Foucault and Binswanger

Beyond the Dream

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This essay deals with the role played in the early development of Foucault’s thought by Ludwig Binswanger’s project of Daseinsanalyse (“existential analysis”). It is well known that there is an important biographical connection here. But given its existential-phenomenological character, Foucault’s interest in Daseinsanalyse is generally seen as what Alan Sheridan called a “false start,” a juvenile pre-history of the real Foucault, and thus as lacking any philosophical import with regard to his later work. However, notwithstanding that Foucault did reject Daseinsanalyse, that view is incorrect. On the contrary, I submit that what Foucault specifically rejected was not phenomenology per se, but rather the methodological framework of genetic phenomenology—and that this rejection was motivated precisely by the inadequacy of that framework for addressing normative concerns with subjectivity.

Recognition of this situation is important for two related reasons. First, it can help to clarify the overall continuity of Foucault’s oeuvre, inasmuch as it suggests that the apparent normative concerns of his final works stem from a longitudinal axis. Second, it reveals a potential philosophical complementarity between Foucauldian accounts of the “historicity of forms of experience” and phenomenology, inasmuch as the latter acknowledges that even at the genetic level it remains transcendentally naïve if it fails to come to terms with the external horizons of experience. In other words, it suggests that Foucault’s work can be read as extending, rather than rejecting, phenomenology’s transcendental concern with subjectivity.

My essay has four sections. I first (1) introduce Foucault’s relation to Binswanger, and then (2) clarify what Foucault found philosophically significant in Daseinsanalyse. I then (3) consider the methodological limits of the latter and how this relates to Foucault, and by way of conclusion (4) I discuss this with particular reference to Binswanger’s case of “Ellen West.”

I

Along with others such as Karl Jaspers and Eugène Minkowski, Binswanger was a pioneering figure in phenomenological-existential psychiatry, and his project of Daseinsanalyse—which he developed mainly in the 1930s and 1940s in the context of his directorship of the family-based Bellevue clinic on Lake Konstanz in Kreuzlingen (Switzerland)—is a major landmark in this field.

It is well-known among Foucault scholars that there is at least an historical connection here, as Foucault’s first (at least non-pseudonymous) publication (1954) was a lengthy introduction to Jacqueline Verdeaux’s French translation of Binswanger’s 1930 article “Traum und Existenz”—a piece which, it should be noted, Binswanger himself, approached by Verdeaux, selected for translation. He made this choice presumably because, in addition to being relatively non-technical (it was originally published in a literary review), it represented the first step in the formulation of Daseinsanalyse, the single most important source for which—the Daseinsanalytik of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit—had appeared in 1927. Basically, already drawn to Husserlian phenomenology as essential to proper psychiatric insight, Binswanger saw in Heidegger’s work—especially the notion of being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-Sein]—a crucial
new way to interpret holistically the immanent structure of styles of existence that would otherwise be reduced to psychopathology. The fullest expression of Daseinsanalyse appeared later in Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins (1942), a work that Binswanger supplemented with a detailed case study of a patient known as “Ellen West” (1944/45).

Length aside, Foucault’s was no mere introduction. Rather, as he made clear, it was an attempt to use Binswanger’s article as an incisive point of entry into Daseinsanalyse as a whole—in effect, (although he did not say so explicitly), a radical effort to root out its “unthought.” And he construed this project precisely as Binswanger himself had characterized it, namely, as anthropology qua (unified) science of “man”—or qua (what might be called) “science of subjectivity,” where subjectivity, approached under the aegis of “existentiality” [Existenzialität], is understood existentially as a certain mode of situated transcendence.

In this way, what Foucault called the “basic sense” of Binswanger’s anthropological project implies that it defies traditional disciplinary lines. As he put it in the Introduction, his intent was “to present a form of analysis which does not aim at being a philosophy, and whose end is not to be a psychology; a form of analysis which is fundamental in relation to all concrete, objective, and experimental knowledge; a form of analysis, finally, whose principle and method are determined from the start solely by the absolute privilege of their object: man, or rather, the being of man, Menschsein”—this latter being a key term in Binswanger’s thought.

Foucault’s view was reflected in the epigraph from Kierkegaard’s Postscript that Binswanger placed at the start of “Dream and Existence” (and elsewhere besides): “Above all, we must keep firmly in mind what it means to be a human being.” But it was more the case for Binswanger that the imperative here is to keep asking “what it means to be a human being”—the Menschseinsfrage, as it were. As he claimed in the article itself, “the question [as to] who ‘we human beings’ actually are, and what we are, has never been given less of an answer than in our own time, and today we stand again at the very beginning of a new questioning regarding this we.” In the studies of mania (“flight of ideas”) and manic-depression that Binswanger published shortly after “Dream and Existence”—the first application, so to speak, of Daseinsanalyse—this anthropological orientation—and its contempt for traditional boundaries between normal and pathological—was explicit. “It is our opinion,” he wrote, “that ‘manic-depressive insanity’ does not teach us anything anthropologically new about ‘humans,’ but rather that it gives us, in a clearer and more conspicuous form, an answer to the question [as to] ‘what a human being is’ [‘was der Mensch ist’].” Binswanger’s work thus directly addresses Kant’s “fourth”—and, according to the Jäsche Logic—fundamental question for philosophy—at least, as Kant put it—“in [the] cosmopolitan sense,” namely, Was ist der Mensch? And concerning this path of anthropological interrogation, Foucault—who was already lecturing on Kant’s Anthropology (a text which he would later translate with an introduction)—expressed the view that Binswanger’s work represented “the royal road.”

Foucault thus had a profound interest in Binswanger. The notes from the Introduction to “Dream and Existence” make reference to several other of Binswanger’s works, and Daniel Defert reported that Foucault owned “carefully marked copies of all of Binswanger’s major articles and books.” Apparently, Foucault had even translated some of these, including a case history of schizophrenia published in 1945 (the case of “Ilse”), the title of which carried a contrast that could easily be seen as significant for Foucault: Wahnsinn als lebensgeschichtliches Phänomen und als Geisteskrankheit (“Madness as Life-Historical Phenomenon and as Mental Disease”). Foucault visited Binswanger at his clinic at Kreuzlingen, possibly multiple times, as well as at his summer residence, and he also entered into a correspondence with him. It was in a letter to Foucault that Binswanger commented quite favourably on Foucault’s text: “Your essay is for me a life-historical event [ein lebensgeschichtliches Ereignis]—although Foucault’s radicalization of his position was not lost on him.

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Conversely, in later reflecting on his reading of Binswanger, Foucault noted that in looking for some “counterbalance” to “the traditional grids imposed by the medical gaze,” “these superb descriptions of madness as fundamental, unique, incomparable experiences were, most certainly, decisive for me.”

Foucault’s first book, *Maladie mentale et personnalité* (1954), a short text for students that was written at the behest of Althusser for a series edited by Jean Lacroix, also included a number of significant references to Binswanger, all of which remained in the drastically revised (and re-titled) edition of 1962—although as we know, Foucault had and always retained an extremely negative—even hostile—attitude toward that work.

It is, no doubt, largely for this and corollary reasons that this earliest period is usually given very short shrift in the literature on Foucault—if it is even mentioned at all. It is typically seen along the lines of what Alan Sheridan called a “false start,” a sort of juvenile pre-history of the real Foucault. Standard periodizations of Foucault’s work begin in 1961 with *History of Madness*, and proceed thence to define periods of “archaeology” and “genealogy,” followed by a final period, centring on the subsequent volumes of *The History of Sexuality* which, dealing with “practices of the self” or “ethics,” could be labelled “the return of the subject” (or something to that effect).

But as is well known, there are difficult questions concerning, not necessarily the overall “unity” of Foucault’s work, for that may be a misplaced idea, but rather the consistency of archaeology and/or genealogy with that work of the final period. For what Amy Allen called the “anti-subjective hypothesis”—consisting in the belief that “the point of Foucault’s archaeological analyses of discourse and his genealogical analyses of power/knowledge is to attack, undermine, and eventually eradicate the concept of the human subject”—in other words, to participate in the (structuralist) “death of the subject”—is a widely subscribed reading (whether positively or negatively) of Foucault. Yet on the surface, at least, this seems scarcely compatible with Foucault’s later turn to the self and issues of ethical subjectivity. Connected to this interpretive problem are the larger questions of the practical and normative consequences of the “anti-subjective hypothesis” with respect to the viability—or even the very possibility—of moral and transformative agency. For if subjectivity is nothing but an effect of anonymous regimes of power/knowledge, then it would seem that Foucault’s project precludes any possible grounding for even minimally autonomous forms of ethical and political resistance to those regimes.

Now, I don’t think that this is the case. Rather, I think that Foucault’s characterization of his project as “a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” is accurate—that his abiding concern was with “the relations between the subject, truth, and the constitution of experience”—which is to say, as Foucault did indeed say, that “the subject” was all along “the general theme of [his] research.” It is just that his is a project of transcendental critique. As such, it is focused on conditions of possibility. But in contradistinction to the universalism of Kantian transcendental critique, Foucault’s aims to come to terms with the social, cultural, and especially historical conditions of possibility—in a word, the historical a priori—of modern subjectivity. As he wrote at the end of “What is an Author?” this sort of critique asks: “under what conditions and through what forms can an entity like the subject appear in the order of discourse? What position can it occupy, what functions does it exhibit, and what rules does it follow in each type of discourse?” It is, as Allen argued, a matter of treating subjectivity as explanandum and consequently bracketing it out methodologically (Allen herself doesn’t put it that way) from any explanatory (that is, constitutive) role. “Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical works should not be understood as attempts to eradicate the concept of subjectivity; on the contrary, they are attempts to specify the discursive and non-discursive practices that make a particular . . . conception of subjectivity possible,” and this in a way, Allen claims, that
allows for coherent sense to be made of the later concern with (constitutive) "practices of the self."

This is generally correct, I think. I would, however, take issue with Allen concerning how she frames her conclusion: "this way of reading Foucault holds out the possibility of a new understanding of Foucault’s philosophical project, one which emphasizes the continuity between the three periods...of his work," that is, in a way that stretches back "almost [to] the very beginning of his philosophical project." For I would contend that Foucault’s earliest, pre-archaeological period also fits into this continuity, and, what’s more, that it may be necessary to include it therein. For it is by no means immediately clear just how the interpretive shift that Allen suggests will result in "a conception of a subject that hints at the possibility of new and potentially liberating modes of subjectivity." With this in mind, I would rather take literally Foucault’s statement that the later return to the subject was a matter, as he said, of "reintroducing the problem of the subject that [he] had more or less left aside in [his] first studies."

Béatrice Han called that a "curious understatement." This is because it seems to contradict Foucault’s unambiguous rejection of any approach—paradigmatically, phenomenology—that remains committed to a constitutive notion of the subject. But this view is inattentive (or oblivious) to what it was that Foucault had found so interesting in Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse. Most generally, this has to do with Kant, and the relative priority between the Critiques and the Anthropology—of universality and finitude within the transcendent theme. Is it the case, as Kant is standardly read, that the latter is to be grasped in terms of the former? Or is it rather the case that the Critiques themselves need to be founded in a critical anthropology that discloses the ontological finitude of Menschsein? This latter view is along the lines of Heidegger’s claim that the essence of Kant’s philosophical project lay in the attempt to ground metaphysics through a disclosure of its “inner possibility” in “the subjectivity of the human subject,” and that “the grounding of metaphysics is [thus] a questioning with regard to the human being, i.e., Anthropology.”

Now, despite Foucault’s late claim that, for him, Heidegger was “the essential philosopher,” and that his “entire philosophical development was determined by [his] reading of Heidegger,” this view of Kant is not quite the line he follows. He did not, that is, take up anthropology as an analytic of finitude lying on this side of the empirical-transcendental divide. It is thus not just the sense of the transcendental that gets reworked in Foucault, but the sense of the empirical as well. And he was drawn to consider the point of their connection—the point where, as Merleau-Ponty echoed Husserl, the empirical and the transcendental sich einströmen, where they flow into one another. Such is exactly what the young Foucault perceived in Binswanger’s Daseinsanalyse. As he wrote in the Introduction to “Dream and Existence,” Binswanger, rejecting any a priori distinction between them, “outflanks the problem of ontology and anthropology by going straight to concrete existence, to its historical content and development. From there, by way of an analysis of the structures of existence...he moves continually back and forth between the anthropological forms and the ontological conditions of existence. He continually crosses a dividing line that seems so difficult to draw, or rather, he sees it ceaselessly crossed by a concrete existence in which the real limit of Menschsein and Dasein is manifested. ...It is a matter, for [Binswanger], of bringing to light, by returning to the concrete individual, the point at which the forms and conditions of existence mutually articulate.” It is because Binswangerian “existentiality”—that is, the existential a priori—is in this way orthogonal to the Heideggerian distinction between the existential and the existentiell that Daseinsanalyse can maintain a coherent, non-aporetic commitment to a concrete sense of constitutive subjectivity.

Here some brief comments concerning Binswanger’s relation to Heidegger are necessary—comments which, as far as I know, go against virtually every reference to Binswanger in the Foucault literature. For these tend to gloss Daseinsanalyse as in effect simply the applica-
tion of Heidegger’s thought to the psychopathological domain. Whereas in fact, notwithstanding an enormous intellectual debt,37 Binswanger’s work—under the contrary influence of Martin Buber, for example, as well as Karl Löwith’s important early critique of Heidegger—differed in certain fundamental ways from what Heidegger was doing. As Binswanger himself once put it, Daseinsanalyse is based on “a productive misunderstanding” [eine produktive Mißverständnis] of Heidegger’s Daseinsanalytik.38 Basically, whereas Heidegger approached Dasein in strictly ontological terms, Binswanger’s approach was, as we have seen, anthropological—something which, as made explicit in the Zollikon seminars, was wholly anathema to what Heidegger was doing. Rather than just on the general structures of “being-in-the-world” interpreted in terms of “care” [Sorge], Binswanger focused on what he termed particular “world-designs” [Weltentwürfe], the articulation of Eigen-, Mit-, and Umwelten, that are as much a function of “love” [Liebe], understood as an irreducible dimension of intersubjective co-existence that is, in an existential sense, “beyond” the world [über-die-Welt-hinaus]. Indeed, criticizing the narrowness and inadequacy of Heidegger’s account of existence as simply In-der-Welt-Sein, and extending it into an account of In-der-Welt-Über-die-Welt-hinaus-Sein (“being-in-and-beyond-the-world”), is in effect the principal task undertaken by Binswanger in Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, and it lies at the very heart of his Daseinsanalyse. This “misunderstanding” of Heidegger—which, in addition to Buber and Löwith, also reflects the earlier influence on Binswanger of Husserl39—centers Binswanger’s work on a notion of “encounter” [Begegnung] and gives it a robust dialogical and intersubjective orientation that differs radically from Heideggerian phenomenology. It is this view of existentiality as “being-in-and-beyond-the-world” that enables Binswanger to maintain a coherent commitment to a concrete sense of constitutive subjectivity.

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Even this coherence, however, has its limits. Binswanger’s is, after all, a phenomenological project. Above I used the term “bracketing out” deliberately to indicate the family relation between phenomenology and Foucauldian archaeology and genealogy as radical reprises of transcendental critique. The key point of contact concerns a profound methodological problem afflicting phenomenology at its very core, namely, that its definitive reliance upon the self-evidentness of intuitional givenness renders it congenitally incapable of undertaking a critical interrogation of the socio-historical horizons within which (that is, against the background of which) this self-evidentness is experienced. Without such an interrogation phenomenology would be left (in Husserl’s terms) “transcendently naïve”—yet it is a task that phenomenology’s methodological commitment to givenness renders it incapable of discharging. It cannot get beyond the level of “genetic phenomenology,” and thus necessarily remains limited within the framework of egological self-temporalization (Lebensgeschichte).40

We can see this in Foucault’s first book—which is accordingly divided into two parts. (It was primarily the second part that Foucault rewrote.) The first part deals with “the psychological dimensions of mental illness,” and it is here that we find the references to Binswanger. Foucault presented phenomenological psychology as the proper culmination of psychology. For since “the way in which a subject accepts or rejects his illness . . . constitutes one of the essential dimensions of the illness,”41 it is necessary to understand pathological experience “from the inside.”42 Fundamentally, as he put it in an historical survey of psychology published in 1957, the coherence of the discipline necessitates that it be founded upon an “existential analysis of the way in which human reality is temporalized, [how it is] spatialized, and how it projects a world.”43 This prioritizes precisely the sort of phenomenological psychopathology practiced by Binswanger, which is at root “a matter of restoring . . . both the experience that the patient has of
his illness . . . and the morbid world on which this consciousness of illness opens, the world at which this consciousness is directed, and which it constitutes.”

Qua world, the “morbid” world of mental illness serves as the background condition of possibility for the inner history of the illness itself. But at the same time, “it is never an absolute that abolishes all reference to the normal.” Rather, “the sick consciousness always opens out with a double reference, either to the normal and the pathological, the familiar and the strange, the particular and the universal, or wakefulness and dreaming [l’onirisme].” How, then, Foucault asks, does such a world relate to the ‘normal’ world? Fundamentally, it is as a matter of abandonment or detachment—or more generally, of alienation. Whereas—and here Foucault cites an important invocation of Heraclitus that Binswanger makes in “Dream and Existence”—the “normal” world is the single world of common wakeful life, Heraclitus’ koinos cosmos, the “morbid” world is a “private world”—Heraclitus’ idios cosmos—that results from a process of Verweltlichung. Foucault leaves this term untranslated, but we could call it “mundanization”—by which is meant a disintegrative collapse that “abandons the subject to the world as to an external fate.” It is the loss of the dimension of existence “beyond” the world. ‘The nucleus of [mental] illness lies in this contradictory unity of a private world and an abandonment to the inauthenticity of the world.”

But Foucault did not stop there. Even if in 1954 he positioned Binswanger’s phenomenological anthropology at the apex of psychology, he did not think that psychology was the whole story. Even then he recognized the need to carry the analysis further. As he wrote at the beginning of the Introduction to “Dream and Existence,” it is necessary “to situate existential analysis within the development of contemporary reflection on man,” and, by following—i.e., taking further—“the inflection of phenomenology toward anthropology,” to show “what foundations have been proposed for concrete reflection on man.” It is a matter of accounting for the enigmatic Verweltlichung of mental illness in terms of the world itself.

This is addressed in the second part of the book, and herein lies the rupture between the two editions. One the one hand, in the first edition Foucault looked toward the “external and objective conditions” of the world, in effect laying out a Marxist materialist account of mental illness in terms of the alienating structural contradictions of modern society. This left the book hanging on a disconnect between a phenomenological anthropology and a materialist social history. It is with respect to this that Foucault later recollected: “I wondered whether, rather than playing on this alternative, it would not be possible to consider the very historicity of forms of experience.” As he had written in 1957, the possibility of psychology does depend on an existential-analytical basis, but also a return to “what is most human in man, namely, his history.”

Thus, on the other hand, the revised second part offers what amounts to a summary of History of Madness. Here the concern is with psychopathology as “a fact of civilization”—not the socio-economic conditions that would cause mental illness in some (in principle) universally true and ahistorical sense, but rather the historically specific cultural and discursive conditions in virtue of which madness has been pathologized as such, and the subsequent institution of normalizing disciplinary practices. The work thus no longer seeks “the root of mental illness” through “a reflection on man himself” but rather in “a certain historically situated relation of man to the madman and to the true man.”

The overall task changes accordingly from an attempt to situate personal existence socially, to one of situating (phenomenological) psychology and its attendant concepts (e.g., mental pathology) in its historical context. As the revised first part concludes: “Is there not in mental illness a whole nucleus of significations that belongs to the domain in which it appeared—and, to begin with, the simple fact that it is in that domain that it is circumscribed as an illness?”

It was this additional level of self-critique that Binswanger’s phenomenology lacked. For
Foucault, then, the problem with *Daseinsanalyse* is that it operated uncritically within the parameters of normalcy of the modern world. But this world is not *the* world. It is, rather, a historically specific and contingent world, and this must be taken into account, if one’s perspective is not to suffer an insupportable transcendental naïveté.

No less important than identifying this line of criticism is recognizing Foucault’s work as a corrective generalization of *Daseinsanalyse*—the historical generalization of existential apriority. Archaeology and genealogy respond to the methodological impasse of phenomenology by articulating the historical horizons of its experience and thus providing a critical perspective on the forms of subjectivity that are operative within it. This need not replace phenomenology, but rather can be seen as situating it in a way that allows for a more complete and critical fulfillment of the common radical transcendental thematic—and this in a way that can maintain a non-aporetic commitment to a concrete sense of constitutive subjectivity.57

By way of analogy with *Daseinsanalyse* as therapy, then, “one can think of later Foucault as practicing genealogical therapy on the madness of modernity. He is trying to historicize . . . the closed, normalized view we have of ourselves as . . . subjects in order to ready us for the possibility of a new interpretation of the human self that could take up currently marginalized practices, thus opening up our world rather than shutting it down.” In short, the hints and gestures toward liberation and disalienation that are sensed in Foucault’s later work especially point back to the normative spark that animated the Daseins-analytical account of existentiality with which he originally engaged. As Foucault once wrote in a Nietzschean vein: “Historical sense has more in common with medicine than philosophy. . . . Its task is to become a curative science.”59

4

The issues that I have been discussing are in many ways crystallized in Binswanger’s case of “Ellen West.” This is a well-known but controversial case study published by Binswanger in 1945 of an intelligent, creative, idealistic, revolutionarily-minded Jewish woman suffering from anorexia, who, after two failed analyses and several suicide attempts, ended up in Binswanger’s care. By means of a “hermeneutic exegesis [of her life] on the ontic-anthropological level,” he ultimately diagnosed her as suffering an incurable sort of schizophrenia: basically, he thought that there were existentially irreconcilable rifts between her *Eigenwelt* and her *Mit- und Umwelten*. Her mortification of her body was an expression of this. Her dreams and desires were not rooted concretely. “Ellen’s being-beyond does not begin and end in being-in-the-world [but] in a return to Nothingness.”60 “Nowhere does her existence find a loving shelter, nor can it anywhere lay hold of its ground. This means that her existence is threatened by its own nothingness.”61 Her authentic self-realization thus required her corporeal de-realization. Binswanger thus consented to her leaving the sanatorium, fully confident—correctly, as it turned out—that her suicide was inevitable. And, indeed, she poisoned herself just days later. Binswanger infamously argued that this was an “authentic suicide,” that it was “the fulfillment of the life-meaning of this existence,”62 and he consequently regarded this case as methodologically important for understanding *Daseinsanalyse*.

Historically, though, this case has been the focus of a variety of criticisms, (albeit without access to original documentation), including malpractice,65 “psychic homicide,”64 misdiagnosis (concerning eating disorders),66 misogyny, and anti-Semitism.66 Such criticism has led some to suggest that *Daseinsanalyse* represents a kind of “therapeutic nihilism.”67 Recently available archival material has given rise to renewed scrutiny and criticism of the case.68 This exceeds the scope of the present essay. But what is germane is that in the 1950s Foucault endorsed Binswanger’s diagnosis, in both the Introduction to “Dream and Existence”—where, indeed, death and suicide form a *leitmotiv*—as well as in both editions of *Maladie mentale*. What are we to make of this?

We can relate this to the question of “the death of the subject.” While there is something like “the death of the subject” in Foucault’s archaeological
and genealogical works, that is just a mistaken view of the “bracketing out” of the subject. And this sort of “de-subjectivation” is geared toward the goal of a less “alienated” realization of subjectivity. There is something truly like “the death of the subject” in Foucault—but unexpectedly, it is in the earliest period, and it is manifested in the case of Ellen West. This shows simultaneously the radical nature but also the pitfalls of Binswanger’s project as phenomenological. The subject’s death—her suicide—is accepted as “authentic” and inevitable solely and precisely because of the inherent methodological limitations of the genetic phenomenological framework. Ellen West was aspiring to constitutive subjectivity—in an important sense she is “the subject”—but the structural obstacles of the modern world that underlay her alienation and oppression were beyond the ken of Binswanger’s perspective. The inauthenticity and impossibility of her existence are real enough, but a more radically “curative” view is possible through a more radically historical analysis. Taken naively, her case shows that subjectivity is a dream, and that “death is the absolute meaning of the dream.”

But a more complete transcendental analysis would show that we can wake up, surpass the primacy of the dream, and find real happiness in the order of expression by engaging subjectivity as “an ethical task and an historical necessity.” Unexpectedly, then, it is precisely through the archaeological and genealogical work that many have indicted in “the death of the subject” that Foucault may actually contribute something quite valuable to saving it.

NOTES

6. Ibid.
9. In the Jäsche Logic (1800) Kant summarizes “the field of philosophy in [the] cosmopolitan sense” in four questions: What can I know? [Was kann ich wissen?] What should I do? [Was soll ich tun?] What may I hope for? [Was darf ich hoffen?] What is a human being? [Was ist der Mensch?] Kant says that the first question is answered in metaphysics, the second in morals, the third in religion and the fourth in anthropology. But crucially, he adds that all of this can be included under anthropology because all of the questions “relate to anthropology.” Lectures on Logic, trans. and ed. J. M. Young (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 538.
10. See Foucault, Dits et écrits I, 22.
11. Ibid., 95.
13. See Foucault, Dits et écrits I, 21.
14. Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, 60.
15. Eribon, Michel Foucault, 45–46.
17. As Binswanger put it: “your essay is for me a life-historical-event, for I have lived through the time when the dream had the greatest difficulty securing its right to scientific investigation, whereas now it is virtually triumphant and existence in the sense of wakeful experience is already nearly disparaged.”

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19. The chronological order in which Foucault respectively composed this work and the Introduction to Binswanger’s article is not clear.
25. See Kant, “What is Enlightenment?”
27. “There is nothing particularly disturbing about the death of man. It is just a particular case—or if you like, one of the visible forms—of a much more general death. I do not mean by it the death of God, but that of the subject, of the Subject with a capital S, of the subject understood as the origin and foundation of knowledge, Freedom, Language, and History” (“La naissance d’un monde,” in *Dits et écrits i*, 816).
29. Ibid., 126–27, my emphasis.
30. Ibid., 125, my emphasis.
31. Ibid.
36. Foucault, *Dits et écrits i*, 95.
40. This is precisely the primary issue in Trần Đức Tháo’s work, *Phénomènologie et matérialisme dialectique* (Paris: Minh-Tân, 1951).
42. Ibid., 53.
43. Foucault, *Dits et écrits I*, 164.
45. Ibid., 68.
46. Ibid., 60–61.
49. Ibid., 69. For Binswanger, the aim of therapy is thus to establish new intersubjective bonds that overcome such “detachment from life” and thereby liberate the person from captivity in/by his subjective realm. The therapist is a link between individual idiosyncrasy and the shared intelligibility of the public world. Her task is to help free the patient “from out of blind isolation, out of the idios cosmos . . . thus from mere life in his body, his dreams, his private inclinations, his pride and his exuberance, and to illuminate and liberate him for the ability to share in the koinos cosmos, the life of genuine fellowshio (Koinoinia) or community” (“Über Psychotherapie” [1935], *Ausgewählte Werke*, 3:215f.).
50. Foucault, *Dits et écrits I*, 93.
52. A situation that mirrors the structure of Trân’s *Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism*.
54. Foucault, *Dits et écrits I*, 165.
56. Ibid. [l’homme fou ..l’homme vrai].
59. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History,” in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 156.
61. Ibid., 280.
62. Ibid., 295.
67. Lanzoni, *Bridging Phenomenology and the Clinic*, 267; cf. 271.
69. Foucault, *Dits et écrits I*, 123.
70. Ibid., 147.
71. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 2009 meeting of the Society for Existential and Phenomenological Theory and Culture, on a panel organized by Chloë Taylor and Bettina Bergo.