On the Methodological Role of Marxism in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology

Abstract

While contemporary scholarship on Merleau-Ponty virtually overlooks his postwar existential Marxism, this paper argues that the conception of history contained in the latter plays a significant methodological role in supporting the notion of truth that operates within Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological analyses of embodiment and the perceived world. This is because this conception regards the world as an unfinished task, such that the sense and rationality attributed to its historical emergence conditions the phenomenological evidence used by Merleau-Ponty. The result is that the content of *Phenomenology of Perception* should be seen as implicated in the normative framework of *Humanism and Terror*.

Keywords: Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, Methodology, Marxism, History
In her 2007 book *Merleau-Ponty and Modern Politics after Anti-Humanism*, Diana Coole made the claim (among others) that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is “profoundly and intrinsically political,” and in particular that it would behoove readers of his work to return to the so-called ‘communist question’ as he posed it in the immediate postwar period. For reasons that basically form the substance of this paper, I think that these claims are generally correct and well-taken. But this is in spite of the fact that they go very distinctly against the grain of virtually all contemporary scholarship on Merleau-Ponty. For it is the case that very few scholars today – and this is particularly true of philosophers – have any serious interest in the political dimensions of Merleau-Ponty’s work. And this is especially true with regard to his early political thought. Indeed, it is overwhelmingly the case that the existential Marxism espoused by Merleau-Ponty in the postwar period is nowadays viewed by philosophers as a philosophically unimportant appendage to his phenomenological project, an enthusiastic deviation that forms no essential part of his real work and which is consequently best dismissed and, if possible, excised and forgotten altogether.

Consider, for example, Marc Richir’s judicious claim that Marx was always a crucial point of reference for Merleau-Ponty’s thought, and contrast it with the fact that neither of the two most widely-cited philosophical treatments of Merleau-Ponty’s work – Martin Dillon’s *Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology*, and Renaud Barbaras’ *De l’être du phénomène* – make any significant reference to Marx or to Marxism at all. Conversely, it is likewise noteworthy that of the two most important studies of Merleau-Ponty’s political philosophy – Coole’s book referred to above, and Kerry Whiteside’s *Merleau-Ponty and the Foundation of an Existential Politics* –
neither is written by a philosopher with a profound interest in or understanding of Husserlian phenomenology. In other words, Merleau-Ponty scholarship is marked by an unfortunate division of labor between those who study Merleau-Ponty the phenomenologist and those who study Merleau-Ponty the political thinker, such that the intimate connection that Merleau-Ponty himself perceived (rightly or wrongly) as holding between Marx and Husserl (or between Marxism and phenomenology) – a connection that is fundamental to his postwar thought – has tended to be systematically overlooked within the not inconsiderable amount of scholarly attention that has been paid to Merleau-Ponty.

In this context, then, Coole’s interventions do represent a welcome contribution. But the arguments behind her claims are not terribly compelling, at least not in philosophical terms. In effect, what Coole seeks to show is that Merleau-Ponty was a philosophe engagé who had a dialectical style of political involvement that could helpfully serve us as a model for our own political engagement within the contemporary conditions of the twenty-first century. I would not want to dispute that there is some important truth in this claim. But it is not a very compelling argument inasmuch as it would make the renewed interest in Merleau-Ponty’s political thinking contingent upon one’s prior interest in effective political engagement of the sort Coole has in mind. In other words, there is a large presupposition that is both extraneous and quite contentious which must be satisfied in order for her arguments to succeed.

In contrast to this, I submit that there are good philosophical reasons that support a fresh re-interrogation of Merleau-Ponty’s existential Marxism. Moreover, I will argue that these reasons are fully internal to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological project, such that the force of the argument will properly impose itself on anyone who claims any significant degree of agreement with that project. The point is therefore that revisiting Merleau-Ponty’s engagement with Marx-
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ism and the ‘communist question’ would not simply be a potentially desirable thing to do, depending upon one’s political proclivities and intentions, but rather that such a return is positively imperative for anyone with a serious scholarly interest in his thought. Specifically, it would be imperative for anyone who takes seriously the phenomenological analyses of the lived body and the perceived world that are developed in *Phenomenology of Perception*. For I will argue that in order to be properly understood, the phenomenological evidence upon which these analyses are based must be regarded as inextricably situated methodologically within the philosophy of history that forms the core of Merleau-Ponty’s existential Marxism, and which is sketched out primarily (but not exclusively) in his text, *Humanism and Terror*. This is because, as I hope to show, the view of history outlined in this work contains crucial aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s elusive conception of the phenomenological reduction. I will consequently argue that in a fundamentally important and irreducibly philosophical way, *Phenomenology of Perception* – undeniably Merleau-Ponty’s *magnum opus*, irrespective of his apparent subsequent critique thereof – must be approached and understood within the broad terms of *Humanism and Terror*, a text that many (if not most) philosophical commentators today would freely and openly acknowledge as being absent from their bookshelves and as scarcely even registering on their Merleau-Pontian radar at all.

The discussion will proceed as follows:

(1) I will first give a brief account of Merleau-Ponty’s view of the phenomenology of phenomenology, and show how this emerged from a critical encounter with the account of phenomenological method that Eugen Fink articulated in his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*. This will show that while Merleau-Ponty agreed with Fink about the methodological necessity for phenomenological inquiry to be situated within a ‘progressive’ metaphysical framework that would
enable it to surpass the limitations of ‘regressive’ analysis even at the genetic level and thereby
to come to terms with the problem of the ‘world’ as such, he disagreed radically with Fink as to
the status of the ‘world’ and hence also with regard to the nature of the required progressive
framework.

(2) I will then briefly describe the salient tenets of Merleau-Ponty’s existential-Marxist
philosophy of history – in particular his understanding of the world as an open and unfinished
historical task of human action or praxis – and argue that circa 1945 this account is his attempt
to satisfy transcendental phenomenology’s methodological need for a ‘progressive’ metaphysi-
cal framework. In other words, it is this account which supplies the outer horizons that shore up
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological conception of truth, for which reason his phenomenology –
and in particular the descriptive analyses contained within Phenomenology of Perception, and
whatever philosophical validity they may have – must be approached and understood as ulti-
mately premised upon the normative outlook implied by this philosophy of history.

(3) Finally, and by way of conclusion, I shall just comment very briefly upon some of the
larger issues that are at stake in all of this.

1.

The argument that I want to develop deals mainly with the problem of the horizontality of phe-
omenological experience—the problem that, lest it remain in a state of transcendental naïveté,
phenomenology must be able to come to terms in some way with the outer horizons of its own
‘reduced’ experience, even though in principle these horizons can never be given intuitionally
(or at least not with an evidentiary value that would support cognitive claims). This problem can
be seen in terms of the recognition that Husserl’s ‘principle of all principles’ does not hold in
general, and that phenomenology can no more remain at the level of ‘genetic’ regressive analysis than it could remain at the ‘static’ level.\textsuperscript{10} The consequence is that the horizons within which egological self-temporalization transpires must themselves be somehow ‘progressively’ – that is, not regressively as in Husserlian \textit{Rückfragen} – apprehended in order for phenomenology’s account of what \textit{is} presented with self-evident givenness not to be hopelessly uncritical and hence philosophically futile and inconclusive.

That phenomenology as a descriptive project is dependent in this way upon a broader metaphysical framework of some sort was impressed upon Merleau-Ponty by the critique of phenomenological method developed by Eugen Fink in his \textit{Sixth Cartesian Meditation}. But Merleau-Ponty’s response to the problem differed radically from Fink’s position.\textsuperscript{11} For whereas Fink proposed a ‘constructive’ account that would embed phenomenology within a speculative metaphysics strongly informed by Hegelian idealism, Merleau-Ponty’s proposal was inspired by his reading of Marx’s \textit{critique} of Hegelian speculative philosophy (although the impress of Georg Lukács’ germinal development of Marxist philosophy in his work in \textit{History and Class Consciousness} is evident as well.) In both accounts (i.e., Fink’s and Merleau-Ponty’s) there is a view of the world in its historical development that is intended to support the viability of phenomenology as a philosophical project—that is, the possibility of its being able to attain and express truth. But whereas in Fink’s account this is strictly premised upon phenomenological insight being gained from the radically detached standpoint of what he called a “non-participating spectator” \textit{[unbeteiligte Zuschauer]}, such that phenomenology itself must come to be regarded as “a cognitive movement of the [meontic] Absolute,”\textsuperscript{12} Merleau-Ponty consistently construed philosophy, and transcendental phenomenology in particular, as not being “separate” \textit{[séparé]},\textsuperscript{13} that is, as emerging from and forming a unity with mundane empirical human existence. In this
way he embraced the well-known claim made by Marx against Hegelian idealism to the effect that philosophy cannot be realized without being transcended \([\textit{aufgehoben}]\) – that is, without being integrated with reality through transformative praxis.\(^{14}\) Merleau-Ponty thus founded the possibility of phenomenological truth on the same “productivity” that makes innovative human agency in general possible.\(^{15}\) For Merleau-Ponty, this productivity is the fact of our being, as he put it, “a relation to something other than [one]self,” the fact of participating inexorably in the spontaneous historical logic of human coexistence. It is thus a \textit{practical} idea of phenomenological method that Merleau-Ponty developed in response to Fink, a view based on the claim that ‘transcendental subjectivity is intersubjectivity’ – a claim upon which Merleau-Ponty repeatedly insisted,\(^{16}\) and which is tantamount to the claim (and this is \textit{why} he was so insistent) that, as he put it in \textit{Humanism and Terror}, “we grasp the absolute through our total \textit{praxis},” which in his view is to say that “interhuman praxis” is itself “the absolute.”\(^{17}\)

The claim that the philosophical job assigned by Husserl to transcendental subjectivity is actually done by ‘concrete intersubjectivity’, that is, by human coexistential or intercorporeal praxis or involvement — this claim is manifested most dramatically in the form of the ‘hero’ with which \textit{Phenomenology of Perception} ends (i.e., the cryptic reference to Saint-Exupéry).\(^{18}\) Briefly, Merleau-Ponty’s point in ending the work in this (seemingly strange) way is to establish the outer horizons of the analyses contained in the work by demonstrating that the transcendental field is fully exhausted by ‘concrete intersubjectivity’, and to do this by \textit{projectively} bringing to intuitional phenomenological givenness the ‘productivity’ that underlies phenomenology in an anonymously general and pre-reflectively operative way. Here the hero is understood in (ostensibly) universal terms as ‘man’ – specifically, the subjective embodiment of “\textit{man as productivity}”\(^{19}\) – and hence is seen as living out what Merleau-Ponty described as “loyalty to
the natural movement that throws us toward things and toward others.”20 As Merleau-Ponty used the term, then, heroism manifests a natural purposiveness that ensures that (so-called) heroes become, as he put it, “outwardly what they inwardly wished to be” – that is, that they realize a perfect coincidence of subjectivity and objectivity – thereby, as Merleau-Ponty continued, “melding with history at the moment when it claimed their lives.”21

What Merleau-Ponty wanted to affirm with this account of heroism (or more precisely, of ‘heroic death’) was that the moment of ‘absolute knowing’ – which he glossed as “the point at which consciousness finally becomes equal to its spontaneous life and regains its self-possession,”22 and which primarily concerns the outer horizons of phenomenological (and, in general, human) experience — what Merleau-Ponty wanted to affirm with his account of heroism was that the moment of ‘absolute knowing’ is not (nor could be) as in the case of the Fin-kian ‘onlooker’, a moment of complete theoretical detachment, but rather that it is (and could only be) a moment of complete practical participation. For what is at issue here is not a matter of knowing, but of the doing of knowing. And unless history is over – unless, that is, the world is fully complete and determinate, such that le préjugé du monde would actually be true rather than the naïve and unwarranted prejudice that (at least for Merleau-Ponty) it is23 – then theoretical cognition is in principle incapable of ever saying enough. For it is a matter of the operative intentionalities of human productivity that are presupposed by any act of cognition, awareness of which can as a result be gained, according to Merleau-Ponty, only by way of a pre-reflective self-apprehension of existential inherence within the nexus of intercorporeal involvement, and more specifically, within the spontaneous historical development of that context.

It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty claims – surprisingly perhaps – that it is Marxism that supplies what he called the “general formula” of this absolute awareness.24 In other words,
it is Marxism that supplies what becomes necessary if we agree with Merleau-Ponty that the phenomenological reduction as formulated by Husserl (at least in published works) is necessarily ‘incomplete’. For even if we agree that there can be no ‘complete reduction’ in that sense, it would be a grave error and sheer folly to conclude that Merleau-Ponty was of the view that phenomenology as a project is somehow methodologically incomplete. Rather, what he puts in place at that point is what he called a “perception of history,” which in his view it is the job of Marxism to support. This perception is grounded upon the experience of heroism, for in ‘melding with’ it, heroism does what nothing else may do, namely, provide a concrete experience of history as such by bringing it to some kind of intuitional givenness. This perception thus forms the fundamental horizon for all other perception. It does this by situating it in accordance with an historical-intentional orientation, and it is for this reason, I would contend, that it should be regarded as the basic modality of perception that underwrites Phenomenology of Perception. In other words, we should recognize that for all the important discussion in that work of the metaphysics of ambiguity, the implicit understanding of and methodological approach to ambiguity is not itself meant to be ambiguous. And further, that it is only at the end of the text, only with the experience of heroism and the perception of history that it provides at the outer limit of genetic phenomenology, that we gain the requisite moment of historical – and consequently methodological – disambiguation, lacking which no philosophical sense could be made of anything whatsoever.

2.

But we may still ask why we would experience the phenomenon of heroism in a way that confirms Merleau-Ponty’s view of the absolute—that is, why we would see natural purposiveness,
rather than, say, rogue idiosyncrasy or random happenstance, in phenomena like the death of Saint Exupéry. Merleau-Ponty gave an answer to this question in *Humanism and Terror* in saying that “the glory of those who resisted [...] presupposes both the contingency of history [...] and the rationality of history, without which there would be only madmen *[des fous]*.”27 The phenomenon of heroism thus depends upon certain horizons of historical perception, horizons which imply that, in addition to contingency, which is manifest, there is also a “logic of history.” By this Merleau-Ponty meant the following: (a) that history is an integral whole, “a single drama” in which all events have a human significance; and (b) that the phases of this drama do not follow an arbitrary order, “but move toward a completion and conclusion.”28 In other words, that history is intelligible and has a direction – that “there is in the present and in the flow of events a totality moving toward a privileged state which gives the whole its meaning.”29 For Merleau-Ponty, this is the essential content of Marxism, combined with the idea that the “privileged state” in question represents “a genuine and complete reconciliation of man with man” in fully universal terms.30 For this reason, then, he sees this vision of history as the basis for phenomenological truth. It is the rationality and sense *[sens]* at the level of history as a whole that underwrites the rationality and sense that may be perceived at any subordinate level. For, as he put it, “where history has no structure and no major trends it is no longer possible to say anything, since there are no periods, no lasting constellations and a thesis is only valid for the moment.”31 Whereas on the contrary, “the simple fact that man perceives an historical situation as invested with a meaning that he believes to be true introduces a phenomenon of truth”32—that is, a presumptive rationality emerges in the course of historical development that “testifies to our rootedness in the truth.”33 And this presumption is inescapable: “the contingency of history is only a shadow at the edge of a view of the future from which we can no more refrain than we
can from breathing.”34 Or as he put it in defending a Lukácsian conception of totality against worries expressed by Jaspers: “a certain postulate of the rationality of history is something that we cannot avoid, for it belongs to the necessities of our life. Everyone […] has a certain conception of the whole of historical life, and if he does not formulate it in words, he nonetheless expresses it in action.”35 Thus, for Merleau-Ponty the very experience of historical contingency is itself sufficient evidence of a historical logic, that is, of a ‘common history’—in other words, the consciousness of historical contingency is, for Merleau-Ponty, self-cancelling.36

It is thus the case for Merleau-Ponty that our être-au-monde is indistinguishable from ‘being-in-the-truth’ [« être-à-la-vérité »]37 – that “we are in the truth,”38 that “we are true through and through”39 – just in virtue of what we might call his existential-communist philosophy of history. But the latter is also a necessary condition. As Merleau-Ponty put it,

Marxism is not just any hypothesis that might be replaced tomorrow by some other. It is the simple statement of those conditions without which there would be neither any humanism, in the sense of a mutual relation between men, nor any rationality in history. In this sense Marxism is not a philosophy of history; it is the philosophy of history and to renounce it is to dig the grave of Reason in history.40

The sense of this extremely audacious claim is that “any philosophy of history will postulate something like what is called historical materialism,” inasmuch as it could not fail to see history in terms of total Gestalts in a way that maintains the identity of subjective and objective factors, while still remaining oriented to truth in a universal sense. But more importantly, that Marxism is the philosophy of history means that it is the philosophy of the historical emergence of the world – it maintains that the world is not yet, that as a singular universal frame of reference this remains an open and unfinished historical task, and that philosophy is ultimately not a matter of understanding the world, but of realizing it.
This idea – that the world is always in a state of unfinishedness with no crisp line between the constitutive and the constituted – amounts to the critical recognition of *le préjugé du monde*—a notion that is central to Merleau-Ponty’s elusive conception of the reduction, but which, as we can now see, derives from his existential Marxism, of which it forms the core. For this outlook rests on the idea “that human perspectives, however relative, are absolute because there is nothing else and no destiny” – that “what should be said is not that ‘everything is relative’, but that ‘everything is absolute’.” 41 In effect all is true, and therefore, as Merleau-Ponty later cited Alain (Émile Chartier), “truth is momentary […] It belongs to a situation […] it is necessary to see it, to say it, to do it at this very moment.” 42 This is consistent with Merleau-Ponty’s view of existential Marxism as offering a ‘perception of history’ exclusively from the perspective of the living present. 43 This sort of perception is primordial in Merleau-Ponty’s scheme, in that all other perceptual experience is situated within its horizons and has its epistemic status conditioned accordingly. And it is what he had in mind when, with reference to Jules Langeau, he described “the idea—sometimes considered barbarous—of a thought which remembers that it was born and then sovereignly recaptures itself and in which fact, reason, and freedom coincide.” 44 Such a ‘barbarous’ sort of idea is clearly dear to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (e.g., in the form of the ‘tacit cogito’), but it is crucial to recognize that whatever philosophical validity and value it may have for this project accrues entirely from the historical framework within which it is set.

An instructive way to grasp the main claim for which I am arguing, *viz.*, that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception must be understood within the horizons of history as projected by existential Marxism, lies in recognizing – contrary to standard views – that Merleau-Ponty’s account of history is *not* based upon an attempt, as Taylor Carman (for one) recently
expressed it, “to extend some of the basic insights of his phenomenology [of perception] into the political sphere.” Merleau-Ponty would fully agree that there is no legitimate Gestalt-theoretic basis for any such analogical move from body to world. But he would vigorously disagree with Carman’s claim that this is because “[t]here is no totalizing perspective for an entire society as there is for a single perceptual subject.” On the contrary, for Merleau-Ponty it is only at the level of the historical world that we can begin with totality—indeed, as he said to Jaspers, this is ‘a necessity of life’. It thus follows that the order of logical priority is precisely the reverse from what is typically assumed. That is, methodologically speaking, Merleau-Pontian phenomenology begins with a holistic view of the world in its historical becoming – what he once called “the Idea in the Hegelian sense” – which is then extended down to the level of perceptual experience. It is only in virtue of this that Merleau-Ponty can approach the phenomena of our embodied être-au-monde and the perceived world in holistic and integrated terms. For without the historical horizon, there is simply no legitimate phenomenological justification for adopting a totalizing perspective on the perceptual subject (something that is particularly important in regard to all the results that Merleau-Ponty draws from considerations of pathological phenomena). This may ultimately count as phenomenologically true, but such truth would derive its epistemic value from the place of the phenomena within the horizons of the world. And it is because the world is, for Merleau-Ponty, an open-ended process of becoming that his phenomenology of perception cannot be properly understood in abstraction from his philosophy of history.

3.

It should be clear, I hope, that the aim in all this is not to ‘politicize’ phenomenology. Nor is it to impugn the rational credentials of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Rather, and on the
contrary, the aim is to come to terms with the fact that phenomenology can only achieve methodological coherence if it provides its own foundation – Husserl’s “Rückbeziehung der Phänomenologie auf sich selbst” – together with the recognition that – speculative idealism aside – this will ineluctably make of it a normatively participatory undertaking inasmuch as the constitution of sense “concerns the future orientation of sense, which is to say, the generation of new historical meaning structures.”

It is with this in mind that we must revisit Merleau-Ponty’s existential Marxism. For while this certainly has its flaws, it may be the case that the most defensible way to come to terms with the methodological coherence of phenomenology, as well as to give hope for making headway on its ‘infinite task’, is to follow Merleau-Ponty in seeing it as an integral part of the broader historical movement wherein truth – and the singular common world that underlies it – are not so much matters simply to be known as they are first of all to be made—a shift of emphasis that captures well the deeper sense of the existential-Marxist perspective that is in question.

In any case, at the very least readers of Merleau-Ponty need, I think, to become more lucidly aware of the fact that the phenomenological evidence upon which the descriptive analyses contained in Phenomenology of Perception are based is wholly implicated in a historical horizontality that is not, could not be, nor was intended to be, normatively neutral.
Notes


13. PhP 520/456; cf. SNS 237/133.


15. Cf. SNS 229/129.

HT 20/18. Cf. Zahavi, “Merleau-Ponty on Husserl: A Reappraisal,” where a 1927 research manuscript of Husserl’s is cited to the effect that “the absolute reveals itself as the intersubjective relation between subjects” (24).


PhP 171/200.

SNS 330/186, emphasis added.

SNS 258/146, emphasis added.

SNS 112/64.

See PhP, pp. 11, 62, 296, 316/5, 51, 256, 273

HT 94.

PhP xiv/viii.

HT 98.

HT 40f.

SNS 212/121.

HT 153.

HT 129f.

HT 144f.

HT 95f.

HT 96.

Ibid.

HT 188. Cf. SNS 297/167f: “we are condemned, whether we like it or not, to the philosophy of history.”

PhP 452/395.

PhP xi/xvi.

PhP 520/456.

HT 153.

HT 18, 95.

EP 50f/62f.

HT 98, 126.


Ibid., 163.

Cf. PhP xviii.

This would be, in Merleau-Ponty’s view, Kurt Goldstein’s main philosophical shortcoming. (It should become clear that Merleau-Ponty’s crucial discussion of the ‘patient Schn.’ would have no philosophical import whatsoever without his philosophy of history.)

“To seek harmony with ourselves and others, in a word, truth, not only in a priori reflection and solitary thought but through the experience of concrete situations and in a living dialogue with others apart from which internal evidence cannot validate its universal right, is the exact contrary of irrationalism, since it accepts our incoherence and conflict with others as constants but assumes we are able to minimize them. It rules out the inevitability of reason as well as that of chaos.” (HT 187).