at 1. This escalation is best demonstrated by the pre-dawn killings of Black Panther leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by CPD officers working under the office of State’s Attorney Edward Hanrahan on December 4, 1969, as well as the subsequent raid on the home of Panther leader Bobby Rush on December 5. Sengali’s arrest came only hours after the police raid on Hampton’s apartment. John D. Vasilopoulos, \textit{Rights Groups Unite in Probe Demand}, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Dec. 9, 1969, at 5; CVL Calls Gang Parley, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Dec. 16, 1969.

\textsuperscript{176} Donald Mosby, \textit{Cops Hold Gang Chieftains}, CHI. DAILY DEFENDER, Jan. 6, 1960, at 3.


\textsuperscript{178} Gellman, \textit{supra} note 18, at 128.

\textsuperscript{179} See id. at 126–27.

\textsuperscript{180} Id.; see Galloway, \textit{supra} note 167.
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ment for each of the trades on a case-by-case basis and without federal enforcement guarantees or affirmative action data.\textsuperscript{181} Rather, each union committed itself to a good-faith agreement, pledging to prepare their own plan for taking in pre-apprenticeship trainees as well as recruiting them through the five recruitment centers to be opened across the City.\textsuperscript{182} As historian Erik Gellman argues:

With CUCA weakened, it proved easy for unions with extraordinary inside knowledge of the construction industry to outmaneuver the Chicago Plan. . . . The meeting minutes during the negotiations among CUCA, the construction industry, and the mayor thus portended the problems that would develop in its implementation. Vivian worried that, without a strong agreement, “We would end up fighting the battle with 19 different locals.” The subsequent agreement floundered precisely because the individual unions made little effort to enforce it and the administrative committee, paralyzed by its own bureaucracy, had little power to sanction the unions.\textsuperscript{183}

This weakness was largely grounded in the growing division between civil rights organizations and gang leaders. One year after the start of the Jobs Campaign, the rumored split between the CUCA and the LSD had come to fore, as unions had given only seventy-five Black youth training opportunities with seventy-five more to be trained at some undetermined point in the future.\textsuperscript{184} “We were sold out,” said Lamar Bell, a Stone leader.\textsuperscript{185} “Many of our guys who were arrested a year ago are still in jail. We got nothing out of the whole deal—no jobs, no training, no money, no nothing, just a year ago are still in jail. We have been left with nothing to do, making it

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182. Maynard, supra note 7.
183. Gellman, supra note 18, at 128.
185. Id.
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any way we can.” This sense of frustration emerged most dramatically in the tensions between the Stones and the CUCA partner organizations based on the South Side. A year prior, for instance, Curtis Burrell, head of the KOCO, had marched with LSD even putting Sengali and other Stones on KOCO’s payroll. By the summer of 1970, however, Burrell had fired all of the Stones except for Sengali and had organized a “march against fear.” In retaliation, the Stones allegedly shot into Burrell’s Woodlawn Mennonite Church and then set fire to it, demanding their share of the more than $3.5 million in federal and private funds KOCO had received over the past several years. For his part, Jesse Jackson found his relationship with the Stones strained as he stood with Burrell in front of his burned out church denouncing gangs as “evil forces in our community.” In spite of their differences, all sides agreed that the Depression-era levels of joblessness amongst Black Chicagoans, particularly young people, had created a desperate situation.

Within eight months, the CUCA-sponsored investigation found the plan to be fundamentally flawed and unworkable. In response, the CUCA would seek to scrap this agreement and renegotiate it as the New Chicago Plan in 1972. Even though this newer plan would be touted as one of fifty-three “hometown plans” subsidized by $1.7 million in funding from the Department of Labor, it would still be found lacking in both design and implementation. In assessing this new plan, historian Jeffery Helgeson finds the gains “were limited, with

186. Id.
188. See Cooley, supra note 187, at 922; Siddon, supra note 187.
193. Id.
the number of workers actually placed in the hundreds rather than in the thousands." Tragically, the CUCA’s Jobs Campaign began with an initial demand for 10,000 job positions, but wrung from the building industry only a few hundred jobs, hardly any of which went to the LSD members who served as the force behind the campaign.

V. CONCLUSION

In his short book, Explosion of Chicago’s Black Street Gangs: 1900 to the Present, scholar, playwright, and youth worker Useni Eugene Perkins describes the 1969 Jobs Campaign in largely tragic terms but for a starkly different reason. “It is noteworthy that during these CUCA demonstrations, particularly during the one that tried to shut down the construction site at the University of Illinois Chicago Campus, several gang leaders were arrested,” Perkins writes. “These arrests were followed by many more, and by the early seventies almost all of the major leaders of Black street gangs were incarcerated.” Those leaders indicted and, in nearly all instances, incarcerated would include Bobby Gore of the Lords, Leonard Sengali and Jeff Fort of the Stones, and David Barksdale of the Disciples. A 1970 City report, “Organized Youth Crime in Chicago,” estimated a total of 300 indictments against members of the three largest gangs since the launch of its “War on Gangs.” By publication, prosecutors had secured “over 100 felony convictions, 20 for murder.”

These arrests and convictions would be consequential in several different ways. They laid the foundation for a marked but brief decline in gang activity on the South and West Sides of Chicago. Indeed, this decline did not mean the end of these gang organizations but rather their reconstitution and expansion within the Cook County Jail and the Illinois prison system. “Ultimately, the gangs were repressed through a shift in law enforcement resources and priorities,” Jacobs argues. “They were sent to prison en masse after 1969.” As

194. Id. (citation omitted).
195. PERKINS, supra note 37, at 37.
196. Id.
197. JACOBS, supra note 72, at 143.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 173.
targets of Daley’s “War on Gangs,” members of Chicago’s three largest Black gangs made up an important aspect of the broader influx of Black residents of Chicago, Cairo, Rockford, East St. Louis, and other cities into Illinois’s prison system. Behind bars, these men found themselves facing an overwhelmingly rural, white custodial and administrative staff as well as few prison jobs and even fewer educational opportunities. Over the course of the decade, this new generation of Black prisoners played an important role in some ten major disturbances that occurred inside Illinois state prisons: from a hostage-taking in Menard Prison in 1973 to two takeovers of Stateville prison in 1979. Here, the involvement of Chicago street organizations in the broader turmoil that roiled the state’s prison system offers a window into the ways in which the uneven politicization begun on the City’s West and South Sides continued behind bars.

In her account of the links between civil rights and mass incarceration, Michelle Alexander contends that a key hurdle that contemporary movement activists must overcome is the unwillingness to associate themselves with criminalized populations. “Challenging mass incarceration requires something civil rights advocates have long been reluctant to do: advocacy on behalf of criminals,” she writes. “Over the years, civil rights lawyers have made heroic efforts to save the lives of condemned criminals. But outside of the death penalty arena, civil rights advocates have long been reluctant to leap to the defense of accused criminals.” Interestingly, Chicago offers the unique case of civil rights veterans repeatedly siding with a highly criminalized population, local gang members, in broadening a key front in anti-discrimination organizing. However, when the Daley administration’s “War on Gangs” ensnared hundreds of coalition partners, including key leaders within LSD, those on trial and later


201. ALEXANDER, supra note 38, at 226.

202. Id.
behind bars found themselves, with only a few exceptions, largely abandoned by their erstwhile coalition partners. This isolation would continue as former members of the LSD, now incarcerated, sought to directly challenge the prevailing policy of rehabilitation, itself a response to an earlier round of prisoners’ rights struggles. Ultimately, this approach to corrections failed to accommodate a renewed challenge by former gang members, now state prisoners. Instead, correctional officers, prison officials, and state lawmakers sought to reassert their control within prison facilities through a host of new policies and mechanisms of control, including a key set of sentencing reforms that would spur a round of prison siting and construction.  

Taken together, this punitive turn in the philosophy and practice of corrections would directly inform the substantial expansion of the state’s prison population. Between 1970 and 1989, the average daily number of those held in Illinois prisons rose from a low of 8,455 to a high of 21,300, establishing a nearly three-fold increase in the number of those held behind bars during the run up to the federally funded War on Drugs. Indeed, it was during this period that the foundation for the exponential growth in the size and scale of Illinois’ carceral state would be laid, as assumptions about the effectiveness of urban policing, determinate sentencing, and prison construction changed in direct response to the challenge posed by the involvement of these gangs in an insurgent movement: First on the streets of Chicago, and then in the cell blocks of downstate prisons.
