# The Ghost *of* Jacques Derrida

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ABSTRACT: This essay examines the phrase—"here, now, yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts"—a phrase uttered by Derrida in a filmed interview. It takes up Derrida's avowal of belief in ghosts, not simply to explain the significance of "ghosts," simulacra, doubles, hence *images*, in Derrida's work and to show their relation to death and mourning, or to merely draw an analogy between the structure of doubles or simulacra and what we may call "synthetic" images, but also to attend to the alliance between the image, the ghostly, and belief.

"Here, now, yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts [*crois-moi, je crois aux fantômes*]."[1] So declares Jacques Derrida, recounting the words of another, words that were once pronounced to him by Pascale Ogier during the filming of the movie *Ghost Dance*.[2] These words, themselves repeated in a filmed interview with Bernard Stiegler, form part of a book entitled *Echographies of Television* published in 1996. In this interview, Derrida describes the singular, "strange," and "unreal" experience of filming a scene in his office for McMullen's movie, a scene in which he and Ogier sit face to face, looking at each other, into one another's eyes. Practicing with Ogier, Derrida is supposed to ask her: "And you then, do you believe in ghosts?" and at the behest of the director, she is to respond succinctly: "Yes, now, yes."

Derrida recalls this experience—that of rehearsing this scene in his office with Ogier at least thirty times—when two or three years later he is asked to view McMullen's movie again by his students in the United States. Asking Stiegler to imagine his experience, given the fact that Ogier had unexpectedly passed away in the interim, Derrida remarks: "I saw the face of Pascale, all of a sudden, coming on the screen, which I knew was the face of a dead person" (E 135). "She responded to my question 'Do you believe in ghosts?' Looking at me almost in the eyes, she said to me again, on the large screen: 'yes, now, yes'" (E 135). Subsequently, after Ogier's death, while viewing *Ghost Dance*, Derrida has the overwhelming feeling of the return of "the specter of her specter [*le spectre de son spectre*]," coming

back "to tell me, here now: 'Now . . . now . . . now . . . that is, in this dark room or auditorium of another continent, in another world, here, now, yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts'" (E 135).

A voice comes forward to say "Here, now,"—but, which "now?"—"yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts." The voice does not simply seek to assure—"believe me, have faith in me"—but asks to be trusted—"believe me when I say that I believe in ghosts." How is one to take this phrase "Believe me, I believe in ghosts," especially if it is itself the repetition of the very phrase of another? What is it not only to believe in ghosts but to *declare* that one believes in them? Soon it becomes clear that this strange enunciation is much more complex than it first appears, bearing within it a (double) affirmation ("yes" and "I believe"), an exhortation ("believe me!"), a request ("please believe what I tell you"), a declaration ("I believe in ghosts"), an (infinite) repetition ("yes, I believe in ghosts," this utterance itself the repetition of another's avowal, repeated again with every appearance of Ogier on the screen), and a testimony that in repeating affirms the belief. As if matters were not already complicated enough, all of this is brought to us via video, thus raising the question of the relation between technics and the affirmation of belief or believing in general.

I would like to take up Derrida's avowal of belief in ghosts, not simply to explain the significance of "ghosts," simulacra, doubles, hence images, in Derrida's work and to show their relation to death and mourning, or to merely draw an analogy between the structure of doubles or simulacra and what we may call "synthetic" images, but also in order to scrutinize each part of the expression "Believe me, I believe in ghosts." This phrase would oblige us not only to attend to the performative force of "Believe me!" but also to think the alliance between the image, the ghostly, and belief. The aporetic rapport between faith (religious and fiduciary) and technics, in every attestation and testimony, would bring to the fore the credit we accord the image. If I will have resorted to what may seem like "excessive quotation" by the standards of academic writing, I will have done so in order to give Derrida the word. By citing him as much as possible, in an essay that is "mimetic," I have tried to bear in mind what he taught us about citation. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that much of Derrida's thought can be contained in this very phrase, "Believe me, I believe in ghosts."

## GHOSTS

Generally speaking, there would have to be plenty of skepticism about an avowal of belief in ghosts uttered by a philosopher, but these words, coming from Derrida's mouth, may not strike us as so absurd. After all, a thought of ghosts, phantoms, and specters has been at work across the entirety of Derrida's corpus from *Dissemination* (1972) to *The Truth in Painting* (1978), from *Memoires: For Paul de*

*Man* (1988) to *Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde* (2003).[3] As Derrida writes in *Specters of Marx*, "the concept or scheme of the ghost was heralded long time ago" in his work, and on several occasions he has gone on record admitting that specters have in fact haunted his texts for decades.[4]

Now, what we in English refer to as a "ghost"[5] is one rendering or translation of a number of related archaic and Attic Greek terms such as *eidōlon*, *phantasma*, *phasma*, and *psuchē* found in texts from Homer onward.[6] These terms, whether referring to the shades of the dead or the exact duplicate of a Homeric hero fashioned by a god, designate a category of doubles hovering between life and death, the real and the unreal.[7] What is always suggested by these terms and other related words, shadow (*skia*), dream vision (*oneiros*), reflections in water, or figures in mirrors, is something visible or visual that appears but whose appearance is more faint, that which has less being or reality than what is "real."[8] What is worthy of serious study is how these terms, which are not exact equivalents, have been translated in the philosophical languages of the West—as *figura*, *forma*, *simulacrum*, *effigy*, and *imago*, hence "image"—a translation and hence interpretation that has been dominated by Platonism throughout Western metaphysics.[9] At least this seems to be Derrida's assessment in *Dissemination*, where turning to Plato, he examines philosophy's relation to all that is "ghost"-related. It is in the dialogues of Plato, according to Derrida's reading, that the status of the "ghostly" is once and for all determined in the West.[10] Through the course of a number of essays, in particular "Plato's Pharmacy" and "The Double Session," Derrida undertakes to re-evaluate the place assigned to doubles and simulacra in the Platonic interpretation of *mimēsis*, hence rewriting and reinscribing the terms associated with spectrality and the ghostly.

It was Socrates who passed the first and most decisive judgment on the magical and thaumaturgical operation of *mimēsis* in the *Republic*. There he judged the production of likenesses or fabrication of images (*eidōlopoiikē*), what can be called mimetology, to be far removed from truth and reality.[11] According to an "order of appearing, the precedence of the imitated [*ordre d'apparition, la pre-séance de l'imité*]," the anteriority and superiority of "reality," that which *is*, substance, or the thing itself, takes precedence over that of images, likenesses, doubles or copies.[12] An order of appearance and appearing is set up, with its own linear temporality, in which the orders are distinct and discernible—numerically discernible. The first order is constituted by the signified, the simple, which is more real, essential and true. The double, the imitator, the signifier, belongs to the second order, coming after the thing, or the meaning of the thing itself, its manifest presence. The model or the imitated thus always precedes the image and appears first—it has an ontological and logical precedence.[13] Thus the referent is conceived as a real thing or cause, anterior and exterior to all that proceeds from it. Following a schema commanded by ontology and a process of truth, the *eidos* (the idea as

the presence of what is) gives rise to *logos*, which in turn solicits the *eikon* and the *phantasma*: What *is* mirrors intelligibility or visibility itself, which then leads to the production of icons and images.[14] The mimetic arts such as painting and writing are then measured against the truth, understood as the being-present of what-is. "This order of appearance is *the order of all appearance* [*Cet ordre d'apparition est l'ordre de l'apparition*], the very process of appearing [*l'apparaître*] in general" which is commanded by a process of truth (D 219/192).

By putting into play the simulacrum, the *phantasma*, or the ghost throughout *Dissemination*, Derrida sets out to undertake "a displacement without reversal of Platonism and its heritage" (D 240/211). Associating what he is calling *writing* with the simulacrum, Derrida states that writing "open[s] up the possibility of the double, the copy, the imitation, the simulacrum" (D 181/157), as long as the simulacrum is not understood, as it has been throughout Western thought, as a copy of a copy but is taken as an undecidable double. The simulacrum or the *phantasma*, "at once image and model, and hence image without model, neither image nor model" would not be a derivative of the *eidos*, but a "double" with nothing coming before it (D 239/211). If there is no simple reference but only the differential structure of *mimesis*, then "there is no longer any model, and hence, no copy and that this structure . . . is no longer being referred back to an ontology or a dialectic" (D235/207).

For Derrida, Plato in his criticisms of writing as a game, as that which repeats itself always signifying the same thing, is only criticizing a pale form—or the ghost of—writing, that is, writing understood within a binary opposition dominated by philosophy. Yet, Derrida adds, what he himself "imprudently named *fantôme* [italicized in his text] can no longer be distinguished, with the same assurance, from truth, reality, living flesh, etc." (D 118/103). For, if there is no simple reference, then the *eidos* springs from the same possibility as the phantom. Here "the historical ambiguity of the word *appearance* [*apparence*] (at once the appearing or apparition [*l'apparaître ou l'apparition*] of the being-present *and* the dissimulation of the being-present behind its appearance" is significant (D 239–40/211). The instability between the appearing and the appearance, between perception and hallucination leads to constant supplementation. If we say that there are only appearances or apparitions, this is without a dissimulated reality, without another world behind it, thus an appearance without appearance. "A difference without reference [to reality], or rather a reference without referent, without any first or last unit, a ghost that is phantom of no flesh [*fantôme qui n'est le fantôme d'aucune chair*], wandering about without a past, without death, without birth or presence" (D 234/206). Reference remains but the referent cannot be said to "exist" in a static realm (ontological or not).

By juxtaposing Mallarmé's "Mimique" and sections of Plato's *Philebus* in "The Double Session" Derrida enacts the disorganization and dislocation of the

ontological machine of oppositions in order to displace the Platonic heritage of a weakened, ontologically less significant entity, a pale imitation of the real. With the tall white Pierrot, the one with the cadaverous face, as one among the many errant ghosts wandering about throughout his text, Derrida's "Double Session," through a proliferation of simulacra, re-invigorates—if the deathly and the moribund can be given life and energy anew—all the limit-terms between life and death, presence and absence, the real and the unreal, performing a re-evaluation of all ghostly terms, "at once living and dead, living more dead than alive, *between life and death*," in Western thought such as *eidōlon*, *phantasma*, and phantom (*fantôme*) (D 233 n./205 n.). This also allows for a reformulation of what has been called the image, transforming it from denoting a sensible object belonging to the domain of the visual and art history created or fashioned in resemblance or likeness of a prototype or an idea to the spectral trace—the appearing in disappearing—of the non-present other.

## FORCE

The simulacrum is a force, declares Derrida in the essay "Dissemination" that bears the same title as the collection in which it appears (D 362/326). In the course of reading a number of Philippe Sollers's texts, Derrida writes that if writing is what puts the simulacrum into play, then the simulacrum bears a relationship to force—it is a force, it has a force. Functioning "between life and death, reality and fiction," "the writing of force [*l'écriture de force*]" ceaselessly dislocates identity, especially the identity of the "I" (D 361/325). Feigning to put on stage the presence of the present, "this force of writing [*cette force d'écriture*]," writing's force, produces "reality-effects," doubling reality, simulating it. And death is what gives the simulacrum its force. It is also what gives painting, writing, and the image in general, their force without force.

What is force then? Immediately this very question would seem to paralyze or disable whatever effectiveness—to use a word which Louis Marin employs in the introduction, "L'être de l'image et son efficace," to his text *Des pouvoirs de l'image*—the image, or any discourse on the image, may have. For, the use of the locution "What is?" would already submit the image to the ontological order, an order that has conceived of it as a secondary thing with less reality, an appearance of a being, a being of illusion, a weakened reflection, setting up a relationship between the image and being that is regulated by imitation, making the former a representation of the thing (PI 10).[15] In his introduction Marin notes that the philosophical tradition has always considered the image "*a lesser being* [*un moindre être*]" (PI 10, author's italics), a weaker and inferior being, "a being without power [*un être sans pouvoir*]," "a being of little power, of little force."[16] Submitting the image and its force to the "What is?" question, then, would be "to

miss it and its force," to miss "the image in its force [*l'image en sa force*]," which has less to do with whether it is or not, but with the fact that "its dynamic, its *dynamis*, the dynasty of its force, will not submit to an onto-logic: its dynamo-logic . . . would never have been, a logic of being, an ontology" (FD 181/145). In other words, the ontological order, i.e., philosophy, "would have been constituted as such for not knowing the powers of the image" (FD 181/145). This would be because philosophy either did not take the powers of the image into account or because it mistook them "*with a view to* [*en vue*] doing so, so as to oppose them . . . to the unavowed counterpower of a denial intended to assure an ontological power *over* the image, over the power and *dynamis* of the image" (FD 181/145–6).

The powers of the image stem from "the force of an image that must be protected from every ontology," a force that "protects itself," "tears itself away" from the ontological tradition of the question "what is?" This is its force, "the force of its force [*la force de sa force*]" (FD 181/145). 'Force' then would be that which disturbs the authority of the "what is?" question. The emphasis on force and *dynamis* is itself borrowed from Marin's phrase in the introduction to *Des pouvoirs de l'image* where he speaks of *la virtù* and the *dynamis* of the image. As soon as *dynamis* is withdrawn or protected from the traditional ontology that dominates it, it would play "a decisive role" linking "force, power, and *virtù*" with "the virtual *as such*—i.e., a virtual that has no vocation to go into action [*passer à l'acte*]" (FD 181–2/146). *Dynamis* then would have to do with a possible that remains "possible as possible," accomplishing "the possible *as such* [*le possible en tant que tel*] without effacing it or even enacting it in reality" (FD 182/146). *Dynamis* would mark "within itself . . . the interruption of this going into action, this enactment [*l'interruption du passage à l'acte*]," an interruption that bears "the seal" of death (FD 182/146). A paradox thus illuminates Marin's earlier trajectory, a law according to which "the greatest force does not consist in continually expanding ad infinitum but develops its maximal intensity only at the mad moment of decision, at the point of its absolute interruption, there where *dynamis* remains virtuality, namely, a virtual work as such"(FD 184/148).

## DEATH

Only death—or rather mourning—"can open up this space of absolute *dynamis*," necessary for understanding the powers of the image (FD 182/146). Philosophy's attempt "to reduce, weaken, and wear out" these powers, so as to subject the image to philosophy, this "philosophical exorcism," would concern and "would *regard* death [*aurait à voir avec la mort*]"—that which should not be seen, and hence must be denied (FD 182/146). In fact, philosophy's "clandestine war of denial" is precisely a denial of death (FD 182/146). According to Derrida, Marin's book *Des pouvoirs de l'image*, brings about a "double conversion": first, it protects the ques-

tion of the image from the authority of ontology, and second, this protection finds its truth or its law in "the being-towards-death [*l'être-pour-la mort*] of the image"; "the being-to-death [*l'être-à-mort*] of an image . . . that *has* the force, that *is nothing other than* the force *to resist, to consist, and to exist* in death" (FD 183/147).

This *being-to-death* of the image would oblige us to think it "not as the weakened reproduction of what it would imitate, not as a *mimēme*, a simple image, idol or icon, as they are conventionally understood . . . , but as the increase of power," as the origin of authority, "the image itself becoming the author, . . . insofar as it finds its paradigm, which is also its *enargeia*, in the image of the dead" (FD 183/147). The image of the dead is not one among a wide array of images, but its paradigm, for "an image would give seeing" *from* death, from "the *point of view of death*," of the dead (FD 184/147).

"Mourning is the *phenomenon* of death" and the *phainesthai* of this phenomenon provides the "only possible access to an original thought of the image" (FD 184/148). Marin proposes the images of the dead as examples in order to make the power of the image visible and energetic: "It is in the *re*-presentation of the dead that the power of the image is exemplary" (FD 185/148, my italics). It is in death, or "the point" of mourning, that "the non re-productive intensity in the *re*- of re-presentation gains in power" what "the present that it represents loses in presence" (FD 185/148). Marin broaches the "substitutive value" of the *re*- of re-presentation in order to track "a re-presentation or an absolute substitution of representation for presence," as well as "to detect within it an increase, a re-gaining of force or a supplement of intensity in presence, and thus a sort of potency or potentialization of power for which the schema of substitutive value, of mere replacement, can give no account" (FD 185/149). Thus representation would no longer be "a simple reproductive re-presentation"; but rather such a "resurgence of presence thereby intensified" that it would make us think the lack or "default" of presence that "had hollowed out in advance" the living present (FD 185/149).

## IMAGE?

"Image?" asks Marin provocatively (PI 11). But can one still speak of an image, when "representation actually gains in intensity and force, when it seems to have even more power than that of which it is said to be the image or the imitation?"(FD 186/149). Yes and no. If "the ontological concept of the image as the mimetic and weakened double of the thing itself" is no longer acceptable, we have to think the image "on the basis of death," in other words, "on the basis of the mourning that will confer upon it its power and an increase in intensive force" (FD 186/149). This image would then be "more than an image, stronger or *more forceful* than the image defined and weakened by ontology" due to "the power of alterity that works over the being-to-death of every image" (FD 187/151). Yet, the power of

the image would not have to wait for death," since "the anticipation of death" is what "comes so indisputably to hollow out the living present that precedes it" (FD 188/151). And every image derives its *efficacity*, and "enacts its efficacity [*agit son efficace*] only by signifying the death from which it draws all its power" (FD 189/152). The image draws its force from death, which as "the most absent of absences," gives it "its greatest force"; but because it bears death, "this greatest force is also the 'without-force'" (FD 191–2/154). The force of the image, a force that "*owes itself not to be*," must thus be intimately linked to that which is not force, the 'without-force' (FD 183/147). Thus, "the greatest force is to be seen in the infinite renunciation of force, in the absolute interruption of force by the without-force" (FD 183/147).

What representation purports to do, according to Marin, is "the presentification [*présentification*]" (PI 12) of the absent, and what the image does is to make "appear the disappeared, the departed [*faire paraître le disparu*], or making it re-appear [*faire ré-aparaître*] with greater clarity or *enargeia*" (FD 195/157). Each time, the image makes the disappeared appear, but in doing so it obeys no simple temporality—"resuscitate[ing] as *having been* [*ayant été*] the one who (singularly, he or she) will have been [*aura été*]" (FD 194/156). Not only does the image, as Alberti wrote of painting, "make the absent present" but it also shows "the dead to the living" (cited by Marin PI 11).[17] For Derrida, this displays "an acute thought of mourning and of the phantom that returns, of haunting and spectrality: beyond the alternative between presence and absence, beyond negative and positive perception even, the effect of the image would stem from the fantastic force of the specter, and from a supplement of force" (FD 190/153).

## WORKING ON MOURNING

Derrida works on mourning.

Working *on* mourning, working *at* mourning, on the *work* of mourning, Derrida partakes in a work of remembrance, taking part in death, in one's own death, for what is working on mourning but also partaking in one's own death—not the death to come, but the one already announced and *at work*—but also, more importantly, the death of the other.

Derrida works at mourning.

By honoring Louis Marin, as one of the foremost thinkers of "the Age of Representation," an expert in the works of Pascal and the logic of the Port Royal, by working on one of the works of Marin, Derrida works at mourning him. But this work of mourning, he tells us, would not be something whose time would eventually come to an end; it cannot ever fully succeed, for success in mourning would amount to reconciling with death and the complete incorporation of the other—a denial or effacement of his alterity. Thus, Derrida works at mourning so

as to not fully succeed; knowing that true mourning would always be impossible, interminable, and necessarily so, he is at work on 'failing' at mourning. For as far as mourning is concerned, this "failure" would let the other remain other.

"By Force of Mourning," written, on the one hand, to celebrate the living force of Marin's thought on the occasion of, at that time, a yet-to-be published work, *Des pouvoirs de l'image*, and, on the other hand, as an homage to a close friend very recently passed away, bears the strange temporality of these contradictory purposes. How to salute and honor a friend, how to celebrate the work of a contemporary, how to convey the gentle force of Louis Marin's work, Derrida's essay seems to ask, than to bring to the fore those very motifs in his work—the image, force, death—that occupied him throughout his life, and to which he had devoted so much of his intellectual energy? How else to convey his loss, our loss, on the occasion of both a public homage and the celebration of the upcoming publication of a new text on the force of the image, than to show the increase in intensity and power of Louis Marin's image, an image that looks at us, even now? What better than to show, drawing on Marin's work, a work which articulates "a thought of the theologico-political and a certain icono-semiological theory of representation," how whatever has been construed as "the image" in the West has always been intricately linked to death (FD 184/148)? In light of Marin's last work, Derrida's essay calls for a reassessment of "the image," arguing that what is called the image is to be thought anew on the basis of death and mourning. Moreover, "By Force of Mourning" also demonstrates that this re-assessment—dare one say these days, a deconstruction—of the image, along with a thought of spectrality, has been at work throughout Derrida's own writings, particularly in his writings on mourning and death.

After the death of a friend, in his or her absence, one is left only with memory, the memory of the other left "in me." As Socrates says in the *Theaetetus*, memory, akin to an image (*eidōlon*) imprinted upon a slab of wax, functions by retaining an impression of what is remembered (191c–d). The death of the other leaves us, bereft and alone, with no other choice but to remember and interiorize, to bear within us remembrances of the other. In *Memoires for Paul de Man* referring to Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, Derrida points out the felicity of the German idiom in which memory and interiorization coincide. We know from *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* that remembering-interiorizing, *Erinnerung*, consists of intelligence (*Intelligenz*) positing the content of the feeling in its interiority, in its own space and time, as an image (*Bild*).[18] We also know from Freud that the "normal" work of mourning "entails a movement in which an *interiorizing idealization* [*Er-innerung*] takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the other" (MPdM 54/34–5). This devouring of the other, gives a place to or "makes place for a body, a voice, a soul which, although 'ours,' did not exist and had no meaning *before* this possibility that one *must* always begin by remembering and whose trace must be followed"

(54/34–5). This movement of interiorization, Derrida remarks, thus keeps "within us in the form of images" the "life, thought, body, voice, look or soul of the other" (MPdM 55/37). Mourning, the desire to remember and retain in memory, then would be an attempt "which would interiorize within us the image, idol, or ideal of the other" (MPdM 29/6). Yet the other "resists the closure of our interiorizing memory" allowing itself only to be interiorized, if at all, as that which cannot be fully interiorized (MPdM 53/34). For, interiorization is not possible, must not be possible and completed, if the other is to remain other.

Yet if the friend is no more, no longer here, he "can only be but *in us* [*en nous*]" (FD 200/159):

> When we say 'in us,' when we speak so easily and painfully of inside and outside, we are naming space, we are speaking of a visibility of the body, a geometry of gazes. . . . *We are speaking of images.* What is *in us* seems to be reducible to images, which might be memories or monuments, but which are reducible in any case to a memory that consists of *visible* scenes that are no longer anything but *images*, since the other of whom they are the images appears only as the one who has disappeared or passed away [*comme le disparu*], as the one who, having passed away, leaves 'in us' only images. (FD 198/159)

Yet if complete interiorization is not possible, "it would be, rather, because of another organization of space and visibility, of the gazing and the gazed upon [*du regardant et du regardé*]," because of a strange topology where the inside and the outside could no longer be simply delimited by drawing a line (FD 198/159).

The image owes its force to the fact that it "sees more that in it is seen [*voyante, plus que visible*]": "The image looks at us, concerns us [*L'image nous regarde*]" (FD 199/160). This dissymmetry of being looked at marks "an essential anachrony" in our being exposed to the other: "Louis Marin is outside and he is looking at me," Derrida confides. "I am an image for him. At this very moment. There where I can say *cogito, sum*, I know that I am an image for the other and am looked at by the other" (FD 199/160). Moreover, "in my relationship to myself, he is here in me before me [*en moi avant moi*], even stronger or more forceful [*plus fort*] than me" (FD 199/160).

We are all looked at, each of us singularly. But this strange dissymmetry "can be interiorized only be exceeding, fracturing, wounding, injuring, traumatizing the interiority that it inhabits or that welcomes it through hospitality, love, or friendship" (FD 199/160). This inversion indicates

> an *absolute* excess and dissymmetry in the space of what relates us to ourselves and constitutes the 'being-in-us,' the 'being-us,' in something completely other [*tout autre chose*] than a mere subjective interiority: in a place open to an infinite transcendence. The one who looks at us in us—and *for whom* we are—is no longer; he is completely other [*tout autre*], infinitely other. (FD 200/161)

Death, bringing about a distance, has distanced the other in "this infinite alterity" (FD 200/161).

We thus appear before a gaze that we are not able to "seize and appropriate" or master. We bear this excess and dissymmetry "*in ourselves*," bearing the gaze that "Louis Marin bears *on us*," from "there where this power of the image comes to open the being-far-away. This excess also brings about the limitless enlargement of the image. This power of dilation gives it its greatest force" (FD 200/161).

This "trace of the other in us" (MPdM 29E), what with a totally new inflection we have been calling the *image* of the other in us, outside inside, inside outside, bears a force, a power, that increases with "the incontestable authority of death, that is the very inexistence of the image, its fantastic power, the impresence of a trace" (FD 204/164). The image derives its authority, its force without force, from the lack or absence of ground, or that of a founding body, an authority that begins, to be sure, before death:

> The authority or power, and particularly the theologico-political power of representation . . . might come to it, in its very founding agency, precisely from its lack or absence of *Grund*, from the *Abgrund* on the basis of which it founds: for it founds precisely there where the founding body, the founding agency or existence, comes to disappear in death, to act as the one who has disappeared or passed away. (FD 190/152)

Marking the intertwining of the non-living, absence and reference to the other, the *image*, the specter of the non-present, living-dead other, has the tangible intangibility of a body without flesh. Its mode of appearance is that of appearing in disappearing, disappearing in its appearance.[19] Making appear or making re-appear with greater clarity the disappeared, all images partake of a spectral structure. This spectrality, no stranger to technics and technology, allows for the revenant or image of the disappeared to be interiorized, to remain in me, *as other*, living-dead, inside, yet outside, while at the same time making possible the appearance of "visual" images outside, in us. All the spectral terms in the series of "almost equivalent words" that signify haunting—the phantom, the ghost, the specter, the image, etc.,—have their specific singularity, nonetheless as doubles or simulacra they all have a certain structure and function in common. This is why the spectral trace of the other can be said to share in the same structure as the "synthetic" image. The structure of the digital, televisual image is spectrally constituted via technological delay. The remote dispatching of "bodies" that are non-bodies—"artifactual" bodies—is made possible by spectral virtualization.[20] It is this very structure that allows for Pascale Ogier's apparition, a spectral simulacrum, to appear and re-appear on the screen.

## A Spectral Body

Pascale Ogier's *apparition* returns. It comes back. Each time she appears, her re-apparition is an event. Her every "appearance" is a becoming-body, but a body that "disappears in its appearance, apparition [*apparition*]."[21] Bearing the traces of something disappeared or departed, the ghostly or spectral apparition then is that which "effaces itself in the appearing of its coming [*s'efface dans l'apparition de sa venue*]" (AA 460). The return of Ogier's apparition on the screen attests to the "structure" of *revenance*: the production of a spectral, virtual, prosthetic body incarnating the apparition of the departed, the disappeared (*l'apparition du disparu*). Pascale Ogier's apparition, her "digitized image," like the fabrication of a virtual body through a phantomatic work of mourning, belongs to the same "structure" that makes possible the production of all spectral bodies. In the process of taking in, memorializing the other, the work of mourning also leads to the production of phantomatic bodies—to ward off death, or the return of the dead, and to protect the living from confrontation with their own death while at the same time guaranteeing the survival and the 'living on' of the dead.

The terms "specter" and "phantom or ghost [*fantôme*]," in contrast to *revenant*, the ghost that returns, are etymologically related to visibility and the visible spectacle.[22] Spectrality and "ghostliness [*fantomalité*]" share "the becoming almost visible of that which is visible only insofar as it is *not visible* in flesh and blood" (E 129, my emphasis).[23] Exceeding the oppositions between the sensuous and the non-sensuous, "*at the same time* visible and invisible, phenomenal and non-phenomenal: a trace that marks in advance the present by its absence" (E 131, my emphasis), the return of a specter is "the *frequency* of a certain visibility" that is not tangible (SM 165/100–1).

Ogier's *apparition* then is not the simple making-present, aided by technology, of that which is no longer present. Her spectral *apparition* puts into question the temporal schema utilized to understand the distinction between the "live presence of the real" and its "preservation" and "reproduction" by archival machines, such as video or film. The apparition cannot merely be attributed to a representation or an "image," as conventionally understood, captured and preserved by recording equipment. To say that we see Ogier's "digitized image" is to say that we are confronted by the return of her ghostly apparition, her *phantasma* or *eidōlon*.

The re-appearance of her *apparition*, the very possibility of its appearance, re-production, and archivization, depends on the apparition's ability to appear in Ogier's absence. In fact, all tele-technology functions on the basis that what is captured must be reproducible in its absence. Thus each of Ogier's appearances, the 'first' time and every time after, is always already haunted by disappearance, by her absence or death; a disappearance or departedness (*disparition*) that was already there as she spoke and was being filmed. She was already haunted by this

disappearance (*disparition*), a "disappearance" that is also there whenever her apparition appears to us. This disappearance already bears within it

> another magic 'apparition' ["*apparition*" *magique*], a ghostly 're-apparition' [*une "re-apparition" fantomale*] which is in truth properly *miraculous* . . . as admirable as it is unbelievable [*incroyable*], believable only by the grace of an act of faith, which is summoned by technics [*la technique*] itself, by our relation of essential incompetence to technical operation. (E 131)

And the every day usage of tele-technology functions to conceal this miraculousness.

The re-appearance of Ogier's apparition is only possible because the living constantly divides itself, harboring within death and non-presence. The living present's deferral from itself, this delay or lag, which modern technologies are in constant pursuit of shortening, effacing, or denying, ensures the possibility of any "making-present." It is this spectral self-relation and relation to the other that makes what we, in general, call "images" possible and enables them to be recorded or reproduced. The possibility of death inhabits and haunts all modern technologies, brings about re-production as well as allowing for the restitution as "living present" of what is dead but is preserved *as if* it were alive. Every "live effect [*un effet de direct*]" or a real-time "effect," then, is an effect of the simulacrum brought about by technics (E 48).

For the skeptic, who can only believe what he or she can see, what may appear to distinguish Ogier's *apparition* from what has conventionally been understood or maligned as "a ghost" is that it can readily be "seen" in everyday life on the video screen. One sees, one believes that one sees immediately, right away, without delay, live—there is actuality. Yet what we "see" on the screen, as Derrida explains to Bernard Stiegler, is of an entirely other order. The spectral *apparition* of Pascale Ogier, the visibility of Ogier's "image," is no simple visibility, but what he calls "a nocturnal visibility," a "visibility of the night" (E 129–31). Whatever is "captured" by optical instruments is already the specter of "a 'televised' [*une "télévisée"*]," already dis-appearing as it is looked at, aimed at, targeted, by an intentionality at a distance (*télé-visée*) (E 131).

## "You'll Just Have to Believe Me"

In the contemporary world, tele-technologies such as video are quite commonly relied upon to provide proof or evidence, but this would be to mistake showing, displaying or presenting with testifying and witnessing. Even though tele-technolgies may be used to indicate or exhibit something, they can never take the place of bearing witness and testimony. We place our faith in technology, we believe in it without really knowing how it functions, but technology or technics cannot be relied upon for proof. With live presence or a live broadcast, it seems that no doubt is possible, for, the thing itself is being presented. There is the im-

mediacy of the senses and certitude, the reasoning goes, thus no necessity for any belief or faith. Live presence or the thing itself thus seems to call for a suspension of belief.[24] Not only is there no need for blind belief the image seems to imply, but one can also dispense with any commentary or analysis. And yet—there is the necessity of testimony.

Technics cannot be relied upon for evidence; it cannot take the place of, or substitute for, testimony. However, no testimony or attestation is without an intimate relation to technics. On the one hand, technics or the technical is the possibility or "chance" of any faith and is indispensable for all testimony. There would be no faith without iterability, thus no faith without all that is technical and "machine-like [*machinic*]" (Foi 63/47).[25] For, *tekhnē* and all that is automatic opens up life and the living to death and the other. *Tekhnē* is not simply added on to nature or a natural body, it does not happen to something that is presumed to be natural; it always, already haunts, inhabits, and is originarily at work in that to which it "happens." On the other hand, even though the "living present of the testimonial pledge," is not only detached from its proper presence but is also made possible by repetition and iterability, technics will never produce testimony. Thus the "the machinic and faith [*le machinique et la foi*]" will always need to be thought together in their *aporetic* relation.

What happens, then, when a voice comes forward and says "Believe me!"? What occurs when one attests to some thing, when an appeal is made asking one to believe, an appeal that comes to us via technics? For example, a plea such as "here, now, yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts." Is this declaration—"You have to believe me," "I tell you that I am telling the truth. Believe me. You have to believe me'"—evidence or proof?[26] The statement is presented as a testimony: this given word, this sworn faith, like the *sacramentum*, promises to testify truthfully to the truth, it vows to speak the truth. And like all attestation, this avowal is advanced in the first person: "I swear!," "Believe me!," "I pledge to tell the truth." The voice says: "I promise you the truth. And I ask of you to believe. Believe in what I believe." But when someone says, "Believe me! I'm telling you the truth," the appeal is itself not provable since the act of faith or belief called forth by any bearing witness is beyond all knowledge and intuition. Bearing witness is not the equivalent of proving. The witness attests that some "thing" has been present to him or her: "I swear I have seen, I have heard," "I swear, believe me, I'm telling you the truth." This testimony is itself beyond proof or demonstration—it is an appeal to blind confidence, *as if* this voice were saying: "'My testimony could be false, but I am sincere and in good faith. This is not a false testimony'" (Foi 83/64).

To say "believe me! [*crois-moi!*]" is to appeal to the experience of a miracle: "'Believe in what I say as one believes in a miracle'" (Foi 83/63–4). All attestation, by definition, thus attests to the miraculous and the extraordinary: "*Pure* attestation, if there is such a thing, belongs to the experience of faith and of the

miracle" (Foi 84/64).To believe what I tell you, to have "faith in my good faith, ... is *as if* you were to believe in a miracle."[27] It is nothing short of "extraordinary to *believe* someone who tells you 'believe me'" and the experience of disenchantment is nothing but a modality of this "miraculous" experience (RM 76).

All witnessing assumes as part of its structure that the addressee of the witness will never see what was once present to the witness. This addressee has no immediate access to what was witnessed. Of course, the witness is not present to what he recalls either, all he can do is attest *now* to his having-been-present. So, the voice asks you to believe—"Believe me because I tell you to, because I ask it of you."—but to believe is never to subscribe to the conclusion of a syllogism. A testimony is a pledge of sworn faith, yet "You have to believe me" cannot be taken as a convincing demonstration. Witnessing appeals to the act of faith which is always open to betrayal, infidelity, and perjury. If perjury or false oaths were not at the heart of all witnessing—and there must always be the chance of perjury—there would be no testimony.

A testimony asks us to believe, but what is it to believe? What is an act of belief? "The radical phenomenon of believing [*croyance*]" is "the only possible relation to the other as other."[28] There can be no social bond or tie without belief and believing, for an appeal to faith is made in every act of language and every address of the other. As soon as one opens one's mouth or exchanges a silent look, a "believe me" is involved. Each time I speak or manifest something to another, I am testifying to the extent that every utterance implies: "I am telling you the truth, I am telling you what I think, I testify before you. ... As soon as I testify, I am before you as before the law." And "you'll just have to believe me," take me at my word, at the very moment that I swear.[29]

## "I Believe in Ghosts"

A voice asks us not just to believe, but *to believe in the belief* in ghosts. Yet how can anyone believe *in ghosts*?[30] Especially if a preoccupation with ghosts, at least since the Enlightenment, has always been associated with obscurantism, occultism, mysticism, and superstition and if the thought of ghosts—even the word itself—has always evoked, certainly in the Anglo-American tradition, "ghoulies and goblins," haunted houses, Halloween and children's fairy tales?[31] If philosophical thinking, the exercise of *logos*, has been throughout its history a struggle against all forms of superstition, mystification, and demagoguery, if the ultimate aim of the rational drive or the scientific enterprise has been an attempt to dissociate and free thought from all illusions and phantasms (in particular those associated with religion, theology, the occult, etc.), then it seems "believing in ghosts" would be tantamount to a taking leave of one's senses, unless the form of thinking dominant in the West, which links science to the real and the objective, has placed too much of its faith

in the reality of the real, the perdurance of the substantial and the living present.[32] Has it not always been "in the name of the scientificity of science," Derrida asks, "that one conjures ghosts or condemns obscurantism, spiritualism, in short, everything that has to do with haunting and with specters?" (E 133/118). To "believe in ghosts," then, would require not a steadfast trust in the rationality of thought but a leap of faith—and what is faith but belief in the "unbelievable?"—a leap that is unacceptable to the adherents of immanentism, objectivism or realism, rationalism or scientificity, all of whom believe themselves to be on firm ground, holding on to the reassuring idea of a continuous progress of universal rationality.[33] This tele-technoscientific reason or rationality, with its disdain for all popular interest in such things as clairvoyance, parapsychology, and metapsychology, must reject all belief as a remnant of theological doctrine. Little did Marx know how right he was when he wrote disparagingly in the *German Ideology* that theology *in general* is "belief in ghosts [*croyance aux fantômes*] (*Gespensterglaube*)" (SdM 234/146).[34] There is an intimate relation not only between religion, theology and ghosts, but also between belief, credulity, and ghosts: "One might say belief *in general*" is belief in ghosts (SdM 234/146).[35] Yet to say "yes, believe me, I believe in ghosts" is not to believe in some *thing*, or some general notion of "spirituality" or the existence of a more glorious afterlife.

## "Because, You See, I Am a Ghost"[36]

*"Comment filmer un spectre qui dit: je suis un spectre?"*[37]

When Jacques Derrida turns to the camera and confesses that he "believes in ghosts" is he referring to the ghost that "he *is*," the ghost that "*he has* in him," or the one before him, "in front of him" and who haunts him, "an other," therefore, "the ghost (who is an other) in him as the ghost of an other?"[38]

Jacques Derrida "looks at us. *In us*. He looks in us [*Il regarde en nous*]" (FD 200/161). Far away in us, outside. He looks at each of us singularly and asks us to bear witness and be responsible. Believe me, he says, I believe that, from the beginning, there is death, this possibility exists in life and all that is living; each thing or mark is double, dividing or doubling itself in order to relate to itself; bearing its specter within itself, it can only be itself if it is divided by "the phantom of its double," making possible all images; there is *revenance* and *survivance*, ghostly return and spectral sur-vival *in life*, even before death: an absolute affirmation of life, life beyond life, therefore a certain thought of death, a life that does not go without death. Believe me, he says, I believe in belief or faith itself, but a faith without dogma, a belief without organized religion, a belief in the necessity of believing. I believe in believing. This is what I believe in, yes, here, now, yes, believe me!

## Notes

1. Jacques Derrida, "Spectrographies," in *Échographies—de la television: Entretiens filmés* (Paris: Galilée-INA, 1996), 135. Henceforth cited as E in the body of the text. All translations are my own.

2. *Ghost Dance* (100 min., 1983), a film produced, written, and directed by Ken McMullen, a Looseyard production for Channel 4 (Great Britain) and ZDF (West Germany).

3. A list of references may include the following texts by Derrida: *Dissemination* (117/103, 159/138n., 165/143, 234/206, 361/325), *Glas* (230ai/205ai), *The Truth in Painting* (221/193, 248/217, 292/257, 330/288, 377/329, 412/360–1, 426–7/373–4, 431–5/377–81), *The Post Card* (206/191), *Ear of the Other* (58–9, English edition only), *The Right of Inspection* (XVI–XVIII, XXI, XXXII), *Parages* (86, 91, 96, 106, 108, 116, 136–8, 164–5), *Shibboleth* (96/19, 102/62), *Psyché* (263, 628), *Ulysse gramophone* (10, French edition only, 27/149, 30/150, 141, French edition only), *Of Spirit* (11/1,45/24, 142/91, 162/99, 184/113), *Cinders* (22), *Memoires: For Paul de Man* (76/64, 89/80), *Memoirs of the Blind* (53/47, 72/68), *Given Time* (204/161), *The Other Heading* (105/87,107/89), *Points* (145/135), *Politics of Friendship* (93–4/75–6, 320/288), *Archive Fever* (63–5/38–9, 98–100/61–2, 111/69, 131–40/84–9), *Religion* (15/6), *Aporias* (68/35, 60–1/110–2), *Resistances* (45/30, 112/88), *Echographies* (6, 20, 30–2, 39, 61, 129), *Adieu* (191–2/111–2), *Of Hospitality* (39/37), *Marx en jeu* (24, 57–8), *Demeure* (91/71, 94/72, 98/75, 123/91), "Fors" (42–3/xxx–xxxi), *Specters of Marx*, etc.

4. See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Marc Guillaume, and Jean-Pierre Vincent, *Marx en jeu* (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1997), 57–8: "Il y a des spectres partout, dans mes textes, depuis des décennies."

5. The entry for "ghost" in the OED informs us: "Forms: 1 gást, gáest, 2–5 gast(e, 3–6 gost(e, 4–6 gooste(e, 6 Sc. goast, goist, 5–6 ghoste, ghoost, (6 ghoast, 8 ghest), 5-ghost, 6- Sc. g(h)aist. [Common WGer.: OE. *gást* (also *gdest*) str.masc. =O Fris *gást*, OS. *gêst* (Du *geest*), OHG. (MHG., mod.Ger.) *geist*.—OTeut. type *gaisto-z*. Although the word is known only in the W Ger. langs. (in all of which it is found with substantially identical meaning), it appears to be of pre-Teut. formation. The sense of pre-Teut. *ghoizdo-z*, if the ordinary view of its etymological relations be correct, should be 'fury, anger.' ...Outside Teut. the derivatives seem to point to a primary sense 'to tear, wound, pull to pieces.'" The OE form *gdest* is constant in the Exeter Book. "The spelling with *gh-*, so far as our material shows appears first in Caxton, who was probably influenced by the Flemish *gheest*. It remained rare until the middle of the sixteenth century, and was not completely established before about 1590."

6. The distinction between the living and the dead has been at the source of every thought of the image. The entire history of the West could be written by tracing the appearance and subsequent translation of limit-terms such as *psuchē, eidōlon, phantasma*, and *phasma*. What is called for is a non-Platonic interpretation of these terms. The following is a mere sampling: *eidōlon: Iliad* 5.451 and 23.72, 23.104–7; *Odyssey* 4.796, 4.824, 4.835, 11.83, 11.213, 11.602, 20.355, etc. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 839, Sophocles, *Ajax* 126, Euripides, *Helen* 684, 1136, Plato, *Theaetetus* 240a–b, *Cratylus* 432a, *Sophist* 240a, 234c, 241e, 266b, 267c, *Republic* 598 b, 516a, 599d, *Timaeus* 71a, *Laws* 959b, *Theaetetus* 150c; *phantasma*: Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes* 710, Euripides, *Hecuba* 54, 94, 390,

Plato, *Phaedo* 81d, *Sophist* 236b, 241e, 264c, *Republic* 599a, *Timaeus* 71a, *Protagoras* 356e; *psuchē*: *Iliad* 1.3, 9.408, 16.505, 22.362, 23.67 and 72, *Odyssey* 11.37, 24.1, 24.14–20, Euripides, *Alcestis* 712 ; *phasma*: Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 415, Sophocles, *Electra* 501, 644, 1466, *The Women of Trachis* 509, Euripides, *Hecuba* 70, *Alcestis* 1125, *Iphigenia Among the Taurians*, 1263, Plato, *Symposium* 179d, *Theaetetus* 155a; *oneiros*: *Iliad* 2.56–8; *skia*: *Odyssey* 10.495, 11.207, Plato, *Phaedrus* 260c, *Republic* 510e, 417d, 532c.

7. The birth of doubles in archaic and Attic Greece is bound up with the perception of death and the funerary practices involved. After death, and the performance of burial rites, each person takes on a double aspect: (1) a visible aspect: permanent, localized, hard like the stone erected over the tomb. A *mnēma*, a memorial, was constructed by the erection of a *sēma* on the tomb. The *sēma*, a mark in the form of a burial mound, *kolossós* or stele, stood in for the *soma*, the effigy or the corpse that the person became at death. Up to the end of the seventh century B.C. a stele was simply a brute stone with no inscription marking the place of a tomb. In the sixth century the stele began to bear figurative representations. The immovable funerary substitute for the absent corpse also served to evoke in men a glory that was now certain not to perish. Apart from the *mnēma*, the only way for the dead to be remembered was the permanence of their name and the glory of their renown in the memory of the living and that of future generations. (2) an invisible aspect: that of the ungraspable, evanescent *psuché*, the double of the living body—which resembles the body, having its exact appearance, clothing, gestures, voice, etc.—but which is exiled in the world of the beyond, Hades. In contrast to the standard translations of *psuchē* as "life breath," or, according to Benveniste, simply "breath," both Redfield and Vernant convincingly argue that the *psuchē*, that which leaves the person at the moment of death, is not the soul, but a phantom. See James Redfield, "Le sentiment homérique du Moi," *Le Genre humain* 12 (1985): 93–111; and *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994); and Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Psyché: double du corps ou reflet du divin?" originally published in *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse* 44 (Autumn 1991): 223–30, reprinted in *Entre mythe et politique* (Paris: Seuil, 1996), translated by Froma I. Zeitlin as "Psuche: Simulacrum of the Body or Image of the Divine?" in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays*, ed. Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

All doubles or "supernatural" apparitions, whether *psuchē*, *phasma*, or *oneiros*, connote a "presence" external to the subject that at the same time reveal themselves to belong to another, inaccessible realm. Each phantomatic double is a real "presence" and simultaneously an irremediable absence, the irruption of the invisible in the visible. It is with Plato, the first theoretician of the image as artifice and fiction, that all doubles become judged against the proper, truth, essential being (*ousia, to on*) as insubstantial semblances. On "the category of doubles," see Jean-Pierre Vernant's extensive work, especially "Eidolon. Du double à l'image," in *Figures, idoles, masques* (Paris: Julliard, 1990); "Figuration de l'invisible et categorie psychologique du double: le colossus" and "De la présentification de l'invisible à l'imitation de l'apparence," both in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs: Etudes de psychologie historique* nouvelle ed., augmentée (Paris: La Decouverte, 1985), the latter translated by Froma I. Zeitlin as

"From the 'Presentification' of the Invisible to the Imitation of Appearance," in Zeitlin, ed., *Mortals and Immortals*.

8. Plato, *Republic* 510a, 516a4–6.

9. The sources of the word image in English are: "a. F. *image* (13th C in Littré), in 11th and 12th C. *i'magene*=Pr. *image, emage*, It. *Im(m)agine*, Sp. *imagen*, Pg. *imagem*, ad. L. *imāgo, imāgin-em* ... containing the same root as *im-itārī*" (OED). The image bears a relationship to the effigy, a pictorial likeness of the dead, in particular, of royalty. See, for example, Plato's *Laws* where in a description of funerary practices it is remarked that "dead bodies [*nekrôn sómata*] are said to be *eidōla*" (XII, 959). Also, in the *Histories* Herodotus recounts that a substitute is fashioned for the royal corpse: "Whenever a king is slain in war, they make an *eidolon* of him and carry it out on a well-bedecked bier" (VI, 58).

10. Attending to the nuances and subtleties of Plato's arguments in *Dissemination*, Derrida demonstrates that Plato's discourse on *mimēsis* is never monolithic and that there is more than one type or version at work in the dialogues. The Platonic tradition, Derrida writes in *Specters of Marx*, associates the image (*eidōlon*) with the specter and the idol with the phantasm, "the *phantasma* in its phantomatic or errant dimension as living-dead." In the *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*, *phantasmata*, which are not distinguished from *eidōla*, are "figures of dead souls." See *Spectres de Marx: l'état de la dette, le travail du deuil et la nouvelle internationale* (Paris: Galilée, 1993), 235, translated by Peggy Kamuf as *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 147. Henceforth cited as SdM in the body of the text, with the page references first to the French, then to the English editions.

11. As is well known, in the *Republic mimēsis* is called a "demiurgy of images [*eidōlon dēmiourgia*]" (599a7), while in the *Sophist mimēsis* is a fabrication or making (*poiēsis*) of images (265b1). The maker of an image (*eidōlu poiētes*) is a *mimētēs*. For *mimēsis* in Plato, see Gerald Else, "'Imitation' in the Fifth Century," *Classical Philology* 53:2 (April 1958): 73–90; and *Plato and Aristotle on Poetry*, ed. Peter Burian (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1986); and Göran Sörbom, *Mimesis and Art: Studies in the Origin and Early Development of an Aesthetic Vocabulary* (Uppsala: Svenska Bokförlaget, 1966). Particularly helpful is Jean-Pierre Vernant's "Naissance d'images," in *Religions, histories, raisons* (Paris: Maspero, 1979), translated by Froma I. Zeitlin as "The Birth of Images," in Zeitlin, ed., *Mortals and Immortals*. The vocabulary of *mimos, mimeisthai, mimēma, mimētēs* belonged to the literary genre of the mime in the fifth century, for example, Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.

12. Jacques Derrida, *La Dissémination* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), 218; translated by Barbara Johnson as *Dissemination* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 192. Henceforth cited as D in the body of the text, with the page references first to the French, then to the English editions. We could say that the priority of that which *is* has to do with its *pré-venance*, its prior coming on the scene.

13. Deleuze's reading in "The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy," one of the appendices to the *Logic of Sense*, shares with Derrida's *Dissemination* an emphasis on the simulacrum. According to Deleuze, in the attempt to distinguish essence from appearance and to identify false pretenders in the *Sophist*, Plato divides the domain of images-idols into two, "copies-icons" (belonging to the realm of the *eikastikē*) and "simulacra-

phantasms" (belonging to the *phantastikē*). The copy is an image endowed with resemblance (a good copy), whereas the simulacrum is an image without resemblance (a bad copy, a copy of a copy, or an infinitely degraded copy). However, for Deleuze, "the simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power [*une puissance positive*] which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*." See Gilles Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Minuit, 1969), 357; translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale as *Logic of Sense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 262. It is worth noting that Derrida's reading, for reasons that should become clear, does not observe the Platonic or Deleuzian distinction between the *phantasma* or simulacrum and the *eidōlon* or *eikon*.

14. The prohibition of images and the interdiction against any substitution stem from mimetology. The idol—fallen, distanced, removed from the origin—is always judged according to a lineage and patrimony of the idea. For an analysis of iconoclasm, see Alain Besançon, *L'image interdite: Une histoire intellectuelle de l'iconoclasme* (Paris: Fayard, 1994); translated by Jane Marie Todd as *The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000). For an examination of idolatry, see Moshe Halbertal and Avishai Margalit, *Idolatry*, trans. Naomi Goldblum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992).

15. Louis Marin, *Des pouvoirs de l'image: gloses* (Paris: Seuil, 1993). Henceforth cited as PI in the body of the text.

16. Jacques Derrida, "A force de deuil" in *Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde* (Paris: Galilée, 2003), 181; translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas as "By Force of Mourning," in *The Work of Mourning*, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 145. Henceforth cited as FD in the body of the text, with the page references first to the French, then to the English editions. I have occasionally very slightly modified the translation to reflect my reading. The expression "A force de" can also mean "by dint of," "as a result of," "due to." So, the clause "by force of" in the title of the essay can be read as "as a result of mourning."

17. Leon Battsita Alberti, *On Painting*, trans. John R. Spencer (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).

18. See G. W. F Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, vol. 3, "Phenomenology and Psychology," ed. M. J. Petry (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), §452, 144–217. For an illuminating reading of third section, "Psychology," of the first division, "Subjective Spirit," of the third part of the *Encyclopedia*, "The Philosophy of Spirit," see David Farrell Krell, *Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). As Krell explains, the image is transitory, *vorübergehend*. Interiorized and remembered in intelligence, the image no longer *exists* as such. It is unconsciously preserved, *bewusstlos aufbewahrt*, in intelligence. The abstractly preserved image requires for its true existence an existent intuiting. *Erinnerung* is the relation of the image to an intuiting whereby each individual intuition conforms to the universal and to representation as such. The image which was the property of intelligence is then released to the exterior. The synthesis of an interior image with its remembered existence is representation proper, *das Vorstellen*.

19. "Like the dis-appearing of an apparition [*comme dis-paraître d'une apparition*]" (SdM 202/126).

20. See *Spectres de Marx*.

21. Serge Margel, "Les dénominations orphiques de la survivance: Derrida et la question du pire," in *L'animal autobiographique*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 460. Henceforth cited as AA in the body of the text.

22. "Specter" is derived from French *spectre* (sixteenth century) or Latin *spectrum*, from *specere*, "to look, see," and "phantom or ghost [*fantôme*]" from Middle English *fantosme, fantome*, from Old French *fantosme* (twelfth century), from Latin, from Greek *phantasma*, from *phantazo*, "make visible," from *phaino*, "show," which is related to *phainesthai*, "appearance or appearing for vision" (*l'apparaître pour la vue*), and to the brilliance of the day and to phenomenality.

23. This is my rendering of "C'est que devient alors quasiment visible ce qui n'est visible que pour autant qu'on ne le voit pas en chair et en os."

24. I recall Jacques Derrida's comments during a conference on the topic of "Transcendance, évangile, télévision: les nouvelles nouvelles" at the Institut néarlandais in Paris in December 1997, when one of the members of the audience commented that the media tend to efface the question of the body, and that in discussions of the media more attention needed to be paid to our "physical presence" and "bodies." Derrida noted, gesturing toward her, that at the very moment that he was speaking he was much less sure of "presence" and "the body itself." He added that he was not sure at all that we were fully in the presence of each other.

25. Jacques Derrida, "Foi et savoir: Les deux sources de la 'religion' aux limites de la simple raison," in *La Religion*, ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Paris: Seuil, 1996); translated by Samuel Weber as "Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of 'Religion' within the Limits of Mere Reason," in *Religion*, ed. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998). Cited throughout as Foi in the body of the text, with the page references first to the French, then to the English editions. I have silently modified the translation to reflect my reading.

26. Jacques Derrida, "'A Self-Unsealing Poetic Text': Poetics and Politics of Witnessing," trans. Rachel Bowlby, in *Revenge of the Aesthetic: The Place of Literature in Theory Today*, ed. Michael P. Clark (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 189.

27. Jacques Derrida, "Above All, No Journalists!" trans. Samuel Weber, in *Religion and Media*, ed. Hent de Vries and Samuel Weber (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 76. Henceforth cited as RM in the body of the text.

28. Jacques Derrida, *Mal d'archive: Une impression freudienne* (Paris: Galilée, 1995), 147; translated by Eric Prenowitz as *Archive Fever* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 94, translation modified. Henceforth cited as MA in the body of the text, with the page references first to the French, then to the English editions.

29. This is Peggy Kamuf's translation of the phrase "et là il faut me croire" from Jacques Derrida's "Le ruban de machine à écrire [Limited Ink II]" in *Papier machine: le ruban de machine à écrire et autres reponses* (Paris: Galilee, 2001), 110; "Typewriter Ribbon," in *Without Alibi*, ed. and trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 132.

30. For a sample study of the modalities of *believing* in ghosts (in Europe from the fifth century to the fifteenth century), see Jean-Claude Schmitt, *Les revenants: les vivants*

*et les morts dans la société médiévale* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994); translated by Teresa Lavender Fagan as *Ghosts in the Middle Ages: The Living and the Dead in Medieval Society* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998). It is Schmitt's argument that there was no such thing as an immutable "belief in ghosts" in the Middle Ages and that this belief was always in the process of being shaped and transformed.

31. The dismissal of "ghosts" and their relegation to the realm of children's stories has a long history in the Anglo-American tradition. The status of ghosts as fodder for supernatural folklore and horror stories may have much to do with the developments shaping the West's relation toward death occurring between the end of fifteenth century to the nineteenth century, as detailed by Jean-Claude Schmitt in the last chapter of his study. Even though Schmitt's study is confined to the Middle Ages, he provides a thumbnail sketch of developments regarding the relationship to ghosts up to the twentieth century. He explains that the impact of Protestant reform (which officially rejected the doctrine of souls in purgatory and contributed to an increased diabolization of ghosts), the link between the apparition of spirits and belief in sorcery, the transformation of popular beliefs into folklore, the replacement of "messengers of souls" by spiritualists, the evolution of attitudes toward death, and the rise of fantastic literature have all helped shape current Western attitudes toward ghosts.

As regards the attitude toward ghosts in the English-speaking world, we must not underestimate the great influence on our current views of thinkers such as Hobbes and Locke, who often advocated the need to expel ghosts and phantoms in order to secure the limits of rational discourse. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes makes a sustained attack on miracles and wonders, drawing a close connection between "phantasms of the brain" and "dead men's ghosts." He criticizes "the demonology of heathen poets" and "their fabulous doctrine concerning demons, which are but idols, or phantasms of the brain, without any real nature of their own, distinct from human fancy; such as are dead men's ghosts and fairies, and other matter of old wives' tales." See *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 398. This attack on ghosts must be thought in conjunction with Hobbes's attempt to delimit, purge, and exorcise language, particularly its figurative dimension. For Hobbes, "Fictitious miracles" and "histories of apparitions" are associated with religion which promotes "conjuration" (449, 401–3). "Spirits" which have come to be translated as "ghosts," he comments, "signifieth nothing, neither in heaven nor earth, but the imaginary inhabitant's of man's brain" (265; see also 436).

Locke also attributed "the Ideas of Goblines and Sprights" to tales told to children by "foolish Maids." See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), book 2, chap. 33, §10, 397–8. For both thinkers, it was important to be able to mark the boundaries between "the enlightened and dark Part of Things" (I, I, 7), and to draw clear limits between monstrous figures and rational, philosophical discourse. It should be noted that an attack on monsters, chimeras, and ghosts was also a criticism of rhetoric and figurative language, which always had the potential to mislead judgment.

Permit me here to salute the work of Nicholas Royle, who has single-handedly championed "the ghostly" in numerous texts. See, for example, Nicholas Royle, *Telepathy and Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991).

32. For Derrida's comments regarding the relation between superstition and "scientific positivism" in particular in Freud, see "Mes chances" in *Psyché I: Inventions de l'autre* (Paris: Galilée, 1987–1998).

33. See, for example, "the essence of believing, here the essence of faith *par excellence*, which can only ever believe in the unbelievable [*l'incroyable*]" (SdM 227/143). For a very interesting examination of "belief, confidence, faith, fidelity, credit, credibility, [and] credulity," see Peggy Kamuf, "Melville's Credit Card," in *The Division of Literature: Or the University in Deconstruction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). One of the voices in Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas's "To Believe: An Intransitive Verb? Translating Skepticism in Jacques Derrida's *Memoirs of the Blind*," *Paragraph* 20:2 (July 1997): 101–19, notes that belief or faith—like the ghostly, we might add—takes place at the limits of vision or sight.

34. For another reference, see Derrida's comments on "croyance aux esprits, aux spectres at aux âmes des revenants *(der Glaube an Geister und Gespenster und wiederkehrende Seelen)*" in Freud's *Gradiva* in *Mal d'archive* (MA129–55/83–101, especially 138–9/88–9 and 147/94–5).

35. Derrida further notes in *Specters of Marx* that the religious "gives to the production of the ghost or of the ideological phantasm its originary form or its paradigm of reference, its first 'analogy'" (SdM 264/166).

36. In a brilliant article, "The Ghosts of Ulysses" in *James Joyce: The Artist and the Labyrinth*, ed. Augustine Martin (London: Ryan Publishing, 1990), Maud Ellmann quotes from Ken McMullen's video: "In the recent film *Ghost Dance* ... Jacques Derrida is interviewed by an ethereal young woman who asks him if he believes in ghosts. 'That's a hard question,' he smiles, 'because, you see, I *am* a ghost'" (193). A footnote indicates that her translation is "condensed and approximate." In his account of the filming of the movie Derrida does not mention this exchange. See Andrew Payne and Mark Lewis, "The Ghost Dance: An Interview with Jacques Derrida," trans. Jean-Luc Svoboda, *Public* 2 (1989): 60–73.

Maud Ellmann's acutely perspicacious essay, first delivered as The Richard Ellmann Memorial Address at the Eleventh International James Joyce Symposium in Venice in June 1988, in which she speaks of Joyce's ghost and in which she calls *Ulysses* "a book about mourning" (197), also mentions Stephen Daedalus's famous definition of a ghost: "What is a ghost? Stephen said with tingling energy. One who has faded into impalpability through death, through absence, through change of manners." Remarking on Stephen's "curiously undefinitive" answer, Ellmann adds: "He could be wiser to inquire if anyone, or anything, is not a ghost, because the living are already almost dead, dispersed among the names and images they leave behind to haunt succeeding generations" (196). Further, criticizing our culture's "*vivocentrism*" which tries to protect the living from the dead by insisting upon an opposition between them, she queries "what could be blinder than refusing to believe in ghosts?" (193). Toward the end of her essay, Ellmann confides in the reader that "the ghost of my father, Richard Ellmann, has been visiting me regularly in my dreams" (217). She recounts three of her recent dreams about him, the last of which goes as follows: "The last time my father visited was the ghostliest day of the calendar, the 29th of February. In the dream, however, it was Bloomsday, and I was at an Irish shebeen revelling with two

companions. Exhilarated by the music we shouted in unison. 'I want to dance!' We seized the piano. One of my friends began to play elaborate arpeggios, his fingers dancing over the keys. The other man, I now saw was my father, said 'I want to sing tenor aria but I need Maudie to help me reach some of the high notes.' I agreed, although I was nervous about singing in public, and I also thought it odd that my father should be so eager to perform, since he was virtually tone-deaf and had lost the power of speech before he died. He began tunelessly enough, but slowly, stealthily, his voice rose into a tenor of such unearthly sweetness that every listener was wonderstruck. I began to weep. 'Why are you crying?' my father asked. I said, 'I miss you.' 'How can you miss me when I'm right here?' 'But you're *dead*!,' I exclaimed. 'Well, I guess there is *that* to consider!,' he laughed, as if it were the least of inconveniences. Now that our song was finished I went to take my place among the audience again: but as I passed each person I demanded, 'Was that not my father?' And no one could deny it. The vision faded: I woke up to remember I was fatherless. But now, as I resume my place amongst the living, my dream begins again, and I leave you with my ghost-inspired question. Was that not my father?" (218).

37. Jacques Derrida, "Le cinéma et ses fantômes," *Cahiers du cinéma* 556 (April 2001): 83.
38. Jacques Derrida, *La vérité en peinture* (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1978), 426; translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod as *The Truth in Painting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 373. I have very slightly modified the translation to reflect my reading.

# Traité de Tous les Noms (What Is Called Naming)

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ABSTRACT: What's in a name after Derrida? What's in a name after all? What is a name such that it always already remains, after all is said and done? And who or what is it that one calls name, names, or by name? Is it possible (for anyone or anything) not to have a name of one's own? Or to have another? The same as another? Is it possible to call and recall, in the name of memory and remembrance, indifference or convention, one name for another, one name for the other? Can the name be, as it were, avoided? Could anyone respond responsibly yet decline or resist, not so much that (or because) names wound, nor to protect oneself from being called names, but instead neither to call nor respond to the name, as it were, to the very same name one is called? *To protest* against the name, to refuse the name to the point of abandoning this and that name? To invent oneself beyond the name, beyond all names, in the name of the name? "For in order to live oneself truly," Derrida writes, "it is necessary to elude the law of the name, the familial law made for survival and constantly recalling me to death." What is called naming? One could say that the name is, to life, at once insult and injury. Or that calling names—mourning.

"Tiens, un nègre!"

—Franz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Mask*

Anyone responding to the call must continue to doubt, to ask himself whether he has heard right, whether there is no original misunderstanding; whether it was in fact his name that was heard, whether he is the only or the first addressee of the call; whether he is not in the process of substituting himself violently for another; whether the law of substitution, which is also the law of responsibility, does not call for an infinite increase of vigilance and concern. It is possible that I have not been called, me, and it is not even excluded that no one, no One, nobody, ever called any One, any unique one, anybody. The