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The Experience of Nature in Heidegger

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In phenomenology, “Nature (Natur)” has a highly complex character, which has been extensively discussed in the literature. In Husserl, three types of nature can be identified: 1) the nature as physical, causal, mechanical nature in the naturalistic attitude: 2) the living nature as the natural basis of the spiritual Ego: and 3) the primal nature, which should have been given before any sedimentation of spiritual products.² Nature appears as what is constituted, what constitutes and the premise of what constitutes. The circumstances are similar for Heidegger. While nature appears in the context of criticizing the traditional concept of the world in *Being and Time (BT)*, it appears as ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenes*) and present-at-hand (*Vorhandenes*) in everyday life. Furthermore, after *BT*, apart from nature as individual entities, nature is the presupposition of the factual existence of *Dasein*. On the other hand, nature is connected with the truth ($\acute{\alpha}$ -λήθεια), the happening (*Ereignis*), and the fourfold (*Geviert*), which are the keywords in middle and late Heidegger. What is nature? How can we describe the experience of nature? The whole picture of the concept of nature has not been disclosed. In this article, by following the development of the concept of nature in Heidegger, we clarify indices that distinguish nature, and what is the experience of nature that is the presupposition of experience.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we will organize the multiple meanings of nature that are ambiguously used in *BT* through criticizing several previous studies (Section 1). Next, we clarify the concept of nature as “beings as a whole (*das Seiende im Ganzen*)” through a comparison with the nature in *BT* (Section 2). Then, we confirm the significant change of nature’s character. That is, nature is no longer overcome by *Dasein*’s transcendence, and the struggle between man and nature transforms into a natural internal struggle. Moreover, it will be revealed that the latter struggle can be seen in art works and thing (*Ding*), and that the encounter with nature, which is the premise of

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² Sakakibara Tetsuya, “The relationship between nature and spirit in Husserl’s phenomenology revisited”, in: Steinbock A. J. (eds), *Phenomenology in Japan*, Dordrecht: Springer, 1998, pp. 31–48.

experience, appears as never being exhausted at the time of opening the place (Section 3).

1. Nature in Being and Time

Heidegger frequently refers to nature in *BT*, but he does not classify it clearly. Therefore, some have attempted to provide their own classifications. Dreyfus (1991) posits that, “Heidegger distinguishes at least four different ways nature can be encountered. [...] Nature shows up as available, unavailable, occurrent, and also, strangely, in some other way, which is none of the above.”³ Firstly, nature shows up as available. Such nature includes natural materials, natural regularities, and nature taken up into history. Hammer, tongs, and needles refer in themselves to natural materials like steel, iron, metal, mineral, and wood, which comprise inconspicuous tools. Elements of nature, like the sun, are also useful, when, for example, using a watch. The very soil of history is another type of nature. “Nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult” (SZ, 388f.). Secondly, nature as an unavailable natural force is encountered as threatening tool-interaction. Dreyfus cites bad weather for a covered railway platform and the darkness for an installation for public lighting as such natural forces. Third, nature that is encountered as the privative mode of pure present-at-hand, which can be newly contextualized in theory, and nature as an object of observation of natural science can be cited. Finally, nature is for primitive people and romantic poets, such as “the nature which ‘stirs and strives’, which assails us and entralls us as landscape” (SZ, 70).

On the other hand, Seol distinguishes nature in *BT* into three: instrumental nature, nature as present-at-hand, and the nature that is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand⁴. First, instrumental nature inside the envioning world includes natural product (Naturprodukte), natural power (Naturkraft), and the envioning nature (Umweltnatur). Natural products include those that are processed (substances) and those that are not processed (which are already available without human assistance), both of which are ready-to-hand. In our everyday life, we also encounter the power of nature. “The wood is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the river is water-power, the wind is wind ‘in the sails’.” (ibid.) The envioning nature is not ready-to-hand in terms of the precise meaning of the word, but it is nature that can be said to be ready-to-hand along with other

³ Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's BT, Division I*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991, p. 109.

⁴ Min Seol, *Das Ansichsein der Natur in der Weltoffenheit bei Martin Heidegger*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2014, S. 79–85.

ready-to-hand (mitzuhanden) and it is the nature Dreyfus mentioned as the second nature (natural regularities). Secondly, there is nature as present-at-hand which is revealed in a “deworlding (Entweltlichung).” The entity that becomes exposed through deworlding does not give us understandable things due to escape from a totality of equipment. According to Seol, in the interpretation of Dreyfus, the nature as present-at-hand was divided into nature in the natural science or nature in the traditional ontology. The latter is considered in the pure present-at-hand without being re-contextualized, the former being thought to be “re-contextualized” by the de-contextualized nature through deworlding. On the contrary, Seol criticizes that Dreyfus has not seen the following points; traditional ontology has already re-contextualized nature and natural science does not handle categories of present-at-hand such as power, movement, and causality by themselves, but takes over them blindly. Finally, “in *BT* there is also the remark of the nature, which is ‘surround us’ and represent ‘the kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand’”.⁵ Such nature is not present-at-hand because this nature envelops us, preceding our theoretical point of view. Also, it is not ready-to-hand because it is not buried in the teleological relationships of the “in-order-to” (Um-zu-Bezüge). However this third possibility of nature has not been explored in *BT*.⁶

There are many criticisms of Dreyfus identified by Seol with which we can agree. As Seol shows, Dreyfus cites the unavailable natural forces as the second nature, but if it does not integrate into the first nature as ready-to-hand, it causes a category mistake. Moreover, in the case of traditional ontology (strictly speaking, Dreyfus does not refer to traditional ontology, but to pure present-at-hand (occurentness)), We must consider that nature has already been re-contextualized. However, as with Seol, should we consider there is the third nature in *BT*? In the following, we will position the nature in *BT* as one of the entity within-the-world (innerweltliches Seiendes) that we meet in the holistic context of the world. In addition, it will become clear that we should set only two classifications, and present-at-hand should be separated into the broad and narrow.

First of all, as Seol correctly presents, the nature in *BT* is an entity within-the-world.⁷ The fundamental ontology, which departs from the Dasein’s understanding of being, does not regard entities as being separated from other entities, but as an entity within-the-world which is encountered

⁵ Min Seol, a. a. O., S. 84.

⁶ Søren Overgaard distinguishes nature into three; (a) nature as something with the being of readiness-to-hand (b) nature not as straightforwardly ready-to-hand, but as a certain unhandiness that by no means reduces it to something merely present-at-hand, (c) nature as something present-at-hand. See Søren Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*, Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, 123–125.

⁷ Min Seol, a. a. O., S. 75.

in a holistic context of the world which is controlled from “for-the-sake-of” (Um-willen). Nature is no exception. If we assume that nature is separated from Dasein’s understanding of being, we will instantly generate a pseudo problem of the external world. This can be confirmed alongside Heidegger’s argument. Nature in *BT* first appears in the context of criticizing traditional analysis of the concept of the world. Since the analysis was trying to interpret the world from the perspective of “nature” (Things of Nature (Naturdinglichkeit)), it never grasps the phenomenon of the world. In other words, it is trying to assemble the world from the basic thing (nature) on the premise of what the world is. According to Heidegger, such nature as present-at-hand arises derivatively from the nature as ready-to-hand. That is, first of all, we encounter nature as available in everyday life, and it is in hand in the relationships of the “in-order-to” of the environing world (Umwelt). Nature that natural science treats is established as the privative mode by neglecting the being of ready-to-hand in nature⁸. Therefore, nature in *BT* is considered only in connection with the environing world. For example, even the bad weather and darkness which seemingly cannot be grasped from availability can be caught in the relationships of the “in-order-to” of the environing world with other tools such as a covered railway platform and an installation for public lighting. Heidegger calls such nature “the environing nature (Umweltnatur)” (SZ, 71), and this exactly shows that nature in *BT* positions nature in the environing world, i.e., nature is encountered as ready-to-hand in everyday life.

Of course, we can isolate nature from the relationships of the “in-order-to” of environing world and think about it separately one by one. In other words, it is possible to see it as present-at-hand by just looking at it in the theoretical attitude. However, it does not mean that present-at-hand ceases to be an entity within-the-world. For example, as natural scientists write papers on what they observed during an experiment, present-at-hand is also incorporated into the worldwide holistic context in a re-contextualized way. Up to this point, we have positioned nature as an entity within-the-world, and have confirmed two ways this is made possible: ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. Then, can we find “third nature,” which is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand in *BT*?

In fact, a more careful interpretation is necessary of the sentence, which Seol (and many other commentators) cites as the third nature: “the kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is present-at-hand”. The full sentence is as follows:

The ‘Nature’ by which we are ‘surrounded’ is, of course, an entity within-the-world; but the kind of being which it shows belongs neither to the ready-to-hand nor to what is

⁸ Cf. SZ, 70.

present-at-hand as ‘Things of Nature’. No matter how this being of ‘Nature’ may be interpreted, *all* the modes of being of entities within-the-world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of Being-in-the world. (ibid.)

That is, there are restrictions on present-at-hand, namely “Things of Nature.” In the previous sentence, Heidegger posits, “[N]ot all presence-at-hand is the presence-at-hand of things” (ibid.). This means that we are able to consider present-at-hand apart from the present-at-hand of things that takes over the reality. We can call the former present-at-hand narrow and the latter present-at-hand broad. Therefore, the above-mentioned place that is said to show the third nature actually identifies that the nature is present-at-hand in a broad sense (neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand in the narrow sense).

The above clarifies that the nature in *BT* is positioned either as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand in a broad sense or a narrow sense, both of which are prescribed as an entity within-the-world. Moreover, nature as an entity within-the-world is an entity based on Being-in-the-world of Dasein.

2. Nature in Metontology

Heidegger in *BT* worked on ontology through a fundamental ontology, which regards Dasein as an exemplary entity all the while departing from Dasein’s understanding of being. Starting from the understanding of being means that we presuppose the understanding of being as a fact (“*ein Faktum*”(SZ, 5)), and interpret any being of beings on the basis of understanding of being. However, is there any entity that cannot be caught by assuming the understanding of being of Dasein? If there are such entities, the entities that the ontology in *BT* can handle will be limited. The nature captured by the framework of transcendental philosophy departing from understanding of being seems to be one-sided. Löwith also holds these doubts. According to Löwith, Heidegger’s existential-ontological question lacks “absolutely autonomous” nature.⁹ Such criticism of Löwith may apply to nature in *BT*. However, it is now widely known that in the metaphysical period (1927–

⁹ Karl Löwith, „Zu Heideggers Seinsfrage: Die Natur des Menschen und die Welt der Natur“, in: *Sämtliche Schriften*, Bd. 8, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1984, S. 280. ; vgl. Karl Löwith, „Heidegger — Denker in dürftiger Zeit“, in: *Sämtliche Schriften*, Bd. 8, Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1984, S. 182. The thought of Löwith may be criticized as dogmatic metaphysics because he assumes absolutely autonomous nature that is completely separated by Dasein. Cf. Min Seol, *ibid.* p. 92.

30) immediately after *BT*, nature, which cannot be considered if we presuppose the understanding of being, is discussed. In this section, we discuss how to position beings as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen), i.e., φύσις.

At first, we have to be careful that Heidegger changes the meaning of “nature” between *BT* and the metaphysical period.

The decisive reason [why nature is apparently missing in the analytic of Dasein] lies in the fact that nature does not let itself be encountered either within the sphere of the environing world, nor in general primarily as something *toward which we comport ourselves*. Nature is originally manifest in Dasein through Dasein’s existing as finding itself attuned *in the midst of beings*. (GA9, 155–156, anm. 55)

As discussed in the previous section, the nature in *BT* was prescribed as an entity within-the-world. Therefore, we can encounter the nature in the environing world. However, after *BT*, nature is not an entity within-the-world, and we cannot encounter it in the environing world. Such nature is beginning to be spoken in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (SS1927; GA24). In this text, “being within-the-world does not belong to the *being* of nature” (GA24, 240), and “it is, even if we do not uncover it, without our encountering it within our world” (ibid.). It is obvious that the nature is different from nature in *BT*, because the nature in *BT* is an entity within-the-world. In *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (SS1928; GA26), the nature becomes the theme of his thought.

The possibility that being is there in the understanding presupposes the factual existence of Dasein, and this in turn presupposes the factual presentness-at-hand [*Vorhandensein*] of nature. [...] As a result, we need a special problematic which has for its proper theme the entity as a whole [*das Seiende im Ganzen*]. This new investigation resides in the essence of ontology itself and is the result of its overturning [*Umschlag*], its *μεταβολή*. I designate this set of questions *metontology*.” (GA26, 199)

The nature as “beings as a whole” is a premise of the factual existence of Dasein that *BT* presupposes, and it is discussed in metontology as a new investigation, which arises from the overturning of ontology. This corresponds to the following remark in *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy* (SS1926, GA22): “*The ontological problem turns around! Metontological; θεολογική; beings as a whole*” (GA22, 106). We can read his plan from this remark, i.e., Heidegger begins to

work on the theology as in Aristotle. Although he shelved this problem in *BT*, he develops it in metontology, and plans his own metaphysics by fundamental ontology and metontology.

Such nature is derived from the interpretation of φύσις in the lecture on Aristotle before *BT*. While Heidegger inherits φύσις of Aristotle, he builds his own concept of φύσις (nature).¹⁰ In *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (SS1929/30, GA29/30), φύσις is prescribed as “self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole” (GA29/30, 38f.). It includes “growth” in a broad sense: “growth not only of plants and animals, their arising and passing away taken merely as an isolated process, but growth as this occurring in the midst of, and permeated by, the changing of the seasons, in the midst of the alternation of day and night, in the midst of the wandering of the stars, of storms and weather and the raging of the elements” (GA29/30, 39). φύσις also includes “the events which man experiences in himself: procreation, birth, childhood, maturing, aging, death” (GA29/30, 39). What is remarkable here is that nature as φύσις is no longer considered as an entity within-the-world like in *BT*. In the model of *BT*, for example, the alternation of day and night, storms and weather, and the raging of the elements are ready-to-hand along with other ready-to-hand, i.e., mitzuhanden. And “the events which man experiences in himself” are regarded as ones which occur within the environing world. On the other hand, φύσις is neither ready-to-hand to be encountered in everyday life nor present-at-hand through deworlding in a theoretical attitude. Moreover, it has the character of “overwhelmingness (Übermächtigkeit),” as in Aristotle’s theology. Heidegger finds the experiences that confront φύσις as beings as a whole in fundamental mood as Aristotle finds it in θαυμάζειν. While Aristotle deals with θαυμάζειν, Heidegger deals with anxiety and boredom. Boredom in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* is especially important for clarifying the experience of beings as a whole. Although we can find something to pass the time (Zeitvertreib) for the first and second form of boredom, we cannot find it in the third, profound boredom, and the entity within-the-world becomes indifferent. “Beings as a whole do not disappear, but *show themselves precisely as such* in their indifference” (GA29/30, 208). Dasein is just delivered to the telling refusal of beings as a whole. From the above, it becomes clear that the experience of nature as beings as a whole is possible through fundamental mood. In *What is Metaphysics*, Heidegger posits, “In the end an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the whole of beings in themselves and finding oneself (Sichbefinden) in the midst of beings as a whole. The former is impossible in principle. The latter happens all the time in our Dasein” (GA9, 110). It is

¹⁰ Yuto KANNARI, "Von der Natur als dem Seiendem im Ganzen: Überprüfung des Begriffs der Natur beim frühen Heidegger", *Jitsuzonshiso-ronshu: annals of existential thought*, vol. 32, pp. 109–125 (Japanese).

important that Heidegger incorporates this nature into the transcendence of Dasein. The transcendence comes from “worldview (Weltanschauung).”

Since *The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview* (War Emergency Semester 1919; GA56/57), Heidegger emphasizes the difference between the worldview and his own philosophy. However, in *Introduction to Philosophy* (WS1928/29; GA27), we find that Heidegger tries to construct his own concept of worldview from the co-existence of the self and the world that is expressed as “having the world” in Kant’s *Critic of Judgment*. According to Heidegger, the worldview is prescribed as follows:

Worldview means fundamentally having the world (Welt-haben), that is, owning the world. In other words, it means bringing to possession enduring in Being-in-the-world, and what nothing-of-support (Haltlosigkeit) lacks but it exactly instructs. (GA27, 344)

Dasein is thrown into beings as a whole, and it does not find any support against the overwhelming nature. However, our attitude towards beings as a whole is not only acceptance. According to Heidegger, we can take two kinds of attitude to it: “sheltering (Bergung)” and “holding (Haltung).” The former is a source of myth and religion and refers to the way that is thoroughly dominated by beings as a whole, and governs relationships with beings as a whole by magical acts. On the contrary, worldview as “holding” creates philosophy and various sciences. In this worldview, Dasein as acting as a support to himself confronts beings as a whole, and it occurs “Overcoming overwhelmingness of beings” (GA27, 381). For the first time, through this confrontation and overcoming, entities become understandable to us. Heidegger named this situation “entering the world (Welteingang)” of entities and connects beings as a whole to the world. As Tengelyi explains it, Heidegger develops Dilthey’s worldview in that Dasein establishes existential holding in the midst of beings as a whole despite being metaphysically helpless.¹¹ In addition, although little attention has been given to it, the particular problem in Heidegger’s metaphysical period is that the dynamics of the world in confrontation with the nature as beings as a whole. Heidegger depicts this antecedent situation of our understanding as transcendence.

According to Heidegger, what is overcome is beings as a whole. “Dasein does not overcome

¹¹ László Tengelyi, “L’idée de métontologie et la vision du monde selon Heidegger”, in: *Heidegger Studies*, Vol. 27, 2011, pp. 137–153; László Tengelyi, *Welt und Unendlichkeit: Zum Problem phänomenologischer Metaphysik*, München: Verlag Karl Alber, 2014. S. 228–263.

this and that entities, but overcomes beings as a whole” (GA27, 306)¹². As indicated above, the world that is distinguished from beings as a whole becomes the destination to overcome in transcendence. “Dasein transcends the entity, and this leap is a leap to the world” (GA26, 233). Heidegger explains this transcendence through “world-building (Weltbildung).” “‘Dasein transcends’ means that Dasein is world-builder in the essence of its existence” (GA9, 158). The meaning of “world-builder (Weltbildend)” includes giving Dasein a certain fundamental look which functions as a “pre-image (Vorblick)” of entities through the world that Dasein causes.¹³ That is, Dasein causes the world that prescribes the being of entities, and for the first time in the world the entities can be incorporated into the web of reference as being understandable. Such work of world-building cannot be understood as one of the acts Dasein can do in the world. Rather, world-building is a situation that has already occurred on which the existence of Dasein is based.¹⁴

Metontology inherits the framework of transcendental philosophy from *BT*. Nature (φύσις) as beings as a whole is certainly not grasped within the holistic context in the world like entities within-the-world in *BT*. However, such nature is caught as an element of transcendence of Dasein, which can understand something “as something” with λόγος. After, nature is no longer told based on Dasein’s transcendence and world-building. While Heidegger does research into an ancient Greek understanding of φύσις, he takes φύσις into his own philosophy. In the next section, we look at φύσις in the ancient Greek understanding, and discuss Heidegger’s concept of the earth (Erde).

3. Nature and Earth

Clearly, Heidegger’s thoughts on “On the Essence of Truth“ (1930) is taking over beings as a whole, which is the theme of metontology. However, unlike in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, the character of refusing in nature is no longer reduced to Dasein’s transcendence. The hidden character of nature becomes attributed to untruth (Unwahrheit) as essentially belonging to the truth. “[The essence of philosophy] can be determined only on the basis of relatedness to the original truth of beings as such as a whole”(GA9, 199), and such truth includes untruth, or, in other words, “unconcealment (Unverborgenheit)” (GA9, 193) of beings as a whole.¹⁵

¹² Cf. GA9, 118.

¹³ Cf. GA9, 158.

¹⁴ Cf. GA29/30, 414.

¹⁵ We can find another change of nature in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (SS1935; GA40). In this lecture, φύσις is said to be “the emerging-abiding sway (das aufgehend-verweilende Walten)”(GA40, 16), namely it emerges from itself (for example, the blossoming of the rose). Here, the confrontation no longer exists as a relationship between Dasein and beings as a whole, but it is regarded as being

In *The Origin of Western Thought: Heraclitus* (SS1943, GA55), Heidegger attempts to identify the primitive meaning of φύσις in Heraclitus. In this lecture, φύσις is “a thing that never sinks yet,” that is, “to appear constantly.” For example, this can be seen in the sprouts budding, the flowers blooming, and the sun rising. However, the famous fragment of Heraclitus that is usually translated as “nature loves to hide” (φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ) seems to be saying the opposite. But, according to Heidegger, there is no contradiction between “appear constantly” and “love to hide.” This is because they can be understood in a unified way. Heidegger translates the fragment above as “appearing presents grace to concealing itself” (GA55, 110). Concealing essentially belongs to appearing, and that which involves concealment in itself appears without the concealment being removed, which is Ἀ-Λήθεια as “un-concealment (Un-verborgenheit)” of φύσις.

Heidegger takes φύσις into his own philosophical thought as “the earth.” In *The Origin of the Work of Art* (*The Origin*; 1935/36), some significant characters of the earth are described. As Gadamer points out, the earth is a concept derived from Hölderlin, to whom Heidegger was devoted at the time¹⁶. However, only Hölderlin is not the origin of the earth. The earth is derived from φύσις in the Greeks. “The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things φύσις. It clears and illuminates, also, that on which and in which man bases his dwelling (Wohnen). We call this ground the *earth*” (GA5, 28). Heidegger tries to see the earth in art. Unlike a tool, a material (Stoff) of artwork is unchangeable to other things and never wears down. For example, the stone of a stone ax is suitable if the stone is not too heavy or not too light and does not face any resistance. In this case, it is consumed and disappears in usefulness. Meanwhile, the stone of a building, like Greek temple, is not consumed but appears solid. The work contains something that does not come into the world and maintains its original form. In this sense, the work indicates the incomprehensible earth we are thrown in. Compared with beings as a whole, the earth is emphasized in that it has the character of self-secluding, which is against our understanding. The earth is essentially self-secluding, but it will appear as the earth itself when we avoid any clarification and watch it as essentially undisclosed. Heidegger explains the relationship between the world and the earth as the strife between them.

In metaphysicality, the way to move us away from average everydayness is profound boredom as a fundamental mood. On the other hand, art plays an important role in *The Origin*. The work “transport[s] us out of the realm of the ordinary” (GA5, 54). “In the vicinity of the work we

in φύσις. Furthermore, λόγος is not like the ability of Dasein, but is regarded as the work of collecting in φύσις. A confrontation occurs within in φύσις.

¹⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer “Zur Einführung” in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes*, Reclam, 2008, p. 99.

were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.” (GA5, 21) The experience of the earth requires a particular way of engaging with things that are different from everyday life. Finally, let us take a look at how to engage with things in late Heidegger.

In *Bremen Lectures* (1949; GA79), the earth occupies one of “the fourfold (Geviert)” along with the sky, the divinities, and the mortals. The earth is defined as follows: “The earth is the building bearer, what nourishingly fructifies, tending waters and stones, plants and animals” (GA79, 17). The earth does not emerge meaningfully as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand within-the-world. And it is not the premise of Dasein’s understanding. That is, we cannot encounter it in dealing with the entity within-the-world, nor in the fundamental mood like anxiety and boredom. Then, how can we engage with the earth? According to Heidegger in *Building Dwelling Thinking* (GA7), the relationship with the earth becomes possible as “saving (Rettung)”.

Mortals dwell in that they save the earth (...) To save really means to set something free into its own presencing. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from spoliation. (GA7, 152)

It is necessary to save nature because nature is considered as a mere source of power in the modern technological world and the original being of nature is lost. As Heidegger posits, “Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry” (GA16, 523). We need to set something free into own presencing. Heidegger calls this “releasement (Gelassenheit) toward things” (GA16, 527). The attitude means that while we let technology enter into our daily lives, we never regard it as absolute. When we never regard technology as absolute and let things open a place for fourfold, we can experience the earth as never being exhausted in the things.

Conclusion Remarks

Three types of experiences of nature can be found in Heidegger: 1) dealing with entities within-the-world, like ready-to-hand and present-at-hand: 2) confronting overwhelmingness in fundamental mood: and 3) releasing toward things. Heidegger describes nature in Dasein’s understanding in *BZ*, and in order to clarify the understanding he discusses beings as a whole. On the other hand, phenomenology of nature in Heidegger is useful to consider the limit of transcendental approach. Nature has the character of self-secluding, which is beyond our access.

List of Abbreviations

References to volumes of Martin Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann) will be indicated by "GA" followed by the volume number. I refer to English translations.

• Martin Heidegger,

SZ (BT) = *Sein und Zeit*, Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 19 Aufl., 2006. (translated by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1962)

GA5 = *Holzwege*.

GA7 = *Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

GA9 = *Wegmarken*.

GA16 = *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*.

GA22 = *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*.

GA24 = *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

GA26 = *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang vom Leibniz*.

GA27 = *Einleitung in die Philosophie*.

GA29/30 = *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*.

GA40 = *Einführung in die Metaphysik*.

GA56/57 = *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*.

GA79 = *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*.