GRADUATE COURSE DESCRIPTIONS
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
SPRING 2024

Philosophy of Mind
David Miguel Gray
PHIL 4421/6421
T/R 1:00-2:25
<Theoretical>

COURSE DESCRIPTION
We think of the mind in different ways than we do the brain. Minds have representational states (beliefs, desires, and memories), computational states (inferring, predicting, coordinating), and sensory states (seeing, feeling, smelling). Many of these states also have the strange property of being conscious: we are aware of our believing, inferring, sensing, etc. In contrast to this, brains have neurons and glial cells, action potentials and electrical impulses, and ventricles and lobes. The stark difference between the kinds of properties we assign to the mind and the brain raises the question, "How is the mind related to the brain?" Additionally, there is the question of how to understand the mind 'on its own terms'. What is required to have a mind? What does it mean to have representational and computational states? What other states does the mind have? Through an exploration of mental phenomena such as belief, perception, inference, association, and consciousness, we will see how philosophers and psychologists have attempted to explain mental phenomena – both on their own terms and in ways that can help us understand how they can be explained in terms of physical systems.

Seminar in Continental Philosophy:
"The Relation to the Other" in Post-19th Century European Thought
Kas Saghafi
PHIL 7030/8030
W 2:30-5:30
<Theoretical>

COURSE DESCRIPTION
Who or what is "the other"? What is meant by the *relation* to the other? Why not speak in generalities about "persons" or "people" in larger groups, communities, societies, or nation states? In the humanities and, lesser so, in social and political philosophy, it has become common to designate another person of a different ethnicity, background, faith and pigment as "the other" and references to "othering" have become common parlance. I recently heard in an interview that "a lot of Americans are other." What are we to make of this term? Are all "other"s interchangeable? Is there a difference between a social-anthropological notion of "the other" and a philosophical one? How to dissociate the formal or logical "other," inaugurated very early on in Plato's dialogues, and used in the discourses of many philosophers, from its contemporary social and political usage? One temptation would be to go to the philosophical roots of this term to discover how it has been used.

Throughout the history of philosophy, the main focus and "protagonist" of Western philosophy has been *the subject*, the self, the ego or (self-)consciousness. "The philosophical subject" which has gone by many names, for example, *hypokeimenon* (Aristotle), *ego cogito* (Descartes), *subjectum, le sujet,*

Subjekt, consciousness (Locke), the "I think [*ich denke*] (Kant), self-consciousness [*selbst-bewusstsein*] (Hegel), Dasein (Heidegger), etc. has always been philosophy's main subject (pun intended).The assumption has always been that the other is another self, that to speak of the other is to speak of the experience of another self-consciousness. Thus, the other has always been viewed from the perspective of the self. It was not until Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*, when the notion of the other [*das andere*] and otherness [*Anderssein*] were introduced and explored that philosophy had to contend with them. The phenomenology of Husserl engaged with intersubjectivity, but can every relation to the other be defined as "intersubjective"? What are the assumptions of the notion of intersubjectivity? Levinas wrote about *Autrui* and *autrui* (traditionally translated as the Other with a capital O to indicate that it refers to the human other rather than to the logical or formal term, the other [*l'autre*]).The Other [*l'Autre*] makes an appearance in Lacanian psychoanalysis as well as in the work of Ricoeur and Theunissen and the writings of those who are labeled "French Feminists" (even though some are Belgian). Yet the terminology of certain contemporary French thinkers, say Deleuze, Foucault, or Badiou, does not even place an emphasis on the notion of the other and the term rarely appears in their thought. Why is that?

Not enough attention has been paid in the extant English translations to the specificity of the terms employed by different thinkers and they have been often conflated. We will play close attention to the definition of the other and the terms being used by a variety of post-Kantian thinkers to attend to their functioning, their specificity and to disentangle them from one another. We will also be attentive to how the relation to the other has been defined (for example, as a confrontation, an experience, an encounter, etc.).

We will be reading a selection of texts from Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Irigaray and others to get a good understanding of each thinker's notion of the other.

TEXTS

G.W.F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977). *"Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage" pp. 111-119.*

Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations, translated by Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). "Fifth Meditation" and "Conclusion," pp. 189-157*

Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (HarperSan Francisco, 1962). "Introduction" and § 26 "The Dasein-with of Others* [*der Anderen*] *and Everyday Being-with," pp. 153-163.*

Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness,* translated by Hazel Barnes (The Philosophical Library/Washington Square Press,1956). "§The Look" pp.340-401 in Part Three, Chapter One "The Existence of Others [*autrui*]," pp. 301-400.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith, (Routledge, 1989). "Other Selves [*Autrui*] and the Human World" pp. 346-365; *Prose of the World*, translated by John O'Neill (Northwestern University Press, 1973). 'Dialogue and the Perception of the Other [*Autrui*]" pp. 131-146.

Emmanuel Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*. (Indiana University Press, 1996). "Is Ontology Fundamental?" pp.1-10.

Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, translated by Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill (Cornell University Press,1993), "Love of Same, Love of Other [*L'Autre*]," pp.97-115, "Love of the Other," pp. 133-150.

REQUIREMENTS

Students will write a *Protokoll* (a class presentation) and a final research paper (15-20 pages).

Social/Political Philosophy: Smith, Hegel, & Marx
Remy Debes/Mike Monahan
PHIL 7/8541
T 2:30-5:30
<Practical>

COURSE DESCRIPTION

In this course, we will explore the social and political philosophies of Adam Smith, Georg Hegel, and Karl Marx. While Smith and Marx are most commonly understood as foundational advocates for (even avatars of) capitalism and socialism respectively, our focus will be more on the philosophical underpinnings of their respective economic theories, rather than on their economic work *per se*. In other words, the goal will be to understand Smith's account of the political subject, and the ways, means, and ends of social life such that capitalism emerges as the best way to organize our economic life. By way of contrast, we will then look at the different critiques of Smith, both implicit and explicit, in some of the major works of Hegel and Marx. Again, the focus in our reading of these figures will be on their different views of the subject and of political life. Additional short readings will be used to paint the philosophical landscape these three thinkers inherited, including from Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mandeville.

TEXTS:

Adam Smith – *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, *The Wealth of Nations*

G.W.F. Hegel – *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*

Karl Marx – *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*

Seminar in Modern Philosophy: The History of the History of Philosophy

Daniel J. Smith

PHIL 7301/8301
M 2:30-5:30
<History of Philosophy>

Course description:

"The study of the history of philosophy is the study of philosophy itself."

- Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*

Following a "historical turn" in the modern period, many philosophers have developed expansive and self-consciously philosophical accounts of the history of philosophy, in a process which has led to many creative transformations in our understanding of that history. What principles have philosophers used to

construct their various accounts of the history of philosophy? How have they decided what the main periods and major figures should be, and how have they addressed the difficult problem of what to include and what to exclude? Do standard historiographical concepts such as "empiricist", "modern" or "18th century" stand up to scrutiny? How did philosophy's unusually stable and long-lasting canon come about? What is the history of those exclusions – of women, of non-Europeans – that are a major concern for contemporary philosophy? These are some of the questions we will ask during the semester though a careful study of the history of the history of philosophy.

In this class we will be reading an unusually wide range of texts, both primary and secondary. This will include selections from early modern histories of philosophy by figures that may include Stanley, Brucker, Ménage, the Abbé Grégoire and Meiners, alongside important texts from the German idealist period by Kant, Reinhold, Tennemann, and Hegel. We will also read both contemporary and historical secondary literature on the historiography of philosophy which may include work by Martial Gueroult, Émile Bréhier, Giovanni Santinelli, Eileen O'Neill, Jorge Gracia, Jonathan Rée, Peter Park, Huaping Lu-Adler, Robert Bernasconi, Christia Mercer, and Catherine König-Pralong. Depending on student interest, we may also survey debates about the history of philosophy outside the West in places that may include Russia, South Africa, and China.

The main objectives of this course are the following: 1) to introduce students to the burgeoning field of "historiography of philosophy" by reading and discussing the main texts in that area; 2) to help students develop skills in historical research especially across multiple languages, including the use of digital repositories and other research tools; 3) to give advanced students the opportunity to develop a research project in an area of growing contemporary interest that might lead to a publication.

Requirements: a final paper and two in-class presentations.

Seminar—Metaphysics: History of the Concept of Intensity
Mary Beth Mader
PHIL 7414/8414
Thursdays 2:30-5:30
<Theoretical>

Course Description
"To think intensities, rather (and sooner) than qualities and quantities; depths rather than lengths and breadths; movements of individuation rather than species and kinds . . . .We have always refused to think intensity in the West. Most of the time, we have reduced it to the measurable and the play of equalities; Bergson, for his part, to the qualitative and the continuous. Deleuze liberates intensity now, by and in a thought that would be the most elevated, acute and intense. One should make no mistake about this. To think intensity—its free differences and its repetitions—is not a slight revolution in philosophy." Michel Foucault, "Ariane s'est pendue", (1969 review of Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition)*, in *Dits et Ecrits*, I, p. 798. Trans: Mary Beth Mader.

Intensities or intensive magnitudes, such as temperatures and speeds, are part of the physical descriptions of the world offered by the natural sciences. Scientific accounts of intensity have their roots in philosophical accounts, specifically in the ontologies developed in the philosophies of medieval European Christendom. A minor tradition of philosophical thought about intensity has developed In Western philosophy since then, generally in the context of ontologies of quality and quantity.

In *Difference and Repetition* and several other texts, Gilles Deleuze implicitly revives, enriches, and centralizes this lesser tradition of ontological thought on the nature of intensity in Western philosophy. However, he rejects philosophical accounts of intensity that on his view neutralize it and fail to capture the specific character of intensity and its necessarily ineliminable structuring difference.

Although prompted by the Deleuzian critique, this seminar does not take it for granted, but presents the philosophical high points in the history of the ontology of intensity for our scrutiny and evaluation. The aim of the course is to examine the ontology of intensity chronologically so as to begin to set out its history or, even, its genealogy. We will study the concept as it appears in: Medieval sources: Aquinas, Duns Scotus, The Oxford Calculators, Nicolas Oresme; Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Deleuze. It will also necessarily include discussion of the history of the ontology and philosophy of measure, as well as the relation of intensity to art and to the faculty of sensibility. Time, student interest, and translations permitting, works from Raymond Ruyer, Gilbert Simondon, and Gilles Châtelet may also be included in our study.

General Requirements
Regular contribution to seminar discussions, a seminar presentation, a short text explication (5-7 pp.), a one-page seminar paper proposal, and a seminar paper (16 pp.).