

# PHANTASMAPHOTOGRAPHY

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The black orb has me in its sight.<sup>1</sup> At the turn of almost every page a solid black point aims at me straight in the eye. The *punctum*, the absolute singularity of the other, points at me. Perforating the page, each *punctum* also links together the passages that it separates. Pierced and punctured by its gaze, like the stare of Cyclops's eye, I am its only concern, for it addresses solely me.

Composed of a series of fragmentary paragraphs or sections, each separated from the other—punctuated, Derrida would say—by a solid black circle or point which, with more than a wink, refers to one of its main motifs (the *punctum*), "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" is a remarkable testimony to the writings of a contemporary, and a testament to a unique friendship.<sup>2</sup> Written on the occasion of the passing away of a friend, originally published in the journal *Poétique* in 1981, and later collected in *Psyché: Invention de l'autre* in 1987, Derrida's essay is a meditation on death and mourning, memory and ghosts, the referent and the other, the proper name and the unique, the look and the image, and their intertwining in the structure of photography. Mainly devoting itself to a reading of Barthes' last book, *La chambre claire*, itself a book of mourning, "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" elucidates how the force of metonymy allows us to speak of a singular death, how, despite having a suspended relation to the referent, photography permits us to maintain a relation to the absolute singularity of the other, and how, given the ubiquity and pervasiveness of photographs in our culture, their relation to spectrality remains to be examined.

The *point* of the commentary that follows, if it has one point, will be to attempt to graft a few remarks onto just one passage of Derrida's essay, a passage that ties together all of the motifs mentioned above, in order to elaborate the rela-

tion between photography and spectrality. By functioning as a testament or proof for the exigency of the absolute singularity of the other, or "the referent," photography demonstrates how death and the referent are brought together in the same structure (Psy 292/76). It is this "conjugation" of death and the referent in "the photographic event" that, I would like to show, gives photography its "spectral" structure (Psy 291/76).

## I

A text written for Roland Barthes and in tribute to him, Derrida's essay addresses the dilemma of not just writing about, but also to and for a friend who has recently passed away. How to write, Derrida wonders, so that the writing would, somehow, keep alive within oneself the recently departed friend? Derrida admits to wishing to "write at the limit," in a writing beyond the neutral and colorless, that would respect the singularity and uniqueness of Barthes' writing but would also circumvent the pitfalls associated with conventional eulogies and tributes (Psy 282/60). These pitfalls would consist of either (i) an excess of fidelity, which in its devotion to the subject amounts to saying nothing and returning the other's words back to him, or (ii) an undue emphasis on the living friend speaking as the other, which would then risk the total effacement of the friend. Neither of these paths—or "infidelities," as Derrida calls them—is avoidable, and we are left with correcting the one with the other (Psy 283/62).

It is "for him," for Roland Barthes himself, that Derrida wants to write, yet he realizes that any attention paid to Roland Barthes, and thus to his name, would have to be fully aware of the separation of the name from its bearer (Psy 284/62). So, when Derrida evokes the name of Barthes after his passing away, he knows that it

will not be the bearer of the name who will receive it, but only his name. Unable to call upon the friend who is no longer here, "it is certainly him whom I name," Derrida writes, but also "him beyond his name" (Psy 285/64). By invoking his name—which can never be said to have been his uniquely, since any proper name can only function if it is detachable from its bearer—"it is him in me that I name, toward him in me, in you, in us that I pass through his name" (Psy 285/64). When I call out his name, Derrida says, he is with me, with us, here. He knows this because "the image of the I of Barthes that Barthes inscribed in [him]" smiles at him, here and now (Psy 275/47). This "image" is not merely a memory that I have of the friend; it is not how he or she is going to be remembered—he is here, now. Conventionally, we believe that mourning begins with the death of the other, with that "unqualifiable event called death," but from the first moment that the name separates from its bearer, and perhaps even before, mourning—"the interiority (of the other in me, in you, in us)"—has commenced (Psy 285/64).

## II

Just as Barthes in his texts "mobiliz[ed] concepts by playing them against one another," Derrida's essay plays "concepts"—derived from a close reading of *La chambre claire* (somewhat unsatisfactorily translated as *Camera Lucida*)—against one another in order to arrive at Barthes' "unique trait" (Psy 276/50).<sup>3</sup> By reading Barthes' first book, *Writing De-gree Zero*, and the last book published before his death, *La chambre claire*, two books that he had never read before, Derrida hopes to have an "instantaneous access" to Barthes' work.<sup>4</sup> With a combination of irony and seriousness, knowing that what he is asking for is unrealistic and daring, Derrida still believes it possible to ask for "revelation" from a detail. "As if," he emphasizes, by proceeding in this manner—by reading the first and the last book and by playing off one motif against another—the "secret" of Barthes' text would yield itself to him (Psy

276/49). Risking "a certain mimetism," which is necessary whenever we take someone into ourselves in order to make him or her speak within us, Derrida claims he will be able "to see and know everything" about Barthes, "the pace, step, style, timbre, tone, and gestures" by following this *modus operandi* (Psy 276/48, 49). Thus Derrida's essay—incomplete, yet faithful to Barthes' own manner of approaching a topic—follows a detail "at once very visible and hidden," that of the relation of the *punctum* to the *studium* in *Camera Lucida*, in order to gain access to all of Barthes' work and his unique way of reading and writing, as if such a thing were possible (Psy 277/50). Derrida reads Barthes as Barthes himself read the text of others. Choosing his words carefully, as one would choose a garment to wear,<sup>5</sup> Derrida feels it important to take on an approach or a writing that would suit Barthes, that would attend to the suppleness, refinement and rigor of his writing.

It is from a detail, then, rather than a major theme, topic, subject or theory, that Derrida asks for "the ecstasy of revelation [*l'extase révélatrice*]" (Psy 277/50). By focusing on this detail, by magnifying it and opening it out, Derrida seeks to search, he confides in the reader, just "like him, as him" (Psy 277/50). Having secluded himself to read Barthes' first and last book in order to write his essay, he keeps looking at photographs of Barthes for something that may catch his eye, a particular detail, something that speaks only to him, something that is meant only for him. And it is the *punctum*, he finds, that is pointing at him, and only at him. The *punctum* is that detail which looks only at him.

In *La chambre claire* Barthes distinguishes two elements of a photograph, the *punctum* and the *studium*. He defines the *punctum* as a "prick [*piqûre*], little hole [*petit trou*], little patch/spot/mark [*petit tache*], little cut [*petite coupure*]"—and also a cast of the dice. A photograph's *punctum* is that accident which *pricks me, grips me [me point]*, (but also bruises me, is poignant to me [*me poigne*]" (CC 49/27, trans. slightly modified). The *punctum*,

Derrida elaborates, is that "point of singularity that punctures, the surface of the reproduction—and even the production—of analogies, likenesses and codes" (Psy 277/51). The *studium*, in contrast, is "a kind of general, enthusiastic commitment," a polite "irresponsible interest" which is of "the order of *liking*, not of *loving*" (CC 48, 50/26,27). Barthes noticed that in certain photographs the *studium* is "traversed [*traversé*], lashed [*fouetté*], striped [*zèbré*] by a detail (*punctum*)" (CC 69/40 §17). In a photograph, Barthes admitted, he sought out and culturally participated in the *studium*, but the *punctum* was that which rose out of the scene of the photograph, shooting out like an arrow to point to him and prick him.

Such is "the Winter Garden photograph" in *La chambre claire*, a photograph capturing Barthes' mother at the age of five, posing with her brother in a glassed-in conservatory, a photograph that Barthes confesses he cannot reproduce in the book. For others this photograph could, at most, sustain a mild interest or curiosity, whereas for Barthes it remains a poignant wound. Yet this wound is not an insignificant detail of mere personal interest; "irradiating" the entire book, as Derrida claims, it is the *punctum* of *La chambre claire* (Psy 296/84). Evoking the love of the mother, his mother, the unique other, the Winter Garden photograph seems to encapsulate an irreplaceable grace and "a quality (a soul)" that Barthes associated with her—not just with the Mother, but with *his* mother (CC/75 §31). The Winter Garden photograph, he writes, "was indeed essential, it achieved for me, utopically, *the impossible science of the unique being*" (CC/71 § 28).

Yet, for Derrida, the "poignant singularity" of the Winter Garden photograph need not signify a personal particularity restricted to Roland Barthes' life. The singularity does not forbid the generality from having "the force of law, but only arrows it, marks, and signs it. Singular plural" (Psy 284/63). That is why in *La chambre claire* Barthes had decided to take the Winter Garden photograph as his guide, as the

thread that would connect all the photographs of the world, thus revealing to him what it was that drew him to photography in general. The Winter Garden photograph thus becomes that singular, unique specimen from which the "essence" or "nature" of all Photography is to be "derive[d]" (CC/73 §30).

### III

The *punctum*, the absolute singularity of the other, points (at) me.

Derrida writes of the singular starting point of Barthes' investigation, the invisible *punctum* of the book:

It pierces me, strikes me, wounds me, and, first of all, seems to concern only me [*ne regard que moi*]. Its very definition is that it addresses itself [*s'adresse*] to me. The absolute singularity of the other addresses itself to me, the Referent that, in its very image, I can no longer suspend, even though its 'presence' forever escapes me . . . having already receded into the past . . . But it is always the singularity of the other insofar as it comes to me without being directed towards me [*m'arrive sans être tournée vers moi*], without being present to me; and the other can even be "me," me having been [*ayant été*] or having had to be [*devant avoir été*], me already dead in the future anterior and past anterior of my photograph. (Psy 278/51–52).

This pivotal passage in Derrida's essay calls for several detailed remarks:

1. The other in its absolute singularity looks at me, addresses me, concerns me.

The *punctum*, the other in its absolute singularity, comes to me, without being directed toward me or being present to me. The unique other always appears, without appearing, for it can appear only by disappearing. It forever eludes me and escapes my grasp. The other looks at me; in its absolute singularity it addresses me, concerns me. By calling me and addressing me, it seems to concern only me. The image of the other—the image that the other inscribed in me—haunts me, is in me, looks at me. Roland Barthes, or "the image of the I of Barthes," Derrida writes, looks at him.

He "looks at us (inside each of us [*chacun au-dedans*])" but this look that is within us, in us outside, is not ours, we do not possess it even though each of us has it at his disposal, to do with it whatever we wish (Psy 282/60–1). This look means that I am never in a position to deny, reject, or suspend the absolute singularity of the other (or of, what is perhaps too lightly called, the Referent).

2. The absolute singularity of the other, the Referent, cannot be suspended, although a naïve notion of the referent must be.

Earlier on in his essay, noting that *punctum* could be translated as "detail," Derrida mentions the proximity of Barthes' passion for details with that of Walter Benjamin's: "Moving through, extending beyond, and exploiting the resources of phenomenological as well as structural analysis, Benjamin's essay and Barthes' last book could very well be the two most significant texts on the so-called question of the Referent in the modern technological age" (Psy 277/51).<sup>8</sup> For Derrida, photography in particular, bring to light the significance of the notion of reference.

Discussions of "the referent" often invoke the thought of a unique, singular thing or object, which is said to "really exist." It is commonly believed that a photograph always points to the preexistence of an external origin or model. One takes a photograph of something and the photograph is the most simple proof of the existence of that which was photographed. For Barthes, what the photograph points to is not the preexistence of a fully constituted referent or an independent reality but to the inevitability or insistence of the referent. As Barthes writes in *La chambre claire*, "the photograph always carries [*emporte*] its referent with itself" (CC 17/5 §2), it testifies to the "singular adherence [*adhérence*]" and "stubbornness [*entêtement*] of the Referent in always being there" (CC 18,17/6 §2). Photography is thus always dependent on "a visible referent" that it must presume as given. Barthes admits that "in Photography I can

never deny that *the thing has been there [la chose a été là]*" (CC 120/76 §32). He adds that what he calls the "photographic referent" is "not the *optionally* real [*facultativement réelle*] thing to which an image or sign refers but the *necessarily* real [*nécessairement réelle*] thing which has been placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph" (CC 120/76 §32).

For Derrida, it would be more accurate to say that the photograph does not serve as evidence for the Referent itself—as if such a thing existed—but for a structure of reference to the absolute singularity of the other. The notion of the referent, and, in particular, reference, cannot be dispensed with; rather, it is the effects of reference that must be rethought. What "adheres" in photography, then, is "the 'photographic referent,'" a more rigorous discussion of which would require us (1) to suspend a naïve conception of the referent which is most commonly subscribed to, and (2) to acknowledge the possibility of the suspension of the Referent, but not of reference (Psy 287/68).

What is meant by the terms "suspension" and "referent" in the phrase "the suspension of the referent" needs to be closely examined, for they are understood by Derrida in another register. Unlike the vague "grandiose theories [*quelques gros théorèmes*]" on the general suspension of the Referent," mentioned by Derrida, always certain about the meaning of "the reality of an exterior referent," suspension here does not amount to a denial of the necessity of the referent, or to a rejection of historical or political factors pertaining to it (Psy 292/76). What it does suggest is suspension as a discontinuation or cessation of maintaining a notion of the referent as a fully constituted, independent object anterior to the structure of reference.

In photography the referent is not renounced, but is held in abeyance. Even though this suspension entails putting off, deferring, and delaying the encounter with the absolute referent, the wholly other, a suspended relation is still maintained with the referent in this process of placing it in quotation marks. This sus-

pendent relation denotes suspense (the state of being suspended, of awaiting determination or a decision that is pending) but also dependence on the referent (a hanging onto, a reliance on it). While there is no direct access to it, the referent is still desired and reference is maintained. In photography it is always the "photographic referent" that "interests us and animates" our readings (Psy 299/89).

Highlighting the notion of reference—or what Derrida prefers to call "the referential [*le référentiel*]"<sup>10</sup> in order to combine reference and the referent and not to have to choose between them—the photographic referent is not related "to a present or to a real but, in another way, to the other, and each time differently according to the type of 'image,' whether photographic or not" (Psy 287/68). That which is referred to, alluded to and pointed to in reference is not necessarily "reality" as such, but the other, to which there can never be any direct access.

Even though the other is irreducible and can never be fully comprehended within any enclosure, there is in reference a *relation* to the other. Reference, or the structure of referral, maintains a relation to alterity—to that which differs—and retains the mark of the other. Thus reference describes the structure of being marked by the other and maintaining a relation to it at the same time. Further, in its etymology, reference (*ference* [*férence*]: carrying, bearing [*portée*]), of "that which carries" and referent: what "carries back to," from *phéro* Gk and *fero* L) points to a relationship to the other. What is significant in reference, then, is the combination of the *ference*, the conveyance, the transport or mediation and the referent, what "carries back to" the other. The structure of reference carries or bears the other and carries back to the other. Photography thus refers to and suspends that which it refers to, the absolute singularity of the other.

3. Photography functions as a testimony to death, mourning, and bereavement.

In its structure, photography, or the photographic event, assumes the mortality, that is,

the possibility of the loss or death of the photographed. In order for photography to be at all possible, its most rudimentary requirement dictates that photographs be able to circulate freely, separated from the presence of the photographed. Each photograph, then, functions as the announcement of the absence—or death—of what is photographed. At the click of a button, there is death. From the moment the picture is taken and the photo becomes detached from the photographed, like the name from its bearer, the presence of the photographed is not necessary for the survival of the photograph. In other words, that which is photographed might as well be dead. Photography brings sudden death: by becoming photographic "images" the subjects of photography are transformed, petrified, mortified, embalmed (CC 30/14 §5). In this sense, every photograph is a picture of death.

The photograph that brings death thus enables us to speak of our death before our "actual" death. The taking of a photograph is at once a suspension of life (the life of the photographed, assuming for the moment that we know what "life" is) and the instauration of death, producing the "posthumous" character of lived experience. Every picture that I look at is a signal that the one whom I am looking at could have died long ago, is now dead, or is going to die. Bearing the signs of death, every photograph speaks of a past anterior—"a catastrophe that has already occurred"—or a future anterior of a death (CC 150/96 §39). It is not important whether the photographed is "actually" dead or not; what does matter is that "every photograph is this [very] catastrophe," pointing to the mortality of its subject (CC 150/96).

Derrida refers to this "posthumous" character, which links death to a certain strange temporality, when he writes that "the other can even be 'me,' me having been or having had to be, me already dead in the future anterior and past anterior of my photograph" (Psy 278/52). This "other," mentioned by Derrida, refers to the manner in which photography enables me

to view my own picture. Since my photograph, by its very structure, survives me, not only would others be able to look at my picture after my death but I, when I look at it, will appear to myself as dead, as already other, even before the moment of my death. This is, perhaps, what Roland Barthes is suggesting when he writes: "The photograph is the advent [*l'avènement*] of myself as other" (CC 28/12 §5). The photographic structure is what makes the bereaved memories of a mourning-yet-to-come possible.

This explains Barthes' conviction, in the—albeit nocturnal—light of the Winter Garden photograph, that the best way to interrogate photography is from the viewpoint of love and death; since for Barthes, the loss of the unique—his mother's death—the one he uniquely loved, is not his first death, is not the first that he has had to bear, but precipitates and presages his own death. Following his mother's death, life takes on an "unqualifiable" quality, already beginning to resemble death—death in life. The *deaths* of Roland Barthes in Derrida's title thus alludes not just to the singular and unique death of Barthes (Barthes beyond the name), but to "the plurality of deaths" in Barthes' life (made possible by the name) including his "own" (Psy 285/65).<sup>11</sup> With the first nomination, the first interiorization of the other, preparation has already begun to make room for a "plurality of deaths."

#### IV

It is the relation of the structure of reference, or the incessant movement of referral to the other, to the photographic referent, that bestows photography with spectral qualities. Barthes makes an explicit reference to the relation between photography and the spectral in *La chambre claire* when he describes the different elements involved in photography: "The *Spectator* is ourselves, all of us who glance through collections of photographs—in magazines and newspapers, in books, albums, archives. . . . And the person or thing photo-

graphed is the target, the referent, a kind of little simulacrum, any *eidolon* emitted by the object, which I should like to call the *Spectrum* of the Photograph, because this word retains, through its root, a relation to 'spectacle' and adds to it that rather terrible thing which is there in every photograph: the return of the dead [*le retour du mort*]" (CC 22–23/9 §4). Echoing Balzac's belief in the ghostly character of photography,<sup>12</sup> Barthes writes that the photograph captures the emanations emitted by the referent.<sup>13</sup> What emerges is "neither image nor reality, a new being, really: a reality one can no longer touch" (CC 136/87 §36). Photography then, for Barthes, is not only a means for the production of ghostly images but also a technical method or apparatus for recording the impressions of these *eidola*. It is as if there is a direct link, by "a sort of umbilical cord," Barthes explains, between that which is photographed and the gaze (CC 126/81 §34). Upon the realization that his photograph is being taken, Barthes admits, "I then experience a micro-version of death (a parenthesis): I am truly becoming a specter" (CC 30/14 §5). Moreover, this experience need occur not only when one is photographed but also when one looks at one's own picture. As Derrida notes, "the 'target,' the 'referent,' the '*eidolon*' emitted by the object, the '*Spectrum*'" (CC 22/9), need not be an other but can also "be me, seen in a photograph of myself" (Psy 292–93/78).

In *La chambre claire* Barthes insists that even though what the photograph photographs may no longer be living, the referential structure of the photograph always attests to its having-been-there. It is an undeniable fact that photography points to the "That-has-been [*Ça-a-été*]" (CC 120/77 §32). Agreeing with Barthes, Derrida writes that even though in the photograph the so-called referent is "noticeably [*visiblement*] absent, suspendable, vanished into the unique past time of its event," the "reference to this referent . . . implies just as irreducibly the having-been [*l'avoir-été*] of a unique and invariable referent" (Psy 292/76–77, my italics). Derrida returns to the

discussion of the photographic referent and its relation to death and temporality in a text published five years after the appearance of "The Deaths of Roland Barthes," entitled *Droit de regards* (translated as *The Right of Inspection*). Toward the end of his reading of Marie-Françoise Plissart's series of photographs, Derrida writes: "Of all the arts, photography, it seems to me, is the only one that is unable to suspend its explicit dependence on a visible referent" (DdR xxxiv). Yet the having-been of the referent and its "exteriority" are not mutually exclusive. Derrida writes: "Here, the exteriority of the referent, its being-passed, is not canceled out [*Ici l'extériorité du référent, son être-passé ne s'annule certes pas*]" (DdR xxxv).

It seems everything hinges upon how this "having-been" is understood. According to Derrida, the "having-been" of the referent is never a reference to a presence or an external reality that must have existed at some time, but to the referential relation of the referent that incorporates death, spectrality and temporality.<sup>13</sup> "What adheres in the photograph," Derrida explains, "is perhaps less the referent itself, in the present effectivity of its reality, than the implication in the reference of its having-been-unique [*avoir-été-unique*]" (Psy 295/82, my emphasis). Yet the having-been-unique, the unicity of the "having-been," its "[one time or] 'unique time' [*unique fois*]," is bound up with a temporality of spectral return (*revengeance*, return of the dead) and arrival (*arrivance*, *l'arrivée spectrale*) (Psy 292/77). Derrida writes:

Although it is no longer *there* (present, living, real), its *having-been-there* [*avoir-été-là*] now presently part of the referential or intentional structure of my relationship to the photogramme, the return of the referent indeed takes the form of a haunting. This is a 'return of the dead,' [*un retour du mort*] whose spectral arrival [*l'arrivée spectrale*] in the very space of the photogramme indeed resembles that of an emission or emanation. Already a sort of hallucinating metonymy: it is something else, a piece

[*un morceau*] come from the other (from the referent) that finds itself in me, before me but also in me like a piece of me. (Psy 292/77-78)

If photography structurally assumes the mortality of the photographed, that is, if at the time of the click of the shutter the photographic referent is already riven with loss, absence, or death, then the "having-been" of the referent refers to the having-been of the dead or to phantoms that keep coming back. Every photograph attests to the return of the dead or departed, the spectral return of the other, like the proper name, which despite having already been distanced from its bearer, always comes back to it. In every photograph I am addressed by the other that comes back, keeps coming back, like a ghost. Derrida alludes to this structure of spectral coming back or return [*revenance*], making the two meanings of *revenant* resonate: "The other, returning [*revenant*], addresses himself to me, in me, the other truly returning, truly ghostly [*l'autre revenant vraiment*]" (Psy 301/93).

The temporality of the referential combines the time of a future anteriority and a delay or deferral. According to Barthes, "what I see" may have been there "yet already deferred [*cependant déjà différé*]" (CC 121/77 §32). Thus the having-been-there of the other is always deferred, constituting itself in a delay.<sup>14</sup> In order to be photographable, in order for it to be possible to have technically reproduced images *ad infinitum*, the "now" of what is photographed must already be self-differing and deferring, it must constantly diverge from itself. It can only ever be itself through a detour, by way of the other. The photographic referent is thus never self-identical, but already split from itself, already ghostly. This self-divergence constitutive of any entity is spectrality itself and makes photography possible. From the moment of taking the picture—perhaps, even before—the photographed is a phantom. For there to be photography, the referent must be spectral. So, what the early photographs allude to, with their sepia tones and hazy images (which resemble emissions or emanations),<sup>15</sup> is

not some defect or imperfection in the instrument or the photographic process that could be eliminated with advances in technological techniques, but the ghostliness of what is photographed and photography itself.<sup>16</sup> In fact, there would be no photography without specters.

In every photograph there are specters. What survives or lives on in a photograph, thanks to the photographic process, is the survival of the dead or of ghosts. If, as one of the voices in *Droit de regards* proclaims, "The spectral is the essence of photography [*C'est l'essence de la photographie, le spectral*]," then photography is nothing but taking pictures of ghosts (DdR vi). It is an inscription or a writing, in light and shade, of phantoms (a *phantasmaphotoskiagraphy*). Those who look at photographs, then, are being looked at by ghosts. Derrida writes of such an experience while looking at some of the photographs of Barthes during the preparation of his essay. "I am looking," he confesses, "for something that regards me [*quelque chose qui me regarde*], or has me in view, without seeing me [*sans me voir*]" (Psy 301/92).<sup>17</sup> Mourning and spectrality are nothing else but this relation of being regarded by all "the others outside and inside ourselves [*les autres au-dehors et en soi*]" (Psy 288/70).

## V

Throughout his essay, Derrida approaches the *studium* and the *punctum* as a pair (and not as distinct concepts). Attentive to Barthes' comment that, in general, the photographs he likes are constructed in the manner of a classical sonata, Derrida traces the compositional relationship of, what he devilishly refers to as, S and P.<sup>18</sup> Traditionally, the predicative formula "S is p" designates the attribution of a property to a subject or denotes an object placed under a concept. From very early on, Derrida has submitted the proposition "S is p," which is for Husserl "the fundamental and primitive form, the primordial apophantic operation from which every logical proposition must be deriv-

able by simple construction," to a rigorous examination.<sup>19</sup> Also, whenever the opportunity has presented itself in various texts, he has played with this predicational statement and its terms, S and P, sometimes to hilarious ends.<sup>20</sup>

In "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" Derrida examines "the concepts that seemed the most squarely opposed, or opposable" in Barthes's work, such as Nature and History, but also Studium and Punctum, and shows that they "were put in play by him, the one for the other, in a metonymic composition" (Psy 276/49). What may have been interpreted as the presence of binary oppositions in Barthes' work is, in fact, Derrida contends, his "light way of mobilizing concepts" by setting them off against each other, which "could frustrate a certain logic, while at the same time resisting it with the greatest force, the greatest force of play" (Psy 276/49). According to Derrida, the apparent opposition of the *studium* and the *punctum* instead "facilitates a certain composition between the two concepts" (Psy 279/55). Remaining heterogeneous yet not opposed to each other, they "compose together, the one with the other" (Psy 279/55).

Barthes's analysis consists of first demonstrating the heterogeneity, the "absolute irreducibility of the *punctum*," or what Derrida calls the "unicity of the referential" (Psy 295/82). Derrida explains: "The heterogeneity of the *punctum* is rigorous; its originality can bear neither contamination nor concession. And yet [*Et pourtant*] . . ." (Psy 295/82). And yet, Barthes also comes to recognize that "the *punctum* is not what it is" (Psy 295/83). The singular, unique *punctum* is right from the start a "double punctuation"—there is already introduced in the first mark another possibility (Psy 278/52). Derrida writes of the two different aspects, or the two "exposures," of the *punctum*: "On its minute surface, the same point divides of itself" disorganizing "both the unary [*l'unaire*] and the desire that is ordered in it" (Psy 278/52). The punctuated effect of the *punctum* is brought about in a double movement, when in the same instant and

place—at the same point—the *punctum* aims at me, pricks me and points me [*me point*] as I look at it and point to it. The “point of singularity [*le point de singularité*]” comes toward me by piercing the surface of the reproduction, bruising me as discourse traverses toward the unique, irreplaceable other (Psy 277, 295/51, 82).

Indeed, not only is the *punctum* double, but the *punctum* and the *studium* have a compositional, rhythmic relationship with each other. Thus they are not treated like “essences coming from the outside the text” but as “motifs” that cannot be individually singled out (Psy 281/58). This “simulacrum of an opposition” is considered by Barthes as “neither tautological nor oppositional, neither dialectical nor in any sense symmetrical” but as a “contrapuntal [*contrapuntique*]” composition (Psy 295, 296, 295/82, 84, 83). This contrapuntal relationship may be understood in at least three ways:

1) A supplemental relationship: The *punctum* (p) relates to the *studium* (S) by adding itself to the latter. It “comes to stand in or double for [*qui vient le doubler*]” the *studium* (Psy 281/58). Barthes writes of the *punctum* that “it is an addition [*supplément*]: it is what I add and what is nonetheless already there [*qui cependant y est déjà*]” (CC 89/55 §23, my emphasis).<sup>21</sup> In that case, the supplement cannot be a mere surplus, simply exterior to what it adds to—a pure addition. The addition implies that the *studium* cannot be a plenitude either, since at the same time as p adds itself to S, it partially hollows S out. The *punctum* adds itself only in order to replace. It is not being added to a full presence, nor is it simply exterior to S. The relation of the *punctum* to the *studium*, then, is of an other order—it is supplementary. Belonging without belonging to the *studium*, the *punctum* cannot be located within it. As he looks at a photograph, Barthes adds or *invents*, in the supplementary addition of a detail, the *punctum* (his *punctum*), which has been lying in wait all along for him to *discover* it.

2) A rhythmic relationship: The *punctum*, “this absolute other composes with the same, with its absolute other that is not its opposite, with the locus of the same and of the *studium*” (Psy 295–96/83). In composing with it, in giving rhythm to the *studium*, the *punctum* “scans” it (Psy 280/57). Composition, then, is this rhythmic relation between the *punctum* and the *studium* in the photograph (the *punctum* pierces through the fabric of the photograph but allows itself to be reappropriated), and all photographs bear the signs of a constant negotiation or rhythmic relation between what is irredeemably other, outside, and the process of technological reproduction, which seeks to interiorize it. Every photograph is thus a constant attempt at capturing the other by luring it into the picture, a relentless pointing to what is singularly other within a graphics of light and shade.

3) A relationship of haunting: The *punctum* inhabits the *studium* in such a manner that the haunting of the two elements prevents us from clearly distinguishing two distinct places, contents, or things from one another. In this way, neither the *punctum* nor the *studium* could be “entirely subjugated to a concept,” since a concept usually signifies “a predicative determination that is distinct and opposable” (Psy 280/56). Not a concept, but “the ghost of a concept,” not a clearly demarcated, self-sufficient concept or entity, but one inhabited by another (Psy 280/56). This relation of haunting suggests a “quasi-concept” of the ghost; “quasi-” because the “quasi-concept” of the ghost, barely understandable or graspable as such, could hardly be considered a “concept,” as this term has been traditionally understood. Thus it is necessary to designate the relationship of the *punctum* to the *studium* in another way. Derrida writes, “Ghosts [*Fantômes*]: the concept of the other in the same, the *punctum* in the *studium*, the completely other, dead, living in me” (Psy 280/56). The quasi-concept of the ghost is also what permits Derrida to discuss the relationship of another pair of motifs, separated by a slash, evoked by glancing at Barthes’ photographs: life/death.

VI

Early on in his essay, Derrida writes of the Winter Garden photograph and Barthes’ relation to his mother, “there should not be [*il ne devrait pas*], there should not be [*il devrait ne pas*], any metonymy in this case, for love protests against it” (Psy 286/67). The relationship between Barthes and his mother ought to remain unique, for it is without *his* mother that Barthes can not live, and not without *the* Mother. Yet the singular *punctum* lends itself to metonymy, allowing it to be “drawn into a network of substitutions” (Psy 296/83). “Scandalous” though it may sound, metonymy does not efface the singularity of the *punctum*, but actually allows us to speak of the unique (Psy 296/84). If the *punctum* were a mere “one-off,” occurring only one discrete time, we would not be so deeply moved by what Barthes writes of his mother. Nor would we be able to offer his writings up to any analysis or sustain a discourse of “a certain generality” about it.

Thus there must be “a metonymic force [*une force métonymique*]” at work that is “induced [*induit*]” by the *punctum* itself (Psy 296/83). It is the *punctum* that induces metonymy, Derrida notes, “and this is its *force*, or rather than its force (since it exercises no actual constraint and exists completely in reserve), its *dynamis*, in other words, its power, its potentiality, virtuality [*virtualité*], and even its dissimulation, its latency” (Psy 296/83). In *La chambre claire*, Barthes observes the force of the *punctum* and its potential “power of expansion [*force d’expansion*]” (CC 74/45 §19). Derrida relates this “metonymic force” or power [*puissance métonymique*] to the supplementary structure of the *punctum* and to the *studium* “that receives from it all its movement” (Psy 296/84). Since the *punctum* is “more or less than itself, disymmetrical—to everything and in itself—then it can invade the field of the *studium* to which, strictly speaking, it does not belong” (Psy 296/83). Contami-

nating “the field” of the *studium*, Derrida comments, “the punctual supplement parasites the haunted space of the *studium*,” pluralizing itself (Psy 280/57).

This pluralization occurs because the metonymic force “divides the referential trait, suspends the referent and leaves it to be desired, while still maintaining the reference” (Psy 299/90). In photography, the referential trait is split by a metonymic force, which prevents the trait from ever being uniquely itself, but also constitutes it in this process of self-detachment and splitting. This division (or spectrality, we may say) is what allows for the possibility of repetition and technical reproduction. Thus the “unique death” and “the instantaneous [*l’instantané*]” are always susceptible to metonymy.<sup>22</sup>

This metonymic force, or this force of pluralization, also allows one death to be substituted for all the others, “one part for the whole or one name for another” (Psy 297/85). The whole is inserted into a part, which thus becomes larger than the whole. Hence each photograph, even the Winter Garden photograph, can be inserted into another photograph. This relationship of haunting, where each photograph photographs the other, pertains not only to the *studium* and the *punctum*, but applies to every conceptual opposition. In this way, the part that is smaller and more particular encapsulates the concept that it is subjugated to. It is thus impossible to arrest the metonymic substitution, this “phantasmimatism [*phantasmimétique*]” without limit, the invagination of an invagination, a photograph in a photograph (DdR xxxii).

## VII

“Torn between two languages, one expressive, the other critical,” between Proust and Michelet, between the Novel and History, Barthes’ book on photography eschews any encyclopedic pretensions (CC 20/8 §3). A “note”—a sign, an annotation, a (musical) remark—on photography, expressed in concise, staccato fashion, Barthes’ *La chambre claire*

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will remain dissatisfactory for those who expect a commentary analyzing and dissecting the medium of photography, for the same reason that Michelet was considered by many to be a bad historian—because he wrote.<sup>21</sup> Yet, Barthes' book, a chamber of light lit by "the radiant invisibility of a look [un regard]," (Psy 275/48) takes as its inspiration, not the desire to comprehensively say all that can be said about photography, but a desire to bear witness to the "bright shadow" cast by his mother's gaze (CC 169/110 §45).

By Barthes' own admission, all of his work supposes "a mobile, plural reader," a reader who, as he writes in *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, "begins to write with me."<sup>22</sup> In "The Deaths of Roland Barthes" Derrida begins to do just that. His elegiac reading of Barthes, following Barthes' own inimitable manner of reading, also "displays, plays with, and interprets the pair *studium/punctum*, all the while explaining what he is doing by giving us his notes" (Psy 279/54). Negotiating between S and p, between a studied discourse and minute attention to detail, neither entirely imposing its

own words over that of the other nor totally giving itself over to the voice of the other, Derrida's own "metonymic composition [composition métonymique]" adds to what is nevertheless already there (Psy 276/49).

Derrida's own essay could be described with the very same words he uses to explain Barthes' "manner [manière]" of proceeding. Derrida writes of Barthes:

This manner is unmistakably his. He makes the opposition *punctum/studium*, along with the apparent versus of the slash, appear slowly and cautiously in a new context, without which, it seems, they would have no chance of appearing. He gives to them or he welcomes this chance. The interpretation . . . imposes its necessity without concealing the artifact under some putative nature. It demonstrates its rigor throughout the book, and this rigor becomes indistinguishable from its productivity, from its performative fecundity. He makes it yield [lui fait rendre] the greatest amount of meaning, of descriptive or analytic power (phenomenological, structural, and beyond)." (Psy 279/54)<sup>23</sup>

#### ENDNOTES

1. The term "phantasmaphotograph" comes from Jacques Derrida's essay "Lecture de *Droit de regards*" in Marie-Françoise Plissart, *Droit de regards*, (Paris: Minuit, 1985), p. xxxii. *The Right of Inspection*, trans. David Wills. (New York: Monacelli Press, 1998), unpaginated. All further references to this text shall be cited as DdR followed by the pagination of the French text. Translations have been occasionally slightly modified.
2. Jacques Derrida, "Les morts de Roland Barthes," *Psyché* (Paris: Galilée, 1987). Originally published in *Poétique* 47 (September 1981): 269–92. "The Deaths of Roland Barthes," trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, in *The Work of Mourning*, ed. by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2001). (All citations of the English translation refer to the manuscript pagination). This a revised translation which was originally published in *Continental Philosophy*

*I: Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Merleau-Ponty*, ed. by Hugh J. Silverman, (New York: Routledge, 1988): 259–97. All further references shall be cited in the body of the text as Psy followed by the French and English pagination respectively. For discussions of Derrida's essay on Barthes, see Bernard Stiegler, "Mémoires gauches," *Revue philosophique de la France et l'Étranger* no.2 (April-June 1990): 361–94; Rudy Steinmetz, "Deuil et photographie" in *Les styles de Jacques Derrida* (Brussels: De Boeck, 1994), pp. 173–93; Jean-Michel Rabaté, "Barthes as Ghostwriter," in *The Ghosts of Modernity* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996); Marian Hobson, *Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines* (New York: Routledge, 1998); and Laurent Milesi, "Between Barthes, Blanchot, and Mallarmé: Skia(Phot)-Graphies of Derrida," in *The French Connections of Jacques Derrida*, ed. by

Julian Wolfreys, John Brannigan, and Ruth Robbins (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), pp. 175–209.

3. See Derrida's comments on why the translation of "la chambre claire" as "camera lucida," accurate though it is as a translation for the apparatus known as *camera lucida*, is somehow insufficient: "La chambre claire, the light room, no doubt says more than *camera lucida*, the name of the apparatus anterior to photography that Barthes opposes to *camera obscura*" (Psy 286/66). According to Helmut Gernsheim in *The Origins of Photography*, (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1982), the term *camera lucida* was used mainly to refer to an apparatus or instrument. In 1668, Robert Hooke was the first to describe the 'camera lucida' as "a contrivance to make the picture of anything appear on a wall, cupboard, or within a picture-frame, etc., in the midst of a light room in the daytime, or in the night time in any room which is enlightened with a considerable number of candles" (15). Hooke's contrivance or arrangement was unrelated to the *camera obscura*. Nor did it have a connection to William Hyde Wollaston's *camera lucida*, introduced in 1807, which was a small optical instrument for drawing in broad daylight (19).
4. Cf. Roland Barthes, *La chambre claire. Note sur la photographie* (Paris: Seuil, 1980), p. 172; *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Noonday Press, 1981), p. 111, §46. All other references are given in the body of my essay and abbreviated as CC followed by page numbers of the French and English editions respectively, and the section number.
5. After all Barthes was the author of a text entitled *Système de la mode (The Fashion System)*.
6. Derrida is of course referring to Walter Benjamin's "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit [The Work of Art in the Time of its Technical Reproducibility]," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 1/2 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980). Translated as "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," trans. Harry Zohn, in *Illuminations*, ed. by Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969). In "The Deaths of Roland Barthes," commenting on the fact that that both Barthes and Benjamin shared an interest in details, Derrida notes: "Benjamin saw in the enlargement of the fragment or minute signifier a point of intersection between the era of psychoanalysis and that of technical reproduction, in cinematography, photography, etc." (Psy, p. 277/51). In "Lecture de *Droit de regards*," Derrida reiterates that "the invention of photography and the advent [l'avènement] of psychoanalysis *concur [conviennent]*" (xxiii). He adds that these "two religions or two cultures of 'detail'" fully understand the power of magnifying details (p. xxiii). For a brilliant account of Benjamin's writings on photography, see Eduardo Cadava, *Words of Light: The- ses on the Photography of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
7. See Barthes' brief remarks on suspension in *Le bruissement de la langue* (Paris: Seuil, 1984); "The Image," *The Rustle of Language* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986). Referring to the *epoche* in terms of a "suspension of judgment," Barthes adds that "suspension is not negation" (p. 395/356).
8. Cf. Psy, p. 295/82. See also the reference to the "irreducible referential [irréductible référentielle]" (Psy, p. 299/90).
9. In *Droit de regards* Derrida emphasizes that photography does not suspend reference to "reality as such," but only to a certain type of reality. In doing so, it opens a relationship to the wholly other:  
  
But, as soon as [mais, dès lors que] the referent itself consists of enframed photogrammes [photogrammes encadrés], the index of the wholly other [l'indice d'autrui], how marked it may be [si marqué qu'il soit], endless defers reference [n'en renvoie pas moins la référence à l'infini]. . . . It does not suspend reference, it indefinitely defers [il éloigne indéfiniment] a certain type of reality, that of the perceptible referent. It gives the prerogative to the other [il donne droit à l'autre], opens the infinite uncertainty of the relation to the wholly other, this relation without relation [ce rapport sans rapport]. (DdR xxxv)
10. "The name alone makes possible the plurality of deaths" (Psy, p. 285/65).
11. In his autobiography *Quand j'étais photographe* (Paris: Editions d'aujourd'hui, 1979), the famous photographer Nadar [real name: Gaspard Félix Tournachon] discusses Balzac's belief that photography led to a constant loss of spectral layers by all physical bodies. Every time someone's photograph is taken, a spectral layer is removed from the body and transferred to the photograph. Nadar writes: "Donc, selon Balzac, chaque corps dans la nature se trouve composé de séries de spectres, en couches

superposées à l'infini, foliacées en pellicules infinitésimales. . . . Chaque opération Daguerrienne venait donc surprendre, détachait et retenait en se l'appliquant une des couches du corps objecté. De là pour ledit corps, et à chaque opération renouvelée, perte évidente d'un des ses spectres, c'est-à-dire d'une part de son essence constitutive" (p. 6). A portion of Nadar's autobiography has been translated as "My Life as a Photographer," trans. Thomas Repensek, *October 5* (Summer 1978): 7-28. Susan Sontag, in *On Photography* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1978), refers to Balzac's views on photography (pp. 158-59). (My thanks to Jean-Christophe Ferrari for this reference.) Barthes mentions Sontag's text without discussing Balzac explicitly (CC, p. 126/80-81 §34). It is not clear whether Nadar had based his views on a particular text of Balzac, but a possible source may be *Le Cousin Pons* (written in 1848) in Honoré de Balzac, *La Comédie humaine* vol. VI, Ed. Marcel Bouteron, (Paris: Gallimard, 1965); *Cousin Pons*, trans. Herbert J. Hunt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968): "Si quelqu'un fût venu dire à Napoléon qu'un édifice et qu'un homme sont incessamment et à toute heure représentés par une image dans l'atmosphère, que tous les objets y ont un spectre saisissable, il aurait logé cet homme à Charenton. . . . Et c'est là cependant ce que Daguerre a prouvé par sa découverte" (p. 625). "If any one had come and told Napoleon that a man or a building is incessantly and continuously represented by a picture in the atmosphere, that all existing objects project into it kind of specter which can be captured and perceived, he would have consigned him to Charenton [as a lunatic]. . . . And yet that is what Daguerre's discovery proved!" (p. 131). Also: "Ainsi, de même que les corps se projettent réellement dans l'atmosphère en y laissant subsister ce spectre saisi par le daguérotype qui l'arrête au passage; de même, les idées, créations réelles et agissantes, s'impriment dans ce qu'il faut nommer l'atmosphère du monde spirituel, y produisant des effets, y vivent spectralement (car il est nécessaire de forger des mots pour exprimer des phénomènes innommés), et dès lors certaines créatures douées de facultés rares peuvent parfaitement apercevoir ces formes ou ces traces d'idées" (p. 626). "Just as physical objects do in fact project themselves on to the atmosphere so that it retains the 'spectre' which the daguereotype can fix

and capture, in the same way ideas, which are real and active creations, imprint themselves on what we must call the 'atmosphere' of the spiritual world, produce effects in it *spectrally* (one must coin words in order to express unnamed phenomena); if that be granted, certain creatures endowed with rare faculties are perfectly capable of discerning those forms or traces of ideas" (p. 133).

12. Balzac's view is obviously reminiscent of the Empedoclean and Democritean belief that all objects continually emitted *eidola* that were exact replicas of them. An *eidolon* was distinguished from an *eikon*, an image, which was produced in the eyes by *eidola*. For Empedocles, see Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zurich/Berlin: Weidemannsche Verlag, 1952), DK 31B109a, in particular, and DK 31 A90. No complete translation of Diels-Kranz is available in English, however Jean Bollack's *Empédocle*, t.2. *Les origines. Edition et traduction des fragments et témoignages* (Paris: Minuit, 1969) provides a translation of all the fragments and testimonia. Bollack's exhaustive commentaries make up the two-part companion *Empédocle*, t.3. *Les origines. Commentaire 1 et 2* (Paris: Minuit, 1969). For Democritus, see DK 68A 77, 68A 135, and 67 A29, translated in C. C. W. Taylor, ed., *The Atomists: Leucippus and Democritus. Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary* by C. C. W. Taylor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999). See also Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Figures, idoles, masques*, (Paris: Julliard, 1990), pp. 36-37. Barthes' reference to "emanations" perhaps alludes to the dedicatee of *La chambre claire*, Jean-Paul Sartre and to his *L'imaginaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940); see, e.g., p. 53.
13. "By the time—at the instant—that the *punctum* renders space, the reference and death are in it together in the photograph" (Psy, p. 292/76).
14. For the relation between a time of lag and delay [*retard*] and photography, see Jacques Derrida, "Demeure, Athènes," in Jean-François Bonhomme's book of photographs, *Athènes: à l'ombre de l'Acropole* (Athens: Olkos, 1996).
15. Precision is necessary here: the referent, as has been already described, is not an *already existing entity* that emits *eidola*. The spectrality of the photographic referent *resembles* that of emanations or emissions.

16. For an account of the relation between photography and the production of ghostly images, see Tom Gunning, "Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, Magic Theater, Trick Films, and Photography's Uncanny," in *Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video*, ed. by Patrice Petro (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 42-71. That photography was associated with Spiritualism from its inception has to do more with its *spectral potential* than any lack of sophistication in the technological capacity of the early instruments.
17. See CC, p. 172/111 §46 for the distinction between looking and seeing.
18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49/27 §10.
19. See *La voix et le phénomène* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), p. 82; *Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 73. Also Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, ed. by Paul Janssen, *Husserliana*, vol.17 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). In Chapter 1, §13 Husserl begins by studying logic from the Aristotelian perspective, i.e., Analytics, which treats predicative judgments or assertions. Thus "apophantic analytics" (from *apophansis* meaning assertion) studies judgments in the propositional form. The determining judgment "S is p" (where S denotes a substrate and p a determination) is the "primitive form" from which other "particularizations and modifications" are derived (p. 45/51). In her commentary *La logique de Husserl: Etude sur Logique formelle et transcendentale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1957); A

*Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic*, trans. Lester E. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Suzanne Bachelard emphasizes that "there is only one truly fundamental form of judgment" from which other forms can be engendered by derivation, and that is "S is p" (p. 63/11).

20. See for example another text, also published in 1980, "Envois" in *La Carte postale*, (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), where Derrida plays with: Socrates-Plato, pS, Sp, S/p, S and [e] p, S hates [hair] p, I speculate, the primal scene, *Psy* chology-Philosophie and many other similar formulations. For a more recent occasion, see "Sauver les phénomènes—pour Salvatore Puglia," *Contretemps 1* (Winter 1995): 14-25, where Skia-Photographia, *psykhe* or *soma*, and, of course, Salvatore Puglia are put into play.
21. Also cited by Derrida (Psy, p. 280/55).
22. See for example: "If the photograph bespeaks the unique death, the death of the unique, this death immediately repeats itself, as such, and is itself elsewhere" (Psy, p. 296/83). Also elsewhere: "The instantaneous or instamatic in photography, the snapshot [*L'instantané photographique*], would be but the most striking metonymy [*la métonymie la plus saisissante*] within the modern technological age of an older instamaticity" (*ibid.*, p. 299/89).
23. See Roland Barthes, *Le bruissement de la langue* (Paris: Seuil, 1984), p. 228; *The Rustle of Language* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), p. 198.
24. Roland Barthes, *Roland Barthes par Roland Barthes* (Paris: Seuil, 1975), p. 143; *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Noonday Press, 1977), p. 161.
25. I would like to thank Pleshette DeArmitt and Michael Naas for reading, and commenting on, early drafts of this essay.

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