The World after the End of the World

Kas Saghafi

For Pleshette

‘The world’ is gone.¹

There is no world when you’re gone. The moment that I’m obligated, as soon as I am obligated to you—and it is your death that obligates me, makes me obligated, responsible for you and to you—no world can be there. There is no ground—or a third—between us. No world can support us or serve as mediation for us. I am all alone.

‘The world has gone, already, the world has left us, the world is no more, the world is far off, the world is lost, the world is lost from sight, the world is out of sight . . . the world has departed, the world has died’.² On the occasion of the other’s death, each time, it is the end of the world. Upon the other’s death, the world has departed. Farewell to the world, for the world has died.

In the last few years of his life, Derrida on a number of occasions wrote about and commented on Paul Celan’s poem ‘Grosse, Glühende Wölbung’ from Atemwende, which ends with the line ‘Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dich tragen’.³ ‘This poem’, Derrida writes in Rams, ‘says the world, the origin and the history of the world, the archeology and eschatology of the concept, the very conception of the world: how the world was conceived, how it is born and straightaway is no longer, how it goes away [s’éloigne] and leaves us, how its end is announced’ (B, 77/162). Derrida’s writings on Celan’s poem bear on a host of important motifs, motifs such as world (including the
phenomenological concept of the world), death, the death of the other, survival, melancholy, mourning, solitude, and resurrection. What can be learned from these writings can be summarised all too quickly as follows: There is no such thing as the One universal world that is shared by all; the world is not that within which all beings live or what they inhabit, the intersubjective accomplishment of a transcendental ego or the horizon against which everything is supposed to occur; death marks every time the absolute end of the world; the death of the other entails the disappearance of the world, marking, every time, each time singularly, the absolute end of the one and only world, the end of the world. To state this boldly: for Derrida, whatever we are to understand by ‘world’ is determined out of, determined from, determined by ‘death’—the death of the other. Derrida’s writings force us to think the notion of ‘world’ starting from, out of, or on behalf of, the other. In other words, we are forced to rethink the very thought of the world on the basis of, setting out from, ‘ich muss dich tragen’.4

Moreover, in his various remarks on Celan’s poem, Derrida reformulates what may advisedly be called the ‘mortal’ condition as ‘carrying the other in me’. In his meditations on the verb tragen, particularly in Celan and in Heidegger, and on porter, to carry, to bear, to wear, Derrida places a great emphasis on the experience of carrying the other in oneself. At both ends of life’s spectrum, at birth and at death, I carry or bear the other in myself. For the mother, in the experience of carrying a child before birth, Die Welt is fort, the world disappears—it is far away. For the one who mourns and endures the melancholy of a loss, what is left is to carry or bear the other. That is the survivor’s condition: to live with the melancholy of the end of the world.

In speaking about the end of the world, I am following a path, which may by now be considered well-trodden, a trail already expertly blazed by the remarkable analyses of Michael Naas, Rodolphe Gasché, Ginette Michaud, Geoffrey Bennington, J. Hillis Miller, and Peggy Kamuf, each of whom has, in his or her own way, helped us better understand Derrida’s very curious formulation ‘the end of the world’.5

From the first encounter between us there is melancholy, the melancholy that one day death will separate us. We know, we are aware, that one of us will have to go before the other, leaving the other alone. But mourning does not wait for death, its implacable
temporality of the future anterior dictates that one of us will have been ‘dedicated [voué]’ (B, 22) to carry the other, to carry ‘the world after the end of the world’ (B, 23/140).

For, as Derrida writes in *Rams*, death is not, as we customarily think, the end of a world, ‘the end of someone or something in the world’, the end of one world among others but the absolute end of the one and only world. Each time, each time singularly, death is nothing other than the end of the world (B, 23/140). Death marks, each and every time, the end of the one and only world, the very world that ‘each one [chacun] opens as the origin of the world’ (B, 23/140).

The world is gone. It is no more. The world died; it ended. But what was the world? Has there ever been such a thing as the world? Which world?

References to ‘earth and sky (ouranos)’ in Archaic Greece, ‘the order of all things’ (kosmos) in Homer, ‘the totality of all that is (holon, panta, ta panta)’ in Hesiod and Heraclitus, and the use of all three terms holon, ouranos, kosmos in Plato, determined the conception of what later became known as ‘the world’ (mundus). With the advent of Christianity, the world came to be viewed as the terrestrial ‘globe’, designating the world of human beings or living beings, or regarded as synonymous with the entire ‘universe’ (universum). Leibniz went as far as claiming that there are many worlds. Colloquially, the English word ‘world’ can refer to a milieu, for example as in Tolkien’s ‘world’ or Monet’s ‘world’, while philosophically speaking, the concept of ‘the world’ has its own history or genealogy from Kant and Schopenhauer to the phenomenology of Husserl, Fink, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre. As does the thought of the end of the world, which aside from its apocalyptic connotations plays a very significant role in the writings of many contemporary thinkers, for example Levinas, and Blanchot.

What is the world? The world ‘has at least as a minimal sense the designation of that within which [ce dans quoi]’ all living beings are born, live, inhabit and die (BS II, 365/264). It is said that all living beings inhabit a common world—the same world—the world that they cohabit as inhabitants, for whom it serves as the common horizon. The world is also considered to be ‘an order of ends, a juridical, moral, political order, an international order’. (BS II 359/260) Yet, for Derrida, this is a presumed, anticipated unity, a supposed unity or
identity that ‘one can always question’. (BS II, 366/265) As he writes in the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign: ‘No one will ever be able to demonstrate, what is called demonstrate in all rigor, that two human beings, you and I for example, inhabit the same world, that the world is one and the same thing for both of us’. (BS II, 366/265) He goes on to state that ‘there is not the world [il n’y a pas le monde], that nothing is less certain than the world itself, that there is perhaps no longer a world and no doubt there never was one as totality of anything at all [totalité de quoi que ce soit]’. (BS II, 366/266) He reiterates this a little further by saying that ‘there is no world. Not yet and perhaps not since ever [depuis toujours] and perhaps not ever’. (BS II, 367/266) For, what has been called the world is nothing but an ‘arbitrary, conventional and artificial, historical, non-natural contract,’ an ‘agreement inherited over millennia between living beings’. (BS II, 368/267) According to Derrida, there is such an ‘uncrossable difference’ between us that it has been necessary for the sake of survival to make as if, to go along with a ruse (BS II, 368/267) to give the same meaning to similar vocables or signs, to pretend ‘as if we were inhabiting the same world’. (BS II, 369/268)

Having briefly established Derrida’s views on the world, one path to take would be to pursue the philosophical notion of the world in order to show how Derrida’s differs from its phenomenological predecessors (for whom the world forms the horizon). But perhaps a more interesting approach would be to explore the deconstruction of the world through a discussion of the end of the world. In retrospect, we can say that this is exactly what was taking place in Derrida’s last seminar The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. II (2002–3), devoted in part to Heidegger’s 1929/1930 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, that is, the meticulous but utter reformulation, revaluation, in other words, deconstruction of each of the terms of its subtitle: world, finitude, solitude. There, through a silent reading of the last line of Celan’s poem, each of the three terms of Heidegger’s lecture course is thoroughly worked over and re-interpreted by Derrida.

The world is gone. The world is no more and the survivor remains alone. The survivor remains ‘before [en-deça] and beyond the world’ of the other—before the world itself. (B, 23/140) On this side, below, and ‘before’ the world because with the other’s death there is no world, the world is gone and ‘beyond’ because [the survivor is] far removed from
the world that is gone. The survivor is, as it were, ‘in the world outside the world [dans le monde hors du monde]’. (B, 23/140) Alone, deprived of the world, ‘he feels solely responsible, assigned to carry the other and his world’ (B, 23/140). He is responsible ‘without world (weltlos), without the ground of any world [sans le sol d’aucun monde], thus in a world without world’. (B, 23/140)

In Rams, a talk delivered on February 5, 2003 and published in the same year, while honoring Hans-Georg Gadamer and declaring his admiration for him, Derrida turns to a discussion of Celan’s poem, in particular its last line Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dich tragen. Not because, like Gadamer, who believes that the last line ‘bears the stress of the poem,’ Derrida is following a ‘hermeneutic principle,’ but because this line, separated, solitary, all alone, allows him to speculate on the import of Celan’s words. (B, 30/142)

On a first reading there seems to be a radical heterogeneity between the two clauses of the last line of the poem. What demonstrable link can there be between them? Michael Naas (233) and Ginette Michaud have both emphasised the chiasmatic structure of the last line, Celan’s double proposition that contains a constative (it’s the end of the world) and a performative (a commitment, a promise, an oath, a duty, an ‘inflexible injunction’: I must carry you). But if it is end of the world, why must I still carry you? ‘When the world is no more (n’est plus), when it has gone far away [au loin parti] (fort), then I must carry you, you all alone [toi tout seul], you alone in me or on me alone [tout seul en moi ou sur moi seul]’. (B, 68/158) If one were to invert the order, the sequence of the two parts of the last line of Celan’s poem, in other words, ‘if one were to invert the consequence of if, then [si, alors]: if (where) [si (là où)] there is a necessity or duty toward you, if (where) I must [doit], myself, carry you, bear you [te porter], yourself [toi], well, then,’ Derrida notes, ‘the world tends to disappear [tend à disparaître]’. (B, 68/158) What is called the world tends to disappear when I become responsible, when I am responsible.

It is the other’s death that immediately obligates me. ‘As soon as I am obliged, from the instant when I am obliged to you, when I owe, when I owe it to you, owe it to myself to carry you, as soon as I speak to you and am responsible to you, or before [devant] you, there can no longer, essentially, be any world [aucun monde, pour l’essentiel, ne peut plus être là]. No world can support us, serve as mediation, as ground,
as earth, as foundation or as alibi’. For, there is ‘no longer anything but the abyssal altitude of a sky’. (B, 68/158)

Where there’s no longer any world, I am alone. ‘I am alone with you […] we are alone’—and this is a declaration as well as an engagement. (B, 69/158) Where there’s no world and I’m alone, ‘I am alone in the world as soon as I owe myself to you [je me dois à toi], as soon as you depend on me, as soon as I bear, and must assume’ without the mediation of a go-between, without ground, ‘the responsibility for which I must answer in front of you for you’. (B, 68–9/158) According to Derrida, all the protagonists and the reader of Celan’s poem, ‘hear themselves called [s’entendent appeler]’ [...] ‘as soon as the poem is entrusted to our care and as soon as we must carry it.’ To bear this poem is ‘to give it to the other to bear [donner à porter]’. (B, 69/158–9)

In the tenth session of the second volume of The Beast and the Sovereign Derrida asks ‘What does porter, [to carry, to bear, tragen] mean’? (BS II, 357/258) (Later in the seminar, he pays attention to the lexicon of tragen in Heidegger—Übertragung, Auftrag, and Austrag—in Identity and Difference and the relationship between tragen and Walten.) Derrida devotes an analysis to the term tragen in Celan’s poem in the fifth section of Rams, where he develops a remarkable description of an experience—the experience of carrying the other in the self—in which I must prevails over I am. Before I am, I carry. Before being, I carry.6

In spoken German, tragen refers to the experience of carrying a child prior to its birth. Derrida glosses this further as he puts a twist on Levinas’s notion of ‘the other in me’: ‘Between the mother and the child, the one in the other and the one for the other, in this singular couple of solitary beings, in the shared solitude between one and two bodies, the world disappears’ (B, 72/159). The world is far away for the mother who carries the child. As well as speaking the language of birth, tragen can also be addressed to the dead, to the survivor or to their specter in the same experience of carrying the other in the self. I keep the other in me in mourning, something that I was already doing while the other was still living. According to Derrida, ‘I welcome in me, I take into myself this end of the world, I must carry the other and the other’s world, the world in me: introjection, interiorisation of memory (Erinnerung), idealisation’ (B, 74/160). ‘But if I must (and this is ethics itself) carry the other in myself in order to be faithful to that other,
to respect its singular alterity, a certain melancholia must still protest against normal mourning’ (B, 74/160, trans. mod.). Melancholia is necessary so that I do not keep the other within myself, as myself.

The world is gone; it is in retreat. In *Rams* Derrida addresses the Husserlian-inspired thought of the annihilation of the world (*Weltvernichtung*), referring to this ‘retreat [retrait]’ of the world to ‘the point of the possibility of its annihilation’ as ‘the most insane experience of a transcendental phenomenology’ (B, 74/160). In §49 of *Ideas I* Husserl explains that ‘access to the absolute egological consciousness’ necessitates the suspension of the existence of the transcendent world in a radical *epokhē* (B, 75/161). The hypothesis of the annihilation of the world does not only threaten the sphere of pure egological experience but also opens access to this sphere. According to Derrida, Celan’s poem ‘pushes to its limit the experience of the possible annihilation of the world’, that is, ‘its sense for “me”, for a pure ego’ (B, 75/161). But in this solitude of the pure ego, the alter ego that is ‘constituted in the ego is no longer accessible in an originary intuition’. The alter ego can be constituted ‘only by analogy, by appresentation, indirectly, inside of me, who then carries it there where there is no longer a transcendent world’ (B, 76/161). ‘I must then carry it, carry you, there were the world gives way [se dérobe]’ (B, 76/161). This is my responsibility; but I can only carry you without appropriating you to myself. This carrying can no longer mean to include or comprehend the other in oneself; [but rather,] ‘to bear oneself toward [se porter vers] the infinite inappropriability of the other,’ ‘in me outside of me’ (B, 76/161). I can only be ‘starting from this strange, dislocated bearing [portée disloquée] of the infinitely other in me’ (B, 76/161).

Highlighting the plurivocity of the *dich* in the last line of Celan’s poem, Derrida writes that ‘I must carry the other, and carry you, the other must carry me’, ‘even there where the world is no longer between us or beneath’ us (B, 76/161). My solitude is such that ‘I am alone with the other . . . without world’ ‘wherever the “I must” . . . forever prevails over the “I am”’ (B, 76/161).

A few months after giving the talk on Gadamer, in the Foreword to *Chaque fois unique, la fin du monde* (published in October 2003). Derrida claims: ‘the death of the other, not only but especially if one loves the other [surtout si on l’aime]’, does not simply declare the ‘absence,’ the ‘disappearance [disparition], the end of this or that life’, in other
words ‘the possibility for a world (always unique) to appear to a given living being’ (CFU, 9, first emphasis mine). Rather, ‘death declares each time the end of the world entirely [en totalité], the end of every possible world, and each time the end of the world as a unique, and thus singular, and thus infinite, totality’ (CFU, 9).

The death of the other is ‘as if the repetition of the end of an infinite whole [d’un tout infini] were still possible: the end of the world itself, the only world there is, every time. Singularly, irreversibly’. (CFU, 9) It is as if this end of the world were possible ‘for the other and in a strange way also for the provisional survivor who endures its impossible experience’ (CFU, 9). It is as if every time the repetition of the death of another—the end of the world itself, the only world there is—were possible. What is referred to as an ‘impossible experience’ is this aporetic experience of the repetition of the end of the world (each time the end and then its repetition).

As Rodolphe Gasché observes, ‘to repeat the unique disappearance of the one and only world after the death of an other also means that in every singular case in which a death occurs, and one world (which is also the world itself) disappears, there is no more return of the world itself.’ And this is how Derrida defines ‘the world’, showing that its meaning is entirely derived from death: ‘That is what “the world” would mean. This meaning is conferred on it only by what is called “death”.’ (CFU, 9) The other does not come back. There is no more return of the world. The death of a singular other confronts the survivor with ‘the always open possibility, indeed the necessity of a possible non-return’, the necessity that non-return be possible. This ‘necessity of the possibility of non-return’, this end of the world, signals the end of all resurrection (CFU, 11, my emphasis).  

Commenting on Nancy’s notion of resurrection, what Derrida finds troubling is that ‘anastasis postulates both the existence of some God and that the end of the world will not be the end of the world’. (CFU, 11) As Derrida explains,

‘God’ means: death can put an end to a world, it would not be the end of the world. A world, one world can always survive another. There is more than one world. More than one possible world [or: more than one world possible—un monde possible]. That is what we would wish to believe, as little as we believe or believe to believe in ‘God.’
However, ‘death, death itself, if there is such a thing’, acts as a counter-measure against this thought of God, insofar as it leaves no room [*aucune place*], not the least chance [*pas la moindre chance*], for the replacement or for the survival of the sole and unique world, of the ‘sole and unique’ that makes of each living being (animal, human, or divine), a sole and unique living being. (CFU, 11)

That the other does not come back spells the end of all resurrection.

After Derrida’s writings on the end of the world we can no longer accept the definition of the world as the totality of what there is. The world cannot be thought of as an all-encompassing, universal totality to be grasped synoptically or viewed from a satellite as a globe. Rather, the world is that which is uniquely opened up by the other, the totality of what is for a unique ‘being’ that being’s world, and what comes to an end upon the other’s death.

The discussion of ‘the end of the world’ can be linked to one of the terms or tropes appearing regularly in Derrida’s later seminars—the abyss. The effect of the reading of the end of the world presented above, beyond its significance on death, the other, mourning, melancholy, world, solitude, resurrection, and so on, could be explored on Derrida’s almost contemporaneous reading of the notion of *Grund* (ground, principle, axiom, etc.) in Heidegger, a reading that Derrida takes up over a number of his seminars, for example the *Death Penalty Seminar* and *The Beast and the Sovereign*. Why would such a reading be important? Being for Heidegger is ground, a point that he underscores on a number of occasions. As he writes in ‘The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking’: ‘Since the beginning of philosophy and with that beginning, the Being of beings [*das Sein des Seiendes*] has showed itself as the ground (*archê, aition, principle*), has been considered as ground. The ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, perishing, and persisting.’ Being is the ultimate ground. *Grund* may be *archê*, beginning or first principle, but it is certainly not the cause. Thus, for Heidegger, Being as *Grund* is not being as *ratio* but a ground without ground. The ground is an *Ab-grund*, an abyss; however, with this *Ab-grund*, Derrida suggests, Heidegger is still positing some form of ground—an originary ground (*Urgrund*) that is also a non-ground (*Ungrund*) underlying
everything. The abyss, then, still seems to belong to some primordial Urgrund.\footnote{1}

In contrast, for Derrida, a consideration of ground is not an ontological matter. Each and every other constitutes a ground, rests on a ground. Consequently, with the death of every other, a world goes away; the ground gives way and is lost. The death of every other signals an absence of bottom, ground, or foundation. With the other’s death, there is no ground—an abyss gapes open. The other’s death leaves the survivor with the abyss of without world. Since there is no such thing as the abyss, as Derrida tells us in Session 12 of the first volume of *The Beast and the Sovereign*, there is more than one [plus d’un] ground.\footnote{14} With the passing away of every other, a ground founders. There is no Ur-abyss, no abyssal substratum, but abysses everywhere.

> With you gone, the ground has given way. In the wake of your death I remain turned toward you. It is you ‘in me’, speaking to me, leaving ‘in me’ your spectral traces. I appear before your gaze; I am an ‘image’ for you. I bear in me the gaze that you bear on me. I will bear, ‘in this strange dislocated bearing’ of you (B, 76/161), what you have ‘left living in me’ (CFU, 123/94), thus keeping you—without keeping—in my heart, alive, in me outside of me. ‘At that end of the world that every death is’ (BS II, 244/170), where there is no longer any world between us, there where ‘I am alone with you’ (B, 69/158), without the ground of any world, in a world without world, I must carry you, bear you—making ‘the world come to the world’ (BS II, 369/268).

Notes

1 This paper was first presented at the fourth Derrida Today conference held at Fordham University, New York on May 30, 2014.


7 I will discuss portions of this foreword in some detail as it still remains officially untranslated and requires in-depth commentary.

8 Gasché, op. cit, 318.

9 Cf. Gasché, 318.

10 In “Teleiopoetic World” Peggy Kamuf argues that Derrida enlists teleiopoesis ‘in the deconstruction of the idea of a totalisable, unified world’ (15) and eloquently demonstrates that each engagement with Celan’s line ‘deconstructs the very idea of a unified, totalised, reconciled world’ (16). The world, then, is always a
‘deconstructible world’ (14). While this article focuses on ‘the world’ and its future, Kamuf’s rich and perceptive piece concentrates on a reading of Celan’s line ‘Die Welt ist fort, ich muss dich tragen’.


13 See, for example, Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniella Vallega-Neu (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012), where he writes that the abyssal ground is the originary or the first essential occurrence of the ground (G 382/302). In his second major work, Heidegger further notes that the abyss is the originary unity of time and space. Time-space is grasped as abyssal ground. Also see the discussion of the ‘abyssal character of Being as appropriating event [die Einzigkeit de Abgründlichkeit des Seyns als Ereignis]’ in Besinnung (1938/39) GA 66 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1997), 88; Mindfulness, translated by Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York: Continuum, 2006).

Your short guide to the EUP Journals Blog
http://euppublishingblog.com/

A forum for discussions relating to Edinburgh University Press Journals

1. The primary goal of the EUP Journals Blog

To aid discovery of authors, articles, research, multimedia and reviews published in Journals, and as a consequence contribute to increasing traffic, usage and citations of journal content.

2. Audience

Blog posts are written for an educated, popular and academic audience within EUP Journals’ publishing fields.

3. Content criteria - your ideas for posts

We prioritize posts that will feature highly in search rankings, that are shareable and that will drive readers to your article on the EUP site.

4. Word count, style, and formatting

- Flexible length, however typical posts range 70-600 words.
- Related images and media files are encouraged.
- No heavy restrictions to the style or format of the post, but it should best reflect the content and topic discussed.

5. Linking policy

- Links to external blogs and websites that are related to the author, subject matter and to EUP publishing fields are encouraged, e.g. to related blog posts.

6. Submit your post

Submit to ruth.allison@eup.ed.ac.uk

If you’d like to be a regular contributor, then we can set you up as an author so you can create, edit, publish, and delete your own posts, as well as upload files and images.

7. Republishing/repurposing

Posts may be re-used and re-purposed on other websites and blogs, but a minimum 2 week waiting period is suggested, and an acknowledgement and link to the original post on the EUP blog is requested.

8. Items to accompany post

- A short biography (ideally 25 words or less, but up to 40 words)
- A photo/headshot image of the author(s) if possible.
- Any relevant, thematic images or accompanying media (podcasts, video, graphics and photographs), provided copyright and permission to republish has been obtained.
- Files should be high resolution and a maximum of 1GB
- Permitted file types: jpeg, jpg, png, gif, pdf, doc, ppt, odt, pptx, docx, pps, ppsx, xls, xlsx, key, mp3, m4a, wav, ogg, zip, ogv, mp4, m4v, mov, wmv, avi, mpg, 3gp, 3g2.