

JUDGMENT, SPACE AND FEELING. HIERARCHY OF COMMUNICATION

Victor Molchanov

Russian State University for the Humanities

Moscow

Summary

The interconnection of judgments, questions, and suppositions is the core of communicative mind. Judgments are the main element of this communicative complex; the communicative interrelation of judgments, etc. is a basic structure of the variety of human worlds and spaces. Pure perception is an anomaly, or degeneration of judgment. The differentiation performance is an inherent property of every living thing. The ability to differentiate differentiations is a feature of human being and the foundation of judging. Every judgment presupposes the differentiation of two main types of differentiations: between truth and false, real and non-real, on the one hand, and between analysis and interpretation, subject and object, on the other hand. The primary level in the hierarchy of judgments is bodily one. Judgments in communicative practice are associated with feelings (and will), and the connection between them can be a basis of typology of communications. (In following “judgment” is an abbreviation of “judgments, questions, and suppositions”.)

Ah! How great the world is in the light of the lamps!

In the eyes of memory, how small and slight!

Charles Baudelaire

1. Judgment or Perception?

The ultimate and indispensable level of every communicative practice is a set of judgments, questions, and suppositions. Perceptions cannot play the role of a universal and fundamental communicator, even if they are extremely active.

Phenomenology begins with the thesis that an act of presentation (das Vorstellen) is a basic stratum which underlies all other modes of consciousness. The famous Brentano's thesis, which Husserl accepted in general, runs as follows: «This act of

presentation forms the foundation not merely of the act of judging, but also of desiring and of every other mental act. Nothing can be judged, desired, hoped or feared, unless one has a presentation of that thing» (Brentano 1995, 61). In Husserl presentation as perception becomes the basic mode of consciousness and a sample for structuring of all other types of intentionality. Husserl's doctrine of subjective time also corresponds to the understanding of perception as a continuous process that proceeds in the inner consciousness.

However, their positions are different in relation to inner experience. In fact, Brentano's concept of inner perception brings to the fore judgments. Every mental act contains an inner perception, or inner consciousness of itself, and the latter is nothing else as the inner judgment, as Brentano himself called it. It is considered as a necessary element of every act of consciousness and as the only source of evidence. In this sense judgment is omnipresent; it is necessary part of every wakeful consciousness. In respect of inner consciousness Husserl's position is different: Husserl's reflexion rather looks like as inner observation than inner judgment. In LU V, §6 Husserl tried to transform Brentano's inner judgment, which, as he believes, can give us only a narrow field of evidence, to inner flowing perception. Thus, Husserl accepts the primacy of perception and representation also with reference to inner experience.

It seems to be true, at least in relation to the outer world. It seems that perceived objects really impose themselves on us, whether we want to see them or not. As soon as we open eyes, we involuntarily perceive the objects of the surrounding world. Moreover, we are doomed to hear the coming sounds, if we do not defend us from them.

However, this description is not relevant. Better to say it is only partly true. Of course, we perceive objects, but it does not mean that we scrutinize them. We are dealing with objects or things only as the parts of matters of fact while discerning one matter of fact from another. Is it not already the operation of judgment? Heidegger notes: "Any mere pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets" (Heidegger 1977, 189).

While denying any pure seeing Heidegger seeks for a primary experience, which would be neither perception nor judgment. He calls such an experience “understanding” and “interpretation”. However, there is one more indispensable dimension of primary experience, namely analysis, and the difference between analysis and interpretation makes up the necessary element of judgement as experience. (In brackets: not all judgments are predicative.) In everyday life we understand what has been already understood; we interpret what has been already interpreted. However, even in a daily routine an analysis plays its irreplaceable role. Its significance grows immensely in the sphere of scientific research.

The nature of judgment consists in performance at least of two types of differentiations: between truth and false, real and non-real, on the one hand, and between analysis and interpretation, subject and object, on the other hand. It is evident that perception and representation, which Brentano’s and Husserl’s term “das Vorstellen” in itself unites, lacks for such differences.

Husserl writes: “I think of Jupiter as I think of Bismarck, I think of the tower of Babel as I think of Cologne Cathedral” (LI, V, §11, p. 559). [Jupiter stelle ich nicht anders vor als Bismarck, den babylonischen Turm nicht anders als den Kölner Dom]. Suppose it is true. However, it is impossible in relation to judgment, etc. or assertion. Every act of judgment includes a differentiation between real and non-real. The same Husserl’s judgment can serve as example. Here one can immediately distinguish the real person (Bismarck) from the mythological one (Jupiter). We cannot judge or estimate that Jupiter lived earlier than Bismarck or that the tower of Babel was higher or lower than Cologne Cathedral. Each of them is situated in radical different spaces – in historical and mythological ones. The difference between real and non-real is indispensable for all types of human communications, where either judgment or its counterparts question and supposition come to the fore. in different communicative practices.

Communication is the main characteristic of any human community. Each line of behavior, each object and concept in human world is a result of direct or indirect communication, discussion, and decision. A habitus of every human being can be

also defined as a stable hierarchy of communications with such and such preferences.

Human communication presupposes the spatiality of human world and human body. It is evident also that human communications proceed not only in a pure mental sphere, if the latter can take place at all. Of course one can make judgments about something non-mental. The question is whether is there non-mental judgments? To every sphere of communication there corresponds a type of discourse or set of judgments, questions, and suppositions. Is there judgments, questions and suppositions which stem rather from body movements than from a “stream of thoughts”?

2. Mental and body judgments

Usually one relates judgments to a judging mind, they are considered as a prerogative of consciousness, reason, soul, spirit, intellect, etc. Such judgments we will call later the mental. It is unlikely that anyone will dispute that perceptions and emotions are directly related to the human body. And what about judgments? Certainly one can say that judgments are connected with speaking or hearing body. However, verbalization and hearing of judgments are only means for their expression and understanding.

Is our body only the means to express judgments, can body itself differentiate truth and false, real and non-real? When we lay claim to the truth, does it mean that we are situated exclusively in mental sphere?

Is there an area, in which a person, including a modern one, not only can, but must constantly support the existence of truth? This is not a sphere of contemplation or pure comprehension. It is a sphere of actions, mostly unconscious, in which we must protect ourselves from possible numerous mistakes that can never be completely eliminated. This sphere, in which we are compelled to affirm truth, is nothing else than our body.

We are rightfully talking about right or wrong movements of our body and of other's ones. The issue is not a physiological organism. We consider a human body

in a human world; it is a body which, for example, can better remember the order of figures than the special effort of memory, which catches the ball without thinking, which compares the height of the object without any resort to some ways of measurement, etc. I do not refer here to instincts, which are, of course, also "inscribed" in human body. The issue is the relevance of the bodily movements to a particular situation and in this sense a reasonable behavior that does not involve preliminary thinking or special analysis.

In these and other similar cases our body itself takes upon itself the functions of the analyst. A tennis player striking a ball or a carpenter hammering a nail, make body judgments, pretending on truth and making sometimes mistakes.

Judgments and body judgments also are primarily connected with human freedom. In the sphere of perceptions we are free only to the extent that judgment and will permit or forbid us to perceive something. Emotions possess us and a decision of self-control is a difficult act of freedom, which one can call inner judgment. It goes without saying that the freedom of judgments cannot be absolute like everything in the human world. However, one can freely make decisions, assert or deny, recognize or reject.

In the sphere of body judgments there are also modes of justification and verification, which is quite natural. Body judgment can be not only true or false. It can be partly true and partly wrong. For example: one catches a ball (the judgment is true), but in the same time he injures his hand (his movement is not completely right). However, there is a universal practical principle in this sphere, which is the core of all justification and verification of body movement. It is a feeling or experience that is available to everyone. It is neither a kind of sensation, nor of emotion. It let us distinguish between truth and false in relation to body movements in a whole. It accompanies each body movement in one way or another, being their organizing center. This is a feeling of equilibrium. The body organism in any movement is guided by this feeling: it is neither conscious nor unconscious. It is the basic spatial-bodily feeling, which could be called body apriority. Ability to walk, stand, step over, turn, bend, jump, etc. is ensured by a

sense of balance (the physiological basis of which is the vestibular apparatus), which is directly connected with the basic force of nature, with gravity, and the basic space-corporeal differences: top / bottom, right / left. A sense of balance is a necessary condition of the norm in the life world; the loss of balance and the loss of a sense of balance entail a number of anomalies.

The analogy between feeling of equilibrium and evidence is based on the internal experience of truth preference: we do not consciously strive to mistakes. A feeling of equilibrium, if we do not consider its physiological basis, arises in the "problem situation," in which a possible or actual imbalance threatens us. The same can be said about evidence: we need it when solving problems in the broadest sense.

3. From mental to body judgments. Judgment and Feeling

A. In the New European philosophy, the thematization of judgment is associated with its mental form: Descartes proposes a classification of the mental: *ideae*, *judicia* and *voluntates sive affectus*, and makes a radical distinction between the thinking that encompasses all mental acts and the extent.

B. J. Locke points to the separation of ideas as a necessary basis of judgment. «Judgment ... lies ... in separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference» (Locke 1999, 139). Judgment goes beyond knowledge and fills our desire for knowledge: "Judgment is the presuming things to be, without perceiving it" (Locke 1999, 648). "Judgment, or assent to probability, supplies of our want of knowledge" (Locke 1999, 647). Both philosophers attributed the evidence as a criterion of truth to "ideas", i.e. to representations, and considered judgment only as a mental act.

C. The first step towards the convergence of judgment, body, and space has been made by Kant. Kant connected the notion of absolute space with the absolute relations in human body: "Da das verschiedene Gefühl der rechten und linken Seite zum Urtheil der Gegenden von so großer Nothwendigkeit ist, so hat die Natur es zugleich an die mechanische Einrichtung des menschlichen Körpers geknüpft, vermittelst deren die eine, nämlich die rechte einen ungezweifelten Vorzug der

Gewandtheit und vielleicht auch der Stärke vor der Linken hat“ (Kant 1991, 997). But there is a difference: judgment about areas or places refers to the sphere of intelligence, or reason, and the feeling of the left and right side to the directly bodily experience.

D. Judgment as feeling by Jack London

Body judgments are not judgments about the directions of movement of one's own body, but rather the decision of the body itself to take this or that direction in walking, stopping, performing certain actions. They are not inseparable from the corresponding kinesthetical feelings.

Comparing the two boxers during the fight, Jack London characterizes one of them: "His failing was lack of judgment in time and distance" (London 1913, 56). In another passage of the same story we read: "On Glendon's part, there were times and times when a slip or error of judgment could have been discovered him to one of his antagonist's sledge-hammer blows and lost him the fight" (London 1913, 112). Thus we are reading about possible mistakes in judgments, and in principle errors are possible only in judgments. (In Russian translation of this story judgment is rendered as feeling.) Thus, Kant connects judgments with human body indirectly; J. London directly.

E. An attempt to establish a connection between judgment and feeling "outside of space" one can find in A. Meinong. In his paper "On the judgment-in-feelings» (Über Urteilsgefühle) he writes: «Intellektuelle Voraussetzung des Freudegefühls ist also nicht eigentlich ein Wissen, wohl aber ein Überzeugtsein, ein Urteil also, das zwar irrig sein, niemals aber durch den Verlust des Überzeugungsmomentes in eine "bloße Vorstellung" oder auch nur in eine Annahme übergehen kann, ohne daß zugleich das Gefühl der Freude vernichtet würde» (Meinong 1906, 26). However, Meinong's attitude is still an intellectualist one. Joy and judgment cannot be really described without any reference to a semantic human space, in which this or that joy and its communicative expression in body judgment take place.

5. Space and Body

A. The above-mentioned Kant's work influenced strongly the formation of Heidegger's conception of space: „The firm directions of right and left originate from this directionality... The spatialization of Dasein in its corporeality ... is also marked out in accordance with these directions (Heidegger 1995, 100). ("Aus dieser Ausrichtung entspringen die festen Richtungen nach rechts und links ... Die Verräumlichkeit des Daseins in seiner Leiblichkeit, die eine hier nicht zu behandelnde Problematik in sich birgt, ist mit nach diesen Richtungen ausgezeichnet "(Heidegger 1977, 108). However, Heidegger does not accept the space of „transcendental aesthetics“: “Space is neither in the subject, nor is the world in space. Rather, space is „in“ the world“ (Heidegger 1995, 112) ("Der Raum weder im Subjekt, noch ist die Welt im Raum. Der Raum ist vielmehr "in" der Welt" (Heidegger 1977, 111). The primary characteristic of the worldly space are de-severance and directionality (Ent-fernung and Ausrichtung).

Body (Leiblichkeit) is mentioned, implied, but explicitly this theme is not elaborated in Heidegger. Worldhood of the world (Weltlichkeit der Welt) as a set of references is a background of quasi-human space, in which people communicate with signs through references (Verweisungen), but not with each other.

B. Every human space is a space of communication and of possible intersubjectivity. Meaning and significance of any object and matter of fact is a result of a relation of judgments. Communicative spaces underline perceptions, on the one hand, and signs or indications, on the other hand. “Act” of judgment is a differentiation (not separation as in Locke and Hölderlin) of one matter of fact from another for the formulation and resolution of a definite task. Every judgment implies not only an internal judgment accompanying all differentiations, but also judgments of others, who somehow organize this or that semantic space. Negative judgment is essentially the delineation of boundaries between spaces. It states that in this space there cannot be not only this or that objectivity but also this or that perception and emotion.

6. The typology of judgments and the communicative spaces

The typology of judgments is possible on the basis of their difference and conjugation with feeling and will, which takes place in all human world-spaces. The following typology is preliminary and incomplete.

I. The sphere of body judgments. Judgments and feelings are inseparable in experience.

1. Various skills in everyday life.

2. Gymnastics and sport as an artificial sphere of body competitions, in which volitional efforts play a special role, and judgments are associated with resolution and mood.

3. Meditative practices.

II. Mental judgments.

Here judgment and feeling already differ as types of experience. Judgment seems to be doubled: judgment is not rendered, as a rule, without argumentation, and the types of argument differ substantially from one another depending on one level or another.

1. Discussions in everyday life.

2. Discussions in diverse professional spheres.

3. Judgments in the field of science. Theories and justifications.

4. Judgment in philosophy. Difference between terms, concepts, and problems as a *conditio sine qua non* of philosophical talks and texts.

III. In the sphere of politics and aesthetics judgments and feelings again reveal a certain convergence but of a different kind than in the original bodily judgments. Feeling compensates here for lack of argumentation in judgments, and the place of arguments occupies an appeal to feelings, for example, to sense of patriotism, to sense of beauty or style, etc. Rational arguments are often used for irrational goals.

IV. Ethics and Practice. There arise conflicts between judgment and interests or will, between judgment and feeling of trust and justice. Often it is hard to find a balance between them.

1. Upbringing and education (teacher-student).

2. Orders (commands) and their executions (in any organization with a hierarchy of power).
3. Prescription and trust (doctor-patient).
4. Juridical sphere: judge, accused, prosecutor, attorney.
5. Management of science and science politics.

All these spheres and levels have their own style and language of communication, their spatiality and corporeality, their very complex connection of judgments, questions, supposition, feelings, and perceptions. Judgment (judging) is not only a necessary element of each of the selected and yet not selected spheres and levels, but also a means of transition from one sphere to another and from one level within each sphere to another one.

References

- Brentano 1995 – Franz Brentano *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and Linda L. McAlister. London and New York: Routledge, 1995.
- Heidegger 1977 – Martin Heidegger *Sein und Zeit*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1977.
- Heidegger 1996 – Martin Heidegger *Being and Time*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. State University of New York, 1996
- Kant 1991 – Immanuel Kant *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume // I. Kant Werkausgabe II*. Frankfurt a.M., Suhrkamp, 1991.
- Locke 1999 – John Locke *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* The Pennsylvania State University, 1999.
- London 1913 – Jack London *The Abysmal Brute*. New York: The Century co., 1913.
- Meinong 1906 – Alexius Meinong *Über Urteilsgefühle // Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie* 6, 1906.