Deborah Tollefsen

Professor of Philosophy & Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Clement 319
Office Hours
By appointment
Deborah Tollefsen

About Professor Tollefsen

Professor Tollefsen (PhD, Ohio State University) joined the department in 2002. Prior to her PhD, she received a BA in philosophy from St. Anselm College and an MA in philosophy from the University of South Carolina. Her research and teaching interests include philosophy of mind, social epistemology, and social ontology. Her work has appeared in such journals as Episteme, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Philosophical Explorations, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences and on topics such a group testimony, collective moral responsibility, joint action, co-authorship, and group knowledge.

Recent Publications

Tollefsen, D. and Lucibella, C. 2019 Group Moral Knowledge. Routledge Handbook of Moral Epistemology, ed. by Zimmerman, Jones, and Timmons, pp. 440-453;

Tollefsen, D. 2019. Can groups assert that p? In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Edited by Sanford Goldberg.

Tollefsen, D. 2017. Epistemic reactive attitudes. American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (4): 353-366.

Tollefsen, D. 2017. French on Innocence Lost. In Reflections on Ethics and Responsibility, ed. Zachary Goldberg, Springer.

Deborah Tollefsen & Shaun Gallagher. 2017. We-narratives and the stability and depth of shared agency. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47(2), 95-110.

Shaun Gallagher & Deborah Tollefsen. 2017. Advancing the "we" through narrative. Topoi, 1-9.

Michael D. Burroughs & Deborah Tollefsen (2016). Learning to Listen: Epistemic Injustice and the Child. Episteme 13 (3):359-377.

Tollefsen, D. 2015. Groups as Agents, Polity Press.

Tollefsen, D., Kruez, R. & Dale, R. 2015. Flavors of togetherness: experimental philosophy and theories of joint action. In J. Knobe & S. Nichols, Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Oxford University Press: Oxford.