The Universal Ethics and Religion in Practical Life: A Reflection on Husserl’s Manuscripts from 1930s

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Abstract:

This paper mainly aims at interpreting Husserl’s manuscripts in 1930s about ethics and religion, and most of them are collected in Hua XLII: Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie. I will first introduce Husserl’s ethical and religious thinking before 1930 and then arrange the materials selected from those manuscripts in the six parts below: 1. Universal ethics; 2. Universal God; 3. From factuality to universality; 4. Phenomenological analysis of worldly facticity; 5. God’s belief in view of instinct; 6. Union of philosophy and theology. To conclude, I will highlight Husserl’s following Aristotelian idea of theoria in which he endows with an extended and deepened practical sense through his phenomenological interpretation.

1. Introduction

Before the World War I, Husserl’s ethical thought was essentially influenced by his teacher Franz Brentano. This is collected in Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre, 1908-1914. We can interpret his ethical thought according to Aristotle’s ethics. It is especially worth to mention that Aristotle’s emphasis on the notion of wisdom based on the notion of philia, which renders Husserl’s idea of God be closed to Aristotelian God.1 However, as a victim of World War I, Husserl’s ethical thought was also influenced by Fichte. He gave a series of lectures three times in 1917 and 1918 with the title: “Fichtes Menschheitsideal”, which published in 1987 and collected in Aufsätze und Vorträge (1912-1921). This immediately influenced Husserl’s lecture in Wintersemester 1919/20: Einführung in die Philosophie. From Husserl’s early times to later times, we see the transition of Husserl’s ethics and which shows the two points below: a. the proposition of the notion of love, b. the movement from the individual to communal ethics.2

Later, there were more discussions about love in *Einleitung in die Ethik: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924*, for instance: to embrace with love is the good, or although self-love, neighbors-love, God-love, and art/science-love all are my love, but what I pursue is not only the feeling and knowledge of love, but my joy to help others..., etc. ³

Between 1922 and 1924, Husserl published three articles: “Renewal (Erneuerung)” in Japanese Journal: *The Kaizo*, as the same name of the articles. The two other relevant articles were not published there. These five and other appendix articles are collected in *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937)*, published in 1989. Their ideas correspond to Husserl’s Fichte lectures.

Between 1930 and 1935, Husserl wrote lots of research manuscripts about the relationship between ethics and metaphysics.⁴ It also shows Husserl’s final position to religion. This paper will discuss these manuscripts.

2. Husserl’s thinking of ethics and religion in the 1930s

I will present Husserl’s later religious thinking in which he had developed from his ethical thinking in 30s according to the manuscripts in Husserl Archiv at Universität zu Köln⁵. These are collected in Hua 42: *Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie*.

1) The universal ethics (A V 22, 1931)⁶

The manuscripts A V 22 with the title “universal ethics (Universale Ethik)” were mostly written in 1931. Husserl maintained the ideal of a universal science, which is the same as what he claimed to the ethics. This can be said to be as a theorist’s task, initiated either by the need of his vocation, or purely by his love of science, or by the motivation to benefit people. Theory, which is beyond individual, community, generation, pursuits the ideal in an endless process. (2a-2b) Husserl notes: if ethics that is originally related to the practical life takes the human being’s total and universal life into account, it becomes a theoretical attitude, so that the practical interest becomes the interest to constitute the universal science. (10b-11b) I think that it is an old problem for Husserl. How can the ethics or practical life that is related to the empirical life becomes a universal theory, namely theory in a priori sense? Would this lose its practical sense? It reminds us that Husserl had proposed the idea of pure ethics in his early period, the idea of combination of sensual and intellectual ethics in the 1920s. Now Husserl answers


⁵ I appreciate Prof. Dr. Dieter Lohmar to allow me reading these manuscripts in 2006.

that every ethical normative question should be placed in a world-scientific (weltwissenschaftliche) and universal question of being of the world instead of the mere factuality (Tatsächlichkeit). (18a) Moreover, the factuality entails aging, sickness, death, fate, disaster etc. These render people to repent, despair, even to commit a crime. To sum up, the factuality belongs to the irrational part of human being. However, Husserl points out: “The life goes on. (Das Leben geht fort.)” Despite of irrationality, he firmly believes that rationality can bring the whole life into a harmonic unity, and it will be developed as an infinite being of the world. (21a-21b)

Here I want to elucidate the phenomenon in Husserl’s phenomenology means. Phenomenon entails two elements: contingent fact and essence. The two opposites are united in the notion of “facticity.” Natalie Depraz differs facticity from factuality.7 The latter one is as the contingent fact opposite to the essence which is also what Karl Schuhmann calls “das Empirische”. And facticity is on the irrational part, but is “der Grund für Dasein von wesenmäßig-Rationalem” according to Schuhmann. 8 For Depraz, “facticity” is on the side of life-world, but related to the transcendental structure. Facticity as in-between the factuality and essence is the genuine meaning of phenomenon. Thus, the phenomenology of ethics is a study of the ethical facticity.

Husserl’s ascriptions of ethics to the Greek idea of universal science or his belief in the rationality was first shaken by the World War I. He expected a redemption in the predicament of belief in rationality from the irrational love of God. However, in the end he not only came back to his earlier position which takes the Greek idea for priority but synthesized the Greek and Hebrew lines of Western. On one hand, Husserl stressed that the world is teleologically constituted, where God is believed as the creator of human beings and the world. On the other hand, the motivation of belief should be justified through the free rationality in a scientific way, which is beyond the historical and locational relativities. This was the first time he brought the ethics, the belief in God, and the education of this belief together.

As a universal science, Husserl’s later idea in ethics was not deviated from his early idea in ethics which was as a pure ethics. Many scholars doubt that Husserl treats the pure ethics too much in analog with the formal logic so that his early ethical theory would fall into a formal ethics. I prefer to understand the pure ethics as the highest level of the so-called “teaching of craft (Kunstlehre),” which is distinguished from the other two lower levels of “Kunstlehre”. All these are elucidated in Husserl’s Prolegomena to

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the pure logics and Introduction to the ethics. The later Husserl obviously gives the ethics more material sense; for instance, the element of belief in God is involved in the ethics. Furthermore, regarding the doubt that whether the universal ethics, developed in theoretical interest, might lose its practical sense, Husserl claimed the shift of the attitude from the theoretical to the practical interest, namely “teaching of craft or teaching of norms (Kunstlehre order Normenlehre)” (18b-19b). However, the universal ethics, under the theoretical attitude as the highest level of teaching of craft, has an originally extended and deepened practical sense, which will be highlighted in this paper.

According to Husserl, the way to synthesize the Greek and Hebrew cultures is that God is not only a creator but the entlechie—the idea of endless telos—which lies in the so-called “Monadenall.” Everybody follows this idea, develops himself toward a higher and higher human being, and lastly becomes the super humanity. Even the immortality in human is understood in a rational sense to the extent that the human shares the process of the self-realization of Godhead. This can be shown in the “inheritance (Erbschaft)” of generations. Husserl values this process as true and gut (25b-26a), and then the truth of the whole world as beautiful (schön) (28a).

2) Universal God (A VII 9, about 1930)

Following the above-mentioned universal ethics, Husserl tries to understand God as belonging to the whole human being and the whole world instead of an individual human, family, and ethnic. Besides, Husserl’s idea of God has departed from the stages of historical mythos and multi-gods. His claim of this universal human religion is nothing else than a claim of a universal religious ethics or ethics of the humanity that transcends all people: “terrestrial and mars people (irdische und Marsvölker), in virtue of the oneness of God.” (12a)

In addition, every concrete ethics or religion which is pertaining to a concrete human of certain ethnic or home world is related to a type of the human comportment such as the comportment of Jews or Christian in the historical European world. On contrary, the universal ethics and religion are abstracted from the concrete human and surrounding world. Indeed, the universal religion can be analogous to the pure ethics, namely pure religion. (13a)

How about the issue of “revelation (Offenbarung)” in the universal religion? Universal God is not appropriated to the universal humanity in terms of His revelation in the historical figures as the grounders of religion. However, universal God is departed from the historical revelation, and becomes reveal on an unhistorical way. Husserl noted that the universal God as a revealer (als Offenbarter) is also understood by people who are
on the common historical way, even they are atheists. If we understand this revelation in a broad sense, the narrow sense of revelation of God would seem to be rejected by Husserl. Because he noted that an unhistorical way based on philosophy or the universal science does not presuppose revelation, and if such a way can lead to God, this would be an atheistic way to God, just like a way to the genuine absolute general humanity.

(13a-13b)

3) From factuality to universality (E III 7, 1934)

With the title “human Being in fate, religion, and science (Der Mensch in Schicksal, Religion und Wissenschaft)”, Husserl elucidated how religion and ethics in the local and factual sense become universal, namely as in a universal scientific sense.

Husserl described that different religions in different locations and histories have distributed lots of mystic power upon which the existence of the human and other animals depended. People have ever served the mystic godhead with gifts, sacrifice, honors, and prays. They belonged to individual or community such as Greek and Roman. Husserl called those religious activities as “religious technique (Religionstechnik)”. (3a)

From family to community and ethnics, a rational way of rule was developed. Regels and laws are originated from philosophy or insights, and thus Gods’ role is replaced. (4a) The religious technique is rationalized through “the free self- and world-reflection (Besinnung)” or “the philosophical reflection.” This is a critique of the strange and indigenous religion or critique of the traditional world-visions (Worldvorstellungen). It means to establish the trans-subjective and –ethnic (übersubjektive, übersinnliche) humanity by transcending the traditional soil through the autonomous rationality. (4b-5a)

We should notice how Husserl characterized the process of the philosophical reflection. It grows out of a common motivation in people of numerous communities and classes. (5a) What thing motivates the development of scientific theory out of the autonomous rationality, which lets them free from the local and national tradition? What situation makes them to judge in view of epistêm in spite of doxa? It is also to ask what thing motivates us to philosophize, and to do philosopher’s duty, namely to govern the development of the whole humanity and human praxis. (5b-6a)

We can ask further: What thing is hidden in the ethnic-historical traditions as blind habits and passion? The answer is thaumázo. Wonder is of a subversion of the total world-vision in our common life. The awareness of the subversion discloses a true being whose dignity provokes our wonder. (6b) If wonder is the necessary condition for
people in every location and ethnic to transcend the restriction to tradition, wonder would be implied in everybody. Thus, wonder is the common motivation for people to make the philosophical reflection.

Wonder initiates human scientific treatment that is titled with theoria. Husserl expounded why and how theoria proceeds. Theoria aims to understand a disenchanted nature (entgötterte Natur), namely an evident instead of mystic nature, and to pursue happiness under the guide of rationality, which claims the knowledge for an individual and for the whole humanity. It is further for the sake of a new action style that is also justified by rational insight. (7a-7b)

Husserl described a precise procedure of theoria. Essentially to say, after nature is disenchanted, God in sense of connection of things (sachliche Konnex) awakes wonder and becomes thematic, the universal is theoretically overviewed (überschauen) and the whole world is immediately perceived. Then the world is intuitively constituted in its open horizon so that its essential structures can be gradually and stably acquired. (7b) Otherwise, the world as the only object of a glance (Schau) is prone to be out of consciousness, or slip in a naive empirical nature.

Husserl originally applied phenomenological method to the procedure of theoria. Wonder, overview, and the world as its direct object are reduced to the subjective consciousness and intuition in the open horizon, and then the essential structures of the world are constituted bottom up.

It is noteworthy that Husserl reacted the skeptic who doubts whether philosophy as a pure theory might lose the practical sense. According to Husserl, philosophy as thinking action (Denkverhalten) in an autonomous attitude can be practical; if man is free from prejudices, he can educate people how to live with each other, and to become successful statesmen etc.; and an interest change out of human’s autonomous attitude opens a door for irresponsible actions. Husserl further pointed out that though the Greek Sophists proposed a method to provide a practical signification to philosophy and to awake the knowledge of responsibility, Socrates and Plato grounded human’s more practical existence on the universal theory so that “the theoretical reason is theory of the practical reason.”(8a-b)

This has also to do with the above-mentioned that how the pure ethics can be applied to the practical area and how the religious technique can be raised onto a universal level. According to our discussions, what belongs to the religious technique such as the services of giving, sacrifice, worship, pray, revelation, or Christian love (agape) which is connected with the factual services are firstly transformed as the object of glance (Schau) under wonder, then intuitively constituted. In fact, the love of theoria as philia
plays an important role here.

4) Phenomenological analysis of the worldly facticity (E III 8, 1934)⁹

These manuscripts are divided into two parts: 1. Ethical and practical personal reflection of the world and self. 2. Cosmological reflection of the world.

In the second part, like E III 7 above, Husserl stressed the universal ethics and religion and so the difference between ethnic religion (Volksreligion) and world religion (Worldreligion) were highlighted as well. (19a) Husserl stated that as people carry out a universal practical reflection, the world is in a real and possible material situation for the praxis, and the praxis is for the sake of the human life’s total happiness. (18b) Regarding the total happiness, a cosmological science is needed, which deals with the world, factual human beings, and with essence in the condition of possibility of the human praxis. (16a)

In the first part, he analyzed the feelings of human beings’ lives in the world. This is as abovementioned that the feelings gradually manifest as essential structures by the constitution from bottom up with the phenomenological method after they were free from the restriction to the traditional factuality and had wonder at the total world. However, the first few pages of these manuscripts still highlighted the importance of the universal personal self-reflection as a retrospection (Rückschau) of the total individual and communal life. After that, a whole and endless rational life will be constituted step by step. (2a-3b)

This analysis from bottom up begins with the reflection of that the human does not live alone but co-exists with others (4a), and what is a happy life about (5b). Therefore, the others’ fate and my can determine my happiness or unhappiness. (7a) The death of others, especially who I love, is an inevitable misfortune, which even makes us desperate. Husserl analyzed how an ego is self-destroyed when what he loved is died, and he then noted it will continuously begin a new life (8a-8b). Moreover, he analyzed the meaning of love; for instance, love is that people live together in their whole horizon of life, love is that one is willing to live with others and carry them in him- or herself, love is that one lives in an empathic relationship with others harmoniously…and so on (8b-9a). In order to support that, Husserl also discussed that from sympathy to antipathy, disharmony, hostility, conflict etc. (9b-10a). He noted that a power holder who once rules out hostility and carries through his authority could be indulging in the desire of power (11b).

Among the communities that consist in love, Husserl especially aimed at family. Family

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⁹ Husserl, Edmund. Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, S. 502-519 (E III 2-14, 15-19)
is a unity of living people in different generation and a unity of harmonious cohabitation. It is a prototype (Urform) of neighboring love (12a). In the communal life, there are egoistic and altruistic comportments. In the latter case, the idea of I includes the other’s being and will in myself, and by incompatibility of our actions renounces myself for the sake of others (12b). He further analyzed the egoism in two kinds: weak and strong. The former one excludes an altruistic motivation, whereas the latter is a kind of malicious, unlimited, completely reckless egoism so that people are scared of the following of state law or state power. (13b) Because of the strong egoism, people will pursue to hold the absolute truth, which includes having the absolute belief in a certain religion without be aware of possible falling into an error, so we need the philosophy to help us understand the world and human beings in order to establish scientific theory and to guarantee the objective truth that is valid for everybody. (14b)

I think that the meaning of despair, love, egoism, and altruism Husserl elucidated does not complete a more general essential structure for a stable whole world where once was the object of wonder. What Husserl analyzed is originally the traditional concepts, which was restricted to traditional factuality and can be called as “ethic technique.” As to the phenomenological analysis which aims to constitute essential structure and to establish a universal pure theory, it riches the ethic technique with the ethic significance that is conferred by the theoretical reason. The theoretical reason is for the sake of the practical reason and as a part of this. Conversely, ethics, based on the theoretical interest, can be transformed into a technique by the attitude’s changing.

In addition, among the analyses of those ethical concepts, love is the kernel. In the community, the love between others and mine is philia while eros is not excluded. As Husserl put family as the prototype of neighboring love, he actually transformed agape into philia as the basis of love in general because the latter one is more qualified than the former one to be universal and evident. Originally, before the 1930s, Husserl had changed Jesus from a historical and revelatory figure to a person who is objectively perceived. Accordingly, agape is transformed into philia. In the 1930s, he tried to ground Christianity on philia for it is common for human’s concrete life. Meanwhile, Christianity was transformed from a traditional ethnic religion to a worldwide religion.

5) God’s belief in view of instinct (E III 9 · 1931-1933)

In these manuscripts with title “Instinct, Value, Good, Theology, Norm-structure of Personality”, Husserl discussed the God in the view of instinct as his topics. He started from a deeper ground to analyze the religious facticity’s essential structure and

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10 参考 Husserl, Edmund. Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, S. 246-247 (E III 9 22), 458-468 (E III 9 27-34)
researched its universality and evidence. I will show that with some examples.

Regarding the traditional pray as a religious technique, Husserl insisted that the genuine pray is an inner attitude because the real and actual relationship between human and God is inward (innerlich). On the other side, ritual images, the representation of God as Father, and religious symbols are all worldly and real. The inwardness, which is the ground of all real relations, means an original, unintuitive, and instinctive foreboding of God. For Husserl, our common religious consciousness is based on this sort of instinct. (22a-22b)

This religious consciousness can be comprehended as long as we understand Husserl’s definition of instinct. According to that, this instinct has an intentional direction and is in an empty horizon and so what it intends cannot be prefigured in a familiar structure. (22a) However, every instinct can prefigure the next goal after filling itself and becoming present. This process is only relative insofar as what it has already been presented prefigures the next and makes this further presented. Indeed, the universal philosophy as the highest form of philosophical phenomenology makes the ultimate truth present out of the relativity in an endless process of meaning formation. (22b)

I think that what instinct intends as unformed is like the wonder to the whole world. It needs to be stabilized and determined. This relative presentation means the constitution of essential structures from bottom up. In the end, philosophical activity in the highest form makes the whole world manifest. Husserl further said that people live in a boundless horizon, and they are able to transcend their instinct and continuously to innovate values, and to pursue a world full of values for themselves as well as human beings. (39b) This saying is indeed with regard to the constitution of a stable whole world. Now philosophy help us creates a clarity of what the inward-turning (Innenwendung) of pray signifies like it clarifies what the instincts forebodes. Therefore, Husserl noted that the inward direction (Innenrichtung) of the religion, an individual prayer, and the praying community are not private direction but the way that goes through to the others and to the whole world. (22b)

The saying “family as the prototype of neighboring live,” which has appeared in manuscripts E III 8, has a more precisely discussion in E III 9. Husserl made a difference between the general and individual value. The former one is still suitable for the principle of value absorption (Wertabsorption) to which Husserl had proposed in his earlier ethics. For instance, if anyone wants to choose one from the two pleasures’ events, he can take account to whether the one as secondary pleasure may be absorbed in the other as a major pleasure, and these two values can be more or less fulfilled. (32b) On the contrary, an individual value cannot be absorbed in another, but might be
sacrificed. This shows for example in the story of Abraham in Bible. Nevertheless, if a mother encounters a dilemma on whether she should sacrifice her son for the country or protect her son’s life, how does she face to issue of the neighboring love? Husserl’s answer cannot avoid his statement about “family as the prototype of neighboring live,” but it makes us pay attention to that the choices in between an individual’s values which might cause sacrifice. For Husserl, the mother’s whole neighbor is her son first, and then is her husband. Based upon “family” he described or explained that the neighboring love includes the others in the horizon of my love. But he pointed out that the neighboring love is not a general love, but an individual love and so the conflict and sacrifice regarding different values might be unavoidable. (33b-34a)

Husserl’s another interpretation about whether a value can be absorbed or sacrificed is that the former one is hedonic value while the latter one is spiritual (geistig) value. The former one is an origin of enjoyment (Genuß), basically in the sensual feeling, whereas the latter one is a love of a succinct sense (im prägnanten Sinn). Consequently, enjoyment is not a necessary but accidental result of spiritual value. (40a-40b) The value of spirit or love is related to a person’s identity, his existence (death, destiny and so on) (40a), and his dedication to art. (40b) In this respect, Melle states that Husserl in his later period started to notice the individual love and gave up the earlier principle of absorption of value, otherwise the problem regarding sacrifice would be unsolvable. Melle also mentions the possible conflict between the non-ethical value which based on enjoyment and ethical value of love.11

Moreover, Husserl insisted on the Christian opinion about God is the will’s master. He took God as a universal absolute will that relate to the intersubjectivity and all transcendental subjectivities. The relationship between God’s will and intersubjectivity is that the former one does not presuppose the latter one, but it cannot be concrete without the latter one as structural layer. (44b) Accordingly, in my view, Husserl on one hand did not renounce God as the will of all first subject; on the other hand, it seems to settle down God as an ideal person in the human subjectivity, which aims to constitute individuality, community, and the whole human beings, even other creatures. Genetically speaking, the whole world is implied in a newborn child (47a), in which an original structure is arisen from the variation of original sense data (Urhyle) with the original kinesthesis, original feelings and original instinct. This original material proceeds in a unitary form toward the universal world. In other words, the constitution of the whole world is prefigured in the instinct, rather by a teleology, which refers to the original facticity of the sense data, than a familiar structure. Husserl asks further:

has this teleology its ground in God? (51a-51b)

Generally speaking, in order to establish a universal religion, Husserl, on the one hand characterizes God as a person of will; on the other hand, he puts God as object of an instinctive foreboding. This foreboding shows that the human originally constitutes himself toward the whole world according to teleology in order to realize God’s will. This foreboding and teleological constitution are for Husserl evident and universal. The inwardness of pray manifests a dialog within human and his inner intersubjectivity, which is potential in himself and proceeds to realize God’s will. In this respect, human carries the responsibility to respond and realize his potentiality. If the responsibility is not fulfilled, human would arise to confess. Husserl discusses confession several times, which is understood as an ethical issue of self-responsibility instead of being a religious technique (58a, 59b, 66b), and thus a universal signification of confession is revealed.

6) The Union of Philosophy and Theology (E III 10, 1930-1934)\textsuperscript{12}

In the end, I want to sum up Husserl’s position on religion regarding the last part of these manuscripts with the title: “Philosophy and Theology: their relationship as philosophical problem.” He also elucidated that “Philosophical theology as culmination of philosophy and confessional theology, which follows philosophy and uses philosophy as a tool” in many pages. (14a)

He noted that Aristotle set a model of philosophical theology that is an autonomous and teleological philosophy. This is not on a confessional way to God, but it can give reasons for that the world is essentially and necessarily what human beings dwell in and depend on. Because of that, human beings who exist in different historical concrete religions pursue an ultimate form of religion. (14a-14b)

Husserl seemed to deliberate it from two different standpoints: firstly, a fledged philosophical theology can justify the mundane world we live in; secondly, every historical religion is on the way toward the end form of philosophical theology. In this sense, Aristotelian \textit{philosophia perennis} that consists in an endless development of the idea of universal \textit{theoria} is the true religion, in which philosophy covers theology. (14b)

These discussions are like what we have said before: the universal science or ultimate truth begin and precede from historical facts and involved cultures. In the respect of religion, the universal religion is developed from local and ethnic religions. (15a) This means that inanimate nature, wildlife, human beings are filled with different powers such as spiritual, superhuman, subhuman, which also form a universal mythology. There is a God among them and He rules them all and determines them toward the

\textsuperscript{12} 参考 Husserl, Edmund. \textit{Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie}, S. 259-263 (E III 10 14-17)
universal good. (16a) Therefore, revelation, church, and salvation can make sense only under this point of view. That is, they are developed toward the last form of religion. (17a)

3. Conclusion: on Husserl’s idea of freedom and praxis regarding the universal ethic and religion

Husserl’s commitment to the universal ethic and religion are actualized through the constitution of the empirical, local, historical ethical, and religious actions or events, which are in the layer of factuality. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the idea of freedom originally means that the essence is free from the factual and is able to be achieved by the intentional constitution. In his later genetic phenomenology, he extended the intentionality to the “intentionality of drive (Triebintentionalität)” or “passivity of will (Willenspassivität)”.13 If we follow Kant’s words: “I term all that is possible through free will, practical,”14 then a practical sense is rooted in a very deep layer of subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomenology. It is no wonder that we would hear that from Husserl: “Theory is a part of praxis.”

However, the idea of the universal ethic and religion are based on the Greek idea: \textit{theoria}. Is not the previous practical part on the factual layer absorbed into theory in the sense of \textit{theoria}? Thus we must make a difference in between the narrow sense of theory or praxis and the broad sense of them. Husserl’s discussions about the universal ethic, God, and how the universality is intentionally constituted from factuality actually endow Aristotelian \textit{theoria} with the phenomenological significations. Consequently, the previous practical sense is extended and deepened in the idea of \textit{theoria}.

Husserl’s idea about the universal ethic and religion is issued in both practical and metaphysical aspects of our daily life, that they acquire a pregnant practical sense in terms of \textit{theoria}.

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13 Some phenomenologists mentioned these conceptions, for instance Susi Ferrarello, Henning Peucker, Nam-I Lee, A. D. Smith, and Marta Ubiali. They adopt manuscripts M III 3 III 1 II 103 and others.